The integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) into the legal field, particularly under the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) framework, is a transformative journey that is reshaping the landscape of legal practice. This transformation presents a myriad of opportunities, challenges, and ethical considerations that require our collective attention and action. The potential of AI to enhance efficiency, accuracy, and accessibility in legal services is substantial. However, it is crucial to navigate this transformation responsibly, ensuring that the integration of AI respects and upholds our ethical, legal, and societal values. Striking a balance between technological advancement and human expertise, while also addressing the social implications of AI, is a critical task that lies ahead. The role of international collaboration and knowledge sharing in shaping the AI-infused future of law is significant. Platforms such as the RCEP provide an invaluable opportunity for nations to share best practices, learn from each other, and collaboratively tackle challenges arising from the intersection of AI and law. Moreover, the development of human resources is paramount. As AI continues to revolutionize the legal industry, continuous education and training are crucial to ensure that our workforce can harness these changes effectively. Lastly, the continuous development and promotion of technological innovation in the legal field is a strategic necessity. By acknowledging and addressing the challenges posed by AI, we can harness its potential to elevate our legal systems, redefine the roles of legal professionals, and serve our societies better.

Hanford site has been operated since 1943 to produce the plutonium for nuclear weapons. Significant amount of radioactive wastes was generated by the nuclear weapons production process. The radioactive wastes are stored in 177 aged underground tanks. Due to the risk of leakage into the air and the Columbia River, the US DOE and EPA, and Washington State Department of Ecology organized the Tri-Party Agreement (TPA) to clean-up the Hanford site in 1989. The LAW (low-activity waste) vitrification facility named WTP (Waste Treatment Plant) is plan to vitrify about 212 million liters of radioactive waste. The US DOE announced that the world’s largest melter to vitrify the LAW was heated up on October 8, 2022.

After the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan in March 2011, many Koreans were concerned that products exposed to radioactive materials released from the nuclear power plant would be imported into Korea. Systematic radiation monitoring was required for food and daily necessities imported from the nuclear accident area. The need for a legal system to support systematic radiation monitoring was also demanded. The Act on Protective Action Guidelines against Radiation in the Natural Environment was enacted to resolve concerns regarding environmental radiation in Korea in July 2011. According to this law, radiation monitoring equipment has been installed and operated at major airports and ports nationwide. This paper aims to review the radiation monitoring system of the Korean government comprehensively. The legal system and the legal basis for radiation monitoring of imported cargo conducted by each department were investigated by analyzing the laws and regulations of radiation monitoring for the relevant cargo items. In addition, the current status of radiation monitoring by the government departments was examined to determine how radiation monitoring for imported cargo is performed within the legal system. The investigation of the current radiation monitoring system for imported cargo in Korea confirmed that radiation monitoring is conducted by classifying cargo items under the jurisdiction of each government department for all imported cargo. However, the reduction in efficiency of radiation monitoring of imported cargoes, unclear legal grounds for radiation monitoring of imported cargo by some departments, the occurrence of overlapping inspections by departments, and the difficult process of issuing the radiation test certificate required for customs clearance by the Korea Customs Service were also identified. As a result of the analysis, it was found that the current radiation monitoring system for imported cargo in Korea ought to be improved, taking into account efficiency, overlapping inspection, legal background, and the difficult process of issuing the certificates.

