KEPCO KPS is the contractor for the full system decontamination (FSD) of Kori Unit 1 and under preparation such as modification, lay out for equipment installation, setting up tie-in/out point for chemical injection and way to pressurize the system, of its successful performance. In this research, KPS introduced how KPS has designed and prepared for the FSD project and how will the chemical decontamination process be implemented. As described in the previous research, chemical decontamination process is planned to be conducted for three cycles and each cycle is consisted of oxidation, reduction, decomposition, and purification. Oxidation and reduction process were conducted at 90°C. Chemical decomposition and purification process were conducted at 40°C due to the damage of IX by the heat. If the decontamination result does not meet the target DF and the dose rate, additional cycle can be conducted. Expected volume of process water for FSD is 200 m3. Three systems have been designated as decontamination targets: reactor coolant system (RCS), residual heat removal system (RHRS), chemical volume control system (CVCS). For the steady flow rate, existed plant equipment such as reactor coolant pump (RCP) will be operated and modifications on some components will be conducted. Due to the limited space for installation, decontamination equipment and other resources are distributed to three different places. KPS designed the layout of equipment installed inside the containment vessel. The layout contains the information of shielding for highly radiated equipment such as IX and filter skid.

Derived Concentration Guideline Levels (DCGLs), which represent the residual radioactivity concentration limits, serve as the pivotal criteria for decontamination during decommissioning of nuclear power plants and are essential for license termination. The analysis of radionuclides in various media to check site-specific and radionuclide-specific DCGLs is a resource-intensive and time-consuming processes, and there are some radionuclides that are hard to analyze. In the decommissioning of the Rancho Seco nuclear power plant in the United States, a conservative approach was adopted. Potentially highly contaminated areas on the site were identified by collecting and analyzing soil samples, and radionuclides exceeding the Minimum Detectable Concentration (MDC) were selected as the potential Radionuclide of Concern (ROC), and surrogate DCGLs for hard-to-detect radionuclides were applied to soil samples. For soil samples in the Rancho Seco nuclear power plant, Cs-137 contributed more than 90% of the total radioactivity. DCGLs of the ROC were obtained using the scaling factors through analysis of Cs- 137 for a large amount of soil samples. In Korea, the scaling factor methodology has not been applied to the decommissioning of commercial nuclear power plants. An initial investigation was undertaken to assess the viability of implementing Surrogate Derived Concentration Guideline Levels (DCGLs) in the dismantling of Kori Unit 1, drawing insights from the U.S. nuclear power plant decommissioning experiences. To do this approach, the concentration ratio of radionuclides of interest to key radionuclide in contaminated soil should be known and consistent. But related information is not available at this time. So Surrogate DCGL for representative C-14, Fe-55, Ni-59, Ni-63, and Sr-90 was obtained using the scaling factors applied to radioactive waste data, specifically Decontaminated Aqueous Waste (DAW) and Spent Resin. In order to develop a reliable surrogate DCGLs the Kori Unit 1 site, it is important to analyze the radionuclides in the soil for the Kori Unit 1 decommissioning site to obtain consistent concentration ratio of the radionuclides of concern to the key radionuclides. When a the suitable DCGL is developed, it can be used for FSS planning and prior decision-making ensuring the safe and effective decommissioning of Kori Unit 1 and similar nuclear power plants.

Kori Unit 1 nuclear power plant is a pressurized water reactor type with an output of 587 Mwe, which was permanently shut down on June 18, 2017. Currently, the final decommissioning plan (FDP) has been submitted and review is in progress. Once the FDP is approved, it is expected that dismantling will begin with the secondary system, and dismantling work on the primary system of Kori Unit 1 will begin after the spent nuclear fuel is taken out. It is expected that the space where the secondary system has been dismantled can be used as a temporary storage place, and the entire dismantling schedule is expected to proceed without delay. The main equipment of the secondary system is large and heavy. The rotating parts is connected to a single axis with a length of about 40 meters, and is complexly installed over three floors, making accessibility very difficult. A large pipe several kilometers long that supplies various fluids to the secondary system is installed hanging from the ceiling using a hanger between the main devices, and the outer diameter of the pipe is wrapped with insulation material to keep warm. In nuclear secondary system decommissioning, it is very important to check for radiation contamination, establish and implement countermeasures, and predict and manage safety and environmental risks that may occur when cutting and dismantling large heavy objects. So we plan to evaluate the radiation contamination characteristics of the secondary system using ISOCS (In- Situ Object Counting System) to check for possible radioactive contamination. According to the characteristics results, decommissioning plans and methods for safe dismantling by workers were studied. In addition, we conducted research on how to safely dismantle the secondary system in terms of industrial safety, such as asbestos, cutting and handling of heavy materials and so on. This study proposes a safe decommissioning method for various risks that may occur when dismantling the secondary system of Kori Unit 1 nuclear power plant.

