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        검색결과 4

        1.
        2023.11 구독 인증기관·개인회원 무료
        The objective of this study is to investigate the safety awareness and effectiveness of the education and training for employees engaged in radiological emergency organization of the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI). In 2022, the questionnaire for the education satisfaction survey was revised to regulary evaluate the effect of edcation on perceptions of importance on emergency preparedness for nuclear research facilities. In line with, a standard questionnaire was created which covers 3 factors and 9 attributes, and the evaluation indicatior is based on a 5-point Likert scale. In 2023, the education on radiological emergency preparedness was conducted for 235 emergency staff. From May 24 to July 13, 2023, data was collected from a total of 235 emergency response personnels, including 28 new staffs and 207 maintenance staffs. Aa a result of response analysis, it was identified that education for radiological emergency response had a significant correlation with the promoting safety culture. It was found that senior emergency personnel with more years of experience are highly interested in radioactive disaster prevention and actively participate in and training. On the other hand, it was presented that new and less experienced groups tend to have a relatively high scored of the risk perception of nuclear research facilitites. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the practical curriculum in order to increase the participation of junior disaster prevention personnel in education and training, ensuring that they correctly recognize the risk of research facilities. This results are expected to be used to improve the quality of education and drills for radiological emergency response at KAERI.
        2.
        2023.11 구독 인증기관·개인회원 무료
        The nuclear licensee must ensure that the nuclear or radiological emergency preparedness and response organization is explicitly defined and staffed with adequate numbers of competent and assessed personnel for their roles. This paper describes the responsibilities of medical and support personnel for the medical action of casualties in the event of a radiological emergency at the KAERI. Currently, there is one medical personnel (nurse) in KAERI, and a total of eight medical support personnel are designated for medical response in the event of a radiological emergency. These medical support personnel are designated as one or two of the on-site response personnel at each nuclear facility, operating as a dedicated team of A, B (4 people each). In the event of a radiological emergency, not all medical support personnel are mobilized, but members of the dedicated medical team, which includes the medical support personnel of the nuclear facility where the accident has occurred, are summoned. Medical and support personnel will first gather in the onsite operational support center (OSC)/technical support center (TSC) to prepare and stand by for the medical response to injured when a radiological emergency is declared. They should take radiation protective measures, such as wearing radiation protective clothing and dosimeters, before entering the onsite of a radiological emergency, because injuries sustained during a radiological emergency may be associated with radioactive contamination. In the event of an injury, direct medical treatment such as checking the patient’s vitals, first aid, and decontamination will be carried out by medical personnel, while support personnel are mainly responsible for contacting the transfer hospital, reporting the patient’s condition, accompanying the ambulance, filling out the emergency medical treatment record, and supporting medical personnel. In order to respond appropriately to the occurrence of injuries, we regularly conduct emergency medical supplies education and medical training for medical support personnel to strengthen their capabilities.
        3.
        2023.05 구독 인증기관·개인회원 무료
        In response to a regulatory mandate, all nuclear licensees are obligated to establish an information system that can provide essential information in the event of a radiation emergency by connecting the monitoring data of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) or equivalent system to the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS). Responding to this responsibility, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has established the Safety Information Transmission System (SITS), which enables the collection and real-time monitoring of safety information. The KAERI monitors and collects safety information, which includes data from the HANARO Operation Work Station (OWS) and the HANARO & HANARO Fuel Fabrication Plant (HFFP) Radioactivity Monitoring System (RMS), and the Environmental Radiation Monitoring System (ERMS) & meteorological data. Currently, the transmission of this safety information to the AtomCARE server of the KINS takes place via the SITS server located in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). However, the multi-path of transmission through SITS has caused problems such as an increase in data transmission interruptions and errors, as well as delays in identifying the cause and implementing system recovery measures. To address these issues, a new VPN is currently being constructed on the servers of nuclear facilities that generate and manage safety information to establish a direct transmission system of safety information from each nuclear facility to the AtomCARE server. The establishment of a direct transmission system that eliminates unnecessary transit steps is expected to result in stable information transmission and minimize the frequency of data transmission interruptions. As of the improvement progress, a security review was conducted in the second and third quarters of 2022 to evaluate the security of newly introduced VPNs to the nuclear facility server, and based on the results of the review, security measures were strengthened. In the fourth quarter of 2022, the development of a direct transmission system for safety information began, and it is scheduled to be completed by the fourth quarter of 2023. The project includes the construction of the transmission system, system inspection, and comprehensive data stability testing. Afterward, the existing SITS located in the EOF will be renamed as the Safety Information Display System (SIDS), and there are plans to remove any unused servers and VPNs.
        4.
        2022.05 구독 인증기관·개인회원 무료
        Once a radioactive material is released from the nuclear power plant (NPP) by accident, it is necessary to understand the behavior of radioactive plume to protect residents adequately. For this, it is essential to measure the radiation dose rate around NPPs at important locations. Our previous study developed a movable radiation detector that can be installed quickly in an accident to measure gamma dose rate in areas where environmental radiation monitoring system is not installed. The data measured by the detector are transmitted to the server in real-time through LoRA wireless communications. There are two methods to use LoRA communications; one is self-network, and the other is the network provided by the mobile carrier. A signal receiver, called a gateway, should be equipped near the installation location of radiation detectors to use a self-network without using the mobile carrier’s system. In other words, the movable radiation detectors we made can function if there should be any gateway near them. The distance capable of communication between gateway and detector is about 8 km in an open area without significant obstacles. Korea has many significant obstacles, such as mountains around most NPPs. Thus, the gateways could be installed in the proper position before the accident to operate the movable radiation detectors without problems. If the gateway is located at a high position like a mountain top, it could cover a wide area. In this study, the elevation database in the area around the NPPs was collected and analyzed to determine where gateways should be installed. The analysis range is limited in the urgent protective action planning zone. The optimization was also performed to minimize the number of gateways.