The domestic Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) decommissioning project is expected to be carried out sequentially, starting with Kori Unit 1. As a license holder, in order to smoothly operate a new decommissioning project, a process in terms of project management must be well established. Therefore, this study will discuss what factors should be considered in establishing the process of decommissioning NPPs. Various standards have been proposed as project management tools on how to express the business process in writing and in what aspects to describe it. Representatively, PMBOK, ISO 21500, and PRICE 2 may be considered. It will be necessary to consider IAEA safety standards in the nuclear decommissioning project. GSR part 6 and part 2 can be considered as two major requirements. GSR part 6 presents a total of 15 requirements, including decommissioning plans, general safety requirements until execution and termination. GSR part 2 presents basic principles for securing the safety of nuclear facilities, and there are a total of 14 requirements. Domestic regulatory guidelines should be considered, and there will be largely laws and regulations related to the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, guidelines for regulatory agencies, and guidelines and regulations related to HSE. The Nuclear Safety Act, Enforcement Decree, Enforcement Rules, and NSSC should be considered in the applicable law for nuclear facilities. Since the construction and operation process has been established for domestic decommissioning project, there will be parts where existing procedures must be applied in terms of life cycle management of facilities and the same performance entity. As a management areas classification in the construction and operation stage, it seems that a classification similar to Level 1 and Level 2 should be applied to the decommissioning project. This study analyzed the factors to be considered in the management system in preparing for the first decommissioning project in Korea. Since it is project management, it is necessary to establish a system by referring to international standards, and it is suggested that domestic regulatory reflection, existing business procedures, and domestic business conditions should be considered.

The operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants (NPPs) creates waste in the process of handling radioactively contaminated material, which must be disposed of in a repository or can be recovered of in the same way as conventional waste in the course of handling radioactively contaminated materials. For buildings or sites of NPPs it also has to be decided under what conditions they can continue to be used for other, conventional purposes or demolished. This decision is referred to as “release from supervision under nuclear and radiation protection law” or “clearance” in short. The clearance levels applicable in Germany according to the Radiation Protection Ordinance have been defined such that a radiation dose (hereinafter referred to as “dose”) of 10 μSv per year is not exceeded. The vast majority of the materials resulting from the dismantling of a nuclear power plant (e.g. most of the massive concrete structures) are neither contaminated nor activated. Thus, there is no need to treat these materials as radioactive waste. Emplacement of uncontaminated masses which in Germany is essentially several million tonnes of building rubble in a repository would require additional construction of such facilities, which, in view of the negligible hazard potential, from the point of view of the Nuclear Waste Management Commission (ESK) is clearly to be rejected both economically and, in particular, ecologically. Alternative ways are increasingly discussed in public, such as the abandonment of buildings after gutting, i.e. refraining from demolition of the controlled area buildings of NPPs. Also, another proposal discussed in public, the landfilling or the long-term storage of cleared material at the site, does not offer any safety-related advantages either in the view of the ESK. If, after completion of all dismantling work, the building has been decontaminated such that the clearance levels for buildings are complied with further use of the building rubble resulting from demolition is harmless from a radiological point of view. For these reasons, Germany has deliberately decided to use clearance as an essential measure in the dismantling of NPPs. If it is intended to conventionally reuse or depose of virtually contaminant-free material from controlled areas, it must first undergo a clearance procedure. The prerequisites that must be fulfilled for clearance are regulated in the Radiation Protection Ordinance, which includes two basic clearance pathways: unrestricted and specific clearance. In the following, the basic process of clearance is briefly presented and illustrated for a better understanding. It comprises five steps. Step 1-Radiological characterization by sampling, Step 2-Dismantling of plant components in the controlled area, Step 3- Decontamination, Step 4-Decission measurements, Step 5-Clearacnce and further management. The entire clearance process is governed by a clearance notice and is carried out under the supervision of the competent authority under nuclear and radiation protection law or the independent authorized expert commissioned by it. The clearance pathways contained in the Radiation Protection Ordinance have proven themselves in practice. They permit safe and proper management of material from dismantling and release of the site from supervision under nuclear and radiation protection law. These German regulatory procedures should be taken into account and deregulation and removal should be used as appropriate and necessary tools in the process of decommissioning NPPs in order to return non-hazardous materials to the material cycle or for conventional disposal.

