An administrative agreement (AA) was signed between NSSC and UAE FANR in January 2023 under Article 5 of the ROK-UAE Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. The AA aims to enhance regulatory efficiency in safeguards and export control. This study reviewed the export control measures for the items subject to the agreement (ISA) and implementation procedures under ROK-UAE AA by comparing them with other countries cases. First of all, the ROK-UAE AA distinguishes between ISA and the inventory management target items. Technology is divided into two categories, one requiring consent for retransfer and the other, considering the characteristics of technology that is free to be copied and deleted, and thus less useful for inventory management. Only the former is included in the annual report, which differs from the ROK-Canada or ROK-Japan NCA, which includes all technologies subject to the agreements in the annual report. When ROK notifies export information, it is mandatory to specify whether the technology requires consent for retransfer. Furthermore, some technologies should be controlled as strategic information, even if excluded from the annual report, so efforts to prevent confusion are required. Secondly, the ROK-UAE AA covers all items in INFCIRC/254/rev.9/part1, unlike the ROK-U.S. and ROK-Canada NCA, which listed equipment subject to them. This is significant because it clarifies the criteria for regulation by increasing the consistency between the trigger list items in the domestic law and the ISA. However, the expanded ISA scope could result in some changes in export control procedures. For example, when importing nuclear material (NM) from the US, only uranium was controlled as ISA, and the packages were not considered. In contrast, when exporting fuel assemblies (FA) for UAE, both uranium and zirconium cladding should be treated as ISA. To this end, NEPS was improved to implement the features of the ROK-UAE AA. Consideration of the criteria and methods for imposing obligations under the agreement is essential because this is the first case of Korea concluded AA under exporting NPP and as a supplier of FA. Generally, the obligations for NM are imposed by the country of origin, conversion, and enrichment countries. Canada and EU recognize the fuel fabrication process as a substantial transformation and impose customs origin where the process takes place. Hence, NM fabricated from Canadian equipment is also subject to the same obligations as NM of Canadian origin. From this perspective, it would be appropriate to ensure ROK acts as a supplier and controls when exporting domestically manufactured FA. Moreover, a proper national obligation code system will be required to specify Korea’s control rights.

For the export of nuclear materials (NM), the NSG guidelines require governmental assurance from the importing State that the NM will be used for peaceful purposes, safeguards and physical protection will be applied, and prior consent will be obtained for retransfer. By providing this assurance, the importing State (recipient) is responsible for fulfilling the obligations required by the exporting States (supplier). If the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) has been concluded between the supplier and recipient, it may be replaced by implementing the procedures under the NCA. In the case of NM subject to this obligation, continuous management at the national level is required because prior consent from the supplier may be required for retransfer to a third party under the assurance or may be subject to annual reporting. The obligation swaps are the exchange of obligations of NM without the physical movement of it. Since the physical movement of NM is costly and risky, its obligations are often exchanged for commercial reasons. The basis for obligation swaps is the fungibility and equivalence of NM. The fungibility allows that the inventories of NM need not physically identify the particular NM originally obligated but identify an equivalent quantity of the same isotopic composition. In addition, under the principle of equivalence, even if NM loses its unique physical properties, it can be exchanged by another obligated or nonobligated NM. That is, the principles of equivalence and proportionality allow the comparison of quantities of uranium in different forms. Therefore, it is theoretically possible not only to exchange obligations between NM in same physical form, but also different physical forms of same composition (with the same enrichment), e.g., UO2 powder and its pellets. In U.S., it appears that there are obligation swaps of NM between different enrichment levels, but according to the NCA and its Administrative Arrangement between ROK and U.S., Canada and Australia, the principle of fungibility and equivalence shall not be used to reduce the quality of a quantity of NM. In other words, swaps between NM of different enrichment levels are not allowed under the NCA and AA. However, according to the Supplementary Arrangement between ROK and Canada, the replacement of NM by lower quality NM may only occur where the two States so decide following consultation. The U.S., Canada, and Australia, which are major suppliers of NMs, allow internal obligation swaps within the U.S. and the EU through NCA. The NCA between ROK and these countries does not address whether internal swaps are possible. Since governmental assurance does not impose restrictions on swaps, it can be considered if necessary. Although there is no actual practice of obligation swaps in ROK, research will be necessary regarding the extent to which swaps in ROK should be allowed and the need for government approval or permission.

A bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) should define what is subject to the agreement and when. Nuclear Materials (NM) are the subject of NCA with almost all countries, and the definition used in these agreements is borrowed from Article 20 of the IAEA Charter. The IAEA’s definition of NM as consisting of special fissionable material and source material and describes the types of material each contains. In order to control the export of NM under national laws and implement NCA, not only the types of NM but also quantitative criteria are required. This is because controlling small quantities of NM is impossible, unnecessary, and would create excessive administrative burdens. For this reason, the NSG guidelines establish a quantitative threshold of NM requiring control. Nevertheless, no quantitative thresholds have been agreed upon for NM subject to a NCA. Whether NM transferred is subject to the NCA is primarily a matter for the supplier states to determine. The supplier states make the decision based on quantitative criteria defined in their own export control laws. ROK identifies NM that require export licenses by reflecting the same criteria as the NSG guidelines in Foreign Trade Laws and its Notifications. Less than 500 kg of Natural Uranium, 1,000 kg of Depleted Uranium, 1,000 kg of Thorium, and 50 effective grams of special fissionable materials do not require an export license and is therefore not subject to NCA. In the US, the quantitative threshold for requiring an export license is different from that of ROK. For example, special fissionable materials that are not Pu are required if the individual shipment exceed 1 effective gram or 100 effective grams per year. The difference in the quantitative thresholds for NM between the two countries mean that the same item may be subject to NCA under US standards, but not under ROK’s. For example, the export of 8 grams of highly enriched uranium (93%) contained in a neutron detector would not be subject to the NCA in ROK, but would be considered NM subject to a NCA and required a special license in the US. Of course, in order to ensure the application of safeguards and physical protection to all NM transferred between the two countries, the agreement may not include a quantitative threshold for NM. However, the absence of such a threshold can lead to different conclusions by the two countries on the same item and make it challenging to control retransfers. The definition of quantitative standards will be necessary in the supplementary administrative arrangement for the practical control and management of NM subject to the NCA.

When exporting nuclear power plants to a third country, the U.S. conditions import countries to join the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol. At the Korea-U.S. summit, Korea also agreed to maintain equal non-proliferation standards. This paper first analyzes how the U.S. applies the conditions for joining additional protocols to export control policies. The U.S. Atomic Energy Act is a general law in the field of nuclear power that governs both civilian and military use of nuclear power. Article 123 stipulates matters related to “cooperation with other countries.” According to Article 123, the United States must conclude a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with another country that stipulates nuclear non-proliferation obligations for nuclear cooperation to a “significant” extent. Article 123 of the Nuclear Energy Act presents nine conditions for signing the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, and matters related to safeguards are stipulated in Nos. 1 and 2, and only IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) is specified as requirements under the current law. As a result of analyzing the countries of the nuclear cooperation agreements currently signed by the United States, the United States is evaluating the AP in terms of the policy as an essential item. Among the nuclear agreements with the United States, three countries, Egypt, Brazil, and Argentina do not have AP in effect. Among them, Brazil and Argentina are recognized by the IAEA as replacing the ABACC with the AP, so only Egypt is not a member of the AP. The nuclear agreement between the U.S. and Egypt was signed in 1981 before the AP existed, and all recently signed agreements were identified as AP-effective countries. As a result of reviewing the U.S. export control laws, the U.S. did not legislate the AP as a condition for peaceful nuclear exports. Reflecting the NSG export control guidelines, AP was legislated as an export license requirement only in exporting sensitive nuclear technology (enrichment, reprocessing). However, it is confirmed that the U.S. policy applies AP entry into force as one of the main requirements for determining whether it is harmful to nuclear exports, along with the conclusion of the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, the application of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and military alliance. The appropriate scope of application of the Additional Protocol in Korea and its application plan will be suggested through future research.

In 2004, in order to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the European Union (EU) came into force with Regulation 428/2009 for the export control of dual-use items, which has been working to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). In August 2021, it amended the EU 821/2021 to include mandating the introduction of ICPs for exporters in the member countries in order to strengthen controls over the transfer of tangible and intangible technologies. The main contents are as follows; 1) Mandatory introduction of Internal Compliance Program (ICP): Exporters within the EU countries should introduce a transaction review procedure through the ICP in consideration of their size and organization. 2) Export control on Cyber Surveillance Items to protect human rights: In order to protect human rights and comply with the obligations of international human rights law, EU countries should implement export controls on cyber-monitoring items exported from customs zones in the EU. Cyber surveillance items are specially designed to monitor, extract, collect or analyze data such as biometrics through intrusion of information and communication systems or deep packet hijacking. However, items used for purely commercial programs such as billing, marketing, quality service, user satisfaction or network security are excluded. 3) Expansion of the Catch-all system: EU countries should utilize the catch-all system to strengthen export controls on cyber-monitoring items, including dual-use items. 4) Strengthening control over the cloud: Exporters and EU countries should extend the scope of intangible technology transfer, such as electronic media, fax, and telephone, outside the EU’s customs territory, and apply export control regulations such as general or comprehensive licenses to cloud transmissions outside the EU territory. 5) Introduction of large-scale project authorization: To reduce the administrative burden on enterprises (especially small and medium-sized enterprises) and authorities when exporters with individual or collective licenses export to one or more specific end-users for the purpose of large scale projects, provided that they ensure the implementation of an appropriate level of export controls; EU countries may introduce large-scale project license systems in the form of general authorization. Recently, there is a possibility that the ROK would export its nuclear technologies including APR1400 to the EU member countries in the midst of the EU adoption of carbon-zero policy. In this paper, we have analyzed the EU export control regulations and suggested the future direction of nuclear export control programs in the ROK.

