Among nuclear power plants in the Republic of Korea, Kori Unit 1 and Wolsong Unit 1 have been permanently shut down, and Kori Unit 1 is preparing to be decommissioned. According to the decommissioning plan (DP) of Kori Unit 1, a radioactive waste processing complex will be built on the Kori site to reduce radioactive waste generated during decommissioning actively, and various types of decommissioning waste are expected to be treated in the complex. It is judged that matters related to the safety assessment of the complex are not included in the DP since the equipment and treatment processes have not been determined. IAEA GSR Part 5 states that radioactive waste processing complex shall be operated according to national regulations and the conditions imposed by the regulatory body. However, it has been confirmed that separate regulatory requirements for the complex have not yet been established in Korea. It is expected that the Regulation on Technical Standards for Nuclear Facilities, etc. will be applied mutatis mutandis. Liquid and gaseous radioactive materials can be expected to be released into the sea or atmosphere during the operation of the complex. Accordingly, it should be proved that standards such as discharge limits of radioactive effluents are met. Although the assessment of radioactive effluent discharged from nuclear power plants to the environment is systematically conducted, it has been confirmed that the safety assessment framework for radioactive effluents discharged from the complex has not yet been established. Currently, the SAFRAN Tool is based on SADRWMS (Safety Assessment Driving Radioactive Waste Management Solutions), an IAEA safety assessment methodology for pre-disposal management, which uses Pathway Dose Factors (PDFs) derived from generic environmental models. Therefore, in order to conduct a more detailed safety assessment of the complex on a specific site, site characteristic data should be reflected. Although safety assessment using the SAFRAN Tool was conducted at the Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology (TINT) facility, detailed data were not provided, and PDFs reflecting site characteristic data were not applied. Also, no other studies that considered many types of waste and provided detailed data on the safety assessment were not confirmed. Therefore, this study developed K-CRAFT (Kyung Hee – Comprehensive RAdioactive waste treatment Facility safety assessment Tool), this tool that can derive PDFs by reflecting site characteristic data based on the SADRWMS methodology and conducted preliminary safety assessment for the complex which will be built in Kori site by this tool.

The Agency needs to maintain a solid and reliable foundation for recruited inspectors by providing practical training at commercial nuclear power plants. The Comprehensive Inspection Exercise (CIE) is a basic training which consists of a simulation of a Design Information Verification (DIV) Visit, a Physical Inventory Verification (PIV) at a nuclear power plant, including Complementary Access. The basic curriculum includes a pre-course session, auditing exercises, fresh fuel (bundles and assemblies) measurements, spent fuel (bundles and assemblies) measurements, verification of design features, as well as nuclear material flow. ROK has been holding the lightwater reactor (LWR) / heavy-water reactor (CANDU) training course (CIE) from 2010 every year with about 2 weeks curriculum through MSSP (Member State Support Program). LWR and CANDU are operated by KHNP. To efficiently carry out the safeguards, IAEA receives the contribution through the ROK support program and implement R&D for the nuclear material inspection. ROK has been supporting and contributing total 22 tasks to IAEA in-cash and in-kind. Among them, this training provides for a course on safeguards verification activities at CANDU and LWR facilities. This course offers inspectors a unique opportunity to understand diversion scenarios and to familiarize themselves with instruments specifically used at CANDU and LWR facilities (OFPS and DCVD), as well as spent fuel dry storage transfer verification activities and dry storage dual sealing arrangements. KINAC performs PoC (Point of Contact) on behalf of NSSC and coordinates work between IAEA and KHNP. Additionally, KINAC first discusses with KHNP that can host light-water reactors and heavy-water reactors with KHNP at the beginning of each year. In order to hold a successful training, ROK plans and carries out a lot of process including agenda, accommodation, equipment movement, logistics and so on in consultation with the IAEA and facilities.

