KHNP is conducting research to decommission Wolsong Unit 1 Calandria. Establishment of preparation and dismantlement processes, conceptual design of equipment and temporary radiation protection facilities, and waste management are being established. In particular, the ALARA plan is to be established by performing exposure dose evaluation for workers. This study aims to deal with the methodology of evaluating exposure dose based on the calandria dismantling process. The preparation process consists of bringing in and installing tooling and devices, and removing interference facilities to secure work space. The main source term for the preparation process is the calandria structure itself and crud of feeders. In the case of the dismantlement process, a structure with a shape that changes according to the process was modeled as a radiation source. It is intended to estimate the exposure dose by selecting the number of workers, time, and location required for each process in the radiation field evaluated according to the preparation and dismantlement process. In addition, it is also conducting an evaluation of the impact on dust generated by cutting operations and the human impact of C-14, H-3, which are specialized nuclides for heavy water reactors. KHNP is conducting an exposure dose evaluation based on a process based on the preparation and dismantlement process for decommissioning Calandria through computation code analysis. If additional worker protection measures are deemed necessary through dose evaluation according to this methodology, the process is improved to prepare for the dismantling of worker safety priorities.
Kori unit 1 and Wolsong unit 1 were permanently shut down in 2017 and 2019, respectively. Both plants were decided to demolish the building without reuse. Large structures must be demolished after removing systems and components in the building, and in the case of large structures, thorough planning is required because of the large scale of work. Therefore, in this study, important considerations in the phase of the demolition plan of large structures when decommissioning were analyzed. The demolition of large structures at nuclear facilities is major one phase of work within a broader decommissioning plan. Furthermore, the actual demolition of the structure (i.e., physical process) represents the last step in a process that begins with extensive planning and analysis. The National Demolition Association (NDA) has provided checklist items that should be considered before the start of a commercial demolition project and/or in the bid process. Important Considerations in the Phase of the demolition plan of large structures when decommissioning of nuclear facilities are Site knowledge and programs, Engineering survey/demolition plan, Hazardous and radioactive materials, Open air demolition, Financial and project management, Permits, Code adherence, and Special programs, Disposal pathway, Final site condition. The results of this study can be used as a basis for the Planning large structures demolition of the Kori unit 1 and Wolsong unit 1.
Kori unit 1, the first PWR (Pressurized Water Reactor) in Korea, was permanent shut down in 2017. In Korea, according to the Nuclear Safety Act, the FDP (Final Decommissioning Plan) must be submitted within 5 years of permanent shutdown. According to NSSC Notice, the types, volumes, and radioactivity of solid radioactive wastes should be included in FDP chapter 9, Radioactive Waste Management, Therefore, in this study, the types depending on generation characteristics and radiological characterization methods and process of solid radioactive waste were analyzed. Solid radioactive waste depending on the characteristics of the generation was classified into reactor vessel and reactor vessel internal, large components, small metals, spent nuclear fuel storage racks, insulation, wires, concrete debris, scattering concrete, asbestos, mixed waste, soil, spent resins and filters, and dry active waste. Radiological characterization of solid radioactive waste is performed to determine the characteristics of radioactive contamination, including the type and concentration of radionuclides. It is necessary to ensure the representativeness of the sample for the structures, systems and components to be evaluated and to apply appropriate evaluation methods and procedures according to the structure, material and type of contamination. Therefore, the radiological characterization is divided into concrete and structures, systems and components, and reactor vessel, reactor vessel internal and bioshield concrete. In this study, the types depending on generation characteristics and radiological characterization methods and process of solid radioactive waste were analyzed. The results of this study can be used as a basis for the preparation of the FDP for the Kori unit 1.
According to IAEA PRIS, there is no record of dismantling commercial heavy water reactors among 57 heavy water reactors around the world. In Canada, which has the largest number of heavy water reactors, three of the 22 commercial heavy water reactors with more than 500 MW are permanently suspended, Gentilly unit 2 (2012), Pickering unit 2 (2007), and Pickering unit 3 (2008), all of which chose a delayed decommissioning strategy. On the other hand, Wolsong unit 1, which will be the world’s first heavy water reactor to be dismantled commercially, will be immediately carried out as a decommissioning strategy. KHNP has established various cooperation systems with advanced companies and international organizations related to overseas NPP decommission and is actively exchanging technologies. Among them, the most important focus is on research cooperation related to COG (CANDU owners Group). The first case is a joint study on Conceptual Calandria Segmentation. Four areas of process, waste management, ALARA, and cost for decommissioning reactors to be submitted to Canadian regulators for approval of Pickering and Gentilly-2’s preliminary decommissioning plan have been evaluated, and research on Wolsong unit 1 is currently underway. The second case is Decommissioning and long-term waste management R&D. Although the technical maturity is low, it studies the common interests of member companies in the decommissioning of heavy water reactor power generation companies and long-term waste management. Robotics for dismantling high-radiation structures, C- 14, H-3 measurement and removal methods, and concrete decontamination technology, which are characterized by heavy water, are being actively studied. KHNP is strengthening international cooperation with COG to prepare for the successful decommissioning of Wolsong unit 1. Based on previous studies by Pickering and Gentilly-2, an evaluation of the decommissioning of Wolsong unit 1 reactor is being conducted. In addition, it is preparing for decommissioning through experience analysis of the pressure tube replacement project.
