The Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) conducts various outreach activities, such as publishing brochures and holding seminars and briefings, to make regulated parties aware of the importance and necessity of the export control regime. The outreach program aims to increase compliance rates by generating interest in the export control regime among recipients and to increase communication to support compliance. In order to explore the long-term development of outreach activities, we analyze how KINAC conducts outreach. KINAC conducts nuclear export control outreach to organizations that deal with trigger list items and related technologies. Educational institutions with nuclear energy-related departments, research institutes related to nuclear energy and materials, and industrial companies that handle equipment used in nuclear power plants or nuclear materials were selected for outreach. The outreach program provides information on the export control regime for trigger list items, the strategic technology control regime, and the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. KINAC’s outreach programs can be categorized into education, exhibition, and publication. In the education program, we hold workshops and seminars for industrial companies, with customized content that considers the items handled by companies and the nature of technology transfer. We provide training for educational and research institutions focused on conducting research tasks and projects and transferring technology accordingly. As a result of the education program, there is a regret that the education for SMEs and educational institutions is not directly linked to the implementation of nuclear export control. The exhibition program operated a booth at nuclear-related exhibitions at least once a year. The booth distributed brochures or publications on the export control regime, conducted surveys to investigate awareness of the regime and conducted on-site consultations. The exhibition program effectively increased the understanding of the export control regime among the general public and potential regulated parties. However, it was only sometimes linked to the actual implementation of nuclear export control. The publication program produced promotional materials for use at education and exhibitions, as well as guidance materials on new and revised regulations. It used the agency’s online media to provide information on new and revised export control legislation and related issues. As a result of the publication program, various existing publications explaining the export control regime were consolidated into a single publication, increasing the efficiency and satisfaction of outreach.

The Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) and the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) operate the Nuclear Export and Import Control System (NEPS), an online comprehensive export and import control management system to guide the domestic nuclear export and import control regime and efficiently process the application, processing, and issuance of various civil complaints required for compliance. This paper analyzes the results of NEPS functional improvements made in 2022. First, NSSC and KINAC launched a nuclear plant technology follow-up system. Since establishing the Nuclear Plant Technology Export License (Plant License) system in 2015, large-scale nuclear power plant projects with a large amount of technology transfer have been issued a Plant License, allowing them to transfer technology without a separate individual export license. The recipient of a Plant License is not required to obtain an additional export license but to follow up on the transferred technology, such as checking whether it is a strategic technology and reporting quarterly transfer details. A dedicated system has been established to facilitate the follow-up of plant license projects. That has improved work efficiency for both the regulated and the regulator. Second, we have improved the procedures for retrieving and supplementing civil petitions. We added a function allowing civil petitioners to directly retrieve a civil petition to cancel a previously filed civil petition or to revise it themselves. In addition, we improved the procedure for supplementing a civil petition by setting a supplementation deadline for a reviewer’s request to modify a civil petition and sending a reminder before the expiration of the supplementation deadline. That enhances the convenience of the complainant and the examiner. Finally, we have changed the numbering system for export and import control reviews. Previously, the application number was a 15-digit system with an 8-digit date and 7-digit serial number. We have simplified the number by changing the three unused digits in the serial number to a single symbol that separates the type of application. That made it possible to utilize the number for relevant searches in the future. Also, simplifying the number has improved the efficiency of applying, processing, and consulting for civil affairs. In the future, NSSC and KINAC will continue to upgrade NEPS and make various functional improvements, and there will be many changes in system operation through cloud transfer in a few years.