Kori Unit 1, pressurized water reactor, is the Korea’s first commercial nuclear power plant. It successfully generated electricity for a period of 30 years, commencing from April 19, 1978. Following its approval for continued operation in 2008, Kori Unit 1 continued to operate for an additional 9 years, resulting in a total operational period of 39 years. On June 18, 2017, Kori Unit 1 was permanently shut down. Since then, Korea is actively preparing for the decommissioning of nuclear power plant. During the decommissioning of a nuclear power plant, the heavy components such as reactor, steam generator, pressurizer, reactor coolant pump located in the containment building should be taken out of the containment building. To take out heavy components from the containment building, pipes connected to heavy component should be cut. There are numerous pipes connected to the heavy component, each with varying dimensions and material. Each pipe has a different level of contamination depending on its use. In this study, optimal cutting method of pipe connected to steam generator, one of the heavy components of nuclear power plant, is proposed during the decommissioning of Kori unit 1. In case of pipe connected to Kori unit 1 steam generator, material is stainless steel or carbon steel. These pipes have varying inner diameter, ranging from 0.6 cm to 74 cm, and thickness ranging from 0.15 cm to 7.1 cm. These pipes are classified as low and intermediate level waste (LILW) or very low level waste (VLLW). Because characteristics of pipes are different, each pipe optimal cutting methods are proposed differently considering material, dimension, contamination level, cutting cost, cutting time, and the management of secondary waste. As a result, the cutting method for pipe of reactor coolant system is selected to orbital cutting. The cutting method of main steam pipe and main feedwater pipe is selected to oxygen cutting. In case of other small pipes, cutting method is selected to circular saw.

Compared to operational wastes, nuclear power plant (NPP) decommissioning wastes are generated in larger quantities within a short time and include diverse types with a wider range of radiation characteristics. Currently used 200 L drums and IP-2 type transport containers are inefficient and restrictive in packaging and transporting decommissioning wastes. Therefore, new packaging and transport containers with greater size, loading weight, and shielding performance have been developed. When transporting radioactive materials, radiological safety should be assessed by reflecting parameters such as the type and quantity of the package, transport route, and transport environment. Thus far, safety evaluations of radioactive waste transport have mainly targeted operational wastes, that have less radioactivity and a smaller amount per transport than decommissioning wastes. Therefore, in this study, the possible radiation effects during the transport from NPP to disposal facilities were evaluated to reflect the characteristics of the newly developed containers and decommissioning wastes. According to the evaluation results, the exposure dose to transport workers, handling workers, and the public was lower than the domestic regulatory limit. In addition, all exposure dose results were confirmed, through sensitivity analysis, to satisfy the evaluation criteria even under circumstances when radioactive materials were released 100% from the container.

Kori unit 1, the first PWR (Pressurized Water Reactor) in Korea, was permanent shut down in 2017. In Korea, according to the Nuclear Safety Act, the FDP (Final Decommissioning Plan) must be submitted within 5 years of permanent shutdown. According to NSSC Notice, the types, volumes, and radioactivity of solid radioactive wastes should be included in FDP chapter 9, Radioactive Waste Management, Therefore, in this study, the types depending on generation characteristics and radiological characterization methods and process of solid radioactive waste were analyzed. Solid radioactive waste depending on the characteristics of the generation was classified into reactor vessel and reactor vessel internal, large components, small metals, spent nuclear fuel storage racks, insulation, wires, concrete debris, scattering concrete, asbestos, mixed waste, soil, spent resins and filters, and dry active waste. Radiological characterization of solid radioactive waste is performed to determine the characteristics of radioactive contamination, including the type and concentration of radionuclides. It is necessary to ensure the representativeness of the sample for the structures, systems and components to be evaluated and to apply appropriate evaluation methods and procedures according to the structure, material and type of contamination. Therefore, the radiological characterization is divided into concrete and structures, systems and components, and reactor vessel, reactor vessel internal and bioshield concrete. In this study, the types depending on generation characteristics and radiological characterization methods and process of solid radioactive waste were analyzed. The results of this study can be used as a basis for the preparation of the FDP for the Kori unit 1.