Kori Unit 1 was permanently shut down in 2017 and is preparing to be dismantled. Decommissioning nuclear power plants is expected to generate a lot of decommissioning waste. Therefore, a radioactive waste treatment complex will be built on the site to safely and effectively the process of decommissioning waste generated from the Kori Unit 1, and the details are specified in the decommissioning plan. Therefore, a safety assessment should be conducted according to the facility’s normal and abnormal operations to construct a radioactive waste treatment complex. Currently, a safety assessment for a radioactive waste treatment complex can be conducted by the Safety Assessment Framework (SAFRAN) Tool based on the Safety Assessment Driving Radioactive Waste Management Solutions (SADRWMS) methodology developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The SAFRAN Tool can be calculated radiation dose and hazard quotient (HQ) for workers and the public under normal and abnormal conditions of the radioactive waste treatment complex. When evaluating the radiation dose for the public due to releasing radioactive materials into the air or discharging radioactive materials into liquids, the radiation dose is calculated using the amount discharged or released from the treatment complex, and the Pathway Dose Factors (PDFs) derived from the generic environmental model given in the IAEA Safety Reports Series No.19. PDFs, which reflect the specific site data rather than the generic environmental model data, should be calculated and evaluated when performing the safety evaluation of the radioactive waste treatment complex to be built on the Kori site. In addition, in the SAFRAN tool, there is an inconvenience in that it must be calculated separately by radionuclides to calculate the contribution of dose or HQ for each radionuclide. Therefore, in this study, a safety assessment tool for a radioactive waste treatment complex was developed using Visual Basic by supplementing the limitations of the SAFRAN tool. This tool was developed to allow users to choose whether to apply PDFs based on the IAEA SRS-19 based on the generic environmental model or PDFs calculated to reflect the specific site data. Furthermore, the tool considered all types of decommissioning wastes that may occur during the decommissioning of the Kori Unit 1 and the treatment process scheduled to be introduced. Therefore, this study is expected to be used as basic data when conducting the safety assessment of radioactive waste treatment complex scheduled to be introduced in Korea.

When exporting nuclear power plants to a third country, the U.S. conditions import countries to join the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol. At the Korea-U.S. summit, Korea also agreed to maintain equal non-proliferation standards. This paper first analyzes how the U.S. applies the conditions for joining additional protocols to export control policies. The U.S. Atomic Energy Act is a general law in the field of nuclear power that governs both civilian and military use of nuclear power. Article 123 stipulates matters related to “cooperation with other countries.” According to Article 123, the United States must conclude a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with another country that stipulates nuclear non-proliferation obligations for nuclear cooperation to a “significant” extent. Article 123 of the Nuclear Energy Act presents nine conditions for signing the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, and matters related to safeguards are stipulated in Nos. 1 and 2, and only IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) is specified as requirements under the current law. As a result of analyzing the countries of the nuclear cooperation agreements currently signed by the United States, the United States is evaluating the AP in terms of the policy as an essential item. Among the nuclear agreements with the United States, three countries, Egypt, Brazil, and Argentina do not have AP in effect. Among them, Brazil and Argentina are recognized by the IAEA as replacing the ABACC with the AP, so only Egypt is not a member of the AP. The nuclear agreement between the U.S. and Egypt was signed in 1981 before the AP existed, and all recently signed agreements were identified as AP-effective countries. As a result of reviewing the U.S. export control laws, the U.S. did not legislate the AP as a condition for peaceful nuclear exports. Reflecting the NSG export control guidelines, AP was legislated as an export license requirement only in exporting sensitive nuclear technology (enrichment, reprocessing). However, it is confirmed that the U.S. policy applies AP entry into force as one of the main requirements for determining whether it is harmful to nuclear exports, along with the conclusion of the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, the application of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and military alliance. The appropriate scope of application of the Additional Protocol in Korea and its application plan will be suggested through future research.

The measurement activities to evaluate material balance of nuclear material are usually performed by operator. It is because that the IAEA does not have enough manpower to carry out nuclear measurement accountancy of all nuclear materials in the world. Therefore, the IAEA should consider scenarios which facility operator tries to divert nuclear material for misuse by distorting measurement record. It is required to verify the operator’s measurement data whether it is normal or not. IAEA measures inventory items using their own equipment which is independent of facility operator equipment for verification. Since all inventory lists cannot be verified due to limited resources, the number of items to be verified is determined through statistical method which is called as sample size calculation. They measure for the selected items using their own equipment and compares with operator’s record. The IAEA determines sample size by comprehensively considering targeted diverted nuclear material amount and targeted non-detection probability and performance of measurement equipment. In general, the targeted diverted nuclear material amount is considered significant quantity (plutonium: 8 kg, uranium-235: 75 kg). If the targeted non-detection probability or the performance of the verification equipment is low, the sample size increases, and on the contrary, in the case of high non-detection probability or good performance of verification equipment, even a small sample size is satisfied. It cannot be determined from a single sample size calculation because there are so many sample size combinations for each verification equipment and there are many diversion scenarios to be considered. So, IAEA estimates initial sample size based on statistical method to reduce calculation load. And then they calculate non-detection probability for a combination of initial sample size. Through the iteration calculation, the sample size that satisfies the closest to the target value is derived. The sample size calculation code has been developed to review IAEA’s calculation method. The main difference is that IAEA calculates sample size based on approximate equation, while in this study, sample size is calculated by exact equation. The benchmarking study was performed on reference materials. The data obtained by the code show similar results to the reference materials within an acceptable range. The calculation method developed in this study will be applied to support IAEA and domestic inspection activities in uranium fuel fabrication facility.

