The nuclear power plant (NPP) decommissioning market is expected to expand not only domestically but also overseas. Proven technologies must be applied to decommission NPP. This is based on Article 41-2, Paragraph 2 of the domestic ‘Enforcement Decree Of The Nuclear Safety Act’. Proven technology refers to technology that has verified that it can be applied in the field through demonstration. In other words, in order to carry out NPP decommissioning, verification must be done. Demonstration refers to reducing technological uncertainty and directly verifying services implemented in the field. From a technology commercialization perspective, demonstration requires an approach based on technology readiness level (TRL) from a technology perspective and market readiness level (MRL) from a market perspective. The characteristics of demonstration also differ depending on the characteristics of each field. The demonstration in the field of nuclear energy is the demonstration of demand matching. This is to confirm the feasibility of the technology in the company’s required environment. In order to perform demonstration, a scenario must be derived by reflecting demonstration design considerations. After evaluating the derived scenario, an actual assessment is conducted using lab-based demonstration/virtual environment demonstration/real environment demonstration. What must be preceded by an actual assessment is confirming the consumer’s requirements. In this study, the necessary environment and requirements of consumer’s to perform NPP decommissioning were reviewed. The domestic decommissioning procedure requirements management system presents decommissioning procedures, potential worker accidents, and worker requirements. In the case of foreign countries, it was confirmed that complex wide need, cost benefit, risk reduction, waste generation, operation, reliability and maintenance (RAM) improvement and quantitative measures were evaluated for the technology to be demonstrated. Also the requirements for demonstrating decommissioning need to a detailed review of actual decommissioning cases. Therefore, a comparison must be made between the requirements based on actual NPP decommissioning cases and the requirements derived from this research process. Afterwards, the empirical research approach proposed by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy was applied. The empirical research approach proposed by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy is to secure a track record over a certain period of time and performance under conditions similar to the actual environment in the final research stage at the TRL level 6 to 8. Through this, it will be possible to confirm the suitability of overseas technology for domestic application.

Recently, BNS (Best System) developed a system for evaluation and classification of soil and concrete wastes generated from nuclear power plant decommissioning. It is composed of various modules for container loading, weight measurement, contamination evaluation, waste classification, stacking, storage and control. The contamination evaluation module of the system has two sub modules. One is for quick measurement with NaI (Tl) detector and the other is for accurate measurement with HPGe detector. The container used at the system for wastes handling has capacity of 100 kg and made of stainless steel. According to the measurement result of Co-60 and Cs-137, the waste is classified as waste for disposal or waste for clearance. Performance of the system was demonstrated using RM (Reference Material) radiation source. This year, necessity of system improvement was suggested due to revised operation requirements. So, the system should show throughput of more than 1 ton/hr and Minimum Detectable Activity (MDA) of less than 0.01 Bq/g (1/10 of criteria for regulatory clearance) for Co-60 and Cs-137. And soil waste become main target of the system. For this, the container used for soil waste handling should have capacity of 200 kg. As a result, material for the container need to be changed from stainless steel to plastic or FRP (Fiber Reinforced Plastics). And large area detector should be introduced to the system to enhance processing speed of the system. Additionally, container storage rack and conveyor system should be modified to handle 200 kg capacity container. Finally, moving path of the container will be redesigned for enhanced throughput of the system. In this paper, concept development of the system was suggested and based on that, system development will be followed.