In August 2021, in response to the rapidly changing trade environment, including the advancement of Information Communication Technology (ICT) and its services, the European Union (EU) implemented the Dual-Use Items Control Regulation 821/2021 to introduce an Internal Compliance Program (ICP) to the EU countries. Accordingly, the exporters should comply with the regulation to strengthen their transactions review systems. Sweden, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom have implemented ICPs and outreach activities for dual use items. In particular, France explicitly stipulates the introduction of ICP in the law to manage and supervise it. While Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom strengthen the supervisory authority of regulatory agencies then companies are encouraged to autonomously introduce ICPs. Before introducing the ICP for the trigger list items (the items) to the Republic of Korea (ROK), a comprehensive export license system for them should be firstly considered based on EU Regulations. Also the comprehensive export license might be implemented by expanding the subject for the existing license on technology export of nuclear plant into the items. The ROK does not introduce an ICP as it does not recognize a self-classification on the items in accordance with the nuclear export control law. However, in preparation for the export to the EU countries that have intentions to introduce nuclear plants, it is necessary to analyze the export control programs of Sweden, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. Like the programs of Sweden, Germany and the United Kingdom, the EU regulations might be adopted to reduce the regulation burden in the ROK. With the reference of Sweden, the authority could support the Export Control Manager Certification (ECMC) system accredited by civil association then its outreach activities could be diverse and extended. Basically, the ECMC system could consist of Part I, II, III and IV and an applicant could be accredited by a civil association as the ECM after completing the courses of Part I and II. The ECMC courses might be as follow; 1) Part I: the Basic common course for beginner 2) Part II: the National export control system for the items 3) Part III: the International export control regulations 4) Part IV: Re-Certification within the certain period In this paper, we analyzed the export control programs in Sweden, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom and suggested the ECMC system that might be applied to the ROK as above.

Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control (KINAC) Safeguards division and Export control division operate regulation management system each other according to their work scope and characteristics. Korea Safeguards Information System (KSIS) of Safeguards division handles information for nuclear material accounting and control. Especially, accounting and declaration reports submitted to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are important information in this system. And Nuclear Import and Export Control System (NEPS) of Export control division deals with import and export information of nuclear materials and nuclear weapon trigger list items. Establishing and operating the integrated database as sharing information between KSIS and NEPS derive merits as follows. First, the full cycle of nuclear material transfer records can be managed by collecting information on the nuclear materials from import to export or disposal. In addition, regulatory body can verify inconsistency between transfer records and account records in date, location, element, mass etc. Especially, small quantity nuclear materials are major loop hole in nuclear material accountancy system. The accumulated material transfer data will give an evidence to catch loss nuclear material. Second, sharing the information on nuclear fuel cycle related research and development activities in both divisions can utilize the information to outreach on facility subject to nuclear technology transfer for Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and additional protocol declaration for Safeguards Agreement with IAEA. Third, regulatory body is easily able to manage entire import and IAEA report procedure for items subject to the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA). In present, KINAC regulation on NCA is divided to Export control and Safeguards. Export control division conducts classification imported items subject to NCA and acquires prior consent or notifies to other country. And Safeguards division report inventory list for each NCA country to the ROK government once a year. Imported NCA inventory list will be generated automatically by merging database. Then, it can be easily verified without any additional process by both divisions.

