In the korean supreme court case in question, the fact needs to be reconsidered, that the prosecutor’s record containing the statement of witness that becomes the decisive evidence to prove the guilt was left out. Especially, even though the court judged that the chance of cross-examination was provided to the declarant of the record and there was no substantial violation of procedural rules, it could have assess the circumstantial guarantees of truthworthiness. Every issue will be absorbed into the principle of free evaluation of evidence, if the admissibility of the prosecutor’s record is not considered. It is so hard to completely agree with the argument of the dissenting opinion in which in case of inconsistent statements more weight of reliability must be placed on a court testimony. It is because it is clearly in violation of the principle of free evaluation of evidence to simply more rely on a court testimony in case of inconsistent statement. In light of the facts appearing in the case in question, it was possible to assess reliability of circumstances of statement separately from total consideration of reliability of evidences. Most of all, the witness’ statement before prosecutor should not have easily admitted when considering its’doubtful circumstances. Therefore, the courts, expecially the appellate court, should have closely examined the circumstances by having the persons related to the prosecutor’s interrogation take the stance. Because this process was left out, the requirement of the circumstantial guarantees of truthworthiness was not satisfied.

Criminal Act Article 37 defines the concurrent crimes. The preceding paragraph of Article 37 states coincidence concurrent crimes which is defined as ‘several crimes for which judgement has not become final.' The post concurrent crimes is defined as ‘A crime for which judgement to punish has become final and the crimes committed before the said final judgement' in the latter part of Article 37. The reason for regulating the post concurrent crimes(the latter part of the Article 37, Article 39) besides coincidence concurrent crimes(the preceding part of the Article 37, Article 38) is that the crime for which judgement to punish has become final and the crimes committed before the said final judgement is sentenced as coincident concurrent crime by definition. Therefore, the event which is not noticed to the court cannot be the reason of giving advantage or (especially) disadvantage to the criminal suspect. Amended by Act No. 7623, July, 29, 2005, Criminal Act Article 39 (1) is stated as follows.' In the event there is a crime which has not been adjudicated among the concurrent crime, a sentence shall be imposed on the said crime taking account of equity with the case where the said crime is adjudicated concurrently with a crime which has been finally adjudicated. In this case the said punishment may be mitigated or exempted.' According to the amendment, it is possible to reduce the disadvantage when the criminal suspect is sentenced as post concurrent crime than sentenced as coincidence concurrent crime. The current decision(2006Do8376) represents the first meaningful Supreme Court decision of amended Article 39 (1). The decision includes ambiguous statement such as “deciding coincidentally and considering the equity" and the court may use the discretion in regard to reasonable determination of punishment by applying the previous statement. Therefore, the decision is not subject to restriction of severe application of Article 38 but also the mitigation or the exemption of punishment is considered as the court's genuine discretion. If the criminal suspect who commits a crime for which judgement to punishment has become final(b) and the crimes committed before the said final judgement(a) sentenced as coincident concurrent crime, the decision is not rational and it cannot meet the liability of the regulation. The current article critically examines the interpretation of Supreme Court statement of “deciding coincidentally and considering the equity" and the further conclusion.

Article 9(1) of the Punishment of Tax Evaders Act (“PTEA”) stipulates that any person who evades tax obligations through fraud of other wrongful conduct shall be punished under the PTEA. So far, most of discussions surrounding Article 9(1) of the PTEA were focused on the meaning of “fraud” or “wrongful conduct.” In the case at hand, the focus was on the meaning of “tax evasion.” There has been much controversy and debate over this issue. The debate centers on the issue of whether a person who has properly reported the tax base and therefore cannot be said to have interfered with the tax authorities’ ability to impose and determine tax liabilities, but instead has hindered the collection of the tax, can be punished under the PTEA. In the recent Supreme Court Decision 2005 Do 9546 delivered February 15, 2007 the court ruled that even if there was no interference of the imposition or determination of tax, if there was interference of collection of tax, then the conduct should also be punished. The author of this paper fully agrees with the Supreme Court's decision for the following reasons: First, the legislative purpose of the PTEA is to secure the state’s tax revenues as well as realize the spirit of fairness and justice in tax collection. Moreover, although anyone can report tax returns properly, if that person deliberately attempts to avoid the collection of tax, that conduct cannot go unpunished. Tax returns, in the end, serve the purpose of facilitating tax collection. Second, on a practical level, hindrance of the imposition /determination of tax and the hindrance of collection are both unlawful behavior that bring on the same result, and therefore should be treated alike. In conclusion, the recent Supreme Court decision is significant in that it clarifies the interpretation of “tax evasion” as stipulated in Article 9(1) of the PTEA. More importantly, this interpretation is in accordance with the principle of the legal principle of Nullum crimen sine lege.