This paper stated the variation of the hydrodynamic resistant coefficient K of hand knitting plane model net which was set perpendicularly to the flow of water. The scale of the model net was determined after Tauti's principle for similarity law and experi nent was conducted for measuring the coefficients about two cases of the nets composed of flat knot (reef knot) and trawlers knot(sheet bent). The scale of the model nets which was used in experiment were 1/10, 1/20, 1/30, 1/40, 1/50, 1/60, 1/70, 1/80, 1/90 and full scale. The result of this experiment in circulating water tank came to the conclusion that; a. The hydrodynamic coefficient of trawler knotted net showed about 0.55 higher than the flat knotted net. b. The value of K coincided approximately with the value estimated by the formulae which H. Miyamoto, M. Nomura and Y. shimozaki calculated from experiment. c. The hydrodynamic coefficient K were not varied when the scale ratio was larger than 1/50, the value of K was increased gradually from 1/60 and suddenly increased at 1/80 and 1/90. Therefore, when we design a model net it is appropriate to restrict the scale ratio to less than 1/50, under the condition that the velocity of the full scale is 1.3 knot in this experiment.

To construct and operate nuclear power plants (NPPs), it is mandatory to submit a radiation environmental impact assessment report in accordance with Article 10 and Article 20 of the Nuclear Safety Act. Additionally, in compliance with Article 136 of the Enforcement Regulations of the same law, KHNP (Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power) annually assesses radiation environmental effects and publishes the results for operating NPPs. Furthermore, since the legalization of emission plans submission in 2015, KHNP has been submitting emission plans for individual NPPs, starting with the Shin-Hanul 1 and 2 units in 2018. These emission plans specify the emission quantities that meet the dose criteria specified by the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission. Before 2002, KHNP used programs developed in the United States, such as GASPAR and LADTAP, for nearby radiation environmental impact assessments. Since then, KHNP has been using K-DOSE60, developed internally. K-DOSE60 incorporates environmental transport analysis models in line with U.S. regulatory guidance Regulatory Guide 1.109 and dose assessment models reflecting ICRP-60 recommendations. K-DOSE60 is a stand-alone program installed on individual user PCs, making it difficult to manage comprehensively when program revisions are needed. Additionally, during the preparation of emission plans and the licensing phase, improvements to KDOSE60’ s dose assessment methodology were identified. Furthermore, in 2022, regulatory guidelines regarding resident dose assessments were revised, leading to additional improvement requirements. Currently, E-DOSE60, being developed by KHNP, is a network-based program allowing for integrated configuration management within the KHNP network. E-DOSE60 is expected to be developed while incorporating the identified improvements from K-DOSE60, in response to emission plan licensing and regulatory guideline revisions. Key improvements include revisions to dose assessment methodologies for H-13 and C-14 following IAEA TRS-472, expansion of dose assessment points, and changes in socio-environmental factors. Furthermore, data such as site meteorological information and releases of radioactive substances in liquid and gaseous forms can be linked through a network, reducing the potential for human errors caused by manual data entry. Ultimately, E-DOSE60 is expected to optimize resident exposure dose assessment and enhance public trust in NPP operation.