With the rapid improvement of hardware and software-related IT technology, applying A.I. to the private and public sectors, such as the Food Poisoning Prevention Program in Nevada and Smart City based on big data in Boston, is steadily increasing. However, the cases of application to the regulation sector of government are still insufficient. The Korea Institute of Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) is studying to apply A.I. technology to the regulation to improve the objectivity, consistency, and efficiency of classification and export licensing review. The KINAC developed the Nation Nuclear Technology Information Collection and Analysis System using A.I. techniques such as machine learning and deep learning techniques. KINAC and FNC Technology are developing the Export Risk Assessment System using A.I. modules and Bayesian Networks. The KINAC and Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) are developing an inventory history management system subject to the Nuclear Cooperation Agreements. The Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) and KINAC operate the Nuclear Import and Export Control System (NEPS) for application and export license review according to relevant laws such as the Foreign Trade Act. Therefore, preparing an integration plan for the existing NEPS and the new systems is necessary. Since the NEPS has to be operated and accessible at all times, so the stability of the NEPS is the most important when integration and linking. So, it is suggested that the Collection and Analysis System and the Risk Assessment System, which require a lot of data traffic, are configured in a server separate from the NEPS, and the new DB and the NEPS DB are only linked. An inventory history management system is also suggested to be integrated and configured into the NEPS. Third, it is recommended that each system lists the information provided to or received from the NEPS in advance, and one-way communication should be performed basically. Two-way communication should be performed when necessary. Finally, against various cyber accidents and information leakage, it is proposed to review security vulnerabilities and apply essential security measures and guidelines. Through the integration and linkage of these systems, it is expected that the objectivity, consistency, and efficiency of classification and export licensing review of the KINAC are strengthened, and national transparency of development, production, and use of nuclear material is enhanced. It can be satisfied with the increasingly strengthened demands of the international community on duty for strategic item management.

After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia continued to deploy military forces and equipment near the Ukrainian border in March and October of 2021, heightening the international crisis. On February 24, 2022, Russia began its full-scale invasion of Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, with missiles and ground forces. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was accompanied by an urgent speech by Russian President Vladimir Putin on the day he would conduct a special military operation in Ukraine. Putin warned that Russia would seek to demilitarize Ukraine and retaliate immediately if foreign interference occurred. In particular, he stated that the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and exploitation of Ukrainian territory was unacceptable. Due to the current Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States has updated export controls and sanctions as of March 15. Extensive US export controls and sanctions recently imposed on some areas of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine have included industries such as defense, aerospace, energy, and finance. Executive Order EO14065 is issued to ban transactions with specific individuals and entities, including financial institutions. Additionally, Executive Order EO14066 has banned US imports of Russian oil, natural gas, and coal and new investments in the Russian energy sector. The EAR was revised to strengthen export controls on Russia and Belarus. The sanctions imposed include 48 major defense companies, 328 personnel, and the CEO of Sberbank, which produced weapons used in the attack on Ukraine. Companies are listed on the Sectoral Sanctions Identification (SSI) List, and individuals are listed on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List. Sanctions such as asset freezing and a ban on all financial transactions with Americans apply. In line with the international trend, Korea also declared its participation in sanctions against Russia. As of March 25, 2022, export controls have been strengthened by newly established items subject to catchall licenses related to Russia and Belarus. Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE) added Fifty-seven items to Annex 2-2 in the Notification of Export and Import of Strategic Items. Most of these sanctions are for dual-use items under the jurisdiction of MOTIE. However, as countries, organizations, and individuals who may be subject to catch-all licenses are included in the sanctions list, Nuclear Safety and Security Commission should also review catch-all licenses for Trigger List Items. These sanctions are expected to last for some time. Even though China and Russia are the Nuclear Weapon States, the US has strengthened export controls. This is likely due to the opacity of China and Russia’s export controls system and the lack of active implementation of UN Security Council sanctions. However, there is an aspect of protecting their technology. It seems that Korea should also pay attention to these changes in international trends and keep pace with the level of control in other countries.

Japan has argued that its recently introduced export control measures toward the Republic of Korea (ROK) are consistent with relevant international guidelines. The ROK has rejected this view and claims that Japan’s measures are inconsistent with World Trade Organization (WTO) law. If a WTO Panel is established to adjudicate this matter, the national security exception clause, specifically Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994), is likely to be invoked. Russia–Measures concerning Traffic in Transit is one of the few cases in which a WTO Panel has rendered a decision on this article. In general, the doctrine of precedents does not strictly apply; however, it hints that the Panel may require objective arguments to be provided despite the clause’s “self-judging” nature. On its face, Japan appears to have a stronger case, but the Panel would nonetheless be required to make a difficult decision.

For replacement of methyl bromide(MB) in Korea, VapormateTM, a gas formulation of ethyl formate(EF) with carbon dioxide, are firslty introduced in import bananas and VivakilTM, a gas formulation of phosphine(PH3) with carbon dioxide, are ready to commercial use in export cut flowers. Their applications are being extended for other import and export commodities. Ethyl formate have been shown to have effectiveness short exposure time(<4hr) but it has a limited application at low temperature for TSM(Two spotted spider mites) due to some phytotoxic to strawberry. Phosphine gas has demonstrated their efficacy to TSM at low temperature but only meets quarantine requirement when applying longer fumigation time(>24hr) to control CA(cotton aphids). We firstly evaluated two MB alternatives, EF and PH3, have enhansive effect within short exposure time(4hr) at low temperature(5℃) for controlling both TSM and CA without any injury to export strawberries.