Nuclear safety, security, and safeguards (nuclear 3S) are essential components for establishing robust nuclear environments. Nuclear safety is to protect public and environments from radioactive contamination, which can be caused in accidents. Nuclear security is to protect nuclear facilities from terrorism or sabotage, which related to physical a ttacks or insider threats. And nuclear safeguards is to protect nuclear materials from extortion by a state with a purpose of weaponizing activities. When a new nuclear facility is introduced, it is possible to save abundant amount of resources by considering nuclear 3S in an early stage (design phases). Initially, the international atomic energy agency (IAEA) recommended safeguards-by-design (SBD) approach. The concept of SBD gradually expands to nuclear 3S-by-design (3SBD). Though there are differences in purpose and target subject, each nuclear ‘S’ is closely related with others. When introducing a certain technology or equipment in order to enhance one ‘S’, another ‘S’ also get affected. The effect can be synergies or conflicts. For instance, confidential information in nuclear security is required for a safeguards activity. On the contrary, inspection equipment for safeguards can be used for security. Pyroprocessing is a technology for managing used nuclear fuels. As pyroprocessing is a backend fuel cycle technology, a sensitive nuclear technology, safeguards has taken a large portion of nuclear 3S research in an effort to achieve international credibility and nuclear transparency. As mentioned, there are both synergies and conflicts in integrating nuclear 3S. In this study, we investigate potential challenges in applying nuclear 3S integration to pyroprocessing by addressing synergies and conflicts. This approach will suggest required supplementary methods to build the reliable pyroprocessing environment.

Domestic nuclear power plants have developed radiological emergency plans based on the USNRC’s NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-Rev.1 report and the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety’s (KINS) research report on radiation emergency criteria for power reactors (KINS/RR-12). NUREG-0654 is a US emergency planning guide for nuclear power plants and provides detailed technical requirements for the content of radiological emergency plans. The document classifies radiological emergencies into three levels: Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency, which correspond to the white, blue, and red emergency levels used in domestic nuclear power plants. KINS/RR-12 is a technical guidance document published by the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety in 2012, which divides radiological emergency criteria into criteria for pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and criteria for boiling water reactors (BWRs), and describes in detail the regulatory position and implementation of radiological emergency criteria for domestic PWRs and BWRs. The physical protection-related radiation emergency criteria included in the radiological emergency plan are specified in the radiological emergency criteria guidelines. There are two items each related to white and blue emergencies and one item related to red emergencies. Standard order of emergency plan lists the physical protection-related radiological emergency criteria for domestic PWRs and BWRs, which are identical according to the radiological emergency criteria guidelines. To enhance the physical protection regulation, the legal and regulatory basis for target set identification and vital area identification need to be established by considering radiological and physical protection emergency plan.

이 글의 목표는 원자력 안전규제의 ‘전문성과 독립성 조화의 관점’에서 원자력안전위원회를 구성·운영하는 것이 바람직하다는 점을 논증하는 것이다. 2018년 7월부터 4개월에 걸쳐 5명의 원자력안전위원회 위원들이 결격사유를 이유로 자진 사임한 사태에서 확인할 수 있듯이, 「원자 력안전위원회의 설치 및 운영에 관한 법률」 제10조(결격사유)는 원자력 안전위원회의 독립성을 확보하여 실효성 있는 안전규제를 실시하겠다는 애초의 취지와는 달리 위원회의 정상적인 운영 자체를 막고 있는 실정이다. 따라서 이제는 원자력 안전규제기관의 전문성이나 독립성의 일면만을 강조할 것이 아니라, 전문성과 독립성의 관계를 어떻게 설정하는 것이 바람직 한지에 대해 성찰할 필요가 있다. 이를 위해 본 논문은 원자력 안전규제기관이 전문성과 독립성을 확보해 온 역사적인 맥락을 안전규제의 전문성과 독립성 조화의 관점에서 분석한다. 이 글에서 제시하는 원자력안전위원회의 핵심적인 향후 과제는 안전규제의 전문성과 독립성 조화의 원칙을 실행하는 차원에서 위원의 결격 사유를 적정화하는 동시에 이해충돌방지의무 규정을 강화하고, 기술적 전문가를 포함한 구성원의 다양성을 확보하는 것이다. 그리고 원자력안전위원회의 실질적 독립성을 확보하기 위해 위원회를 대통령 직속 기구로 승격 하고, 상임위원의 인원을 확대하는 방향으로 나아갈 것을 제안한다.