Physical protection education was legislated by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST) in November 2010. KINAC (Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control) was designated as the exclusive institution for physical protection education and training by MEST in October 2011, and it has since functioned as the sole institution responsible for this critical aspect of nuclear security education in the country. Over the past decade, KINAC has undertaken a variety of training initiatives aimed at enhancing the capabilities of nuclear operators’ physical protection personnel. Furthermore, it has consistently pursued annual curriculum revisions based on insights gleaned from surveys and workshops. In conventional curriculum assessments, general surveys often rely on Likert scale or short-answer questions as primary indicators, mainly due to their ease of data processing. Descriptive questions, while capable of capturing diverse opinions, have historically been relegated to a secondary role owing to the inherent challenges associated with data analysis. While physical protection education has made concerted efforts to solicit diverse opinions through descriptive questions, difficulties in organizing and leveraging this valuable data have resulted in it primarily serving as reference material. This study introduces a novel approach by employing ChatGPT, a chatbot, to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the descriptive questions from the physical protection education survey administered in the first half of 2023. The primary objective is to formulate a robust plan for curriculum enhancement based on a wide spectrum of opinions. Following the completion of physical protection training by 2,014 individuals in the first half of 2023, a survey was distributed, yielding an impressive response rate of 95.7% with 1,927 respondents. Chatbots were harnessed to extract major keywords and perform frequency analyses on approximately 360 responses to descriptive questions in the survey. The analysis revealed that certain keywords emerged with notable frequency, in the following order: “drone” (mentioned 51 times), “access management” (mentioned 28 times), “inspection and search” (mentioned 27 times), and “cybersecurity” (mentioned 20 times). Further analysis of these major keywords and related content revealed a consensus among trainees that there is a pressing need to incorporate topics addressing drone threats and responses, as well as strategies to fortify access management into the curriculum. This study underscores the potential to harness standardized data analysis techniques to synthesize and integrate trainees’ subjective opinions, thereby providing a solid foundation for the refinement of the curriculum.

Domestic nuclear power plants have developed radiological emergency plans based on the USNRC’s NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-Rev.1 report and the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety’s (KINS) research report on radiation emergency criteria for power reactors (KINS/RR-12). NUREG-0654 is a US emergency planning guide for nuclear power plants and provides detailed technical requirements for the content of radiological emergency plans. The document classifies radiological emergencies into three levels: Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency, which correspond to the white, blue, and red emergency levels used in domestic nuclear power plants. KINS/RR-12 is a technical guidance document published by the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety in 2012, which divides radiological emergency criteria into criteria for pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and criteria for boiling water reactors (BWRs), and describes in detail the regulatory position and implementation of radiological emergency criteria for domestic PWRs and BWRs. The physical protection-related radiation emergency criteria included in the radiological emergency plan are specified in the radiological emergency criteria guidelines. There are two items each related to white and blue emergencies and one item related to red emergencies. Standard order of emergency plan lists the physical protection-related radiological emergency criteria for domestic PWRs and BWRs, which are identical according to the radiological emergency criteria guidelines. To enhance the physical protection regulation, the legal and regulatory basis for target set identification and vital area identification need to be established by considering radiological and physical protection emergency plan.

Domestic nuclear facilities establish a physical protection system to respond to illegal transfer of nuclear materials and sabotage to nuclear materials and nuclear facilities, and operate a security search system in order to prevent the entry of controlled items into the facility. X-ray security search is also the most widely used for such security search. Since 2018, Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) has developed the “X-ray security screening Web-Based Training Program (XWBT)” and has been using it in the physical protection education. The XWBT contains about 700 X-ray images of the item, and can learn X-ray images by type or package of the item. In addition, trainees can practice reading the X-ray image of the item or package, looking for controlled items, and determining whether the item could be passed or opened. However, there is a limit to Web-Based X-ray training program alone. This is because even if the same item is contained in the same bag, the X-ray image could be varied depending on the direction, angle, and other items in the package. Therefore, in addition to XWBT, X-ray reading practice education for actual luggage should be conducted in parallel. In addition, trainees should be familiar with various images through repetitive X-ray reading practice training so that they should be able to intuitively read X-ray images and find controlled items. Therefore, securing educational time is essential to produce skilled trainees. Korea Aviation Security Academy (KASA), which produces professional security inspectors, has established and operated a “Security search education filed for actual luggage” where trainees can pack their own bags, read X-ray images, and practice whether there are controlled items packed. In addition, KASA provides 40-hour training for security search personnel, which focuses on improving the practical skills that security search personnel must have. This study describes the current status of “X-ray Security Search” of Physical Protection Education for security personnel and presents course improvements through the case of KASA.