The Derived Concentration Guideline Level (DCGL) is required to release the facility from the nuclear safety act at the stage of site restoration of the decommissioning nuclear power plant. In order to evaluate DCGL, there are various requirements, and among them, the selection of input parameters based on the application scenario is the main task. Especially, it is important to select input parameters that reflect site characteristics, and at this time, a single deterministic value or a probabilistic distribution can be applied. If it is inappropriate to apply a particular single value, it may be reasonable to apply various distributions, and the RESRAD code provides for evaluation using probabilistic methods. Therefore, this study aims to analyze the difference between the application of the deterministic method and the application of the probabilistic method to the area and thickness of the contaminated zone among the site characteristics data. This study analyzed the thickness and area of the contaminated zone, and in the case of thickness, the deterministic method was applied by changing the thickness at regular intervals from the minimum depth considered by MARSSIM to the thickness of the unsaturated zone identified in previous research data. In addition, a probabilistic analysis was performed by applying a distribution to the thickness of contaminated zone. Second, for the area of the contaminated zone, the dose was evaluated for each area in consideration of the areas to be considered when deriving Area Factor (AF), and the resulting change in DCGL was observed. As a result, the DCGL tends to decrease as the thickness increases, and it seems to be saturated when the thickness exceeds a certain thickness. Therefore, It was confirmed that the level of saturated values is similar to that of entering a probabilistic distribution, and in the case of a parameter that is reasonable to enter as a distribution rather than as a single value, it is sufficiently conservative to perform a probabilistic evaluation. In the case of area change, the DCGL evaluation result showed that the DCGL increased as the scale decreased. The magnitude of the change varies depending on the characteristics of each radionuclide, and in the case of radionuclides where external exposure gamma rays have a major exposure effect, the change is relatively small. It can be seen that the change in DCGL according to the area has the same tendency as the AF applicable to the survey unit for small survey units applied in the final status survey.

For the release of the nuclear power plant site after the decommissioning, a reliable exposure dose assessment considering the environmental impact of residual radionuclides is essentially required. In this study, the Derived Concentration Guideline Level (DCGL) for the hypothetically contaminated surface soil at the Wolsong nuclear power plant (NPP) unit 1 site was preliminarily calculated by using the RESRAD-OFFSITE computational code and compared with the other case studies. Moreover, radiation exposure dose for local residents and relevant exposure pathways were quantitatively analyzed based on the calculation model established through this work. For the target site modeling, the source term was determined by referring to the previous case studies regarding the nuclear power plant decommissioning, quantification analysis data of pressure tubes of Wolsong NPP unit 1, and radionuclide data estimated by using the MCNP/ORIGEN-2 code. In total, 14 different radioisotopes such as Ag-108m, C-14, Co-60, Cs-134/137, Fe-55, H-3, Nb-93m/94, Ni-63, Sb-125, Sn-121m, Sr-90, and Zr-93 were considered as target radionuclides. In addition, the geological structure model of the Wolsong NPP site was established based on the final safety analysis report of Wolsong NPP unit 1. The distribution coefficients (Kd) were taken from the JAEA-SDB to estimate the migration/retardation behavior of various radionuclides under the groundwater condition of the Wolsong NPP site. In the present work, the DCGL values were calculated according to the site release criterion of 0.1 mSv/yr, which indicates the radiation protection standard for the site release. Moreover, the exposure pathway and sensitivity analyses were conducted to assess the sensitive input parameters remarkably influencing the calculation result. For the evaluation of exposure dose for local residents, a site layout centered around Wolsong NPP unit 4, located in the closest proximity to the residents’ habitation area, was alternatively established and all potential exposure pathways were considered as a comprehensive resident farmer scenario. The results obtained from this study are expected to serve as a preliminary case study for the DCGL values regarding the surface soil at the Wolsong NPP unit 1 site and for evaluating the radiation exposure dose to local residents resulting from the residual radioactivity at the site after the decommissioning.