The Internal Compliance Program (ICP) is a framework for promoting compliance with laws and regulations and minimizing violations. It aims to prevent law breaches, by raising awareness of the compliance within the organization, which leads to enhance the credibility of the organization, and to prepare for audits. From the perspective of nuclear export control, ICP can be used to verify the company’s credibility by following NSG Guidelines and is expected to contribute to preventing the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons in the international community. However, ICP system is not globally established, and the NSG does not provide official guidelines for ICP. Therefore, this study aims to analyze the “Good Practices for Internal Compliance Programs for Nuclear and Nuclear-Related Exports” provided by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to find ways to apply and activate ICPs for domestic exporters. The form of ICP could vary depending on company’s size and internal environments, but it should be organized as follows. First, an internal department should be established so as to implement the ICP, and an executive who has export control knowledge should be assigned as the Chief Export Control Officer (CECO). The CECO, establish and revise ICP operating procedures and manual, organize contact point to communicate internally and externally. Second, measures should be established minimize risks in the export process, including business development transaction screening, supply chain, research and development, human resource, and intangible technology transfer risks. Third, internal control system should be established for export control compliance. The CECO should conduct regular assessments to ensure compliance and strengthen the organization’s internal export compliance processes. Fourth, an export-related training program should be periodically conducted for employees. In addition, as soon as the CECO becomes aware of, CECO should review the matter, take corrective action, and report to the relevant national authorities, when a violation of domestic export control laws or suspicious circumstances are captured. Nuclear export control plays an important role in ensuring nuclear nonproliferation. Republic of Korea has been implementing the ICP system for Dual-Use Items under the Foreign Trade Act, but not for Trigger List Items. Therefore, introduction of ICP for Trigger List Items is expected significantly contribute to nuclear nonproliferation. The subjects of ICP will be initially targeted to major nuclear enterprises, then gradually expanded to all nuclear enterprises. Further researches are needed to introduce on ICP for Trigger List Items.

A person who performs or plans to conduct a physical protection inspection as stipulated by the law, the act on physical protection and radiological emergency, should obtain an inspector’s ID card certified and authorized by Nuclear Safety and Security Commission Order No.137 (referred to as Order 137). In addition, according to Order 137, KINAC has been operating some training courses for those with the inspector’s ID card or intending to acquire it. Also, strenuous efforts have been put to incrementally elevate their inspection related expertise. Since Republic of Korea has to import uranium enriched less than 20% in order to manufacture fuels of nuclear reactors in domestic and abroad, the physical protection for categorization III nuclear material in transit is significantly important along with an increase in transport. The expertise of inspectors should be constantly needed to strengthen as the increase in transport leads to an increase in inspection of nuclear material in transit. We have suggested a special way to improve the inspector’s capacities through Virtual Reality technology (VR). A 3-Dimensional virtual space was designed and developed using a 3-axis simulator and VR equipment for practical training. HP’s Reverb G2 product, which was developed in collaboration with VALVE Corporation and MicroSoft, was used as VR equipment, and the 3-axis motion simulator was developed by M-line STUDIO corp. in Korea for the purpose of realizing virtual reality. The training scenarios of transport inspection consist of three parts: preparation at the shipping point, transport in route including stops and handover at the receiving point. At the departure point, scenario of the transport preparation is composed with the contents of checking the transport-related documents which should be carried by shipper and/or carrier during transport and confirming who the shipper and/or carrier is. Second, scenario is designed for inspector to experience how carrier and/or shipper protect the nuclear material during transport or stops for rests or contingency and how they communicate with each other during transport. Lastly, scenario is developed focusing on key check items during handover of responsibilities to the facility operator at the destination. Those training scenarios can be adopted to strengthen the capabilities of those with inspector’s ID card of physical protection in accordance with Order 137 and to help new inspectors acquire inspectionrelated expertise. In addition, they can be used for domestic education to promote understanding of nuclear security, or may be used for education for people overseas for the purpose of export of nuclear facilities.

Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) and KINAC review a Cyber Security Plan (CSP) by「ACT ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY」. The CSP contains cyber security implementation plans for the licensee’s nuclear power plant, and it shall meet the requirements of KINAC/RS-015, a regulatory standard. The KINAC/RS-015 provides more detailed information on the legal requirements, so if licensees implement cyber security under the approved CSP, they can meet the law. To protect nuclear facilities from cyber-attacks, licensees should identify their essential digital assets, so-called “Critical Digital Assets” (CDAs). Then, they apply cyber security controls (countermeasures for cyber-attacks) on CDAs consisting of technical, operational, and management security controls. However, it is hard to apply cyber security controls on CDAs because of the large amounts of CDAs and security controls in contrast to the shortage of human resources. So, licensees in the USA developed a methodology to solve this problem and documented it by NEI 13-10, and US NRC endorsed this document. The main idea of this methodology is, by classifying CDAs according to their importance, applying small amounts of security controls on less important CDAs, so-called non-direct CDAs. In the case of non-direct CDAs, only basic cyber security controls are applied, that is, baseline cyber security controls. The baseline cyber security controls are a minimum set of cyber security controls; they consist of control a) from control g) a total of 7 controls. Although non-direct CDAs are less critical than other CDAs (direct CDAs), they are still essential to protect them from cyber-attacks. This paper aims to suggest a cyber security enhancement method for non-direct CDAs by analyzing the baseline cyber security controls. In this paper, baseline cyber security controls were analyzed respectively and relatively and then concluded how to apply small amounts of cyber security controls on non-direct CDAs rather than direct CDAs without scarifying cyber security.

An administrative agreement (AA) was signed between NSSC and UAE FANR in January 2023 under Article 5 of the ROK-UAE Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. The AA aims to enhance regulatory efficiency in safeguards and export control. This study reviewed the export control measures for the items subject to the agreement (ISA) and implementation procedures under ROK-UAE AA by comparing them with other countries cases. First of all, the ROK-UAE AA distinguishes between ISA and the inventory management target items. Technology is divided into two categories, one requiring consent for retransfer and the other, considering the characteristics of technology that is free to be copied and deleted, and thus less useful for inventory management. Only the former is included in the annual report, which differs from the ROK-Canada or ROK-Japan NCA, which includes all technologies subject to the agreements in the annual report. When ROK notifies export information, it is mandatory to specify whether the technology requires consent for retransfer. Furthermore, some technologies should be controlled as strategic information, even if excluded from the annual report, so efforts to prevent confusion are required. Secondly, the ROK-UAE AA covers all items in INFCIRC/254/rev.9/part1, unlike the ROK-U.S. and ROK-Canada NCA, which listed equipment subject to them. This is significant because it clarifies the criteria for regulation by increasing the consistency between the trigger list items in the domestic law and the ISA. However, the expanded ISA scope could result in some changes in export control procedures. For example, when importing nuclear material (NM) from the US, only uranium was controlled as ISA, and the packages were not considered. In contrast, when exporting fuel assemblies (FA) for UAE, both uranium and zirconium cladding should be treated as ISA. To this end, NEPS was improved to implement the features of the ROK-UAE AA. Consideration of the criteria and methods for imposing obligations under the agreement is essential because this is the first case of Korea concluded AA under exporting NPP and as a supplier of FA. Generally, the obligations for NM are imposed by the country of origin, conversion, and enrichment countries. Canada and EU recognize the fuel fabrication process as a substantial transformation and impose customs origin where the process takes place. Hence, NM fabricated from Canadian equipment is also subject to the same obligations as NM of Canadian origin. From this perspective, it would be appropriate to ensure ROK acts as a supplier and controls when exporting domestically manufactured FA. Moreover, a proper national obligation code system will be required to specify Korea’s control rights.

According to the “Law on protection and response measures for nuclear facilities and radiation”, Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) licensees should conduct periodic exercises based on hypothetical cyberattack scenarios, and there is a need to select significant and probable ones in a systematic manner. Since cyber-attacks are carried out intentionally, it is difficult to statistically specify the sequences, and it is not easy to systematically establish exercise scenarios because existing engineering safety facilities can be forcibly disabled. To deal with the above situation, this paper suggests a procedure using the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) model to develop a cybersecurity exercise scenario. The process for creating cyber security exercise scenarios consists of (i) selecting cyber-attack-causing initiating events, (ii) identifying digital systems, (iii) assigning cyber-attack vectors to a digital system, (iv) determining and adding type for operator’s response, (v) modifying a baseline PSA model, and (vi) extracting top-ranked minimal cut sets, and (vii) selecting a representative scenario. This procedure is described in detail through a case study, an expected cyber-attack scenario General Transient-Anticipated Transient Without Scram (GTRN-ATWS). It refers to an accident scenario for ATWS induced by GTRN. Since ATWS is targeted for cyber training in some NPPs, and GTRN is one of the most common accidents occurring in NPPs, GTRN-ATWS was chosen as an example. As for the cyber-attack vector, portable media and mobile devices were selected as examples based on expert judgment. In this paper, only brief examples of GTRN-ATWS events have been presented, but future studies will be conducted on an analysis of all initiating events in which cyber-attacks can occur.

