After the Fukushima disaster, overseas nuclear power plants have established conditions for issuing a red alert in the event of fuel damage within the spent fuel pool and they have already implemented conditions for issuing a blue alert when fuel is exposed above the water surface. In South Korean nuclear power plants, a real-time monitoring system is in place to oversee the exposure of spent fuel to the surface within the spent fuel pool. To achieve this, a water level indicator gauge is installed within the spent fuel pool, allowing for continuous real-time monitoring. This paper conducted a comparative assessment of radiation levels from water level monitoring system in two units’ spent fuel pools based on the low water levels (1 feet from the storage rack), utilizing the radiation analysis code (MCNP).

After the decision of the Wolsong unit 1 permanent shutdown (2019), spent fuel stored in the spent fuel bay (hereafter, SFB) should be transported to a dry storage facility (MACSTOR or Canister) in order to decommission Wolsong unit 1. Accordingly, KHNP has established a shipment schedule for damaged fuel of Wolsong Unit 1 and is trying to complete the shipment according to the schedule. Wolsong is equipped with transportation casks and dry storage facilities, but baskets need to be manufactured separately. In addition, license approval is required for baskets, transport cask, and dry storage facilities for legal grounds to contain, transport, and store damaged fuels. In this paper, the initial model, upgrade model, and automation model of encapsulation equipment planned to be introduced in Canada to handle PHWR’s damaged fuel were compared, and the optimal model was selected in consideration of KHNP’s planned spent fuel shipment schedule. The PHWR’s damaged fuel encapsulation system is a system developed the PHWR’s damaged spent fuel to be handled in the same way as the existing PHWR when storing it in the dry storage facility and loading a basket for capsulation into transport cask. At the Gentilly-2 nuclear power plant in Canada, a manually operated encapsulation system was used due to the low quantity of damaged fuel, which can be encapsulated two bundles a day, and this model is an initial model. In the case of Wolsong Unit 1, it has about 300 damaged fuels, so it takes about nine months to work when using the initial model. The upgrade model developed to improve work efficiency and reliability has increased work efficiency through some automation, but it would take about eight months to process the damaged spent fuels of Wolsong Unit 1, and this model has not yet been manufactured and applied. Lastly, the automation model changed the work location outside the SFB and automated drainage/drying operations. It is easy to maintain and replace consumables because the work is carried out by lifting the damaged fuel to a shuttle outside the SFB surrounded by a shielding chimney. Considering the reduction of drainage/drying time, it is possible to save about four times as much time as the initial model. That is, if the automation model is used, it is judged that the supply of Wolsong Unit 1 can be processed in about two months. However, in terms of license, initial model and upgrade model are expected to be easier and the period is expected to be shortened. However, if licensing is carried out as soon as equipment design is completed, it is believed that the period can be shortened by parallel equipment manufacturing and licensing. It is judged that the best way to comply with the target schedule is to select an automation model with excellent work performance, develop equipment, and proceed with licensing at the same time. Accordingly, KHNP is in the process of designing equipment with the aim of using the automation model to take out damaged fuel for Wolsong Unit 1.

Regulatory agencies require burn-up verification to ensure that dry storage casks using burn-up credit are not loaded with fuel with a reactivity greater than the allowable standard. Accordingly, in preparation for dry storage of SF, the reliability of the burnup was verified and action plans for fuel with confirmed errors were reviewed. Reliability verification was performed by comparing the actual burnup calculated with combustion calculation code (TOTE, ISOTIN) used in NPP and the design burnup calculated with the nuclear design code (ANC). As a result of comparing the differences between actual burnup and design burnup for 7,414 assemblies of SF generated from CE-type NPPs, the average deviation was confirmed to be 0.79% and 220 MWD/MTU. In the CE-type NPPs, no fuel showing large deviations was identified, and it was confirmed that reliability was secured. As a result of comparing the differences in 11,082 assemblies of SF generated from WH-type NPPs, the differences were not large, averaging 1.16% or 422 MWD/MTU. However, fuels showing significant differences were identified, and cause analysis was performed for those fuels. The cause analysis used a method of comparing the burnup of symmetrically loaded fuels in the reactor. For fuels that were not symmetrically loaded, a method was used to compare them with fuels with similar combustion histories. As a result of the review, it was confirmed that the fuel was under- or over-burned compared to symmetrically loaded fuel. For fuels for which clear errors have been identified, we are considering replacing them with the design burnup, and for fuels whose causes cannot be confirmed, we are considering ways to maintain the actual burnup.