The periodic safety review (PSR), for all operating nuclear power plants in Korea, has been conducted in accordance with SSG-25, a guideline suggested by the IAEA, The PSR is performed through the review of the regulatory body after the operator’s self-evaluation. In order to guarantee a high level of safety in consideration of the changed environment, such as operating experience (OE) and technology development, it should be comprehensively and integratedly performed, and it is also carried out every 10 years after the operation permit. However, in case that all or part of the reactor facilities have been permanently shut down, such as Kori Unit 1 and Wolsong Unit 1, Around a half of reactor facilities are not in operation. The periodic safety evaluation may not be conducted for unused parts if there is no safety hazard and if there are some difficulties for applying periodic safety evaluation. In considering that the biggest purpose of PSR safety (by PSR definition of KINS guideline) is to improve and accumulated factors such as aging deterioration, facility change, operation experience, and technological development for operating nuclear power plants. It refers to a comprehensive safety evaluation that is periodically performed during the period of operation of a nuclear power plant. It is necessary to review whether PSR should be performed for a nuclear power plant that is permanently shut down after nuclear power plant operation is terminated. Also, in IAEA SSR 2/2 Rev1, it is defined that PSR is performed during the nuclear power plant operation period. “Requirement 12: Periodic safety review, Systematic safety assessments of the plant, in accordance with the regulatory requirements, shall be performed by the operating organization throughout the plant’s operating lifetime, with due account taken of operating experience and significant new safety related information from all relevant sources”. Recently, Kori Unit 1 and Wolsong Unit 1 were decided to permanently shut down in June 2017 and December 2019, and are currently being prepared for decommissioning. According to the Wolsong decommissioning plan, decontamination and demolition will be completed by 2032. The PSR for permanent shutdown of Kori Unit 1 was submitted to the regulatory body in December 2018 and is under approval review. In the case of the permanent shutdown PSR of Wolsong Unit 1, the project will be launched in May 2023 and the PSR will be submitted to the regulatory body in May 2024. In the case of Wolsong Unit 1, it is necessary to operate the various systems, including the systems related to the spent fuel storage tank, even during the period of permanent shutdown. Such as the heavy water related systems used in common with Wolsong Unit 2, are essential operating systems. Based on Basic Subject Index (BSI), 112 out of 218 systems require operation, indicating that about 50% of systems require operation even after permanent shutdown. Decommissioning of systems and equipment will begin after the transfer to modular air-cooled canister storage (MACSTOR) by the end of 2025, and then in-depth discussions will be needed whether PSR evaluation is meaningful.

In order to evaluate the integrity of the reactor pressure vessel, various test specimens necessary to identify irradiation embrittlement. The degree of irradiation embrittlement of the vessel material by neutrons, from the construction to the end of the life of the plant, is evaluated by a monitoring plan that called surveillance program (a series of all plans to analyze and evaluate embrittlement through various tests and analyzes by placing a test piece inside the reactor pressure vessel and taking out a piece at an appropriate time according to the number of operation years and taking necessary measures for safe operation). The reactor monitoring specimens for Kori Unit-1 are located by axis at S (57°), T (67°), R (77°), N (237°), P (247°) and V (257°). Six surveillance capsules are attached to the inside of the pressure vessel around the core and to the outside of the thermal shield. This surveillance container determines the withdrawal timing of the surveillance container according to the provisions of ASTM E185-82. In the monitoring test piece, there are neutron dosimeter materials to measure and evaluate the irradiated neutron flux, and Ni, Cu, Fe, Co-Al, Cd, and shielded Co-Al monitors are wired in the monitoring container. Each axial position is contained in a spacer hole. The neutron dosimetry monitor measures the neutron dose using isotopes produced by neutrons during operation of the reactor. The Al-Co specimen, which can evaluate the degree of radioactivity of cobalt, is located on the lower part of the specimen. The content of Co in the Al-Co specimen is 0.15%, and when expressed in ppm, it is 1,500 ppm, which is similar to the cobalt content of 1,414 ppm in the internal structure of the reactor vessel presented in NUREG-3474. If the radiation value of the Al-Co sample in the reactor monitoring specimen can be measured, the radiation value of the internal structure of the reactor can be indirectly compared. Since the monitoring specimen is located outside of the thermal shield, radiation should be less than that of the thermal shield. Korea Reactor Monitoring Technology performed gamma measurement on Al-Co specimens in 6 monitoring specimens, and although there are differences depending on the sample, it shows radioactivity values around the order of 1E+07 dps/g, or Bq/g. In conclusion, it is thought that using this measurement values, it is possible to verify the evaluation of internal structure radiation for Kori unit-1 decommissioning.

Despite its advantages such as safety, unnecessary pretreatment, and decontamination of waste with complex geometry, conventional ultrasonic decontamination technology has been only used to remove loose contaminants, oil and grease, not fixed contaminants due to the limitations in increasing the intensity in the high frequency range. Thus, ultrasound has been used as an auxiliary method to accelerate chemical decontamination of radioactive wastes or chemicals were added to the solution to increase the decontamination efficiency. The recently developed high-intensity focused ultrasound (HIFU) decontamination technology overcomes these limitations by combining multiple frequencies of ultrasonic waves in a specific arrangement, making it possible to remove most fixed contaminants, including radioactive micro particles less than 1 micrometer within half an hour. KEPCO NF and EnesG developed mobile HIFU decontamination equipment and successfully demonstrated the decontamination effect on various radionuclides found in nuclear power plants by treating radioactive metal waste to the level below free release criteria. The mobile HIFU decontamination equipment used in the demonstration can be operated anywhere where water is supplied, including controlled area in nuclear power plants, and is expected to be used widely for decontamination and free release of metal radioactive wastes.

