The increasing accumulation of spent nuclear fuel has raised interest in High-Level Waste (HLW) repositories. For example, Sweden is under construction of the KBS-3 repository. To ensure the safety of such HLW repository, various countries have been developing assessment models. In the Republic of Korea, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute has been developing on the AKRS model. However, traditional safety assessment models have not considered the fracture growth in the far-field host rock as a function of time. As repository safety assessments guarantee safety for million years, sustained stress naturally leads to the progressive growth of fractures as time goes on. Therefore, it becomes essential to account for fracture growth in the surrounding host rock. To address this, our study proposes a new coupling scheme between the Fracture growth model and the radionuclide transport model. That coupling scheme consists of the Cubic Law model as a fracture growth function and the GoldSim code which is a commercial software for radionuclide transport calculations. The model that adopting such fracture growth functions showed an increase of up to 15% in the release of radionuclide compared to traditional assessment models. our observations indicated that crack growth as a function of time led to an increase in hydraulic conductivity that allowed more radionuclide transport. Notably, these findings show the significance of adopting fracture growth models as a critical element in evaluating the safety of nuclear waste repositories.

The development of advanced nuclear facilities is progressing rapidly around the world. Newly designed facilities have differences in structure and operation from existing nuclear facilities, so Safeguards by Design (SBD), which applies safeguards at the design stage, is important. To this end, designers should consider the safeguardability of nuclear facilities when designing the system. Safeguardability represents a measure of the ease of safeguards, and representative evaluation methodologies are Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) and Safeguardability Check-List (SCL). Those two have limitations in the quantification of safeguardability. Accordingly, in this study, the Safeguardability Evaluation Method (SEM), which has clear evaluation criteria based on engineering formulas, was developed. Nuclear Material Accountancy (NMA), a key element of Safeguards, requires the Material Balance Area (MBA) of the target facility and performs Material Balance Evaluation (MBE) based on the quantitative evaluation of nuclear materials entering or leaving the MBA. In this study, about 10 factors related to NMA were developed, including MBA, Key Measurement Point (KMP), Uncertainty of a detector, Radiation signatures, and MUF (Material Unaccounted For). For example, one of the factors, MUF is used in MBA to determine diversion through analysis of unquantified nuclear materials and refers to the difference between Book Inventory and Physical Inventory, as well as errors occurring during the process in bulk facilities, errors in measurement, or intentional use of nuclear materials. This occurs in situations such as attempted diversion, and accurate MUF evaluation is essential for solid Safeguards implementation. MUF can be evaluated using the following formula (MUF=(PB+X-Y)-PE). The IAEA’s Safeguards achievement conditions (MUF < SQ) should be met. Considering this, MUF-related factors were developed as follows. (􀜵􀜧􀜯 = 1 − 􀯆􀯎􀮿 􀯌􀯊 ) In this way, about 10 factors were developed and described in the text. This factors is expected to serve as an important factor in evaluating the safeguardability of NMA, and in the future, safeguardability factors related to Containment & Surveillance (C&S) and Design Information Verification (DIV) will be additionally developed to conduct a comprehensive safeguardability evaluation of the target facility. This methodology can significantly enhance safeguardability during the design stage of nuclear facilities.

As the demand for nuclear power increases as a means to achieve carbon neutrality, concerns about nuclear proliferation have also grown. Consequently, significant researches have conducted to enhance nuclear non-proliferation resistance. Among these research, nuclear material attractiveness is a methodology used to evaluate how appealing a particular material is for potential use in nuclear weapons, based on the characteristics of that material. Existing nuclear material attractiveness assessments focused on materials like U, Pu, and TRU, which could be directly used in the production of nuclear weapons. However, these assessments did not consider how the properties of nuclear materials change throughout the nuclear fuel cycle, with each facility process. This study assumed a scenario of the nuclear fuel cycle of graphite reduction reactors and analyzed including enrichment facilities and PUREX. This study used the FOM (Figure-Of-Merit) method developed by LANL (Los Alamos National Laboratory) for evaluating the nuclear material attractiveness. The FOM formula consists of three parameters such as critical mass, heat content, and dose The critical mass of targe materials and the dose evaluation were conducted using the Monte Carlo N-Particle code. The heat content was calculated using the ORIGEN code embedded in the Scale code. In particular, if U-238 is dominant in the facility’s materials, such as mining and refining facilities, and critical mass evaluation is unpractical. Therefore, 1SQ (Significant Quantity) of that uranium was assumed as the critical mass value for the FOM evaluation, even though 1SQ is not identical to the critical mass As a result of this study, the attractiveness of Pu produced by PUREX among all nuclear fuel cycle facilities was 2.7616, which was the most attractive to be diverted to nuclear weapons. Through this study, it was shown that the proliferation risk of the nuclear facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle and risk of diversion among those facilities.