This study presents a methodology to determine the radionuclides of concern that are expected to be found during the final status survey of Kori Unit 1 decommissioning. The methodology involved reflecting the evaluation results of ORIGEN based on reference documents such as NUREG/CR-3474, NUREG/CR-4289, NUREG/CR-0130, WINCO-1191, and representative fuel loading. A list of potential radionuclides of concern was provided by reflecting the list of radionuclides of concern included in the Kori Unit 1 decommissioning plan. To select the radionuclides of concern, we analyzed the approach of US decommissioning plants based on the recommendations of NUREG-1757 Vol.2 Rev.1 and excluded certain radionuclides from the list. The final list of 23 radionuclides of concern was derived by excluding radionuclides that have a short half-life, low specific activity, analytically difficult to measure, inert gases, or naturally occurring radionuclides. This methodology can be applied to other nuclear power plants, such as the Wolsong Nuclear Power Plant, by reflecting the unique characteristics of the reactor.

Kori Unit 1 is about 600MW Pressurized Light Water Reactor as WH type. KHNP got an approval for construction and operation of Kori unit 1 on May 31, 1972 and started commercial operation from Apr. 29, 1987. And then, it was decided to permanently suspend it on Jun. 18, 2017 after 40 years of commercial operation. The Nuclear Safety Act stipulates that if a commercial nuclear power plant is permanently suspended, the utility must submit a Final Decommissioning Plan (FDP) within 5 years. So, KHNP, the utility, developed a FDP for Kori Unit 1 and submitted it to the government in May 2021. In South Korea, the FDP is to be prepared in accordance with the relevant notices and consists of 11 major chapters such as (1) Decommissioning Plan Overview, (2) Project management, (3) Status of Site and Environmental, (4) Decommissioning Strategies and Method, (5) Ease of Decom. Design characteristic, (6) Safety Analysis, (7) Radiation Protection, (8) Decontamination and Dismantling, (9) Radioactive Waste Management, (10) Environmental Impact Analysis, (11) Fire Protection and (12, 13) Etc., References and Glossary. KHNP has prepared a strategy and system consisting of three areas such as R&D, Engineering and licensing document development to prepare the final decommissioning plan for Kori Unit 1. The promotion system for the preparation of the FDP for Kori Unit 1 is composed of Engineering (HAS Characterization, Dismantling Safety Evaluation, Radiological Environmental Report, Radioactive Waste Treatment and Facility Construction), R&D(KHNP R&D Results such as Process/Work Package /Cost Estimation, Safety Analysis, Contamination and Exposure, Guide for Detailed Characteristic, Site Safety Analysis, RV & RVI Dismantling Process, etc.), Overseas case lessons learned(Taiwan unit 1 NPP FDP and Spain Zorita NPP FDP analysis) and Development of Licensing Document. KHNP completed the initial completion of the Final Decommissioning Plan for Kori Unit 1 in March 2020 and carried out collecting residents’ opinions through public hearings. And then, KHNP supplemented the results of the residents’ opinions and applied for license to the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission in May, 2021. Now, KHNP are responding to the FDP licensing review.

The current storage capacity of the spent nuclear fuel at the Kori unit 2 has reached approximately 94% saturation, excluding emergency core capacity. As South Korea has not yet constructed any interim storage facilities to store spent nuclear fuel, one of possible options is to install high density storage racks in spent fuel pool at the reactor site to increase its capacity. The high density storage rack is a technology developed to allow the storage to have more spent nuclear fuel than originally planned, while still ensuring safety. It achieves this by reducing the storage gap between the spent nuclear fuel. The purpose of this study is to investigate an appropriate storage capacity for spent fuel pool in the Kori unit 2 and the factors to be considered during the high density storage rack installation. Given that the Kori unit 2 is planning continued operation and Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) is preparing to install a temporary storage facility for spent nuclear fuel at the Kori nuclear site, it is reasonable to consider the installation of high density storage racks in the spent fuel pool as a storage solution for these issues. When evaluating the capacity of the spent fuel pool, the amount of spent nuclear fuel generated by other reactors in Kori nuclear site and the amount of spent nuclear fuel generated by continued operation of the Kori unit 2 should be taken into account. This study aims to consider these factors and evaluate the capacity of the spent fuel pool. Furthermore, when installing high density storage rack for the spent nuclear fuel, it should be noted that the existing storage racks at the Kori unit 2 are welded to the liner plate, which may require additional cutting work. Therefore, it is necessary to review the suitable method for the cutting work. Additionally, assuming that divers need to access the area near the storage racks or cutting & welding devices require radiation protection in the area, it is essential to analyze the expected radiation level with computational code and propose appropriate measures to limit work time or establish a work zone. Thus, this study evaluates appropriate capacity of spent fuel pool and work methods for the installation of high density storage rack in the spent fuel pool at the Kori unit 2. It is expected that this paper contributes to install high density storage racks in SFP safely.