More than 20,000 bundles of spent nuclear fuel are stored in the spent nuclear fuel storage pool of domestic nuclear power plants, and the dry storage facility project in the nuclear power plant site is being promoted as the saturation of the wet storage pool is imminent. Since bending or twisting of spent nuclear fuel is an important item in order to load spent nuclear fuel into a dry storage cask, PSE (Pool Side Examination) was performed to verify this. This paper describes whether it can be safely loaded into a dry storage cask based on the measurement results of bending or twisting of spent nuclear fuel. The nuclear fuel assembly is designed to prevent excessive assembly bending and twisting because it can cause interference during dry storage and handling due to factors such as differences in depletion of nuclear fuel rods, irradiation growth, and coolant flow during reactor operation. The bending of the nuclear fuel assembly is measured by establishing a Plumb Line to photograph the nuclear fuel assembly based on it, and calculating a pixel that images the distance between the support grid and the Plumb Line. The twisting of the nuclear fuel assembly is measured by forming a virtual vertical plane with two Plumb Lines, and based on this, the twisting angle of the lower fixed compared to the upper fixed. As a result of the measurement, the bending of spent nuclear fuel was about 0.0-10.2 mm, much lower than the reactor loading criteria of 15.0 mm, and in the case of twisting, about 0.0~2.2° much lower than the reactor loading criteria of 5.0°. Therefore, it was confirmed that spent nuclear fuel at domestic nuclear power plants was not affected by bending and twisting when loading into dry storage cask.

South It is necessary to develop the future technologies to improve the sustainability and acceptability of nuclear power plants generation. Currently, our company is preparing to build the dry storage facility on-site in accordance with the basic plan for managing high-level radioactive waste announced by the government in 2021. However, studies on technologies for the volume reduction of spent nuclear fuel to increase the efficiency of on-site spent fuel dry storage facilities are very not enough. Accordingly, in this study, the storage efficiency and appropriateness for the SF volume reduction processing technologies such as SF oxide processing technology and consolidation technology are evaluated. Finally, the goal is to develop the optimized technologies to improve the storage efficiency of spent nuclear fuel. As a result in this study is followings. [Safety] After removing volatile fission products (Xe, Kr, I, etc.), Xe, Kr, etc. are removed during storage of the sintered structures. UO2 has a high melting point of approximately 1,000°C after cesium (Cs) has been removed, and heat can be removed by natural convection. [Economy]1999 DUPIC unit facility unit price reference, 2020 standard 328 $/kg estimated. A Comprehensive Approach Considering the Whole System is needed. Benefit from replacement and continuous operation of metal storage containers. Changes in economic efficiency obtained in conjunction with fluctuations in electricity prices and disposal. [Waste filter] A separated solidification facility high-level waste filter is required, and overseas outsourcing must be considered. [Waste cladding]. Cannot be accommodated in low-level disposal site. This reason is why the Ni nuclides occur to be in bulk. [Metal structural material] It is possible to reduce the initial volume by 7.6% or more when compressed or melted, but the technology needs to be advanced. [Oxide blocks] Larger size and density are expected to improve storage and disposal efficiency. [Facilities operation waste] Expected to be able to be disposed of at mid-to-low level decommissioning sites in Gyeongju city. [Solidified volatile nuclides and activated metals] Expected to improve storage efficiency when used volume is reduced and stored, such as outsourced reprocessing. [Oxide block] Radioactivity and decay heat are estimated to be reduced by half during oxide treatment. 75% reduction in volume and 40% reduction in storage area compared to used nuclear fuel before treatment. [Merits/Shortages] Improvement of storage and disposal efficiency empirical research such as large-capacity [real-scale] oxide block production is required. Oxide processing facilities are likely to be classified as post-use nuclear fuel processing facilities. It is determined that additional documents such as a Radiation Environmental Report (RER) must be submitted. Existence of possible external leaks of glass, highly mobile radionuclides from the point of view of nuclear criticality and heat removal. Acceptancy requirements of citizens in the process of creating additional sites for oxide treatment facilities. Considering social public opinion, it is necessary to secure the acceptability such as residents’ opinions convergence. Characteristics of high nuclear non-propagation compared to other processing technologies involving chemical processing. Also, Expectation of volume reduction effect for spent nuclear fuel itself. Volume reduction methods for solid waste and gaseous waste are required.

Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) is currently developing a vertical concrete dry storage module for the dry storage of used nuclear fuel within nuclear power plants. This module is designed with a structure consisting of cylinders, which can block the ingress of external air, thereby preventing Chloride-Induced Stress Corrosion Cracking (CISCC). However, due to the presence of these cylinder structures, unlike conventional dry storage systems, it cannot directly dissipate heat to the external atmosphere, making thermal evaluation an important issue. The SF dry storage module being developed by KHNP is a massive concrete structure of approximately 20 m × 10 m × 7 m in size, employing a vertical storage system. To demonstrate the safety of such a large structure, there is no alternative to conducting experiments with scaled-down models. Furthermore, according to NUREG-2215 Section 5.5.4, it is explicitly mentioned that design-verification testing can be performed using scaled-down models. In this paper, a 1/4 scaled-down model was constructed to perform thermal performance verification experiments, and the effectiveness of this model was analyzed using Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) methods. The analysis results indicated that there was not a significant difference in terms of maximum concrete temperature and air outlet temperature. However, a considerable difference was observed in the canister surface temperature. Therefore, it is concluded that careful consideration of natural convection heat transfer is necessary for the full application of the scaled-down model.

The types of fuel loaded and burned in domestic nuclear power plants are WH-type and OPR/ APR-type nuclear power plants, with a total of 19 types. In the case of spent nuclear fuel released in Korea, the low combustion level of 45,000 MWD/MTU or less accounts for about 75%. In terms of fuel type, WH 17×17 and CE 16×16 fuels account for about 85% of all spent nuclear fuels. The thickness of the oxide film of the fuel cladding can make the fuel rod vulnerable during reactor operation, directly affecting the integrity of the fuel rods. so, it is a very important design factor in design. Therefore, the fuel rod design code that predicts and evaluates this has also been developed to accurately predict fuel rod corrosion. And it’s being applied to the design. In this study, the ECT probe measured by inserting it between fuel rods. The thickness of the fuel cladding oxide film was measured for spent nuclear fuel. When reloading operational nuclear fuel, the IAEA recommends an oxide film thickness of up to 100 micrometers. In this study, it was confirmed that spent nuclear fuels keeping integrity burned for 2-3 cycles were sufficiently maintained within the limit. However, the difference could be confirmed according to the characteristics of the coating material, the combustion cycle, and the use of poison rods. For the reliability of the data, symmetrical to the quadrant fuels were selected, and the fuel burned at the same period was measured. The method of selecting the target fuel can produce meaningful results.