As the acceptance criteria for low-intermediate-level radioactive waste cave disposal facilities of Korea Radioactive Waste Agency (KORAD) were revised, the requirements for characterization of whether radioactive waste contains hazardous substances have been strengthened. In addition, As the recent the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission Notice (Regulations on Delivery of Low- Medium-Level Radioactive Waste) scheduled to be revised, the management targets and standards for hazardous substances are scheduled to be specified and detailed. Accordingly, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) needs to prepare management methods and procedures for hazardous substances. In particular, in order to characterize the chemical requirements (explosiveness, ignitability, flammability, corrosiveness, and toxicity) contained in radioactive waste, it must be proven through documents or data that each item does not contain hazardous substances, and quality assurance for the overall process must be provided. In order to identify the characteristics of radioactive waste that will continue to be generated in the future, KAERI needs to introduce a management system for hazardous substances in radioactive waste and establish a quality assurance system. Currently, KAERI is thoroughly managing chelates (EDTA, NTA, etc.), but the detailed management procedures for hazardous substances related to chemical requirements in radioactive waste in the radiation management area specified above are insufficient. The KAERI’s Laboratory Safety Information Network has a total periodic regulatory review system in place for the purchase, movement, and disposal of chemical substances for each facility. However, there is no documents or data to prove that the hazardous substances held in the facility are not included in the radioactive waste, and there are no procedures for managing hazardous substances. Therefore, it is necessary to establish procedures for the management of hazardous substances, and we plan to prepare management procedures for hazardous substances so that chemical substances can be managed according to the procedures at each facility during preliminary inspection before receiving radioactive waste. The procedure provides definitions of terms and types of management targets for each characteristic of the chemical requirements specified above (explosiveness, ignition, flammability, corrosiveness, and toxicity). In addition, procedure also contains treatment methods of radioactive waste generated by using hazardous substances and management methods of in/out, quantity, history of that substances, etc. As the law is revised in the future, management will be carried out according to the relevant procedures. In this study, we aim to present the hazardous substance management procedures being established to determine whether radioactive waste contains hazardous substances in accordance with the revised the notice and strengthened acceptance criteria. Through this, we hope to contribute to improving reliability so that radioactive waste could be disposed of thoroughly and safely.

Ion exchange resins are commonly employed in the treatment of liquid radioactive waste generated in nuclear power plants (NPP). The ion exchange resin used in NPP is a mixed-bed ion exchange resin known as IRN-150, which is of nuclear grade. This resin is a mixture of cation exchange resin and anion exchange resin. The cation exchange resin removes cationic radionuclides such as Cs and Co, while anion exchange resin handles anions (e.g., H14CO3 -), effectively purifying the liquid waste. Spent ion exchange resins (spent resin) containing C-14 are classified as low and intermediate level radioactive waste, and their radioactivity needs to be reduced as it exceeds the disposal limit regulated by law. Therefore, the microwave technology for the removal of C-14 from spent resin has been investigated. Previous studies have successfully developed a method for the effective removal of C-14 during the resin treatment process. However, it was observed that, in this process, functional groups in the resin were also removed, resulting in the generation of off-gases containing trimethylamine. These off-gases can dissolve in water from process, increasing its pH, which can subsequently hinder the recovery of C-14. In this study, we investigated the high-purity recovery of C-14 by adjusting the moisture content within the reactor following microwave treatment. Mock spent resins, consisting of 100 g of resin with HCO3 - ion-exchanged and 0, 25, or 50 g of deionized water, were subjected to microwave treatment for 40 or 60 minutes. Subsequently, the C-14 desorption efficiency of the mock spent resins was evaluated using an acid stripping process with H3PO4 solution. The functional group status of the mock spent resins was analyzed using 15N NMR spectroscopy. The results showed that the mock spent resins exhibited efficient C-14 recovery without significant functional group degradation. The highest C-14 desorption efficiency was achieved when 25 g of deionized water was used during microwave treatment.

The increasing accumulation of spent nuclear fuel has raised interest in High-Level Waste (HLW) repositories. For example, Sweden is under construction of the KBS-3 repository. To ensure the safety of such HLW repository, various countries have been developing assessment models. In the Republic of Korea, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute has been developing on the AKRS model. However, traditional safety assessment models have not considered the fracture growth in the far-field host rock as a function of time. As repository safety assessments guarantee safety for million years, sustained stress naturally leads to the progressive growth of fractures as time goes on. Therefore, it becomes essential to account for fracture growth in the surrounding host rock. To address this, our study proposes a new coupling scheme between the Fracture growth model and the radionuclide transport model. That coupling scheme consists of the Cubic Law model as a fracture growth function and the GoldSim code which is a commercial software for radionuclide transport calculations. The model that adopting such fracture growth functions showed an increase of up to 15% in the release of radionuclide compared to traditional assessment models. our observations indicated that crack growth as a function of time led to an increase in hydraulic conductivity that allowed more radionuclide transport. Notably, these findings show the significance of adopting fracture growth models as a critical element in evaluating the safety of nuclear waste repositories.