A Study on the Discussion for the Indefendent Charater and the No-cause Character of the Real Rights Behavior The most controversial topic in the Korean civil law academic circle so far is the theory of Real Rights Behavior, which has centered on the the Indefendent Charater and the No-cause Character of Real Rrights Behavior. The core of the controversy over the No-cause Character of Real Rights Behavior is the legal interest of securing transaction safety, and the theoretical basis necessary to argue whether the No-cause Character of Real Rights Behavior is the recognition of the identity of Real Rights Behavior. In the end, the fierce debate, which has been held for the practical legal interest of securing transaction safety, is believed to be due to the lack of a realistic legal system and its regulations, and the unreasonable application of uncritical foreign theories. In other words, the Auflassung system to supplement the formalism examination system of registration in Germany secured transaction safety by strengthening the function of strengthening the credibility of registration. However, in the absence of such systems and related laws, the Korean civil law community borrowed German theories and applied them excessively, and constant debate reproduced them. In order to protect the realistic legal interests of transaction safety and to establish a consistent theoretical system in academia, it is necessary to supplement related systems through legislation

Currently, the most widely accepted disposal concept for long-term isolation of high level radioactive waste including spent nuclear fuels is to disposal in a deep geological repository designed and constructed with multiple barriers composed of engineered and natural barriers so that the waste can be completely isolated in a stable deep geological environment. In this concept, an important consideration is the heat generated from the waste due to the large amount of fission products present in the high level waste loaded in the disposal container. For safe and complete isolation of high level radioactive waste in the deep geology, the disposal concepts that meet the thermal requirements for the disposal system design have been developed by harmonizing the thermal characteristics of engineered and natural barriers in Korea. In this paper, the deposition hole configuration and the decay heat dissipation area (surface area) of disposal container were considered for the efficient thermal management in the deep geological disposal concept. Heat transfer through the waste form, its container and surrounding components and the rock will be mainly by conduction. Heat transfer by radiation and convection can be negligible after backfilling. When considering heat conduction, according to Fourier’s law, if the thermal conductivity of the repository components is the same, the greater the heat dissipation area and the adjacent temperature gradient, the greater the conduction effect. Therefore, rather than the conventional concept of loading 4 PWR spent fuel assemblies per disposal container and placing one disposal container in a deposition hole, it is better to load one assembly per disposal container and place 4 disposal containers in a deposition hole. In this case, it was found that the disposal area could be reduced through efficient thermal management. Considering this thermal management method as an alternative to the concept of deep geological disposal, additional research is needed.

Under the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements (NCA) and its administrative arrangement (AA), Korea annually exchanges the inventory of subject items (including nuclear materials (NM), non-nuclear materials, equipment, and related information) with US, Canada and Australia. Also, the government performs export control procedures such as notification or prior consent during importing and exporting of relevant items. It makes NCA a means of realizing the nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, it raises difficulties in management because the entity that uses and treats those items are end-user, not the authorities of AA, the government agency of each country. Accordingly, to increase the accuracy and effectiveness of item management at the national level, it is required to establish a system for the individual company that has the NCA items, considering the characteristics of each company. In this study, significant companies are classified into more than three types, and the management system of the items subject to the agreement is analyzed. Each company’s item management status has different characteristics depending on its role (position) within the entire nuclear fuel cycle, the type of facility, its possessed items, the main form of national trade, and the frequency of domestic movement. Those differences lead to diversity in the management systems currently owned by each company. For example, from the perspective of nuclear materials, institutions requiring bulk management have systematically organized their management system and obligation code program compared to the ‘item institutions’ that can track batch history for all facility inventory changes. Although Domestic law imposes only the duty of origin management on NMs, fuel manufacturers or research institutes have established their standard obligation codes to manage multiple obligations. The non-nuclear materials and equipment can be easily tracked and controlled by individual items. However, the management of NCA items is a complicated task involving various processes, from importing goods to using, storing, managing inventory change, selling to others, or fulfilling the obligations of AA when exporting. In particular, when the movement of items within a company or international trade occurs frequently, or when the end-users are diverse, the management difficulties increase. So a system that can accurately convey and track items subject to the AA is needed. In addition, since various entities are related, it is necessary to improve understanding of NCA items to increase the system’s utilization and effectiveness. The comparison result and requirement for system improvement based on the review above will be reflected in the history management system for items subject to NCA under development.