MSSP means Member State Support Program, which is the program of the member state supporting IAEA. To efficiently carry out the safeguards, IAEA receives the support of the member states through this program and carries out R&D for the nuclear material inspection equipment, etc. ROK has been supporting and contributing total 21 tasks to IAEA in-cash and in-kind. These tasks consist of training, safeguards approaches, Analysis Support and NWAL Coordination, information analysis, Safeguards Information Systems and System Usability. ROK support program that consisted mainly of hosting IAEA inspector training courses was not active in 2021 due to COVID-19. So, through the project called “online course development consultation”, we developed e-learning module (titled “Introduction to Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements following the model text of INFCIRC/153 (corr.) related to State reporting obligations”) to provide continuous support for IAEA’s non-face-to-face safeguards activities in the current pandemic situation. We developed this module that is HTML5+MP4-based SCORM type to provide services for both PCs and smart phones. In conclusion, The ROK has differed in its form of support from previous years by developing e-learning modules for IAEA trainings and thus contributed towards IAEA’s international collaborative system to enhance its safeguards capability and this has enhanced the ROK’s status in the IAEA.

Since 2017, the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) has been implementing State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC) training courses for the nuclear Newcomer States. This IAEA SSAC course for Newcomer States aims to provide overall concepts and techniques, particularly on nuclear material accountancy and control systems, and address future challenges with regard to developing new nuclear power plants. Due to the restricted travels and limited in-person access to training and facilities from the COVID-19 pandemic, however, a new software was developed to substitute a technical tour on bulk handling facility (BHF) of the training course, and the course was favorably shifted to online in 2021. This newly built training software allows participants to follow each step of the technical process at a virtual bulk handing facility, and provides a video tour for such conditions where the software is found difficult to operate. Another feature of the development is a security function that prevents access of unauthorized users to the software. The achievement is expected to strengthen the SSAC of Newcomer States and ensure the practical implementation of safeguards from the initial stage of their novel nuclear power program through cooperation with IAEA. This contribution of the Republic of Korea (ROK) as one of the leading countries in the field of nuclear nonproliferation will further extend the partnership between IAEA and ROK and promote cooperation with the Newcomer States.

IAEA, in preparation for possible commercial operation of small modular reactors (SMR), is pursuing the early development of safeguards approaches for these reactors along with the publication of the safeguards technical report (STR) to make verification activities easier for inspectors. For this purpose, the IAEA, through the MSSP, is developing various approaches for the application of safeguards by design for SMRs in collaboration with five countries that along with the ROK includes Russia, China, and U.S. etc. In order to review the specific design information of the ROK’s only SMR facility, SMART, and to establish safeguards methods from the initial design stage, collaborations were made with the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, which researched and developed the SMART. As a result, the design information questionnaire (DIQ) and STR was created and sent to the IAEA. The DIQ is a collection of crucial questions regarding the application of safeguards to understand the characteristics of the reactor facility, and STR is a document referred to by IAEA inspectors during safeguards verification activities. The main contents of the STR consist of introduction, technological description of SMR, safeguards approach, conclusions and annexes. Through this study, it is anticipated to understand the technical requirements for safeguards implementation of SMRs in the design stage, and through the completion of the final report applying SBD with regards to the design of the SMART facility, it could be used as information material for future safeguard verification activities by IAEA inspectors.

While inspecting the Natanz Nuclear Site (Iran) on October 6, 2019, an inspector of the IAEA was found to carry suspicious materials. She was prevented from entering the site by the Iranian authorities and was shortly returned to the Agency’s headquarters. Iran could not prosecute her, because of the inspector’s immunity by the Agency. However, in addition to exhaustion of the dispute settlement mechanisms predicted in the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA which has also provided the recourse to the ICJ, Iran may prosecute the Agency by attributing the conduct of the inspector to the Agency in the national courts of non-member States of the Agency that has not accepted the immunity of international organizations as customary international law. This article deals with the immunity of international organizations and its agents, as well as examining the Agency inspector’s fault in inspecting the Natanz Nuclear Site and the Judicial Mechanisms for follow-ups.