It is crucial to understand the hydro-mechanical behavior of rock mass to assess the performance of natural barriers. As rock fractures serve as both mechanically weak planes and prominent pathways for hydraulic flow, they significantly influence the hydro-mechanical behavior of the rock mass. Hence, understanding the characteristics of rock fractures is necessary to analyze the long-term behavior of natural barriers. In particular, fracture apertures are crucial parameters directly associated with groundwater flow and consequently hold significant importance in determining the hydro-mechanical behavior of natural barriers. Fracture apertures are defined as mechanical and hydraulic apertures, and various studies have been conducted to measure and analyze them. However, direct measurement of mechanical aperture according to changes in normal stress is known to be a challenging task. For this reason, there has been a scarcity of direct comparative findings between mechanical and hydraulic apertures under various normal stress conditions. This study aims to analyze the characteristics of the mechanical and hydraulic apertures according to changes in normal stress based on experimental results. A digital analysis technique using a pressure film image was applied to analyze the mechanical aperture characteristics of the fracture. This technique can be applied by performing a pressure film compression test and a normal stiffness test on a fracture specimen, and has the advantage of being able to derive mechanical apertures under various normal stress conditions. The hydraulic aperture characteristics of the fracture were analyzed based on Cubic law after measuring the flow rate by performing a constant pressure injection test under triaxial compression conditions. By applying various confining pressures, it was possible to examine the hydraulic apertures according to changes in normal stress conditions. Through the experimental results, the relationship between the mechanical and hydraulic apertures of the fracture was summarized under various normal stress conditions. In addition, the experimental results were used to examine the applicability of various empirical equations for mechanical and hydraulic apertures proposed in previous studies. The characteristics of the fracture aperture resulting from this study are significant because they are required in the hydro-mechanical model of natural barriers. Future studies will entail further experiments, with the objective of establishing novel relationships based on the accumulation of experimental data.

The natural barrier system surrounding the geological repository for high-level radioactive waste plays a crucial role in preventing or delaying the leakage of radionuclides. Therefore, the natural barrier should ensure low permeability to prevent groundwater flow into the engineered barrier system throughout the repository’s lifetime. Crystalline rock, considered as the host rock for the geological repository in Korea, exhibits low intact rock permeability, but the crystalline rock often contains the multiple discontinuities due to its high brittleness that can allow the unexpected fluid flow. Therefore, the long-term hydraulic behavior of the discontinuity should be characterized while considering additional thermal, mechanical, and chemical effects. In comparison to thermal, hydraulic, and mechanical processes, the chemical processes on the discontinuities progress relatively slowly, resulting in limited researches to include these chemical processes. This research introduces mechanisms the involving coupled thermal-hydraulic-mechanicalchemical processes focusing on the rough fracture surfaces and asperities. The chemically-induced changes in mechanical and hydraulic properties are described based on pressure solution and precipitation concepts. A comprehensive review of laboratory tests, field tests, and numerical simulations is conducted related to the chemically-induced coupled processes in fractured rock. Laboratory tests, in particular, concentrate on microscopic changes in fracture asperities induced by pressure solution to analyze chemically-induced aperture changes. The TOUGHREACT, an integral finite difference method program for thermal-hydraulic-chemical simulations, is generally employed to model the chemical response of pressure solution and precipitation on fracture surfaces. The TOUGHREACT includes a module to describe effective porosity and permeability changes based on the modified cubic law, so the real-time change of the fracture permeability can be reflected during the flow simulation. Considering the coupled thermal-hydraulic-mechanicalchemical processes of discontinuity, it becomes evident that the chemical processes under repository conditions (long-term, high temperature, and high pressure) can disturb the hydraulic performance of the natural barrier, so further research is required to characterize the chemically-induced coupled processes for assessing the long-term performance of the natural barrier system.