For the export of nuclear materials (NM), the NSG guidelines require governmental assurance from the importing State that the NM will be used for peaceful purposes, safeguards and physical protection will be applied, and prior consent will be obtained for retransfer. By providing this assurance, the importing State (recipient) is responsible for fulfilling the obligations required by the exporting States (supplier). If the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) has been concluded between the supplier and recipient, it may be replaced by implementing the procedures under the NCA. In the case of NM subject to this obligation, continuous management at the national level is required because prior consent from the supplier may be required for retransfer to a third party under the assurance or may be subject to annual reporting. The obligation swaps are the exchange of obligations of NM without the physical movement of it. Since the physical movement of NM is costly and risky, its obligations are often exchanged for commercial reasons. The basis for obligation swaps is the fungibility and equivalence of NM. The fungibility allows that the inventories of NM need not physically identify the particular NM originally obligated but identify an equivalent quantity of the same isotopic composition. In addition, under the principle of equivalence, even if NM loses its unique physical properties, it can be exchanged by another obligated or nonobligated NM. That is, the principles of equivalence and proportionality allow the comparison of quantities of uranium in different forms. Therefore, it is theoretically possible not only to exchange obligations between NM in same physical form, but also different physical forms of same composition (with the same enrichment), e.g., UO2 powder and its pellets. In U.S., it appears that there are obligation swaps of NM between different enrichment levels, but according to the NCA and its Administrative Arrangement between ROK and U.S., Canada and Australia, the principle of fungibility and equivalence shall not be used to reduce the quality of a quantity of NM. In other words, swaps between NM of different enrichment levels are not allowed under the NCA and AA. However, according to the Supplementary Arrangement between ROK and Canada, the replacement of NM by lower quality NM may only occur where the two States so decide following consultation. The U.S., Canada, and Australia, which are major suppliers of NMs, allow internal obligation swaps within the U.S. and the EU through NCA. The NCA between ROK and these countries does not address whether internal swaps are possible. Since governmental assurance does not impose restrictions on swaps, it can be considered if necessary. Although there is no actual practice of obligation swaps in ROK, research will be necessary regarding the extent to which swaps in ROK should be allowed and the need for government approval or permission.

The Internal Compliance Program (ICP) is a framework for promoting compliance with laws and regulations and minimizing violations. It aims to prevent law breaches, by raising awareness of the compliance within the organization, which leads to enhance the credibility of the organization, and to prepare for audits. From the perspective of nuclear export control, ICP can be used to verify the company’s credibility by following NSG Guidelines and is expected to contribute to preventing the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons in the international community. However, ICP system is not globally established, and the NSG does not provide official guidelines for ICP. Therefore, this study aims to analyze the “Good Practices for Internal Compliance Programs for Nuclear and Nuclear-Related Exports” provided by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to find ways to apply and activate ICPs for domestic exporters. The form of ICP could vary depending on company’s size and internal environments, but it should be organized as follows. First, an internal department should be established so as to implement the ICP, and an executive who has export control knowledge should be assigned as the Chief Export Control Officer (CECO). The CECO, establish and revise ICP operating procedures and manual, organize contact point to communicate internally and externally. Second, measures should be established minimize risks in the export process, including business development transaction screening, supply chain, research and development, human resource, and intangible technology transfer risks. Third, internal control system should be established for export control compliance. The CECO should conduct regular assessments to ensure compliance and strengthen the organization’s internal export compliance processes. Fourth, an export-related training program should be periodically conducted for employees. In addition, as soon as the CECO becomes aware of, CECO should review the matter, take corrective action, and report to the relevant national authorities, when a violation of domestic export control laws or suspicious circumstances are captured. Nuclear export control plays an important role in ensuring nuclear nonproliferation. Republic of Korea has been implementing the ICP system for Dual-Use Items under the Foreign Trade Act, but not for Trigger List Items. Therefore, introduction of ICP for Trigger List Items is expected significantly contribute to nuclear nonproliferation. The subjects of ICP will be initially targeted to major nuclear enterprises, then gradually expanded to all nuclear enterprises. Further researches are needed to introduce on ICP for Trigger List Items.

Acid rain due to air pollution has been believed to be harmful to vegetation and crops, either by direct deposition on the foliage or by indirect leaching of nutrients from the soil. This study was conducted to investigate physiological response and damage of soybean caused by acid rain in the glasshouse at the experimental station of Seoul National University. Soybean (Glycine max L.) cv. Sinpaldal was subjected to simulated acid rain (SAR) two times a week from R2 stage until its maturity. The pH values of SAR treatments were ranged from 2 to 5 together with tap water treatment (pH 7±0.2) as a control. The SAR was composed of H2SO4 and HNO3 at the ratio of 2:1 (v/v). SAR treatment at pH 2 caused clear visual damage on leaves and pods with severe chlorosis and necrosis even after the first SAR was applied, while those at pH greater than 3 showed no clear visual damage. Chlorophyll content (expressed as SPAD value) tended to decrease with decreasing pH with significant reduction at pH 2 as compared with pH values greater than 3. Photosynthesis also showed decrease with decreasing pH with significant reduction at pH 3 and 2. Soybean yield and its components were also affected by SAR treatment, particularly significant at pH 2.