Reactor pressure vessels and steam generators generated in the process of dismantling nuclear power plants or replaced steam have various shape and occupy a considerable amount of the disposal site when disposed of in original shape. For the development of domestic technologies related to the disposal of large wastes, it is necessary to secure technologies for reducing large radioactive metal wastes, including technologies such as decontamination, cutting, melting, and residual radioactivity evaluation. Cases of disposal of steam generators in Europe and the United States were investigated. Except for u-tubes, steam generators are less contaminated or easily decontaminated, so it is possible to reduce the volume of waste subject to final disposal by exempting a significant amount through appropriate treatment. Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. is currently temporarily storing 24 steam generators at 41.6 billion won. This paper presents a method to exempt more parts of the steam generator and reduce the volume of waste by properly combining mechanical cutting thermal cutting and melting to dispose of the steam generator. Currently the decontamination and dismantling industries of nuclear facilities are gradually expanding around the world. Therefore, it is necessary to localize the treatment technology for metal waste generated during maintenance and dismantling. The result of this study can be used to establish waste reduction and disposal method for dismantling steam generators.

In operating or permanently shut down nuclear power plants which were built between 1970s and 1990s, asbestos was widely used for ceiling materials, wall materials, and gaskets. Furthermore, it was mainly treated as a heat-resistant material like insulation. In Kori Unit 1, radioactive asbestos was replaced or removed through maintenance and repair in the containment building during the operation period of about 40 years, but radioactive asbestos still remains that need to be partially dismantled. Generally, it is more difficult to handle because it belongs to two different waste categories, radioactive waste and hazardous waste. In addition, the risk increases further due to radioactivity with the asbestos hazards itself. Therefore, it is very important to accurately determine the amount of radioactive asbestos waste and to evaluate the treatment method and disposal reduction rate before the decommissioning is started. According to the Korean Waste Management Act, three methods are recommended for the asbestos (hazardous waste) treatment: landfill, solidification, and high-temperature melting. Landfill is commonly used in Korea and the United States while high-temperature melting and solidification are additionally recommended only in Korea. Considering the situation in Korea, landfill is not appropriate due to the limitations of landfill capacity and potential risks (hazards still remain). Therefore, the other two methods can be considered sufficiently in terms of safety, detoxification, and reduction rate. This paper evaluates the amount of radioactive asbestos waste at Kori Unit 1 based on the actual asbestos building material data (as of February 2022) of the Asbestos Management Comprehensive Information Network. Vitrification is considered as a sufficient alternative for treating radioactive asbestos waste. And, it is checked whether the vitrified waste through the high-temperature melting method, plasma torch, meets the requirements such as detoxification, compressive strength and leachability for storage and disposal stability. It is expected to be useful to prepare a radioactive mixed waste management standard and to reduce the disposal cost through the reduction of final waste.

It is necessary to prepare for cutting and storing waste materials in the reactor vessel internals (RVI) for successful decommissioning of the nuclear power plant (NPP). Since RVI contain massive components and relatively highly activated, their decommissioning process should be conducted carefully in terms of radiological and industrial safety. To achieve efficient decommissioning waste management, this study presents radiation level of RVI and cutting optimization was performed for intermediate level waste. As a result of the radiation evaluation, a part of the core side and the upper part of RVI were evaluated as intermediate-level waste, and other components were evaluated as very low-level or lowlevel waste. For intermediate-level waste cutting, the minimum cutting method that can be put into a container was reviewed in consideration of the size, thickness, and cutting method of the interior product. The final segmentation parts are expected to be loaded into two storage containers.