In Korea, borated stainless steel (BSS) is used as a storage rack in spent fuel pools (SFP) to maintain the nuclear criticality of spent fuels. As the number of nuclear power plants and the corresponding amount of spent fuels increased, the density in SFP storage rack also increased. In this regard, maintaining subcriticality of spent nuclear fuels became an issue and BSS was selected as the structural material and neutron absorber for high density storage rack. Since it is difficult to replace the storage rack, corrosion resistance and neutron absorbency are required for long period. BSS is based on stainless steel 304 and is specified in the ASTM A887-89 standard depending on the boron concentration from 304B (0.20-0.29% B) to 304B7 (1.75-2.25% B). Due to the low solubility of boron in austenitic stainless steel, metallic borides such as (Fe, Cr) 2B are formed as a secondary phase. Metallic borides could cause Cr depletion near it, which could decrease the corrosion resistance of the material. In this paper, the long-term corrosion behavior of BSS and its oxide microstructures are investigated through accelerated corrosion experiment in simulated SFP conditions. Because the corrosion rate of austenitic stainless steel is known to be dependent on the Arrhenius equation, a function of temperature, the corrosion experiment is conducted by increasing the experimental temperature. Detail microstructural analysis is conducted using a scanning electron microscope, transmission electron microscope and energy dispersive spectrometer. After oxidation, a hematite structure oxide film is formed, and pitting corrosion occurs on the surface of specimens. Most of the pitting corrosion is found at the substrate surface because the corrosion resistance of the substrate, which has low Cr content, is relatively low. Also, the oxidation reaction of B in the secondary phase has the lowest Gibbs free energy compared to other elements. Furthermore, oxidation of Cr has low Gibbs free energy, which means that oxidation of B and Cr could be faster than other elements. Thus, the long-term corrosion might affect the boron content and the neutron absorption ability of the material. Using boron’s high cross-section for neutrons, the neutron absorption performance of BSS was evaluated through neutron transmission tests. The effect of the corrosion behavior of BSS on its neutron absorption performance was investigated. Samples simulated to undergo up to 60 years of degradation before corrosion through accelerated corrosion testing did not show significant changes in the neutron shielding ability before and after corrosion. This can be explained in relation to the corrosion behavior of BSS. Boron was only leached out from the secondary phase exposed on the surface, and this oxidized secondary phase corresponds to about 0.17% of the volume of the total secondary phase. This can be seen as a very small proportion compared to the total boron content and is not expected to have a significant impact on neutron absorption performance.

South Korea has been storing UNF in spent fuel pool dry storage facility within Nuclear Power Plants. The dry storage facility of used nuclear fuel (UNF) is essential to sustain safety and sustain stable operation of a nuclear power plant. Most abroad countries have attempted to develop a variety of dry storage facility for used nuclear fuel in order to retain the safe restoration. Many studies have been conducting to safety evaluation for the dry storage facility. However, there is not a ventilation evaluation in the wake of fire event that could influence of the thermal effect on the dry storage facility, even though it will likely to occur fire events such as wildfire, air craft crash. In practice, it happened to catastrophic disaster due to the wild fire adjacent to ul-jin mountain. Also, it happened to fire accident near to the Japonia NPP in Ukraine territory caused of military air plane missile. It has not mostly been studied on the ventilation evaluation considered to thermal safety in the dry storage facility excepted for some researches. It could need the mechanical ventilation systems such as HVAC system in the dry storage system, so that thermal effect can be reduced. In this study, we conducted to the ventilation control modelling by using fire modelling tool (Fire Dynamic Simulator v.6.7). The ventilation scenarios made up for 3 case that can compare flowrate variation with ventilation control. As a result of modelling, there is no differentiation between ventilation control using performance curve with not using performance curve even though the pressure fluctuation would be increased, compared with the case of considering performance curve. Second, it evaluated that the mode for fraction control would occur to pressure rise in the state of controlling the ventilation system flowrate. However, sensitivity of flowrate control was more decreased below less than 5 seconds. Third, in the case of on/off control system revealed more higher resolution than other cases caused by flowrate variation. These results could be considered as the design guidelines for the development dry storage facility to improve the thermal performance that can reduce thermal risk. Furthermore, the study results would expect HVAC system installed in dry storage to help automatic ventilation control relevant to dry storage safety increased.

After spent fuel is stored in a dry storage container, it becomes difficult to obtain information on the fuel’s characteristics. As a result, it is necessary to identify the characteristics of spent nuclear fuel in advance and secure the information necessary to establish delivery acceptance requirements for interim storage and disposal in the future. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the characteristics of spent fuel before loading dry storage casks. In order to prepare for the dry storage of spent fuel, information on the basic characteristics of the fuel is required. As part of this information, it is also necessary to establish calculation criteria for spent fuel burnup. Spent fuel burnup can be classified into three categories. The first is burnup evaluated using design codes (design burnup), the second is burnup measured by furnace instruments during power plant operation (actual burnup), and the third is burnup measured through measurement equipment (measured burnup). This paper describes a comparative evaluation of design burnup, actual burnup, and measured burnup for specific fuels (40 bundles).

