The purpose of this study was to create a theoretical structure for the concept of purchasing risks by identifying the structure of purchasing risks that lead to obstacles in the purchasing decisions of consumers in fashion consumption via online channels. This was a secondary research using books, articles, prior researches, and academic journals on the five topics of “characteristics of fashion consumption,” “the concept of purchasing risks,” “purchasing risks by product types,” “purchasing risks by channel types,” and “purchasing risks of fashion consumption on online shopping channels.” According to the arguments of prior researches, the study divided the purchasing risks of fashion consumption through online shopping into four categories : (1) fundamental purchasing risks including financial risk and time loss risk pertaining to any product or channel, (2) online channel purchase risks, which include risks in payment, Information leaks, and delivery and return/exchange risk, (3) fashion product risk related to product quality or experience of other people, which includes social risks and risks associated with quality, and (4) the online channel×fashion product risks, which include the aesthetic and psychological hazards especially amplified in online channels. The four risk factors were then described with a concept map to systemize the multidimensional and stereoscopic psychological structure of purchasing risks. Of the four risk factors, consumers placed the most emphasis on the online channel×fashion product risks, hence, reducing this risk factor is of utmost priority for marketing of online shopping channels.
Omni-channel strategy is an innovative paradigm for integrated information distribution of inventory, sales, operations, marketing, delivery, pickups and returns in supply chain management. Recently the distribution strategy faces new challenges with the advent of mobile distribution channels. Social media with countless apps imposes additional stress on supply chain operations. Due to these changes, distribution network in supply chain is changing naturally and rapidly from multi-channel to omnni-channel platform. Recently numerous domestic distributors establish and adapt this new supply chain optimization tool as a part of seamless flow of movements of goods from one channel to other channels. The objective of this paper is to present a preliminary findings on how omnni-channel affects the supply chain management. A survey is used to ascertain in the degree of omnni-channel implementation and statistical evidence is provided to test sets of hypothesis. The results of the questionnaire showed that consumers' purchasing styles differed by gender, age, purchase purpose, and product type. In particular, women consider purchasing experience in omni-channel to be important. As food and household goods can be conveniently shipped, consumers prefer online purchasing it. Conversely, consumers tend to favor omni-channel strategy in connection with offline experience in IT products.
온라인 상거래가 일상의 한 행위로 자리 잡은 요즈음 오프라인 채널과 온라인 채널 간의 간극이 점점 좁혀지고 있다. 즉, 종전에는 오프라인 상에서의 소비자 구매행위와 온라인상에서의 소비자 구매행위가 판이하게 달랐으나 온라인상에 서의 다양한 상거래가 보편화되면서 이제는 온라인상에서의 구매행위에 대한 연구가 활발하게 이뤄지고 있다. 그러나, 아직도 오프라인상에서의 신뢰가 온라인 구매행위에 미치는 영향에 관한 연구가 피상적인 수준에 머물러왔다. 이에 본 연구에서는 기존 연구의 한계를 극복하기 위하여 개인이 느끼는 뉴로티시즘 성향이 온라인상에서 사용자가 느끼는 불확실성, 거래비용, 그리고 만족 및 지속구매의도에 미치는 조절효과를 체계적으로 분석하고자 한다. 406부의 유효한 설문지를 토대로 분석한 결과, 사용자가 느끼는 거래비용은 온라인쇼핑 지속구매의도에 부의 효과를 미치고 있지만, 만족에는 통계적으로 유의한 영향을 미치지 않는 것으로 나타났다. 또한, 사용자가 가지고 있는 뉴로티시즘 성향은 온라인쇼핑 지속구매의도와 그 영향 요인들 간의 모든 관계에서 유의한 조절효과를 보이고 있는 것으로 나타났다.
In this paper, we study the bargaining strategy of a manufacturer who sells a product through the online and offline distribution channels. To do this, we derive and analyze the equilibrium solutions for both simultaneous and sequential bargaining games. The result shows that the optimal bargaining strategy heavily depends on the size of the online distribution channel’s loyal customers and the difference between the retail prices of the online and the offline distribution channels. It is also shown that, in some cases, the online distribution channel has incentive to downsize its loyal customers and its retail price for a better bargaining outcome.