This paper mainly focuses on the maximum decay heat estimation generated from spent fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool of Kori units 3&4 at the beginning decommissioning. It is assumed that the spent fuel pool is fully occupied with 2,260 spent fuel assemblies, same as its design capacity. In addition, equally 56.5 spent fuel assemblies have been generated per year. The minimum cooling time is five years considering the transition phase between the permanent shutdown and the amendment of Operating License for decommissioning. Sending and receiving of spent fuel assemblies to/from other units are neglected. Seven representative spent fuel assembly groups are established based on the burnup rate and cooling time. Conservatively high values for the burnup rates and low values for the cooling times are applied. Calculation of the decay heat of each representative group has been performed by using ORIGEN decay solver of SCALE. Then, total decay heat has been calculated based on this. Group 1, 2, and 3 contain comparatively old spent fuel assemblies with 45 GWd/tU burnup rate and 20~30 cooling years. The calculation shows 489~586 watts of decay heat per assembly. Group 4, 5, 6, and 7 contain comparatively new spent fuel assemblies with 55 GWd/tU burnup rate and 5~20 cooling years. The calculation shows 741~1,483 watts of decay heat per assembly. The total maximum decay heat therefore is estimated as 1,609,459 watts.

The spent filters stored in Kori Unit 1 are planned that compressed and disposed for volume reduction. However, shielding reinforcement is required to package high-dose spent filters in a 200 L drum. So, in this study suggests a shielding thickness that can satisfy the surface dose criteria of 10 mSv·h−1 when packaging several compressed spent filters into 200 L drums, and the number of drums required for the compressed spent filter packaging was calculated. In this study, representative gamma-emitting nuclides in spent filter are assumed that Co-60 and Cs-137, and dose reduction due to half-life is not considered, because the date of occurrence and nuclide information of the stored spent filter are not accurate. The shielding material is assumed to be concrete, and the thickness of the shielding is assumed to 18 cm considering the diameter of the spent filter and compression mold. Considering the height of the compressed spent filter and the internal height of the shielding drum, assuming the placement of the compressed spent filter in the drum in the vertical direction only, the maximum number of packaging of the compressed spent filter is 3. When applying a 18 cm thick concrete shield, the maximum dose of the spent filter can packaged in the drum is 125 mSv·h−1, so when packaging 3 spent filters of the same dose, the dose of a spent filter shall not exceed 41 mSv·h−1 and not exceed 62 mSv·h−1when packing 2 spent filters. Therefore, the dose ranges of spent filters that can be packaged in a drum are classified into three groups: 0–41 mSv·h−1, 41–62 mSv·h−1, and 62–125 mSv·h−1based on 41 mSv·h−1, 62 mSv·h−1, and 125 mSv·h−1. When 227 spent filters stored in the filter room are classified according to the above dose group, 207, 3 and 4 spent filters are distributed in each group, and the number of shielding drums required to pack the appropriate number of spent filters in each dose group is 75. Meanwhile, 8 spent filters exceeding 125 mSv·h−1 and 5 spent filters that has without dose information are excluded from compression and packaging until the treatment and disposal method are prepared. In the future, we will segmentation of waste filter dose groups through the consideration of dose reduction and horizontal placement of compressed spent filters, and derive the minimum number of drums required for compressed spent filter packaging.

This study is for evaluation and optimization of workers’ radiation exposure for dismantling Reactor Vessel (RV) at Kori unit 1 in connection with its decommissioning process for the purpose of establishing Radiation Safety Management Plan. This is because the safety of workers in a radiation environment is an important issue. The basis of radiological conditions of this evaluation is supposed to be those of 10 years after the permanent shutdown of Kori unit 1 when dismantling work of Reactor Vessel would suppose to be started. Dose rates of work areas were evaluated on the basis of spatial dose rate derived from activation level calculated by MCNP (Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport) and ORIGEN-S code. RV are radiated by neutrons during operation, creating an environment in which it is difficult for operators to access and work. Therefore, the RV must be dismantled remotely. However, due to work such as installing devices or dismantling surrounding structures, it is not possible to completely block the access of workers. Accordingly, the exposure of workers to the RV dismantling process should be assessed and safety management carried out. The dismantling process of Kori unit 1 RV was developed based on in-situ execution in atmospheric environment using the oxigen-propane cutting technology as the following steps of Preparation, Dismantling of Peripheral Structures, Dismantling of RV and Finishing Work. For evaluation of exposure of RV dismantling work, those processes of each steps are correlated with spatial dose rates of each work areas where the jobs being done. Results of the evaluation show that workers’ collective dose for RV dismantling work would be in the range of 536–778 man- mSv. The most critical process would be dismantling of upper connecting parts of RV with 170–256 manmSv while among the working groups, the expert group performing dismantling of ICI (In-core instrumentation) nozzles and handling & packaging of cut-off pieces is evaluated as the most significantly affected group with 37.5–39.4 man- mSv. Based on the evaluation, improvement plan for better working conditions of the most critical process and the most affected workers in terms of radiation safety were suggested.