One of the most important factors in the delivery and acceptance requirements for dry storage of spent fuel is the burnup of spent fuel. Here, burnup has a unit of MWD/MTU and is used as a measure of how much nuclear fuel is depleted in a nuclear reactor. In addition, since it is one of the most basic characteristic information for the soundness evaluation of spent nuclear fuel, it is a required item not only by regulatory agencies but also by KORAD, the acquiring agency. The burnup of spent nuclear fuel is the burnup calculated through flux mapping using signals measured from in-reactor instruments during nuclear power plant operation (hereinafter: actual burnup) and the burnup calculated using the core design code (hereinafter: design burnup). In this paper, the design burnup of spent nuclear fuel discharged from OPR100 NPPs (Nuclear Power Plants) in Korea was recalculated to confirm the reliability of the actual burnup currently managed at the nuclear power plant. Basically, since spent nuclear fuel must maintain subcriticality under wet storage or dry storage, a burnup error of about 5% is considered as a conservative approach when evaluating the criticality safety of wet storage tanks and dry storage systems. Therefore, in this paper, we tried to verify whether the difference between actual burnup and design burnup for all spent nuclear fuel released from domestic OPR100 type light water reactor nuclear power plants is within 5%. As a result of the evaluation, the largest deviation between actual burnup and design burnup was about 1,457 MWD/MTU, and when converted into a percentage, it was about 3.3%. Therefore, it was confirmed that the actual burnup managed by OPR1000 NPPs in Korea has sufficient reliability. In the future, we plan to check the reliability of the performance burnup managed in WH NPPs, and some of them will be verified through measurement.

In Korea, borated stainless steel (BSS) is used as spent fuel pool (SFP) storage rack to maintain nuclear criticality of spent fuels. As number of nuclear power plants and corresponding number of spent fuels increased, density in SFP storage rack also increased. In this regard, maintain subcriticality of spent nuclear fuels was raised as an issue and BSS was selected as structural material and neutron absorber for high density storage rack. Because it is difficult to replace storage rack, corrosion resistance and neutron absorbency are required for long period. BSS is based on stainless steel 304 and it is specified in the ASTM A887-89 standard depending on the boron concentration from 304B (0.20-0.29% B) to 304B7 (1.75-2.25% B). Due to low solubility of boron in austenitic stainless steel, metallic borides such as (Fe, Cr)2B are formed as secondary phase metallic borides could make Cr depletion near it which could decrease the corrosion resistance of material. In this paper, long-term corrosion behavior of BSS and its oxide microstructures are investigated through accelerated corrosion experiment in simulated SFP condition. Because corrosion rate of austenitic stainless steel is known to be dependent on the Arrhenius equation, a function of temperature, corrosion experiment is conducted by increasing the experimental temperature. Detail microstructural analysis was conducted with scanning electron microscope, transmission electron microscope and energy dispersive spectrometer. After oxidation, hematite structure oxide film is formed and pitting corrosions occur on the surface of specimens. Most of pitting corrosions are found at the substrate surface because corrosion resistance of substrate, which has low Cr content, is relatively low. Also, oxidation reaction of B in the secondary phase has the lowest Gibbs free energy compared to other elements. Furthermore, oxidation of Cr has low Gibbs free energy which means that oxidation of B and Cr could be faster than other elements. Thus, the long-term corrosion might affect to boron content and the neutron absorption ability of the material.

For the transport of spent nuclear fuel, it is necessary to evaluate the amount of radioactivity for each assembly and the total amount of radioactivity for each cask. Currently, KHNP is evaluating the radioactivity using the Express mode of the OrigenArp program in the SCALE6.1 code. Express mode is a method to evaluate the radioactivity assuming that it has been burned with the same power per cycle, and Detail mode is a method to evaluate the actual combustion history such as power and cooling time for each cycle. For a total of 3,795 assemblies, including 1,391 assembliess for Kori Unit 1, 1,427 assemblies for Hanbit Unit 2, and 977 assemblies for Hanul Unit 3, the radioactivity was evaluated in Express mode and Detail mode, respectively, and the results were compared. As a result of the evaluation, it was confirmed that the results of the Express mode were evaluated more conservatively by 2.5~12.9% than that of the Detail mode. Accordingly, KHNP established a plan to change the evaluation method from Express mode to Detail mode in order to improve the accuracy of the radioactivity assessment results and eliminate conservatism.