Considering the domestic situation where all nuclear power plants are located on seaside, the interim storage site is also likely to be located on coastal site. Maritime transportation is inevitable and the its risk assessment is very important for safety. Currently, there is no independently developed maritime transportation risk assessment code in Korea, and no research has been conducted to evaluate the release of radioactive waste due to the immersion of transport cask. Previous studies show that the release rate of radionuclides contained in a submerged transport cask is significantly affected by the area of flow path generated at the breached containment boundary. Due to the robustness of a cask, the breach is the most likely generated between the lid and body of cask. CRIEPI investigated the effect of cask containment on the release rate of radioactive contents into the ocean and proposed a procedure to calculate the release rate considering the socalled barrier effect. However, the contribution of O-ring on the release rate was not considered in the work. In this study, test and analysis is performed to determine the equivalent flow path gap considering the influence of O-rings. These results will be implemented in the computational model to assess sea water flow through a breached containment boundary using CFD techniques to assess radionuclide release rates. To evaluate the release rate as a function of lid displacement, a small containment vessel is engineered and a metal O-ring of the Helicoflex HN type is installed, which is the most commonly used one in transport and storage casks. The lid of containment vessel is displaced in vertical and horizontal direction and the release rate of the vessel was quantified using the helium leak test and the pressure drop test. Through this work, the relationship between the vertical opening displacement and horizontal sliding displacement of the cask lid and the actual flow path area created is established. This will be implemented in the CFD model for flow rate calculation from a submerged transport cask in the deep sea. In addition, the compression of the O-ring causes very small gaps, such as capillaries. In these cases, Poiseuille’s law is used to calculate the capillary flow rate.

Once discharged, spent nuclear fuel undergoes an initial cooling process within deactivation pools situated at the reactor site. This cooling step is crucial for reducing the fuel’s temperature. Once the heat has sufficiently diminished, two viable options emerge: reprocessing or interim storage. A method known as PUREX, for aqueous nuclear reprocessing, involves a chemical procedure aimed at separating uranium and plutonium from the spent nuclear fuel. This separation not only minimizes waste volume but also facilitates the reuse of the extracted materials as fuel for nuclear reactors. The transformation of uranium oxides through dissolution in nitric acid followed by drying results in uranium taking the form of UO2(NO3)2 + 6H2O, which can then be converted into various solid-state configurations through different heat treatments. This study specifically focuses on investigating the phase transitions of artificially synthesized UO2(NO3)2 + 6H2O subjected to heat treatment at various temperatures (450, 500, 550, 600°C) using X-ray Diffraction (XRD) analysis. Heat treatments were also conducted on UO2 to analyze its phase transformations. Additionally, the study utilized XRD analysis on an unidentified oxidized uranium oxide, UO2+X, and employed lattice parameters and Bragg’s law to ascertain the oxidation state of the unknown sample. To synthesize UO2(NO3)2 + 6H2O, U3O8 powder is first dissolved in a 20% HNO3 solution. The solid UO2(NO3)2 + 6H2O is obtained after drying on a hotplate and is subsequently subjected to heat treatment at temperatures of 450, 500, 550, and 600°C. As the heat treatment temperature increases, the color of the samples transitions from orange to dark green, indicating the formation of different phases at different temperatures. XRD analysis confirms that uranyl nitrate, when heattreated at 500 and 550°C, oxidizes to UO3, while the sample subjected to 600°C heat treatment transforms into U3O8 due to the higher temperature. All samples exhibit sharp crystal peaks in their XRD spectra, except for the one heat-treated at 450°C. In the second experiment, the XRD spectra of the heat-treated UO2 consistently indicate the presence of U3O8 rather than UO3, regardless of the temperature. Under an oxidizing atmosphere within a temperature range of 300 to 700°C, UO2 can be oxidized to form U3O8. In the final experiment, the oxidation state of the unknown UO2+X was determined using Bragg’s law and lattice parameters, revealing that it was a material in which UO2 had been oxidized, resulting in an oxidation state of UO2.24.