When exporting nuclear power plants to a third country, the U.S. conditions import countries to join the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol. At the Korea-U.S. summit, Korea also agreed to maintain equal non-proliferation standards. This paper first analyzes how the U.S. applies the conditions for joining additional protocols to export control policies. The U.S. Atomic Energy Act is a general law in the field of nuclear power that governs both civilian and military use of nuclear power. Article 123 stipulates matters related to “cooperation with other countries.” According to Article 123, the United States must conclude a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with another country that stipulates nuclear non-proliferation obligations for nuclear cooperation to a “significant” extent. Article 123 of the Nuclear Energy Act presents nine conditions for signing the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, and matters related to safeguards are stipulated in Nos. 1 and 2, and only IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) is specified as requirements under the current law. As a result of analyzing the countries of the nuclear cooperation agreements currently signed by the United States, the United States is evaluating the AP in terms of the policy as an essential item. Among the nuclear agreements with the United States, three countries, Egypt, Brazil, and Argentina do not have AP in effect. Among them, Brazil and Argentina are recognized by the IAEA as replacing the ABACC with the AP, so only Egypt is not a member of the AP. The nuclear agreement between the U.S. and Egypt was signed in 1981 before the AP existed, and all recently signed agreements were identified as AP-effective countries. As a result of reviewing the U.S. export control laws, the U.S. did not legislate the AP as a condition for peaceful nuclear exports. Reflecting the NSG export control guidelines, AP was legislated as an export license requirement only in exporting sensitive nuclear technology (enrichment, reprocessing). However, it is confirmed that the U.S. policy applies AP entry into force as one of the main requirements for determining whether it is harmful to nuclear exports, along with the conclusion of the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, the application of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and military alliance. The appropriate scope of application of the Additional Protocol in Korea and its application plan will be suggested through future research.

In 2004, in order to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the European Union (EU) came into force with Regulation 428/2009 for the export control of dual-use items, which has been working to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). In August 2021, it amended the EU 821/2021 to include mandating the introduction of ICPs for exporters in the member countries in order to strengthen controls over the transfer of tangible and intangible technologies. The main contents are as follows; 1) Mandatory introduction of Internal Compliance Program (ICP): Exporters within the EU countries should introduce a transaction review procedure through the ICP in consideration of their size and organization. 2) Export control on Cyber Surveillance Items to protect human rights: In order to protect human rights and comply with the obligations of international human rights law, EU countries should implement export controls on cyber-monitoring items exported from customs zones in the EU. Cyber surveillance items are specially designed to monitor, extract, collect or analyze data such as biometrics through intrusion of information and communication systems or deep packet hijacking. However, items used for purely commercial programs such as billing, marketing, quality service, user satisfaction or network security are excluded. 3) Expansion of the Catch-all system: EU countries should utilize the catch-all system to strengthen export controls on cyber-monitoring items, including dual-use items. 4) Strengthening control over the cloud: Exporters and EU countries should extend the scope of intangible technology transfer, such as electronic media, fax, and telephone, outside the EU’s customs territory, and apply export control regulations such as general or comprehensive licenses to cloud transmissions outside the EU territory. 5) Introduction of large-scale project authorization: To reduce the administrative burden on enterprises (especially small and medium-sized enterprises) and authorities when exporters with individual or collective licenses export to one or more specific end-users for the purpose of large scale projects, provided that they ensure the implementation of an appropriate level of export controls; EU countries may introduce large-scale project license systems in the form of general authorization. Recently, there is a possibility that the ROK would export its nuclear technologies including APR1400 to the EU member countries in the midst of the EU adoption of carbon-zero policy. In this paper, we have analyzed the EU export control regulations and suggested the future direction of nuclear export control programs in the ROK.