Kori Unit 1 was permanently shut down in 2017 and is currently being prepared for decommissioning. Decommissioning waste generated during the decommissioning of a nuclear power plant has the characteristic of being generated in large quantities over a short period. Therefore, if proper management is not carried out, abnormal situations (i.e., unauthorized disposal, diversion, etc.) may occur. According to IAEA General Safety Report Part 6, radioactive waste shall be managed for all waste streams in decommissioning. This means ensuring that all waste streams are managed by the recorded inventory of all decommissioning waste and verifying that the recorded inventory is reasonable. The radioactive waste management has been managed in units such as mass and radioactivity. However, in the case of decommissioning waste, the amount is very large, so management by radioactivity is expected to have limitations. Therefore, in this study, a simple test was conducted to verify the decommissioning waste generated by a hypothetical scenario by mass. In this study, establish a scenario assuming various flows of decommissioning waste expected to be generated and calculate the expected inventory of decommissioning waste using Microsoft Excel. Specifically, using “Material Unaccounted For” (MUF), a material balance equation in IAEA Services Series 15, Nuclear Material Accounting Handbook, the error inventory was calculated as the difference between the physical inventory of decommissioning waste in the area and the ending inventory. We propose a simple test scenario to verify the flow of decommissioning waste by verifying that the error inventory reasonably matches the set allowable error. This study aims to verify the inventory of decommissioning waste using the material balance methodology used for nuclear material accounting. It is expected that the safety and reliability of the nuclear power plant decommissioning process can be secured by verifying that the total inventory of equipment before decommissioning and the inventory of remaining equipment and decommissioning waste after decommissioning are reasonably consistent.

This paper described a method for analyzing the structural performance of a metal container used for disposing radioactive waste generated during the decommissioning of a nuclear power plant, and numerical analysis results of a method for reinforcing the container. The containers to be analyzed were those that can be used in near-surface and landfill disposal facilities scheduled to be operated at the Gyeongju radioactive waste disposal facility. Structural reinforcement of the container was performed by lattice reinforcement, column reinforcement, and bottom plate reinforcement. Accordingly, a total of 14 reinforcement cases were modeled. The external force causing damage to the container was set equivalent to the impact of a 9-m fall, accounting for the height of the vault at the near-surface disposal facility. The reinforcement methods with a high contribution to the structural performance of the container were concluded to be lattice and column reinforcements.

According to NSSC Notice No. 2021-10, safety analysis needs to be introduced in the decommissioning plan. Public and occupational dose analyses should be conducted, specifically for unexpected radiological accidents. Herein, based on the risk matrix and analytic hierarchy process, the method of selecting accident scenarios during the decommissioning of nuclear power plants has been proposed. During decommissioning, the generated spent resin exhibits relatively higher activity than other generated wastes. When accidents occur, the release fraction varies depending on the conditioning method of radioactive waste and type of radioactive nuclides or accidents. Occupational dose analyses for 2 (fire and drop) among 11 accident scenarios have been performed. The radiation doses of the additional exposures caused by the fire and drop accidents are 1.67 and 4.77 mSv, respectively.