The Co-60 is a radioactive material widely used in domestic and foreign medical, industrial, health and research fields. Currently, world market for the Co-60 is about 80 MCi/yr and is expected to grow to 150 MCi/yr by 2025. For the Co-60, Nordion of Canada occupies about 80% of the world market. In the case of Korea, a small amount of sources with relatively low radioactivity intensity are produced using research reactors, but most of the Co-60 is entirely dependent on imports. Accordingly, although the technical feasibility of the Co-60 production technology using the PHWR was evaluated, it was evaluated as a negative result on the additional construction of a hot cell, core management, safety analysis and economic feasibility. Canada, the main producer of the Co-60, is also conducting research on the Co-60 production technology using PWR with GE-Hitachi and Westinghouse as the number of PHWR is expected to decrease. In Korea, it is necessary to preoccupy the Co-60 production technology and auxiliary technology using the PWR by utilizing excellent technology, and active research is being conducted to secure unique nuclear power technology that does not depend on foreign countries. Therefore, in this study, the thickness and weight of the radioactive shielding required for handling (transport) of Co-60 produced using the PWR were calculated.

The manufactured nuclear fuel assembly is loaded into the nuclear reactor after the core design, and is finally discharged to the wet storage pool after depletion for 3 cycles. The discharged spent nuclear fuel is transported and stored in a dry storage system at the on-site of the nuclear power plant, which is cooled by natural convection, and undergoes final disposal or reprocessing through an intermediate dry storage facility. In this series of processes, the characteristics of the final product, the spent fuel, vary depending on the environmental conditions, so it is essential to manage each history data to verify the long-term integrity of the spent nuclear fuel. In this paper, safety information on spent nuclear fuel is described in order to establish technical requirements that should be considered in each stage of storage, transport, reprocessing, and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Comprehensive safety information on spent nuclear fuel is basically calculated from basic information that considers characteristic information that can be obtained through the manufacture and design of nuclear fuel assemblies, operation history in a nuclear reactor, and location history in a wet storage pool. It can be divided into secondary production information (SF Burnup, Nuclide Inventory, etc.) and tertiary integrity-related information obtained through cladding inspection during spent fuel storage. KHNP produces this multi-layered information according to the production stage and manages it through the comprehensive management system of the spent nuclear fuel, and safety information with some errors is not only improved through re-verification but also continuously updated. In this paper, the spent nuclear fuel safety information was derived based on various information calculated in the entire process of being discharged and managed in a wet storage pool, including new fuel manufacturing information and depletion history. Such safety information will be used as basic data for long-term safe management of spent nuclear fuel, and will be continuously produced and managed. In the future, additional discussions will be held on the safety information of the spent nuclear fuel through consultation with KORAD and regulatory agencies.

The PoN (Proof of Nonce) distributed consensus algorithm basically uses a non-competitive consensus method that can guarantee an equal opportunity for all nodes to participate in the block generation process, and this method was expected to resolve the first trilemma of the blockchain, called the decentralization problem. However, the decentralization performance of the PoN distributed consensus algorithm can be greatly affected by the network transaction transmission delay characteristics of the nodes composing the block chain system. In particular, in the consensus process, differences in network node performance may significantly affect the composition of the congress and committee on a first-come, first-served basis. Therefore, in this paper, we presented a problem by analyzing the decentralization performance of the PoN distributed consensus algorithm, and suggested a fairness control algorithm using a learning-based probabilistic acceptance rule to improve it. In addition, we verified the superiority of the proposed algorithm by conducting a numerical experiment, while considering the block chain systems composed of various heterogeneous characteristic systems with different network transmission delay.