Sabotage on nuclear power plants are of great national and social significance and long-term damage, the IAEA’s “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5) provides a standard direction for physical protection of their nuclear facilities in almost all member countries, including Korea and the United States. In the United States, Federal Law 10 CFR Part 73, Sections 73.40 to 73.57 specify requirements for physical protection of nuclear power plants, performance criteria, physical protection systems and components thereof, core information, and physical protection for key activities related to nuclear power plant operations. Accordingly, the USNRC carefully examines whether the plant meets the physical protection objectives and criteria set out in SRP 13.6.2, whether the core area/protection area is properly set up to protect against internal and external physical attacks, sabotage threats, and what design measures and facilities are being set up for these areas. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), established in 2002 following the 2001 World Trade Center attacks, authorized federal, local governments, and authorities National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) to protect facilities from terrorist attacks and man-made physical attacks in 2007. NIPP clarifies the great principles and governance of the physical protection of national infrastructure in the United States presented by DHS. There are many physical protection design guidelines and technical standards for preventing attacks from terrorists or internal and external sabotage attackers, improving the viability of mitigating the damage in case of emergency, and achieving efficient recovery from such damage. Particularly important, small-scale damage/damage at a particular location of a major facility is extended to the entire facility, resulting in asymmetrical large-scale damage, so-called “Progressive Collapse” under initial attack loads, minimizing local damage, and protecting the building’s integrity through isolation from other structural components. Consequently, this paper deal with physical protection system design on Unite states standards and practices for applying to physical protection system design in Republic of Korea.

Molten salt reactor (MSR) has a unique characteristic using liquid fuel and/or coolant salt among six type of GEN IV reactors. Liquid fuels and on-site processing are fundamentally different from a solid fuel reactor where separate facilities produce the fresh solid fuel and process the Spent Nuclear Fuel. Because the choice of fuel cycle affects the safeguards and non-proliferation characteristics of the reactor system, different MSR concepts may have different proliferation resistance and physical protection characteristics. For example, MSR design variants that use solid fuel but are cooled with liquid salts such as FHR are very close to the Very High Temperature Reactor design concept. The composition of various fuel salts is a representative factor that makes it difficult to generalize the PRPP evaluation principle of MSR. In addition, the flow of molten salts containing fissile materials is also complex depending on the design of the reactor. The path through which radioactive materials travel not only inside the reactor but also to nuclear fuel cycle facilities can act as a difficult factor in measuring nuclear materials. As a further complication, some of the plants include fuel salt drain tanks intended to provide decay heat removal while others are designed to provide decay heat removal while the salt is maintained within the reactor vessel. Some lessons learned from the prior molten salt breeder reactor program are reflected in all of the new designs. Interior reflectors/shielding are frequently employed to reduce the radiation damage to the reactor vessel, and fuel salt chemistry control is employed to substantially limit oxidizing the container alloy constituents. However, even with the vessel interior shielding, the containment environment around both solid and liquid fueled MSRs during operation is likely to have substantially higher dose rates than at LWRs due to the fission process and fission products in the case of circulating liquid fueled reactors, and the shortlived activation products of fluorine (16N, 20F, and 19O) in the case of FHRs. Consequentially due to insufficient shielding from the coolant and the vessel wall, MSR containments will be remote access only for liquid fueled systems and remote access only during operation for FHRs.

In the event of an contingency situation of physical protection in nuclear facilities, the first organization to deal with at the forefront is the Special Response Forces (SRF). Since the SRF has to perform nuclear facility protection at the actual battle site, they must repeatedly train tactical understanding such as shooting, entry, and suppression so that their body can remember it even in real contingency situations (called Muscle Memory). In reality, however, repeated training using firearms is very difficult due to high risk and high cost, except for some military and police organizations. Using the advantages of VR technology, the Korea Institute of Nuclear nonproliferation and control (KINAC) has developed educational contents of “VR Shooting Training Center (VR STC)” to enable low-risk, low-cost, and repeated shooting training for these high-risk, high-cost training. This content was developed by dividing it into an “indoor” and “outdoor” training field. Educational firearms are all developed as gas guns to add to the sense of reality, and trainees can choose firearms, distance movement of targets and other options. The “Indoor training field” was developed by imitating an actual indoor shooting field, in particular the “outdoor training field” was developed using VR technology and motion tracking technology. Therefore, in “outdoor training field”, trainees can move freely within the designated spot of not only in VR content but also reality and then have to perform some missions. Trainees have to overcome random obstacles as they move to a designated destination, and at the destination, they are attacked by terrorists. Therefore, trainees must complete missions by concealing their bodies using objects around them. The one training course includes a total of 10 missions, and after the training is completed, comprehensive training results such as shooting accuracy and mission completion are expressed. VR STC will be a representative example of making high-risk, high-cost training into low-risk, low-cost, and repeated training. In this respect, VR technology can be used to develop various radiation protection curriculums accompanied by high risk and high cost, and can improve educational effects.