Around the world, Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) have been operated since the 1950s and are used as a major power source. In Korea, Kori unit 1 stared commercial operation for the first time in 1978, and as of 2023, 25 units of NPPs are in operation. NPPs produce electricity for about 40 to 60 years after receiving an operating license, and after securing safety through a safety evaluation, the operating period is extended. NPPs that operate for a long time are systematically evaluated for safety at regular intervals through Periodic Safety Review (PSR) recommended by the IAEA. In Korea, PSR has been introduced and performed since 2000. This study reviewed the process of the PSR by comparing with the international PSR procedure. The PSR process is established through the IAEA SSG-25 document and proceeds in the order of establishment of basis document - individual factor evaluation - global assessment - integrated improvement plan. In Korea, PSR is carried out in a similar process, but there are some differences from the IAEA’s procedure. The safety factor review is conducted under the agreement of basis document between the licensee and the regulatory body, but the prior agreement procedure with the regulatory body is not reflected in Korea. As a result, if the licensee and the regulatory body have different opinions on the current licensing basis and the modern safety standards after the evaluation is performed, a difference may occur in the review results and safety enhancement items, which may lead to inefficient PSR progress. PSR is conducted for the continuous safe operation and management of NPPs, and it is important to refer to overseas standards and cases. Although procedures, guidelines, and regulatory requirements are in place in Korea, continuous review and improvement are required. It is necessary to improve procedures such as basis document and global assessment in order to more efficiently carry out PSR evaluation by regulatory agency and licensee’s safety enhancement actions of domestic NPPs

During decommissioning and site remediation of nuclear power plant, large amount of wastes (including radioactive waste) with various type will be generated within very short time. Among those wastes, soil and concrete wastes is known to account for more than 70% of total waste generated. So, efficient management of these wastes is very essential for effective NPP decommissioning. Recently, BNS (Best System) developed a system for evaluation and classification of soil and concrete wastes from the generation. The system is composed of various modules for container loading, weight measurement, contamination evaluation, waste classification, stacking, storage and control. By adopting modular type, the system is good for dealing with variable situation where system capacity needs to be expanded or contracted depending on the decommissioning schedule, good for minimizing secondary waste generated during maintenance of failed part and also good for disassemble, transfer and assemble. The contamination evaluation module of the system has two sub module. One is for quick measurement with NaI(Tl) detector and the other is for accurate measurement with HPGe detector. For waste transfer, the system adopts LTS (Linear Transfer System) conveyor system showing low vibration and noise during operation. This will be helpful for minimizing scattering of dust from the waste container. And for real time positioning of waste container, wireless tag was adopted. The tag also used for information management of waste history from the generation. Once a container with about 100 kg of soil or concrete is loaded, it is moved to the weight measurement module and then it transfers to quick measurement module. When measured value for radioactivity concentration of Co- 60 and Cs-137 is more than 1.0 Bq/g, then the container is classified as waste for disposal and directly transferred to stacking and storage rack. Otherwise, the container is transferred to accurate measurement module. At the accurate module, the container is classified as waste for disposal or waste for regulatory clearance depending on the measurement result of 0.1 Bq/g. As the storage rack has a sections for disposal and regulatory clearance respectively, the classified containers will be positioned at one of the sections depending on the results from the contamination evaluation module. The system can control the movement of lots of container at the same time. So, the system will be helpful for the effective nuclear power plant decommissioning in view of time and budget.

Prevention of radiation hazards to workers and the environment in the event of decommissioning nuclear power plants is a top priority. To this end, it is essential to continuously perform radiation characterization before and during decommissioning. In operating nuclear power plants, various detectors are used depending on the purpose of measurement. Portable detectors used in power plants have excellent portability, but there is a limit to the use of a single measuring device alone to quantify radioactive contamination, nuclide analysis, and ensure representation of measurement results. In foreign countries, gamma-ray visualization detectors are being actively used for operating and decommissioning nuclear power plants. KHNP is also conducting research on the development of gamma-ray visualization detectors for multipurpose field measurement at decommissioning nuclear power plants. It aims to develop detectors capable of visualizing radioactive contamination, analyzing nuclides, estimating radioactivity, and estimating dose rates. To this end, we are developing related software according to the development process by purchasing sensors from H3D, which account for more than 75% of the US gamma-ray visualization detector market. In addition, field tests are planned in the order of Wolsong Unit 1 and Kori Unit 1 with Research reactor in Gongneung-dong in accordance with the progress of development. The detector will be optimized by analyzing the test results according to various gamma radiation field environments. The development detector will be used for various measurement purposes for Kori unit 1 and Wolsong

