The KINAC resident inspectors are responsible for conducting on-site regulatory and intergovernmental support tasks related to safeguards, physical protection, and cybersecurity in each NSSC regional office. In nuclear material accounting and control, resident inspectors primarily perform tasks such as national inspections and technical support for IAEA inspections. However, with the increasing cases of non-compliance with the advance notification procedure by operators, there is a growing need for improvement in the role of resident inspectors in on-site regulation. In response to this situation, the safeguards division in KINAC has analyzed and improved the on-site check procedures of resident inspectors at LWR facilities. The existing procedure outlines the process where resident inspectors receive the advance notification documents submitted by operators and utilize them as a reference for conducting weekly checks during the overhaul period when IAEA surveillance cameras are installed. Additionally, according to the attached forms specified in the procedure, resident inspectors are required to submit the check results report to the director of the safeguards division in KINAC every week and to the NSSC every month. The inspection items include checking the execution and changes of advance notification, verifying unnotified matters, discussing other issues, assessing the integrity of things such as the operational status of IAEA surveillance equipment, and so on. On April 13-14, 2023, the Safeguards division organized a two-day resident inspector’s work-sharing workshop to discuss improvements in the on-site check procedures of resident inspectors at LWR facilities. During the workshop, a comparison and analysis were conducted between the existing procedures and actual on-site activities. Unnecessary tasks such as advance notification document reception and monthly reporting were eliminated, and the focus was shifted towards emphasizing essential tasks. The opinions of resident inspectors were taken into account to derive directions for improvement. The existing procedure was applicable only during Overhaul periods for resident inspectors. It has been improved by removing this limitation, allowing its use during routine times. Furthermore, the procedure has been enhanced by clarifying its purpose, scope, users, and definitions of terms and specifying responsibilities and authorities. Unnecessary terminology has been eliminated. Remarkably, the definition of advance notification has been detailed, and the reporting of check results has been simplified through weekly task reporting. The Safeguards division in KINAC has strived to enhance the efficiency and simplification of on-site regulatory activities for resident inspectors at LWR facilities by improving their on-site check procedures. These improvement activities are expected to aid resident inspectors in effectively performing a wide range of tasks, including safeguards, physical protection, cybersecurity, and government support. In the future, it will be possible to continue refining the on-site check procedures by sharing the results of using the procedure in meetings and gathering various opinions from resident inspectors.

Among the public notices of the NSSC, five notices related to safeguards, including “Education of Nuclear Control, International Regulatory Materials, Preparation of Regulation of NMAC (Nuclear Material Accounting and Control), the National Inspection of NMAC, and Reporting of International Regulatory Materials” The regulations on the National Inspection of NMAC have remained the same since some revisions were made on December 26, 2017, raising the need to revise the public notice due to changes in the domestic and international safeguards regulatory environment. Accordingly, this paper analyzes the public notice of the National Inspection of NMAC and proposes the revision direction. The regulation regarding the National Inspection of NMAC comprises sections such as Purpose and Definition, Types - Scope - Frequency of the National Inspection, Notification of the National Inspection’s plan, and Management of Violation. Appendices include the contents of the violation table, explanations regarding types of violations, and various forms related to the National Inspection, which are attached separately. IAEA mentioned that ROK was selected as a pilot country for the Improved SLA (State-Level Approach) project starting in November 2020. IAEA explained that a quantitative and standardized methodology was adopted and developed for this purpose. As a result, the Unannounced Inspection at LWR facilities will transition to the Random Interim Inspection. Additionally, the Physical Inventory Verification in CANDU facilities will increase to once a year per reactor. This status will change the frequency and intensity of inspection at domestic nuclear facilities. Furthermore, domestically, there is an ongoing trend of continuous growth and diversification of nuclear facilities. In light of the changing domestic and international safeguards environment, it is necessary to set a direction for revising the regulation regarding the National Inspection of NMAC that was partially amended in 2017 to align with the current status. Firstly, due to the increased burden on operators resulting from the increased number of IAEA inspections following the application of Improved SLA, there is a need to streamline the National Inspection of NMAC frequency to enhance overall regulatory efficiency. Furthermore, the definition section should also be revised to include matters related to the regulation to reflect the current reality accurately. Considering the operation and name changes of new domestic nuclear facilities, there may be a need to add or modify computer input codes. While pursuing the revision of regulations regarding the National Inspection of NMAC, an analysis of the need for revision of other regulations related to safeguards should also be conducted, and directions should be set. Through this process, improving the regulatory framework that forms the basis of safeguards can help prevent confusion among operators and promote regulatory efficiency. We can better cope with these changes by proactively adapting to the rapidly changing domestic and international nuclear environment.