Given the situation in the Republic of Korea that all nuclear power plants are located at the seaside, the interim storage facility is also likely to be located at seaside and the maritime transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel is considered inevitable. The Republic of Korea does not have an independently developed maritime transportation risk assessment code, and no research has been conducted to evaluate the release rate of radionuclides from a submerged transportation cask in the sea. Therefore, there is a need to develop a technology that can assess the impact of immersion accidents and establish a regulatory framework for maritime transportation accidents. The release rate of radionuclides should be calculated from the flow rate through a flow path in the breached containment boundary. According to the cask design criteria, it is anticipated that even under severe accident conditions, the flow path size will be very small. Previous studies have evaluated fluid flow passing through micro-scale channel by integrating internal and external flows within and around a transport cask. As part of the evaluation, a comprehensive “Full-Field Model” incorporating external flow fields and a localized “Local-Field Model” with micro-scale flow paths were constructed. Sub-modeling techniques were employed to couple the flow field calculated by the two models. The aforementioned approach is utilized to conduct the evaluation of fluid flow passing through micro-scale flow paths. This study aims to evaluate fluid flow passing through micro-scale flow paths using the aforementioned CFD (Computational Fluid Dynamics) method and aims to code the findings. The Gaussian Process Regression technique, a machine learning model, is utilized for developing a mathematical metamodel. The selected input parameters for coding are organized and their respective impacts are analyzed. The range of these selected parameters is tailored to suit domestic environments, and computational experiments are planned through Design of Experiments. The flow path size is included as an input parameter in the coded model. In cases where the flow path size becomes extremely small, making it impractical to use CFD techniques for calculations, Poiseuille’s law is employed to calculate the release rate. In this study, a model is developed to evaluate the release rate of radionuclides using CFD and mathematical equations covering the whole possible range of flow path size in a lost cask in the deep sea. The model will be used in the development of a maritime transportation risk assessment code suitable for the situation and environment in Korea.

When exporting nuclear-related items, export control is required from two perspectives: the control of “Trigger List Items” as controlled by Nuclear Supplier Groups (NSG) and the control of the “Items Subject to the Agreement” as specified in bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements. While Trigger List Items and Items Subject to the Agreement are largely similar, there are some items where they do not overlap. Furthermore, national law for controlling each item is different. The Trigger List Items are governed by the Foreign Trade Act, and the Items Subject to the Agreement (Internationally Controlled Items) are governed by the Nuclear Safety Act. As a result, the detailed procedures and requirements for controlling each item are quite distinct. For the Trigger List Items, export license must be obtained in accordance with the Foreign Trade Act. The details such as responsible authority, the items subject to license, license requirements and procedures, penalties are specified in the Public Notice on Import and Export of Strategic Goods. For the Items Subject to the Agreement, the process and obligations set forth in bilateral agreements and related administrative agreements are fulfilled in accordance with the Nuclear Safety Act. However, in contrast to the Trigger List Items, the details for complying with the agreements are not specified legally. Since most of the Items Subject to the Agreement are fall within the category of the Trigger List Items, the obligations in accordance with the agreements are reviewed and implemented during the export license assessment process. However, if the Items Subject to the Agreement are not are fall within the category of the Trigger List Items, there is a risk of control omission. For example, this applies to cases of exporting tritium and tritium removal facilities, which are not the Trigger List Items, to Canada and Romania. Moreover, since subjects to the agreement and compliance procedures are respectively different for 29 bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements signed with different countries, it is difficult for enterprise to recognize the appropriate procedures and obligations under the agreement by their own. The bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements establish legal obligations between state parties while NSG are non-legally binding arrangements. Therefore, it could be even more necessary to comply strictly with the agreements. Consequently, legal improvements are required for effective implementations of Nuclear Cooperation Agreements. While it may be challenging to institutionalize details of 29 Nuclear Cooperation Agreements, it is essential to legally specify key elements such as the list of items subject to agreements, responsible authority, requirements and procedures for implement the agreement obligations, and penalties. Furthermore, domestic awareness on compliance with Nuclear Cooperation Agreements is lower compared to the system of export license for Trigger List Items. The continuous outreach is also necessary, along with institutional improvements.