Nuclear fusion energy is considered as a future energy source due to its higher power density and no emission of greenhouse gas. Therefore, various researches on nuclear fusion is being conducted. One of the key materials for the nuclear fusion research is tritium because the D-T reaction is the main reaction in the nuclear fusion system. However, that tritium can also be used for non-peaceful purposes such as hydrogen bombs. Therefore, it is necessary to establish the safeguards system for tritium. In that regards, this study analyzed the possibility of applying safeguards to tritium. To achieve this objective, the tritium production capacity through the light water reactor was analyzed. Tritium Production Burnable Absorber Rod (TPBAR) was modeled through the MCNP code, and tritium production was analyzed. The TPBAR is composed of a cylindrical tube with a double coating of aluminum and zirconium, filled with a sintered lithium aluminate (LiAlO2) pellet to prevent the release of tritium. Tritium is produced by the reaction of Li-6 in the TPBAR with neutrons, and it is extracted and stored at the Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF). As a result, the tritium production increased as the burnup and Li-6 mass increased. In addition, when the tritium produced in this way was transferred to TEF and extracted through the process, the application of safeguards measures was analyzed. To this end, various safeguards measures were devised, such as setting an Material Balance Area (MBA) for TEF and analyzing Material Balance Period (MBP). As there is no designated Significant Quantity (SQ) for tritium, cases were classified based on the type and form of nuclear weapons to estimate the Sigma MUF (Material Unaccounted For) of the TEF. Finally, the comprehensive application of safeguards to tritium was discussed. This research is expected to contribute to the establishment of IAEA safeguards standards related to tritium by applying the findings to actual facilities.

Milling facilities, which belong to the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle, are essential steps for utilizing uranium in nuclear power generation. These milling facilities currently provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with the location and annual production capacity of the facility through the Additional Protocol (AP, INFCIRC/540) and grant IAEA inspectors on-site sampling authority to apply safeguards to the facility. However, since milling facilities process a large amount of nuclear material and the product uranium ore concentrate (UOC) is bulk material, the absence of accounting for the facility could pose a potential risk of nuclear proliferation. Therefore, this study proposes technical approach that can be utilized for safeguards in milling facilities. Since the half-life of uranium isotopes is much longer than that of its daughter, they reach the secular equilibrium condition. However, after milling process, the fresh tailing showed the break of that secular equilibrium. As time goes on, they newly reach another secular equilibrium condition. Based on this observation, this study discussed the feasibility of the ratio method in safeguards purpose. The scenario applied in this study was 1% of uranium mill tailing. It was observed that the U-238/Th-234 and U- 238/Pa-234m ratios in fresh milling tails varied as a function of time after discharging, particularly during the first one year. This change can be worked as a significant signature in terms of safeguards. In conclusion, the ratio method in mill tails could be applicable for safeguards of nuclear milling facility.

The parent and daughter nuclides in a radioactive decay chain arrive at secular equilibrium once they have a large half-life difference. The characteristics of this equilibrium state can be used to estimate the production time of nuclear materials. In this study, a mathematical model and algorithm that can be applied to radio-chronometry using the radioactive equilibrium relationship were investigated, reviewed, and implemented. A Bateman equation that can analyze the decay of radioactive materials over time was used for the mathematical model. To obtain a differential-based solution of the Bateman equation, an algebraic numerical solution approach and two different matrix exponential functions (Moral and Levy) were implemented. The obtained result was compared with those of commonly used algorithms, such as the Chebyshev rational approximation method and WISE Uranium. The experimental analysis confirmed the similarity of the results. However, the Moral method led to an increasing calculation uncertainty once there was a branching decay, so this aspect must be improved. The time period corresponding to the production of nuclear materials or nuclear activity can be estimated using the proposed algorithm when uranium or its daughter nuclides are included in the target materials for nuclear forensics.

