For deep geological repository of the spent nuclear fuel, the fuel assemblies loaded in the storage cask are transferred to the disposal cask and the operation is performed in the fuel handling hot cell at the fuel re-packaging facility. As the fuel handling hot cell shielding is accomplished by the concrete wall and the viewing glass window, the required shielding thickness was evaluated for both materials. The ordinary concrete is applied to hot cell wall and two kinds of glasses, i.e., single layer of lead glass and double layer of lead glass and borosilicate glass, are considered for the viewing glass window. A bare spent PWR fuel assembly exposed to the environment in the hot cell was considered as the neutron and gamma radiation sources. The neutron and gamma transport calculations were performed using the MAVRIC program of the SCALE code system for the dose rate evaluation. The dose limit of 10 μSv/h is applied as the target dose to establish the required shielding thickness. The concrete wall of 94 cm thickness reduces the total dose rate to 6.9 μSv/h, which is the sum of neutron dose and gamma dose. Penetrating the concrete wall, both of the neutron dose and the gamma dose decrease constantly with shield thickness and the gamma dose is always dominant through whole penetrating distance. Single layer lead glass of 74 cm thickness reduces total dose rate to 6.2 μSv/h. Applying double layer shield glass combined of lead glass and borosilicate glass, the total dose rate reduces to 3.6 μSv/h at same shield thickness of 74 cm. Through the shield glass, gamma dose decreases rapidly and neutron dose decreases slowly compared with those for concrete wall. In result, neuron dose becomes dominant on the window glass shielding. The more efficient dose reduction of double layer glass is achieved by the borosilicate glass’s superior neutron shielding power. Thus, the use of double layer glass of lead glass and borosilicate glass is recommended for the viewing glass of the fuel handling hot cell. Finally, it is concluded that about 1 m thick concrete wall and 75 cm thick viewing glass window are sufficient for the radiation shielding of the hot cell at the spent fuel repackaging facility.

In Korea, Kori Unit 1, a commercial pressurized water reactor (PWR), was permanently shut down in June 2017, and an immediate decommissioning strategy is underway. Therefore, it is essential to understand the characteristics of radioactive waste during the decommissioning process of nuclear power plants (NPP). Because radioactive waste must be handled with care, radioactive waste is treated in a hot cell facility. Hot cell facility handles radioactive waste, and worker safety is essential. In this study, it was dealt with whether or not the radiation safety regulations were satisfied when processing the core beltline metal of the dismantling waste treated at the post irradiation examination facility (PIEF) of the hot cell facility. Core beltline metal used for the pressure vessel in the reactor is carbon steel, and it is continuously irradiated by neutrons during the operation of the NPP. A radiological safety estimation of the behavior of radioactive aerosols during the cutting process within the PIEF was carried out to ensure the safety of the environment and workers. When processing the core beltline metal in PIEF, dominant six nuclides (60Co, 63Ni, 55Fe, 3H, 59Ni, 14C) of aerosol are generated. Accordingly each cutting device, amount of aerosol and value of dose is different. Using a 99.97% efficiency HEPA filter, the emission concentration of the dominant nuclides (60Co, 63Ni, 55Fe, 3H, 59Ni, 14C) in the air source term was satisfied with the emission control standard of Nuclear Safety Commission No. 2016-16. It was confirmed that the radioactivity concentration in the airborne source term inside the PIEF is in equilibrium state, when ventilation is considered. Also, the mass of aerosol and the concentration of airborne source term differed according to the thickness of the saw blade of the cutting tool, and the exposure dose of the worker was different through Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP). At that time, 60Co accounted for 95.4% of the exposure dose, showing that 60Co had the highest impact on workers, followed by 55Fe with 2.7%. The worker’s dose limit is satisfied in accordance with Article 2 of the Nuclear Safety Act and the dose limit of radiation-controlled area is found to be satisfied in accordance with Article 3 of the rules on technical standards for radiation safety management at this time.

한국원자력연구소에서는 고온의 용융염 매질 하에서 사용 후 핵연료를 환원시키는 차세대관리종합공정 연구를 수행 중에 있다. 추후 본 기술개발을 실증시험 하기 위해서는 방사선 차폐능이 확보된 핫셀이 필수적이며, 핫셀은 최대 1,385TBq의 방사능량에 대한 차폐 안전성을 가져야 한다. 최대 방사선원에 대한 핫셀의 차폐능을 확보하기 위하여, 본 연구에서는 실증시험 시 사용후핵연료부터 발생하는 중성자 및 감마선에 의한 선량률이 법적 허용선량치보다 낮게 유지되도록 핫셀의 차폐 설계에 대한 안전성을 평가하였다. QAD-CGGP 및 MCNP-4C 코드를 이용하여 핫셀 차폐체의 설계치에 대한 차폐 계산을 수행하였다. 작업구역에 대한 감마선 차폐계산 결과 QAD-CGGP 코드는 2.10, 2.97 mSv/h, MCNP-4C 코드는 1.60, 2.99 mSv/h 이었으며, 서비스 구역은 1.01, 7.88 mSv/h 로 평가되었다. 그리고 MCNP-4C코드를 이용하여 중성자에 의한 선량률을 계산한 결과, 중성자에 의한 선량률은 감마에 의한 선량률의 약 20% 이하치를 나타내었다. 따라서 선량률 대부분은 감마선에 의한 영향임을 알 수 있었다. 본 연구를 통하여 핫셀의 차폐 설계치가 작업구역의 선량 제한치 0.01 mSv/h 와 서비스 구역에서의 선량 제한치 0.15 mSv/h를 만족시키는 것을 확인할 수 있었다.