The ROK government has developed the Nuclear Export and Control System (NEPS) to implement export control activities. Although it was launched in 2008 as a system that can work with classification, licensing, nuclear material approval, government-to-government assurance, complying with nuclear cooperation agreement (NCA) handled through official documents. In order to enhance systematic management for items subject to NCA, KINAC developed a new module for the procedure (hereinafter referred to as “NCA module”) and opened it in 2022. This paper presents the module’s development background, key features, and current operation status. The NCA module prioritizes functional expansion and flexibility, distinct from other tasks for the following reasons. First, the export control duties of classification, export license, and approval for NM are based on domestic law, leading to predetermined target items, application forms, and processes that change only through statutory amendments. In contrast, the implementation of NCA has numerous procedural variables, varying across countries in scope, content, and procedures. Therefore, if the function is over-standardized, there would be many exceptions that the system cannot resolve in practice. Second, the existing NEPS process entails a one-time decision or approval for each application, while the implementation of the agreement encompasses four related procedures for each item: prior notification, written confirmation, shipment notification, and receipt confirmation. Even some steps may be omitted depending on the case. The other difference is the working process. The implementation of NCA must be initiated from the government, so the existing methods, beginning with the licensee filling a form, cannot be adopted as it is. The NCA module has adopted a new reference numbering system to resolve these challenges. It enables the creation of multiple procedures under one reference number on an item to expand the tasks and make it possible to omit some steps or to reflect case-by-case concerns in each stage. It also provides a consolidated view of multiple notifications related to a single item, ensuring to deal with even long-running tasks without missing any obligations until the final procedure. Moreover, some of the data in the NCA module is extensible by allowing users to manage the list themselves. For example, the system can respond to new agreements by allowing users to add and modify codes that distinguish counterparty countries. As a result, the current NCA module accommodates a variety of implementation scenarios, including split shipments, the procedural omissions, and the modification of additional counterparties, offering enhanced flexibility and adaptability.

Regulators conduct inspections and issue non-compliance notice, and it is necessary to examine whether this is equivalent a corrective order. A corrective order imposes binding obligations on a business, and violations of it can result in sanctions such as fines, license revocation, or suspension. Therefore, if it is a corrective order, it must go through procedures such as prior notification under the Administrative Procedure Act. However, so far, no such procedures have been followed when issuing non-compliance notice. There are three possible interpretations of it: 1) the issuance of a non-compliance notice is not a corrective order but a part of an inspection, 2) the issuance of a non-compliance notice is a corrective order but not a disposition, and 3) the process of hearing opinions and prior notification was carried out during the inspection. However, if it is a part of an inspection, it should be issued by KINAC or KINS, which is entrusted with the inspection, but it is issued by the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, and it is a disposition because it makes specific demands, and the corrective orders themselves have not gone through the procedure of hearing opinions. Therefore, in order for a non-compliance notice to be enforceable unlike a recommendation and to be issued by the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission instead of the inspection agency, the law should be amended and the procedure of prior notice and hearing opinions required by the Administrative Procedure Act should be carried out at the issuance stage.

The integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) into the legal field, particularly under the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) framework, is a transformative journey that is reshaping the landscape of legal practice. This transformation presents a myriad of opportunities, challenges, and ethical considerations that require our collective attention and action. The potential of AI to enhance efficiency, accuracy, and accessibility in legal services is substantial. However, it is crucial to navigate this transformation responsibly, ensuring that the integration of AI respects and upholds our ethical, legal, and societal values. Striking a balance between technological advancement and human expertise, while also addressing the social implications of AI, is a critical task that lies ahead. The role of international collaboration and knowledge sharing in shaping the AI-infused future of law is significant. Platforms such as the RCEP provide an invaluable opportunity for nations to share best practices, learn from each other, and collaboratively tackle challenges arising from the intersection of AI and law. Moreover, the development of human resources is paramount. As AI continues to revolutionize the legal industry, continuous education and training are crucial to ensure that our workforce can harness these changes effectively. Lastly, the continuous development and promotion of technological innovation in the legal field is a strategic necessity. By acknowledging and addressing the challenges posed by AI, we can harness its potential to elevate our legal systems, redefine the roles of legal professionals, and serve our societies better.

