The critical hazards generated from operation of a melting facility for metal radioactive waste are mainly assumed to be such as vapor explosion, ladle breakthrough and failure in the hot-cell or furnace chamber using remote equipment. In case of vapor explosion, material containing moisture and/or enclosed spaces may, due to rapid expansion of gases when heated, cause an explosion and/or violent boiling. The rapid expansion of gases may lead to ejection of molten radioactive metal from the furnace into the furnace hall. If there is a large amount of liquid the explosion may damage or destroy technical barriers such as facility walls. The consequences for the facility ranges from relatively mild to very severe depending on the force of the explosion as well as the type of waste being melted. Nonradiological consequences may be physical damage or destruction of equipment and facility barriers, such as walls. Due to the radiological consequences a longer operational shutdown would likely be required. Cleanup efforts would include cutting of solidified metal in a problematic radiological environment requiring use of remote technology before damage and repair requirements can be assessed. Even though there is a risk for direct physical harm to operators for example in the control room and hot-cell, this analysis focuses mainly on the radiological impact. The extent to which remote equipment could be used in the decontamination effort will largely determine the health consequences to the workers. It is reasonable to assume that there will be a need for workers to participate manually in the effort. Due to the potentially large dose rates and the physical environment, it is possible that the maximum allowable dose burden to a worker will be reached. No major consequence for the environment is expected as most of the radioactivity is bound to the material. In case of ladle breakthrough, a ladle breakthrough involves loss of containment of the melt due to damage of the ladle. This may be caused e.g. by increased wear due to overheating in the melt, or from physical factors such as mechanical stress and impact from the waste. A ladle breakthrough may lead to spread of molten metal in the furnace hall. Molten metal coming into contact with the surrounding cooling equipment may cause a steam explosion. The consequences of a ladle breakthrough will depend on the event sequence. The most severe is when the molten metal comes into contact with the cooling system causing a vapor explosion. The basic consequences are assumed to be similar to those of the vapor explosion above. While the ejection of molten metal is likely more local in the ladle breakthrough scenario, the consequences are judged to be similar. In case of failure in the hot-cell or furnace chamber using remote equipment, the loss of electric supply or technical failure in the furnace causes loss of power supply. If not remedied quickly, this could lead to that the melt solidifies. A melt that is solidified due to cooling after loss of power cannot be removed nor re-melted. This may occur especially fast if there is not melted material in the furnace. An unscheduled replacement of the refractory in the furnace would be required. It could be unknown to what degree remote equipment can be used to cut a solidified melt. It is therefore assumed that personnel may need to be employed. This event could not have any impact on environment

An induction melting facility includes several work health and safety risks. To manage the work health and safety risks, care must be taken to identify reasonably foreseeable hazards that could give rise to risks to health and safety, to eliminate risks to health and safety so far as is reasonably practicable. If it is not reasonably practicable to eliminate risks to health and safety, attention have to be given to minimize those risks so far as is reasonably practicable by implementing risk control measures according to the hierarchy of control in regulation, to ensure the control measure is, and is maintained so that it remains, effective, and to review and as necessary revise control measures implemented to maintain, so far as is reasonably practicable, a work environment that is without risks to health or safety. The way to manage the risks associated with induction melting works is to identify hazards and find out what could cause harm from melting works, to assess risks if necessary – understand the nature of the harm that could be caused by the hazard, how serious the harm could be and the likelihood of it happening, to control risks – implement the most effective control measures that are reasonably practicable in the circumstances, and to review control measures to ensure they are working as planned.

The fuel fabrication facility has been built and is being operated by KAERI since licensing research reactor fuel fabrication in 2004. After almost 20 years of operation, outdated equipment for fabrication or inspection has been replaced by automated, digitalized ones to assure a higher quality of nuclear fuels. However, the generation of a large amount of radioactive waste is another concern for the replacement in terms of its volume and various types of it that should be categorized before disposal. The regulatory body, NSSC (Nuclear Safety and Security Commission) released a notice related to the classification of radioactive wastes, and most accessory equipment can be classified into the clearance levels, called self-disposal waste. In this study, the practice of self-disposal of metal radioactive waste is carried out to reduce its volume and downgrade its radioactivity. For metal radioactive waste, which is expected to occupy the most amount, analysis status and legal limitations were performed as follows: First, the disposal plan was established after an investigation of the use history for equipment. Second, those were classified by types of materials, and their surface radio-contamination was measured for checking self-disposable or not. After collecting data, the plan for the self-disposal was written and submitted to the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) for approval.