When decommissioning a nuclear power plant, a large amount of radioactive waste is generated simultaneously. Therefore, efficient treatment of radioactive waste is crucial to the success of the decommissioning process. An utility or decommissioning contractor of NPP often build separate radioactive waste treatment facilities (RWTF) to handle this waste. In Korea, RWTFs are planned to be built for the decommissioning of the Kori Unit 1 and Wolsong Unit 1. In this study, we introduce an application case of using process simulation to derive the optimal layout design and investment plan for a radioactive waste treatment facility. In particular, the steam generator is the largest and most complex device processed in RWTF. Therefore, it is necessary to reflect the large equipment processing area that can treat steam generators in the design of RWTF. In this study, Siemens’ Plant Simulation® was used to derive an optimization plan for the dismantling area of large equipment in RWTF. First, a virtual facility was built by modeling based on the steam generator dismantling process and facilities developed by Doosan Enerbility. This was used to pre-validate the facility investment plan, discover wasteful factors in the logistics waste streams, and evaluate alternatives to derive, validate, and apply appropriate improvement alternatives. Through this, we designed a layout based on the optimal logistics waste streams, appropriate workstations, and the number of buffer places. In addition, we propose various optimization measures such as investment optimization based on optimal operation of facility resources such as facilities and manpower, and establishment of work standards.

The type of radioactive waste that may occur in the process of nuclear power plant dismantling can be classified into solid, liquid, gas, and mixed waste. The amount of these wastes must be defined in the Final Decommissioning Plan for approval of the licensing. Also, in the case of liquid radioactive waste, it is necessary to calculate the generation amount in order to treat radioactive waste at a Radioactive Waste Treatment Facility (RWTF) or on-site. In this regard, there is no Code and Standard for the amount of liquid radioactive waste generated during NPP are dismantled, but ANSI/NS-55.6 describes the amount of liquid radioactive waste generated from a light water reactor type NPP. This code is applied to nuclear power-related facilities such as domestic NPP and radioactive waste disposal facility. Therefore, this review intends to suggest an application plan for domestic NPP decommissioning through codes for liquid radioactive waste expected to generate during nuclear power plant decommissioning.

On March 11 2011, Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant site was attacked by a huge tsunami caused by Tohoku Pacific Ocean earthquake. Nuclear fuels of unit 1, 2, and 3 of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant was melted down by the disaster. After the accident, Japan’s government has announced “Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap towards the decommissioning of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Units 1-4”. The topics of roadmap is made of measures to deal with contaminated water, removal of fuel rod assemblies from spent fuel pools, retrieval of fuel debris, measures to deal with waste materials, and other operations. To support the activity of the roadmap, various facilities about decommissioning have been established and operated on inside or outside of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant site. Representatively, Collaborative Laboratories for Advanced Decommissioning Science which conducts R&D decommissioning, Naraha Remote Technology Development Center which develops remotes robots and VR (Virtual reality), Okuma Analysis and Research Center which performs radiochemical analyses for radioactive waste, and Fukushima Environmental Safety Center which conducts environmental dynamics and radiation monitoring.

Japan’s government has announced plan to release the contaminated water stored from the tanks of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant site into the sea in June. The contaminated water is treated by SARRY (Cesium removal facility) and ALPS (advanced liquid processing system) to remove 62 radionuclide containing Cesium, Strontium, Iodine, and so on using filtration, precipitation (or coprecipitation) and adsorption for other nuclides (except for H-3 and C-14). The total amount of the contaminated water stored at tanks is 1,328,508 m3 (as of March 23, 2023). Currently, three ALPS systems which are existing ALPS, improved ALPS, high performance ALPS have been operated to meet the regulatory standard for release to the sea. According to the release plan, they have announced that 30 nuclides and H-3 concentration of the contaminated water will be measured and assessed before/after the discharge of the contaminated water into the sea. Before the release, the contaminated water is re-treated by reverse osmosis membrane facility and additional ALPS. And then, the water will be diluted with seawater more than 100 times. The diluted water will then move through an undersea tunnel and be released about 1 kilometer off the coast.

