PURPOSES : Recently, interest in radioactive accidents has increased due to domestic and international nuclear power plant accidents. In particular, local residents' concerns are increasing due to safety issues such as radioactive leaks at the Hanbit Nuclear Power Plant in South Korea. As Gwangju Metropolitan City is not included in the emergency planning area set by the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, there are significant limitations to establishing disaster prevention measures for nuclear power plant accidents. Considering the Fukushima and Hanbit nuclear power plant accidents, the improvement of Gwangju Metropolitan City's radioactive leak accident response manual is urgently required. This study aimed to establish disaster prevention measures to respond to nuclear power plant accidents in Gwangju Metropolitan City in the event of a Hanbit Nuclear Power Plant accident and to improve resident protection measures by estimating the arrival time of radioactive materials and radiation dosage through a nuclear power plant accident simulation. Additionally, we aimed to supplement the on-site action manual for radioactive leaks at the Hanbit Nuclear Power Plant. METHODS : This study focused on establishing disaster prevention measures centered on Gwangju Metropolitan City in the event of a major accident such as a radioactive leak at the Hanbit Nuclear Power Plant. Simulations were conducted assuming a major accident such as a radioactive leak, measures to improve resident protection were established by calculating the arrival time of radioactive materials and radiation dosage in the Gwangju area in the event of a nuclear power plant accident, and on-site response action manuals were supplemented in response to a radioactive leak. RESULTS : This study considered the concerns of local residents due to the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident and the Hanbit nuclear power plant failure, conducted a simulation to derive the impact on Gwangju Metropolitan City, and examined the effectiveness of an on-site response manual for radioactive leaks to derive improvement measures. CONCLUSIONS : In the event of an accident at the Hanbit Nuclear Power Plant in Gwangju Metropolitan City, insufficient portions of the on-site response action manual should be supplemented, and close cooperation with local governments within the emergency planning area should be ensured to respond to radioactive disasters. Therefore, based on the revised on-site response action manual for radioactive leaks, close cooperation and a clear division of roles among local governments will enable effective resident protection measures to be implemented in the event of a radioactive disaster.

Solid radioactive waste such as rubble, trimmed trees, contaminated soil, metal, concrete, used protective clothing, secondary waste, etc. are being generated due to the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident occurred on March 11, 2011. Solid radioactive waste inside of Fukushima NPP is estimated to be about 790,000 m3. The solid radioactive waste includes combustible rubble, trimmed trees, and used protective clothing, and is about 290,000 m3. These will be incinerated, reduced to about 20,000 m3 and stored in solid waste storage. The radioactive waste incinerator was completed in 2021. About 60,000 m3 of rubble containing metal and concrete with a surface dose rate of 1 mSv/h or higher will be stored without reduction treatment. Metal with a surface dose rate of 1 mSv/h or less are molten, and concrete undergoes a crushing process. About 60,000 m3 of contaminated soil (0.005 ~1 mSv/h) will be managed in solid waste storage without reduction treatment. The amount of secondary waste generated during the treatment of contaminated water is about 6,500 huge tanks, and additional research is being conducted on future treatment methods.

The Fukushima nuclear power plant accident, which was caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011, is of great concern to the Korean people. The scope of interest is wide and diverse, from the nuclear accident itself and the damage situation, to the current situation in Fukushima Prefecture and Japan, and to the safety of Japanese agricultural and fishery products. Concerns about nuclear safety following the Fukushima nuclear accident have a significant impact on neighboring nation’s energy policy. It has been 11 years since the Fukushima nuclear accident. In neighboring nation society, the nature and extent of damage caused by the Fukushima nuclear accident, the feasibility of follow-up measures at home and abroad, the impact on neighboring nations, and the direction of nuclear policy reflecting the lessons of the accident are hotly debated topics. Recently, the controversy has grown further as it is intertwined with Japan’s concerns about the safety and discharge of the contaminated water into the sea, and conflicts over domestic nuclear power policies. About 1.29 million tons, as of March 24, 2022, of the contaminated water are generated, which is close to the 1.37 million tons of water storage capacity. In response, the Japanese government announced on April 13, 2021, that it plans to discharge the contaminated water into the sea from 2023. This study evaluates the amount of the contaminated water that has passed through the ALPS and reviews the preparations and related facilities for ocean discharge after diluting the contaminated water. In addition, it is intended to forecast the various impacts of ocean discharge.

후쿠시마 원전사고 이후 광역의 방사성 오염부지가 발생되었으며, 이에 대한 제염작업으로 인하여 다량의 제염폐기물이 발 생하였다. 일본에서는 이를 보관하기 위하여 각 지역에 임시저장시설이 운영되고 있으며, 이들 시설들은 피난지시해제가 이루어진 지역의 일반인에 대하여 방사선학적 영향을 미칠 것으로 판단된다. 본 연구에서는 임시저장시설 인근에 거주하 는 일반인의 방사선학적 안전성 확보를 위하여 임시저장시설 특성에 따른 거리별 공간 방사선량률 및 선량제한치를 만족하 는 임시저장시설로부터의 이격거리를 평가하였다. 이를 위해 임시저장시설의 형태 및 크기, 복토 두께 등을 고려하였으며, MCNPX를 이용하여 방사선량률을 평가하였다. 복토에 의한 차폐효과는 두께가 10 cm일 때 68.9%, 30 cm일 때 96.9%, 50 cm 일 때 99.7%로 나타났다. 임시저장시설 형태에 따른 공간 방사선량률은 지상 보관형일 때 가장 높게 나타났으며, 이어서 반 지하 보관형, 지하 보관형일 순으로 나타났다. 임시저장시설 크기에 따른 공간 방사선량률은 5 × 5 × 2 m 시설을 제외한 시 설에 대하여 유사하게 나타났다. 이는 임시저장시설 내 적재된 제염폐기물에 의하여 자기차폐가 이루어지기 때문이다. 최종 적으로 크기가 50 × 50 × 2 m이고, 복토가 없는 임시저장시설의 경우, 지상 보관형의 평가된 이격거리는 14 m(최소농도), 33 m(최빈농도), 57 m(최대농도)이며, 반지하 보관형의 이격거리는 9 m(최소농도), 24 m(최빈농도), 45 m(최대농도), 지하 보관형의 이격거리는 6 m(최소농도), 16 m(최빈농도), 31 m(최대농도)로 나타났다.

The main objective of this paper is to search whether containment vessel's best pressure may increase until how long when loss of coolant accident (LOCA) happened in containment vessel of Ulchin nuclear power plant 1 and 2. Another goal of this research is to find the influential factors that increase containment vessel pressure. Model for this research is Ulchin nuclear power plant 1 with 10 cycles. Data were collected by simulator of Ulchin nuclear power plant 1 and design of experiment was used for data analysis. For the experiment, seven factors that are going to influence in containment vessel pressure were chosen. It was found that fatter which influences in early rise of containment vessel pressure after LOCA is only explosion size. Also, containment vessel's best pressure (3.74 bar.a) was much lower than limit (4.86 bar.a) of FSAR (Final Safety Analysis Report).