Decontamination of spent nuclear fuel from decommissioned nuclear reactors is crucial to reduce the volume of intermediate-level waste. Fuel cladding hulls are one of the important parts due to high radioactivity. Their decontamination could possibly enable reclassification as low-level waste. Fuel cladding hulls used in research reactors and being developed for conventional light water reactors are Al-Mg and Fe-Cr-Al alloys, respectively. Therefore, the recovery of these component metals after decontamination is necessary to reduce the volume of highly radioactive waste. Electrochemical approach is often chosen due to its simplicity and effectiveness. Non-aqueous solvents, such as molten salts (MSs) and ionic liquids (ILs), are preferred to aqueous solvents due to the absence of hydrogen evolution. However, MSs and ILs are limited by high temperature and high synthesis cost, along with toxicity issues. Deep eutectic solvents (DESs) are synthesized from a hydrogen bond acceptor (HBA) and donor (HBD) and exhibit outstanding metal salt solubility, wide electrochemical window, good biocompatibility, and economic production process. These characteristics make DES an attractive candidate solvent for economic, green, and efficient electrodeposition compared with aqueous solvents such acids or nonaqueous solvents such as MSs or ILs. In this research, the feasibility of electrodeposition of Al-Mg and Fe-Cr-Al alloys in ChCl:EG, the most common DES synthesized from choline chloride (ChCl) and ethylene glycol (EG), will be tested. A standard three-electrode electrochemical cell with an Au plated working electrode and Al wires for counter and reference electrodes is utilized. Two electrolyte solutions (Al-Mg and Fe-Cr-Al) are prepared by dissolving 100 mM of each anhydrous metal chloride salts (AlCl3, MgCl2, CrCl3, and FeCl2) in ChCl:EG. Cyclic voltammogram (CV) is measured at 5, 10, 15, and 20 mV·s−1 to observe the redox reactions occurring in the solutions. Electrodeposition of each alloy is performed via chronoamperometry at observed reduction potentials from CV measurements. The deposited surfaces and cross-sections are examined by scanning electron microscopy and energy dispersive spectroscopy (SEM-EDS) to analyze the surface morphology, cross-section composition, and thickness. Authors anticipate that the presence of different metals will greatly affect the possibility of electrodeposition. It is expected that although all metals are distributed throughout the surface, the morphology, in terms of particle size and shape, would differ depending on metals. Different metals will be deposited by layers of an approximate thickness of a few μm each. This research will illustrate a potential for recovery and electrodeposition of other precious radioactive metals from DES.

The type of accidents associated with the operation of a melting facility for radioactive metal waste is assumed to only marginally differ from those associated with similar activities in the conventional metal casting industry or the current waste melting facility. However, the radiological consequences from a mishap or a technical failure differ widely. Three critical and at the same time possible accidents were identified: (1) activity release due to vapor explosion, (2) activity release due to ladle breakthrough, (3) consequences of failure in the hot-cell or furnace chamber not possible to remedy using remote equipment.

영구정지후 해체가 계획된 고리 1호기 원자력발전소는 해체과정에서 다양한 종류의 방사성폐기물이 대량으로 발생될 것으 로 예상되고 있으며, 이 중 원자로 및 내부구조물은 방사능 수치가 높으므로 1차측에서 적절한 크기와 중량으로 해체된다. 고리 1호기 해체시 원자로 및 내부구조물에서 발생되는 방사성폐기물에 대하여 기존 폐기물의 자체처분 현황 및 법적 제한 사항 분석 등을 통해 적절하고 효율적인 처분방법을 마련하는 것은 중요한 사안일 것으로 판단된다. 원자로 및 내부구조물 에서 발생되는 폐기물은 중준위에서부터 자체처분까지 다양한 준위의 폐기물들이 발생되며, 이 중 자체처분 준위에 해당되 는 폐기물은 방사화 평가 결과, 원자로 상부 헤드와 상부 헤드 인슐레이션에서 발생되는 것으로 나타났다. 본 논문에서는 방사화 평가 결과를 바탕으로 자체처분 준위에 해당되는 폐기물을 자체처분 평가 코드인 RESRAD-RECYCLE 코드를 사용하여 자체처분 안전성 평가를 수행하였다. 대상 폐기물의 자체처분 시나리오를 선정하고 자체처분시 개인 및 집단별 최대선량을 계산하여 국내 원자력안전법에서 규정하는 자체처분 기준 제한치의 만족 여부를 판단하였다. 평가 결과, 전체적으로 상당히 낮은 결과값을 보이며 기준 제한치를 만족하는 결과를 나타내었으며, 핵종별 자체처분 허용농도를 도출하였다.