In August 2021, in response to the rapidly changing trade environment, including the advancement of Information Communication Technology (ICT) and its services, the European Union (EU) implemented the Dual-Use Items Control Regulation 821/2021 to introduce an Internal Compliance Program (ICP) to the EU countries. Accordingly, the exporters should comply with the regulation to strengthen their transactions review systems. Sweden, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom have implemented ICPs and outreach activities for dual use items. In particular, France explicitly stipulates the introduction of ICP in the law to manage and supervise it. While Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom strengthen the supervisory authority of regulatory agencies then companies are encouraged to autonomously introduce ICPs. Before introducing the ICP for the trigger list items (the items) to the Republic of Korea (ROK), a comprehensive export license system for them should be firstly considered based on EU Regulations. Also the comprehensive export license might be implemented by expanding the subject for the existing license on technology export of nuclear plant into the items. The ROK does not introduce an ICP as it does not recognize a self-classification on the items in accordance with the nuclear export control law. However, in preparation for the export to the EU countries that have intentions to introduce nuclear plants, it is necessary to analyze the export control programs of Sweden, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. Like the programs of Sweden, Germany and the United Kingdom, the EU regulations might be adopted to reduce the regulation burden in the ROK. With the reference of Sweden, the authority could support the Export Control Manager Certification (ECMC) system accredited by civil association then its outreach activities could be diverse and extended. Basically, the ECMC system could consist of Part I, II, III and IV and an applicant could be accredited by a civil association as the ECM after completing the courses of Part I and II. The ECMC courses might be as follow; 1) Part I: the Basic common course for beginner 2) Part II: the National export control system for the items 3) Part III: the International export control regulations 4) Part IV: Re-Certification within the certain period In this paper, we analyzed the export control programs in Sweden, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom and suggested the ECMC system that might be applied to the ROK as above.

KINAC has regulated cyber security of nuclear facilities based on「Act on Physical Protection and Radiological Emergency」and KINAC/RS-015 “Security for Computer and Information System of Nuclear Facilities”, a regulatory guide. By that law and regulatory guide, nuclear licensees shall protect digital assets so-called CDAs, which are conducting safety, security, and emergency preparedness functions from cyber-attack. First of all, to protect CDAs from cyber-attack, licensees should identify CDAs from their assets according to the RS-015. The identification methods are provided in another regulatory guide, RS-019. To research the best practice, a reference case is selected as a U.S. case. In this study, a comparison analysis was conducted especially focused on EP CDAs identification methodology between R.O.K. and U.S., because the regulation basis is relatively insufficient in R.O.K., and improvement plans for the cyber security regulations in R.O.K were proposed. From the analysis, it was identified that detailed methods to identify EP function are provided in NEI 10-14 “Identifying Systems and Assets Subject to the Cyber Security Rule” published by Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), an institute of nuclear power reactor licensees. Also identified that the definition of EP function is provided clearly in NEI 10-04 based on related regulation, 10 CFR 50.47 “Emergency Plans”. In that regulation, licensees shall follow and maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the sixteen planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b). So, these sixteen planning standards correspond to the emergency preparedness functions. In NEI 10-04, scoping considerations for emergency preparedness function are provided referring to sixteen planning standards. Moreover, in that scoping considerations, planning standards, planning standard functions and 10 CFR 73.54 “Protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks” scoping guidance are provided, so, licensees identify EP CDA in their assets conveniently. In case of R.O.K., because these sixteen planning standards are not established, there is an ambiguity in identifying EP CDAs. The only related provision is “Detailed Standards for Establishment of Emergency Plan”. To resolve the ambiguity, it is needed to analyze sixteen planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and “Detailed Standards for Establishment of Emergency Plan”. Then, should be developed ‘scoping considerations for emergency preparedness function’ based on the analysis as provided in NEI 10-04.