Uranium extraction from seawater has been a topic of considerable interest over the past decades. However, Commercial facilities for uranium extraction from seawater have not yet been constructed due to its lack of economic feasibility. With the increasing demand for sustainable energy sources, there is a growing interest in eco-friendly uranium extraction methods. Despite this, the safeguards associated with these extraction techniques remain relatively under-researched, necessitating comprehensive studies that address both the economic feasibility and safeguards approach. The Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Central Research Institute is poised to elucidate the economic value of uranium extraction from seawater and embark on research to extract Yellow Cake from seawater on a laboratory scale. Given these advancements, it becomes imperative to consider the approach to safeguards. In this study, a comprehensive review was conducted to understand the relevant regulations that encompass both international obligations in partnership with the IAEA and domestic guidelines, specifically the Nuclear Safety Act. Emphasis was placed on a detailed examination of the IAEA’s comprehensive safeguards agreement and its additional protocol, focusing on deriving the necessary regulatory timings, subjects, and methodologies for effective reporting and verification. We reviewed the safeguards guidelines and the IAEA policy to confirm the international non-proliferation obligations. The study also reviewed the impact of the State-Level Approach promoted by the IAEA and its implications on state-specific factors and evaluations of state technological advancement. Additionally, the regulatory aspects of extracted uranium as an internationally regulated material under the Nuclear Safety Act were critically assessed. In conclusion, this study explains the international and domestic regulatory considerations for uranium extraction from seawater. Ultimately, this study will provide valuable understanding for policymakers, researchers, and practitioners involved in uranium extraction from seawater. Additionally, we expect that this study will contribute to establishing the safeguards approach and regulatory framework for the commercialization of uranium extraction from seawater in the ROK.

The purpose of this study is to detect future signals and changes in nuclear-related research to apply safeguards by design to new nuclear facilities or to determine nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development (R&D) activities. First, a total of 2,029 scientific articles published between 2015 and 2022 in the journal of “Nuclear Engineering and Technology” by the Korean Nuclear Society were collected. The authors of the scientific article used their expertise and knowledge to select keywords that can properly represent the article. Therefore, in this study, the keywords of each scientific article were analyzed using the technique of text mining. We then calculated the “word frequency” and “term frequency-inverse document (TF-IDF)” values of the keywords. Consequently, significant words such as “reactor,” “nuclear,” and “fuel” were extracted, which were represented as word clouds. Furthermore, keywords extracted through text mining were quantitatively classified into weak or strong signals using a keyword emergence map (KEM). The KEM is a tool that can explore future signals because essential keywords have a high frequency of appearance, and newer keywords are more important than older keywords. The KEM results showed no keywords in the strong-signal area in the field of nuclear academia. However, keywords such as “deep learning,” “earthquake,” “zircaloy,” and “CFD” were confirmed to be distributed in the weak signal area. A weak signal indicates the most probable topic that could become a strong signal in the near future. The weak signal methodology can be applied to predict future nuclear scientific trends in the rapidly changing world. Based on the results of the study, changes in the subject of nuclear-related scientific articles over the past eight years and future signals were interpreted. The results confirmed that this method can be applied to safeguards measures of new nuclear facilities in the design stage and can be used to detect R&D activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle in advance.

According to the ROK-IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), the ROK submits inventory change reports (ICRs), physical inventory lists (PILs), and material balance reports (MBRs). Suppose inventory changes occur in each material balance area (MBA). In that case, the facility operators prepare ICRs monthly, conduct physical inventory taking (PIT) every 12 to 18 months, and submit PILs and MBRs to KINAC. KINAC reviews ICR presented by the facility operators, submits it to the IAEA, and reports it to the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC). Various methods have been prepared and implemented to minimize errors in reviewing the accounting reports submitted by the facility operators. Accordingly, this paper analyzes the mistakes in the accounting reports that occurred over the past two years and proposed methods to improve them. The basis for carrying out the accounting reports is stipulated mainly in the CSA and the Nuclear Safety Act. First, Article 63 of the CSA describes the rationale for submitting the accounting reports, and the details are described in detail in the subsidiary arrangement. Article 98 of the Nuclear Safety Act stipulates information related to accounting reports, and details are described in the regulations on reporting internationally regulated materials, etc., of the NSSC Notice No. 2017-84. Among the accounting reports submitted in 2021, a total of 36 errors were confirmed. There were ten errors related to inventory changes, followed by six errors in the material balance period (MBP) in the header information. There were four cases of spacing, weight mismatch, and overdue errors, and the rest were related to grammar errors. There were a total of 30 errors in the accounting reports identified in 2022. MBP errors of header information, which occurred the second most in 2021, was the highest with nine, followed by six inventory change errors and five weight mismatch and overdue errors, respectively. Compared to 2021, the total number of errors has decreased by about six, which is interpreted as the result of outreach activities through accounting reporting workshops and nuclear control education conducted by KINAC. Accounting reporting is the most critical part of the Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NMAC) system. Efforts to check errors in accounting reports and improve report quality through outreach activities could be confirmed by the statistics of the two years analyzed earlier. In the future, if the reporting program used by the facility operators is improved to minimize errors and manage the accounting reporting system through continuous maintenance work, the quality of the accounting reports will be upgraded to the next level.