Radioactive waste generated during the decommissioning of Kori Unit 1 can be packaged in a transport container under development and transported to a disposal facility by sea transport or land transport. In this study, the cost of each transport method was evaluated by considering the methods of land transport, sea transport, and parallel transport of the radioactive waste dismantled at Kori Unit 1. In evaluating the shipping cost, the shipping cost was evaluated by assuming the construction of a new ship without considering shipping by CHEONG JEONG NURI, which is currently carrying operational waste. Since the cargo hold of CHEONG JEONG NURI was built to fit the existing operating waste transport container and is not suitable for transporting the transport container currently under development, sea transport using CHEONG JEONG NURI was excluded in this paper. In the case of on-road transportation, the final fare for each distance was calculated in accordance with the Enforcement Decree of the Freight Vehicle Transportation Business Act, and the cost of onroad transportation was evaluated by estimating the labor cost of the input manpower required for onroad transportation. The cost of on-road transportation was estimated to be approximately KRW 510 million, the product of the total number of transports 459 times the sum of the cost of transportation vehicle freight cost of about KRW 720,000 and the labor cost of input personnel of KRW 380,000. It is difficult to predict the cost of building a new ship at this point, as the cost of building new ship is determined by the cost of number of items such as ship design specifications and material prices, labor costs, and finance costs at the time of construction. Accordingly, considering the 2% annual inflation rate based on the shipbuilding cost (about KRW 26 billion) and financing cost (about KRW 12 billion) at the time of construction of the CHEONG JEONG NURI (2005 yr.), decommissioning of Kori Unit 1 (2025 yr.) construction cost finance cost was estimated and evaluated. According to the result of comparing the transport cost for each transport scenario, land transport is about 510 million won, which is advantageous in terms of economic feasibility compared to the sea transport scenario. However, when transporting by land, it is disadvantageous in terms of acceptability of residents because it is transported multiple times on general roads. The cost of building a new ship is about KRW 56.4 billion, which is disadvantageous in terms of the cost of transporting waste from the dismantling of Kori Unit 1. But, in the future, cost reduction can be expected if waste materials issued when dismantling nuclear power plants are transported.

An application of the final decommissioning plan for unit 1 of Kori NPP was submitted to NSSC on 14 May 2021. We have been implementing the project related to the radiological characterization for the plan since 2019. However, the project was not running smoothly due to the regulatory environment. The destructive sampling from the objects was not allowed, so only smear (swipe) samples are available. In this study, the sampling way and the analytical results of radionuclides are presented. In addition, we propose in-situ measurement using gamma camera and in-situ gamma spectroscopy to obtain more comprehensive radiological information on the object.

The permanent shut-down of Kori unit 1, the first nuclear power plant (NPP) in Korea, generates various radioactive waste. They are dry active waste (DAW), spent resin, concentrated waste, activated metals, etc. During normal operation of NPP, activated metals are rarely generated. The decommissioning of NPP, however, generates massive amount of metallic waste including activated metals and contaminated metals, while normal operation generates small amount of metallic waste. The reactor vessel and internals are relatively highly activated components in NPP. Since they are exposed to the high concentration of neutrons during the operation, their contains relatively high radioactive nuclides. They activation analysis is usually performed to understand the radiological inventory of the activated reactor vessel and internal. The results offer various important information including, radiological inventory, waste classification, etc. The impurities in the carbon steel and stainless steel have a great impact on the radiological inventory of the activated metals. The cobalt, nickel, niobium are primary elements that affects the activation analysis and waste classification. Especially, the cobalt, which transforms to 60Co, plays an important role. The 60Co, strong gamma emitter, affects the waste classification, safety analysis of decommissioning workers, and determination of segmentation and package plans. In this paper, effects of impurity concentration on activation analysis is studied. The expected impurity from various sources, including NUREG/CR-3474, commercial NPP data, etc, and effects will be demonstrated. Also, the comparison between results and international experiences will be followed.