Рrecipitation of platinum group metals (Rh, Ru, Pd, so-called MPG) from the melt essentially affects the reliability of installations for vitrification of high-level liquid radioactive waste (HLW). To date, it is difficult to find an approach which allows simultaneous recovery of all three metals. The aim of our work was to select a sorbent that would provide simultaneous up to complete recovery of given metals. The following inorganic materials were tested as sorbents – yellow blood salt (YBS).and hexacyanoferrates of iron, aluminum, copper and nickel. The degree of metal recovery was studied is influenced by the temperature and concentration of nitric acid. Only palladium was completely recovered using YBS. At the same time, specially prepared iron hexacyanoferrate (HCF-Fe) under optimal experimental conditions recovers almost all Pd and more than 95% and 90% of Rh and Ru, respectively. The behavior of fission products, including the main dose-forming components of HLW (Cs, Sr) and Mo, U, Ag, REE) in the course of MPG recovery was studied. The experiments were carried using both multicomponent model solutions and real raffinates. Options for further management of the recovered metals have been worked out. Thus, the proposed method of metal recovery seems promising for the development of a technology for the removal of MPG from nitric HLW during the reprocessing of the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) before vitrification. The recovered metals can be probably used in various technological processes. Also, this method can provide the MPG recovery from low-concentration tail solutions.

As of 2023, there are a total of 24 nuclear power plants (NPPs) in operation in Korea, with 21 pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and three pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs). Korean NPPs discharge radioactive effluents into the environment every year. Radioactive effluents from NPPs contain various radionuclides and materials, including 3H, 14C, Noble gas, particulates, and iodine Among the radioactive effluents discharged from Korean NPPs, 14C is a pure beta emitter with a half-life of 5,730 years. The human body can inhale and ingest 14C to cause internal exposure. In addition, the amount of 14C present in the environment is decreasing, but the amount of 14C discharged from NPPs is increasing. 14C discharged to the environment can be inhaled and ingested by the public around NPPs through various pathways. For this reason, it is very important to monitor and manage 14C because it affects the dose of the public around NPPs. Therefore, this study compared and analyzed the average emissions of 14C discharged from PWRs and PHWRs during the recent 10 years (2012-2021). An average of the public dose due to 14C released from NPPs depending on the reactor types from 2012 to 2021 was also compared. It is inevitable to discharge radioactive effluents while operating NPPs. Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) manages and monitors radioactive effluents released into the environment. According to a survey and analysis of 14C discharged from PWRs and PHWRs and the average dose of the public over the recent 10-year (2012-2021) around Korean NPPs, 14C released from PWR accounted for 3.1% of the total discharge but accounted for more than 93.67% of the total public dose. In addition, 14C discharged from PHWRs accounted for 1.12% of the total discharge, but its resulting dose to the public accounted for more than 83.87% of the total public dose. As a result of analyzing the public dose due to 14C from 2012 to 2021, it was gradually increasing every year. Based on these results, monitoring and managing 14C discharge and its resulting doses to the public are important in the future.

From Fukushima nuclear disaster, as the water which is supplied by rain and groundwater flow into reactor building, contaminated water which contains radioactive nuclides is occurred. Although about 600 tons of contaminated water was generated at the early of accident, as the groundwater management system is developing, about 150 tons of contaminated water is generated now. Tokyo Electric Power Holdings (TEPCO) operate a multi-nuclide removal equipment which is called ‘ALPS’ and store purified water (ALPS treated water) in the Fukushima NPP site by tank. From 2023, the Japanese government decided to dilute the stored ALPS treated water and discharge it into the ocean to secure space on the site. In this study, based on the data opened to the public by TEPCO, the current status of ALPS is investigated. The dilution and discharge process under conceptual design was investigated. In addition, the treatment capacity of ALPS was analyzed based on the radioactivity concentration data of 7 nuclides. And then, two points to be checked found. First, it was confirmed that the performance of ALPS temporarily decreased between 2015 and 2018 due to reduced replacement cycle of filter and absorbent. Second, it was confirmed that the ALPS treated water from specific ALPS still haven’t satisfied the discharge limit for I-129, Sr-90, and Cs-137. In the case of Cs-137, about 1.7 times the radioactivity concentration was detected compared to the discharge limit. For I-129 and Sr-90, about 2.4 times and 2.1 times of radioactivity concentration was detected compared to the discharge limit. From this study, some of the ALPS treated water are confirmed that the radioactivity concentration exceeds the discharge limit, and the treatment capacity of ALPS might be unstable depend on the ALPS operation such as replacement cycle. Therefore, before the discharging of contaminated water on 2023, it is necessary to inspect ALPS if it purifies contaminated water with reliability or not, and to secure the reliable evaluation method to measure radioactivity concentration.