North Korea claimed to have tested a hydrogen bomb in its fourth nuclear test in 2016, and declared that the hydrogen bomb was completed after the sixth nuclear test in 2017. North Korea’s operation of Yongbyon Graphite-moderated reactor has been thought to be aimed at producing plutonium, but it has been strongly argued that the restart of the Graphite-moderated reactor is, indeed, aimed at supplying tritium recently. Tritium can be used not only to manufacture hydrogen bombs, but also to miniaturize nuclear weapons, making it as a key material for nuclear weapon capability. Since upgrading nuclear weapons and developing hydrogen bombs through the use of tritium by North Korea could pose a major threat to the security of the Korean Peninsula, it is important to accurately evaluate North Korea’s nuclear weapon capabilities through the analysis of nuclear material production scenarios based on its nuclear facilities. However, researches on North Korea’s nuclear materials such as HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) and Pu production has been actively conducted, while no research has been shown on tritium production yet. Therefore, this study aims to evaluate the tritium productivity based on the analysis of hypothetical nuclear material production facilities and possible tritium production scenarios. Basic research was conducted about the existing theoretical methodology for tritium production, the analysis of the global tritium production history, and the analysis of nuclear facilities. Based on this basic investigation, feasible tritium production scenarios were constructed. Subsequently, based on design criteria of an hypothetical Graphite-moderated reactor, possible tritium production scenario was modeled by applying the TPBAR (Tritium Production Burnable Absorber Rod). In addition, the factors such as 6Li concentration, design parameters, material compositions, and the number of TPBARs, which may affect tritium throughput were analyzed in terms of sensitivity study such that the maximum and minimum throughput can be predicted.

The present multidisciplinary study, which is a nexus of engineering and political science, investigates how the modernization of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNWs) affects the IAEA safeguards system based on the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons. To this end, this study examines the characteristics of modernized NSNWs using Monte Carlo techniques. The results thus obtained show that 10 kt NSNWs with a Circular Error Probability (CEP) of 10 m can destroy the target as effectively as a 500 kt weapon with a CEP of 100 m. The IAEA safeguards system shows that the Significant Quantity (SQ) of 1 of plutonium is 8 kg, a parameter that was established when strategic nuclear weapons were dominant. However, the results of this study indicate that in recent years, low-yield nuclear weapons such as NSNWs have been more strategically interesting than strategic nuclear weapons as NSNWs require less plutonium than strategic nuclear weapons. Therefore, we would like to conclude that reducing the SQ of plutonium can result in more robust safeguards and non-proliferation strategies.

Porcine parvovirus (PPV), a member of the genus Parvovirus, family Parvoviridae, is a significant causative agent in porcine reproductive failure, causing serious economic losses in the swine industry. PPV is a non-enveloped virus and its capsid is assembled from three viral proteins (VP1, VP2, and VP3). The major capsid protein, VP2 is the main target for neutralizing antibodies in PPV. When VP2 was expressed in large amounts, it assembled into virus-like particles (VLPs) similar in size and morphology to the original virions. In this study, we generated the recombinant Bombyx mori nucleopolyhedrovirus (BmNPV) to express the VP2 protein. Expression of the VP2 protein was analyzed by SDS-PAGE and Western blot. The recombinant VP2 protein of approximately 64 kDa was detected by both analyses. The formation of VLP by recombinant VP2 was confirmed through transmission electron microscopy examination. The purified VP2 protein assembled into spherical particles with diameters ranging from 20 to 22 nm.

The bulb mite (Rhizoglyphus echinopus) damages garlic, shallot and onion in the bulbs, corms and tubers. It has recently become a serious problem because of the continuous use of acaricides resulting in resistance among bulb mite population. Thus, there is need to find alternative control measures to suppress bulb mite population. Here, we report the screening result of pathogenic fungi for the control of R. echinopus. Initial screenings were performed using 352 isolates of entomopathogenic fungi from Korea soils. As results, 15 isolates of acaropathogenic fungi showed the pathogenicity to bulb mite supporting fungal conidiation. These isolates were identified as 3 isolates of Metarhizium flavoviride var. pemphigi and 12 isolates of Metarhizium pingshaense by microscopic examination and genetic sequencing of the ITS region and elongation factor-1 alpha. Selected 15 isolates were tested for their virulence against adult R. echinopus and the thermotolerance and the activity to UV-B irradiation of conidia. Additionally, the activities of chitinases and proteases produced by M. pingshaense were compared according to the medium. These acaropathogenic fungi would be considered promising for biological control of bulb mite.