Hanford site has been operated since 1943 to produce the plutonium for nuclear weapons. Significant amount of radioactive wastes was generated by the nuclear weapons production process. The radioactive wastes are stored in 177 aged underground tanks. Due to the risk of leakage into the air and the Columbia River, the US DOE and EPA, and Washington State Department of Ecology organized the Tri-Party Agreement (TPA) to clean-up the Hanford site in 1989. The LAW (low-activity waste) vitrification facility named WTP (Waste Treatment Plant) is plan to vitrify about 212 million liters of radioactive waste. The US DOE announced that the world’s largest melter to vitrify the LAW was heated up on October 8, 2022.

After the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan in March 2011, many Koreans were concerned that products exposed to radioactive materials released from the nuclear power plant would be imported into Korea. Systematic radiation monitoring was required for food and daily necessities imported from the nuclear accident area. The need for a legal system to support systematic radiation monitoring was also demanded. The Act on Protective Action Guidelines against Radiation in the Natural Environment was enacted to resolve concerns regarding environmental radiation in Korea in July 2011. According to this law, radiation monitoring equipment has been installed and operated at major airports and ports nationwide. This paper aims to review the radiation monitoring system of the Korean government comprehensively. The legal system and the legal basis for radiation monitoring of imported cargo conducted by each department were investigated by analyzing the laws and regulations of radiation monitoring for the relevant cargo items. In addition, the current status of radiation monitoring by the government departments was examined to determine how radiation monitoring for imported cargo is performed within the legal system. The investigation of the current radiation monitoring system for imported cargo in Korea confirmed that radiation monitoring is conducted by classifying cargo items under the jurisdiction of each government department for all imported cargo. However, the reduction in efficiency of radiation monitoring of imported cargoes, unclear legal grounds for radiation monitoring of imported cargo by some departments, the occurrence of overlapping inspections by departments, and the difficult process of issuing the radiation test certificate required for customs clearance by the Korea Customs Service were also identified. As a result of the analysis, it was found that the current radiation monitoring system for imported cargo in Korea ought to be improved, taking into account efficiency, overlapping inspection, legal background, and the difficult process of issuing the certificates.

The domestic Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) decommissioning project is expected to be carried out sequentially, starting with Kori Unit 1. As a license holder, in order to smoothly operate a new decommissioning project, a process in terms of project management must be well established. Therefore, this study will discuss what factors should be considered in establishing the process of decommissioning NPPs. Various standards have been proposed as project management tools on how to express the business process in writing and in what aspects to describe it. Representatively, PMBOK, ISO 21500, and PRICE 2 may be considered. It will be necessary to consider IAEA safety standards in the nuclear decommissioning project. GSR part 6 and part 2 can be considered as two major requirements. GSR part 6 presents a total of 15 requirements, including decommissioning plans, general safety requirements until execution and termination. GSR part 2 presents basic principles for securing the safety of nuclear facilities, and there are a total of 14 requirements. Domestic regulatory guidelines should be considered, and there will be largely laws and regulations related to the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, guidelines for regulatory agencies, and guidelines and regulations related to HSE. The Nuclear Safety Act, Enforcement Decree, Enforcement Rules, and NSSC should be considered in the applicable law for nuclear facilities. Since the construction and operation process has been established for domestic decommissioning project, there will be parts where existing procedures must be applied in terms of life cycle management of facilities and the same performance entity. As a management areas classification in the construction and operation stage, it seems that a classification similar to Level 1 and Level 2 should be applied to the decommissioning project. This study analyzed the factors to be considered in the management system in preparing for the first decommissioning project in Korea. Since it is project management, it is necessary to establish a system by referring to international standards, and it is suggested that domestic regulatory reflection, existing business procedures, and domestic business conditions should be considered.

The operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants (NPPs) creates waste in the process of handling radioactively contaminated material, which must be disposed of in a repository or can be recovered of in the same way as conventional waste in the course of handling radioactively contaminated materials. For buildings or sites of NPPs it also has to be decided under what conditions they can continue to be used for other, conventional purposes or demolished. This decision is referred to as “release from supervision under nuclear and radiation protection law” or “clearance” in short. The clearance levels applicable in Germany according to the Radiation Protection Ordinance have been defined such that a radiation dose (hereinafter referred to as “dose”) of 10 μSv per year is not exceeded. The vast majority of the materials resulting from the dismantling of a nuclear power plant (e.g. most of the massive concrete structures) are neither contaminated nor activated. Thus, there is no need to treat these materials as radioactive waste. Emplacement of uncontaminated masses which in Germany is essentially several million tonnes of building rubble in a repository would require additional construction of such facilities, which, in view of the negligible hazard potential, from the point of view of the Nuclear Waste Management Commission (ESK) is clearly to be rejected both economically and, in particular, ecologically. Alternative ways are increasingly discussed in public, such as the abandonment of buildings after gutting, i.e. refraining from demolition of the controlled area buildings of NPPs. Also, another proposal discussed in public, the landfilling or the long-term storage of cleared material at the site, does not offer any safety-related advantages either in the view of the ESK. If, after completion of all dismantling work, the building has been decontaminated such that the clearance levels for buildings are complied with further use of the building rubble resulting from demolition is harmless from a radiological point of view. For these reasons, Germany has deliberately decided to use clearance as an essential measure in the dismantling of NPPs. If it is intended to conventionally reuse or depose of virtually contaminant-free material from controlled areas, it must first undergo a clearance procedure. The prerequisites that must be fulfilled for clearance are regulated in the Radiation Protection Ordinance, which includes two basic clearance pathways: unrestricted and specific clearance. In the following, the basic process of clearance is briefly presented and illustrated for a better understanding. It comprises five steps. Step 1-Radiological characterization by sampling, Step 2-Dismantling of plant components in the controlled area, Step 3- Decontamination, Step 4-Decission measurements, Step 5-Clearacnce and further management. The entire clearance process is governed by a clearance notice and is carried out under the supervision of the competent authority under nuclear and radiation protection law or the independent authorized expert commissioned by it. The clearance pathways contained in the Radiation Protection Ordinance have proven themselves in practice. They permit safe and proper management of material from dismantling and release of the site from supervision under nuclear and radiation protection law. These German regulatory procedures should be taken into account and deregulation and removal should be used as appropriate and necessary tools in the process of decommissioning NPPs in order to return non-hazardous materials to the material cycle or for conventional disposal.

The Internal Compliance Program (ICP) is a framework for promoting compliance with laws and regulations and minimizing violations. It aims to prevent law breaches, by raising awareness of the compliance within the organization, which leads to enhance the credibility of the organization, and to prepare for audits. From the perspective of nuclear export control, ICP can be used to verify the company’s credibility by following NSG Guidelines and is expected to contribute to preventing the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons in the international community. However, ICP system is not globally established, and the NSG does not provide official guidelines for ICP. Therefore, this study aims to analyze the “Good Practices for Internal Compliance Programs for Nuclear and Nuclear-Related Exports” provided by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to find ways to apply and activate ICPs for domestic exporters. The form of ICP could vary depending on company’s size and internal environments, but it should be organized as follows. First, an internal department should be established so as to implement the ICP, and an executive who has export control knowledge should be assigned as the Chief Export Control Officer (CECO). The CECO, establish and revise ICP operating procedures and manual, organize contact point to communicate internally and externally. Second, measures should be established minimize risks in the export process, including business development transaction screening, supply chain, research and development, human resource, and intangible technology transfer risks. Third, internal control system should be established for export control compliance. The CECO should conduct regular assessments to ensure compliance and strengthen the organization’s internal export compliance processes. Fourth, an export-related training program should be periodically conducted for employees. In addition, as soon as the CECO becomes aware of, CECO should review the matter, take corrective action, and report to the relevant national authorities, when a violation of domestic export control laws or suspicious circumstances are captured. Nuclear export control plays an important role in ensuring nuclear nonproliferation. Republic of Korea has been implementing the ICP system for Dual-Use Items under the Foreign Trade Act, but not for Trigger List Items. Therefore, introduction of ICP for Trigger List Items is expected significantly contribute to nuclear nonproliferation. The subjects of ICP will be initially targeted to major nuclear enterprises, then gradually expanded to all nuclear enterprises. Further researches are needed to introduce on ICP for Trigger List Items.