우리나라에서는 우버 서비스가 허용되지 않고 있으나, 우버와 같은 공유경제에서 플랫폼의 알고리즘에 의해 가격이 책정되는 경우 언제든지 미국에서의 우버 담합 논의와 같은 문제가 제기될 수 있다. 공유경제 공급자들은 플랫폼으로부터 자유롭게 이탈할 수 있으므로 엄밀하게 말하면 알고리즘 담합 문제는 가격정보의 교환 문제로 볼 수 있다. 현행 우리나라 공정거래법에서는 가격정보의 교환과 같은 동조적 행위를 부당한 공동행위로 열거하고 있지 않으므로 가격정보의 교환은 부당하게 경쟁을 제한하는 행위에 대한 합의의 정황 증거가 될 뿐이다. 그러나 경쟁 제한적 정보교환 행위를 부당한 공동행위의 하나의 유형으로 포함 하는 공정거래법 개정안이 통과될 경우 알고리즘에 의한 가격정보의 교환이 부당한 공동행위가 될 가능성이 보다 커질 것이다. 공유경제 플랫폼으로서는 공급자에게 알고리즘에 의해 결정된 가격에 구속되지 않을 수 있는 권리를 주는 등 선제적 조치를 취할 필요가 있다. 공유경제 공급자와 플랫폼이 경제적으로 하나의 실체에 가깝다는 점에 주목하여 플랫폼과 공급자를 부당한 공동행위에 있어 서로 ‘다른’ 사업자로 볼 수 없다거나, 플랫폼과 공급자 사이 위험 공유의 정도가 높을수록 부당한 공동행위 인정기준을 완화하여야 한다는 주장이 있으나 모두 타당하지 않다. 경쟁법적 관점에서 공급자가 플랫폼에 종속되어 있다고 보기 어렵고, 담합이 문제되는 상황에서는 수요자가 피해를 볼 뿐 플랫폼 과 공급자들의 손익은 언제나 같은 방향으로 움직이기 때문이다.

This study is to develop a mathematical analysis model to grasp the behaviors of cartels. Cartels are formed tacitly and cause tremendous damage to consumers in modern society which is composed of advanced industry structure. The government authorities have instituted the leniency programs to respond cartels. However, cartels will continue unless there are legal sanctions against cartels based on an accurate analysis of leniency programs. The proposed cartel equilibrium analysis model is a mathematical behavior model which is based on the existing methods and the prison’s dilemma of game theory. Therefore, the model has a form of pay off matrix of two players. We use a iterated polymatrix approximation (IPA) method to deduct a Nash equilibrium point. The model is validated by an empirical analysis as well.

This study deals with construction contract bid-rigging by Japanese contractors who monopolized the construction market of the Korean Peninsula during the Japanese colonial rule, and investigates the abuses of the contract bid-rigging. First of all, construction contract bid-rigging in Korea was triggered by Japanese construction contractors and contract brokers, who had savored the benefits of bidrigging in Japan and had repeated the bid-rigging in Korea since 1903. Second, the agency played a significant role to mediate construction contractors, and existed throughout the Japanese colonial rule on the Korean Peninsula with changing their names. Most of them were engaged in major contract bid-rigging scandals. Among them was Construction Association of Korea, which existed for over 13 years. The agencies had took part in governmental services since the mid-1930s when Japan exploited Korean people during wartime, and focused on sweating human resources for the constructions. Third, one of the biggest construction bid-rigging scandals during the Japanese colonial rule was "the 1st and 2nd scandal on Daegu construction contract bid-rigging." Indeed, the second scandal paved the way for the serial scandals: "Kyeongseong construction contract bid-rigging scandal", "Busan construction contract bid-rigging scandal", and other cases throughout the nation. Fourth, along with the contract bid-rigging cases related to the Japanese Government-General of Korea and local authorities, bid-riggings firmly took rooted in local governments' farmland reclamation projects in the 1920s and the poor relief services in the 1930s. The "bid-rigging charges" forced contractors to compensate their losses with exploiting material costs and labor costs, generating serious problems. The construction contract bid-rigging enabled Japan to monopolize the construction industry and to sweat farmers on the Korean Peninsula. Against this backdrop, contract bid-rigging by Japanese construction contractors during the its colonization made Korean contractors ruled out, and helped Japanese monopolize the industry. A large amount of bid-rigging charges drove Japanese contractors to do fraudulent work with cheap materials and to exploit Korean labor force.