Sabotage on nuclear power plants are of great national and social significance and long-term damage, the IAEA’s “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5) provides a standard direction for physical protection of their nuclear facilities in almost all member countries, including Korea and the United States. In the United States, Federal Law 10 CFR Part 73, Sections 73.40 to 73.57 specify requirements for physical protection of nuclear power plants, performance criteria, physical protection systems and components thereof, core information, and physical protection for key activities related to nuclear power plant operations. Accordingly, the USNRC carefully examines whether the plant meets the physical protection objectives and criteria set out in SRP 13.6.2, whether the core area/protection area is properly set up to protect against internal and external physical attacks, sabotage threats, and what design measures and facilities are being set up for these areas. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), established in 2002 following the 2001 World Trade Center attacks, authorized federal, local governments, and authorities National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) to protect facilities from terrorist attacks and man-made physical attacks in 2007. NIPP clarifies the great principles and governance of the physical protection of national infrastructure in the United States presented by DHS. There are many physical protection design guidelines and technical standards for preventing attacks from terrorists or internal and external sabotage attackers, improving the viability of mitigating the damage in case of emergency, and achieving efficient recovery from such damage. Particularly important, small-scale damage/damage at a particular location of a major facility is extended to the entire facility, resulting in asymmetrical large-scale damage, so-called “Progressive Collapse” under initial attack loads, minimizing local damage, and protecting the building’s integrity through isolation from other structural components. Consequently, this paper deal with physical protection system design on Unite states standards and practices for applying to physical protection system design in Republic of Korea.

Since the reform and opening up, China has maintained rapid economic growth for nearly 40 years, and is the country with the fastest economic growth in the world. However, the rapid economic growth has also paid a huge social price, which is directly related to the unreasonable economic structure and extensive growth mode. Traditional engines of economic growth began to fade. This paper through the analysis to the theory of ancient and modern Chinese and foreign economists study on economic growth: economic growth is an extremely complex process, many factors influence the economic growth, correctly grasp the role of these factors in economic growth, to grasp the law of economic growth, the correct understanding of modern economic growth is very important. Sustained economic growth in China, on the basis of dynamic analysis, combined with the current economic situation at home and abroad, as you can see, in the high-speed economic growth since reform, various factors have been attenuation or mutation, the major developed countries and regions for the adjustment of the external imbalance in pressure, the depth of the global economic growth and recovery of the factors of uncertainty, It is difficult to maintain and improve the driving force and source of China’s economic growth in the future. The current industrialization process has reached a historical and international high level and is nearing the end. The growth rate of industrial investment will slow down significantly in the future. The demographic dividend is gradually depleting, and the savings rate will gradually decrease in the future. The era of rapid economic growth brought by demographic dividend and high savings rate in a long period of time will change. Therefore, based on the perspective of supply side demand and the development of new industries, the paper analyzes the driving force of traditional economic growth in China in the past, and holds that the driving force of consumption upgrading and digital economy are the important driving force of economic growth, and strives to improve the consumption structure of residents, increase the consumption rate and vigorously develop digital economy. Shifting China’s economic growth from relying on external demand to relying on domestic demand will provide strong support for high-quality development.

Climate change has recently become a serious global issue, and carbon emissions and energy consumption are increasing, particularly in cities where economic activities and populations are concentrated. Accordingly, various countries worldwide are promoting the Green New Deal and promoting urban-centered climate change response policies with the aim of carbon neutrality. In Korea, following the “smart green city” project that creates a city where humans and the environment coexist, a similar “carbon neutral green city” policy is set to be introduced. Therefore, in this study, implications and directions for the sustainable introduction of the carbon neutral green city policy will be derived by comparing and analyzing the State and Tribal Assistance Grants of the U.S. bipartisan infrastructure law and the smart green city of the Korean new deal.