KHNP is carrying out international technical cooperation and joint research projects to decommission Wolsong unit 1 reactor. Construction data of the reactor structures, experience data on the pressure tube replacement projects, and the operation history were reviewed, and the amount of dismantled waste was calculated and waste was classified through activation analysis. By reviewing COG (CANDU owners Group) technical cooperation and experience in refurbishment projects, KHNP’s unique Wolsong unit 1 reactor decommissioning process was established, and basic design of a number of decommissioning equipment was carried out. Based on this, a study is being conducted to estimate the worker dose of dismantling workers. In order to evaluate the dose of external exposure of dismantling workers, detailed preparation and dismantling processes and radiation field evaluation of activated structures are required. The preparation process can be divided into dismantlement of existing facilities that interfere with the reactor dismantling work and construction of various facilities for the dismantlement process. Through process details, the work time, manpower, and location required for each process will be calculated. Radiation field evaluation takes into account changes in the shape of structures by process and calculates millions of areas by process, so integrated scripts are developed and utilized to integrate input text data. If the radiation field evaluation confirms that the radiation risk of workers is high, mutual feedback will be exchanged so that the process can be improved, such as the installation of temporary shields. The results of this study will be used as basic data for the final decommissioning plan for Wolsong unit 1. By reasonably estimating the dose of workers through computer analysis, safety will be the top priority when decommissioning.
Wolsong unit 1, the first PHWR (Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor) in Korea, was permanent shut down in 2019. In Korea, according to the Nuclear Safety Act, the FDP (Final Decommissioning Plan) must be submitted within 5 years of permanent shutdown. According to NSSC Notice, the types, volumes, and radioactivity of solid radioactive wastes should be included in FDP chapter 9, Radioactive Waste Management, Therefore, in this study, activation assessment and waste classification of the End shield, which is a major activation component, were conducted. MCNP and ORIGEN-S computer codes were used for the activation assessment of the End shield. Radioactive waste levels were classified according to the cooling period of 0 to 20 years in consideration of the actual start of decommissioning. The End shield consists of Lattice tube, Shielding ball, Sleeve insert, Calandria tube shielding sleeve, and Embedment Ring. Among the components composed for each fuel channel, the neutron flux was calculated for the components whose level was not predicted by preliminary activation assessment, by dividing them into three channel regions: central channel, inter channel, and outer channel. In the case of the shielding ball, the neutron flux was calculated in the area up to 10 cm close to the core and other parts to check the decrease in neutron flux with the distance from the core. The neutron flux calculations showed that the highest neutron flux was calculated at the Sleeve insert, the component closest to the fuel channel. It was found that the neutron flux decreased by about 1/10 to 1/20 as the distance from the core increased by 20 cm. The outer channel was found to have about 30% of the neutron flux of the center channel. It was found that no change in radioactive waste level due to decay occurred during the 0 to 20 years cooling period. In this study, activation assessment and waste classification of End Shield in Wolsong unit 1 was conducted. The results of this study can be used as a basis for the preparation of the FDP for the Wolsong unit 1.
RADTRAN is a code that assesses the radiation risk of radioactive material transportation. RADTRAN assumes that the package is a point source or a line source regardless of package type and corrects the external dose rate using a shape factor which depends on the critical dimension of the package. However, the external dose rate calculated using a shape factor may be different from the actual external dose rate. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the effect of the shape factor on the external dose rate. In this study, the effect of the shape factor on the external dose rate in RADTRAN was analyzed by comparison with MCNP. This study analyzed change in external dose rate depending on the distance from the package and the critical dimension. The distance from the package was in the range of 1–800 m. The shape of the package was assumed to be cylindrical with a radius of 1 m, and the critical dimensions of the package were assumed to be 2, 4, and 8 m. Attenuation and build-up in the air were not considered to consider only the effect on the shape factor. When simulating the exposure situation using MCNP, the package was assumed to be a volume source, and flux by distance from the package was calculated using F5 tally. The dose rate at 1 m from the package was normalized to 2 mSv·hr−1. As a result of the analysis, the external dose rates of the package were higher in RADTRAN than in MCNP. For the critical dimension of 2, 4, and 8 m, when the distance from package is 1–10 m, the RADTRAN was 1.83, 4.08, and 5.27 times higher on average than MCNP, respectively. And when the distance from the package was 10–100 m and 100–800 m, RADTRAN was 1.10, 2.02, 3.01 times and 1.04, 1.92, 2.43 times higher than MCNP, respectively. It was found that the larger the distance from the package is and the smaller the critical dimension of the package is, the less conservatively RADTRAN assessed. It is because the shape of the package gets closer to the point source as the distance from the package increases, and the shape factor decreases as the critical dimension of the package decreases. The result of this study can be used as the basis for radiation risk assessment when transporting radioactive materials.