KINAC began dispatching the resident inspector in 2012 to strengthen on-site Wolsong nuclear power plants (NPPs) regulations. The dispatched resident inspector is a member of the regional office of the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) and is in charge of technical support, on-site regulation of safeguards, and physical protection for the Wolsong regional office of NSSC. As the number of nuclear facilities in the ROK increased, the resident inspectors began to be dispatched to other regional offices. The resident inspectors were assigned to Hanul in November 2015, Kori in March 2017, Hanbit in March 2015, Saeul in March 2022, and Wolsong in March 2023. Accordingly, this paper intends to reflect on the increasing role of resident inspectors and predict on-site regulatory work in the field of nuclear control. The role of the resident inspectors is described in detail in the internal regulations of KINAC. Among the tasks in the common field is technical support at regional offices for the most critical areas of nuclear control implementation, and on-site verification of the matters requested by the director of each implementation division shall be carried out. Tasks in the field of safeguards include an on-site check of facility regulation review, implementation of national inspections, technical support for IAEA inspections, and information management. Among them, technical support work for Unannounced inspections should be the top priority. These days, in particular, the importance of reviewing the results of checking advanced information and containment and surveillance equipment by facility operators is emerging. Among the tasks performed by the resident inspectors, more than 80% of the functions related to physical protection account for. The resident inspectors check the status of the physical protection system by weekly/monthly/quarter, implement physical protection regulation review and inspection, conduct exercise evaluation, and perform technical support for special assessments. Recently, regulatory activities related to radioactive terrorism and the emergence of illegal drones have been strengthened. In the field of cybersecurity, where its role has recently been increasing, the resident inspectors are performing basic field regulation tasks. Similar to the area of physical protection, the resident inspectors check the cybersecurity system for weekly, monthly, and quarterly readiness, and on-site inspections of cybersecurity review and inspection technical support, exercise evaluation, and other requests are mainly performed. The role of the resident inspectors is expected to expand further in the future due to the increase in terrorist risks at home and abroad and changes in the regulatory environment. However, there is a limit to performing an increasing number of tasks, with the human resources of the resident inspectors limited to one to two for each site. If the resident inspectors are dispatched for each field of safety measures, physical protection, and cybersecurity, they can perform their duties more efficiently, but problems may arise in the operation of our personnel. Therefore, the proper and precise allocation of work while maintaining the current system is an essential part. The roles and prospects of the resident inspectors analyzed in this paper can be used to deploy the headquarters and field regulation personnel and set the direction of work in the future.

Since 2015, the IAEA has been implementing inspections by changing the paradigm from a nuclear facility level perspective to state level approach in order to enhance effectiveness/efficiency, and random inspections have become a major means of paradigm conversion. From this point of view, Safeguards Division analyzed the implementation status of random inspection conducted in ROK over the past five years by type, facility, and year, and predict the future implementation direction. A total of 106 random inspections have been implemented in ROK over the past five years (2017- 2021). When classified by random inspection type, 20 Short Notice Random Inspections (SNRI), 9 Short Notice Inspections (SNI), 34 Unannounced Inspections (UI), and 43 Random Interim Inspections (RII) were performed, of which RII accounted for the largest proportion with about 40.6%. IAEA conducts customized random inspections according to the characteristics of each nuclear facility. In the past five years, 34 cases of LWR, 20 cases of Bulk Handling Facility, 22 cases of CANDU, 30 cases of random inspections were implemented at R&D facilities, with the largest proportion of LWR. In connection with this, as a result of analyzing the current status of random inspections by year, 19 cases in 2017, 21 cases in 2018, 20 cases in 2019, 19 cases in 2020, and 27 cases in 2021 were implemented, especially in 2021, an increase of about 40% compared to the previous year. In conclusion, the IAEA is increasing the proportion of random inspections every year in line with the updated SLA, and this stance is expected to be maintained in the future. This can be seen as proof that randomized tests are showing an increasing trend even in the COVID-19 pandemic situation that has occurred since December 2019. and, In the case of LWR, it is expected that the form of random inspection may vary depending on the direction of IAEA’s SLA improvement. Through these analyses, it is expected that the direction of future safeguards policy can be established.

본 연구는 다문화 연구의 시각 아래 시행되는 한자 연구에서 고려해야 할 바를 6가지로 나누어 기본적인 생각을 표현하였다. 이러한 6가지 관점은 한자연구와 한자교육 문제를 넘어 동아시아 한자문화권 전반에 걸친 연구의 담론적 성격을 지니고 있다. 이러한 담론의 활성화를 통해 향후 한자 연구가 지향할 바를 고민하는 계기가 되고자 한다.