Nuclear safety, security, and safeguards (nuclear 3S) are essential components for establishing robust nuclear environments. Nuclear safety is to protect public and environments from radioactive contamination, which can be caused in accidents. Nuclear security is to protect nuclear facilities from terrorism or sabotage, which related to physical a ttacks or insider threats. And nuclear safeguards is to protect nuclear materials from extortion by a state with a purpose of weaponizing activities. When a new nuclear facility is introduced, it is possible to save abundant amount of resources by considering nuclear 3S in an early stage (design phases). Initially, the international atomic energy agency (IAEA) recommended safeguards-by-design (SBD) approach. The concept of SBD gradually expands to nuclear 3S-by-design (3SBD). Though there are differences in purpose and target subject, each nuclear ‘S’ is closely related with others. When introducing a certain technology or equipment in order to enhance one ‘S’, another ‘S’ also get affected. The effect can be synergies or conflicts. For instance, confidential information in nuclear security is required for a safeguards activity. On the contrary, inspection equipment for safeguards can be used for security. Pyroprocessing is a technology for managing used nuclear fuels. As pyroprocessing is a backend fuel cycle technology, a sensitive nuclear technology, safeguards has taken a large portion of nuclear 3S research in an effort to achieve international credibility and nuclear transparency. As mentioned, there are both synergies and conflicts in integrating nuclear 3S. In this study, we investigate potential challenges in applying nuclear 3S integration to pyroprocessing by addressing synergies and conflicts. This approach will suggest required supplementary methods to build the reliable pyroprocessing environment.

To mark the 70th anniversary of the alliance between South Korea and the United States, President Yoon Seok-youl of South Korea and President Joseph R. Biden of the United States convened at the White House, adopting the pivotal “Washington Declaration.” This significant act paved the way for the establishment and institutionalization of the ROK-US Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG). The NCG is envisioned as a mechanism to address North Korea’s nuclear threat, striving for nuclear sharing and a nuclear defense system, thereby alleviating concerns about nuclear security. The NCG is perceived as a crucial advancement in the realm of ‘tailored extended deterrence’ on the Korean Peninsula. However, its operational scope and efficacy remain subjects of debate within South Korea. A comparative analysis with other consultative entities, such as NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and Extended Deterrence Strategy Consultative Group (EDSCG), raises questions about NCG’s unique contributions and potential functional overlaps. Furthermore, the establishment of the NCG represents a notable progression in the strengthened ROK-US alliance. This progression coincides with the resumption of large-scale joint nuclear security military exercises under the new administrations of both nations. Anticipated future operations within the NCG framework encompass the continual deployment of strategic assets and the execution of nuclear simulation exercises. Such actions serve not merely as a deterrent message to North Korea but also aim to instill confidence in the US’s commitment to extended deterrence among the South Korean populace. This study aims to highlight the significance and implications of the ROK-US Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) through an exhaustive comparative analysis of existing nuclear security consultative bodies and pertinent nuclear security policies. Moreover, this research emphasizes strategies to boost the NCG’s effectiveness, the necessity for policy enhancements to foster South Korea’s nuclear security autonomy, and the importance of raising nuclear security awareness among the general public.

In Korea, additional regulatory requirements are increasing due to the full-scale decommissioning of nuclear power plants following the permanent shutdown of Kori Unit 1 and Wolseong Unit 1. Accordingly, it is necessary to preemptively expand the scope of physical protection regulations from design, construction, and operation stage to back-end nuclear fuel cycle such as cessation of operation and decommissioning. According to Article 2, Paragraph 24 of the Nuclear Safety Act, the decommissioning of nuclear facilities is defined as all activities to exclude them from the application of the Nuclear Safety Act by permanently suspending the operation of nuclear facilities, demolishing the facilities and sites, or removing radioactive contamination. In other words, it refers to a series of technologies or activities to safely and efficiently dismantle nuclear power plant and remove radioactive contamination and restore them to their original state after permanently shut down of nuclear power plant. Security changes during decommissioning and decontamination since removing fuel from the reactor alters the plant’s safety status, some of the systems or components considered as vital equipment during plant operation will no longer be needed. The vital areas may be reduced as fewer buildings, equipment and systems need to be protected, which means access controls, surveillance and so on can be reduced. And also, decommissioning will probably require more workers than operation would, although this might not be the case at all times. From a security point of view, this might require more personnel or additional access points. Changing operating require changed security measures, to ensure that the required security level will be maintained while at the same time work proceeds efficiently. Once all of the fuel is removed from the plant, radiological release risk is much lower. The lower risk requires a lower level of security measures. Even during the removal of nuclear material and contaminated equipment from nuclear facilities, lower level of security measures should meet regulatory requirements based on a graded approach. Therefore, this study intends to examine the responsibilities and obligations of regulatory authorities, regulator, and nuclear operators in terms of protection after permanent shutdown and decommissioning.

Domestic nuclear power plants have developed radiological emergency plans based on the USNRC’s NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-Rev.1 report and the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety’s (KINS) research report on radiation emergency criteria for power reactors (KINS/RR-12). NUREG-0654 is a US emergency planning guide for nuclear power plants and provides detailed technical requirements for the content of radiological emergency plans. The document classifies radiological emergencies into three levels: Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency, which correspond to the white, blue, and red emergency levels used in domestic nuclear power plants. KINS/RR-12 is a technical guidance document published by the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety in 2012, which divides radiological emergency criteria into criteria for pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and criteria for boiling water reactors (BWRs), and describes in detail the regulatory position and implementation of radiological emergency criteria for domestic PWRs and BWRs. The physical protection-related radiation emergency criteria included in the radiological emergency plan are specified in the radiological emergency criteria guidelines. There are two items each related to white and blue emergencies and one item related to red emergencies. Standard order of emergency plan lists the physical protection-related radiological emergency criteria for domestic PWRs and BWRs, which are identical according to the radiological emergency criteria guidelines. To enhance the physical protection regulation, the legal and regulatory basis for target set identification and vital area identification need to be established by considering radiological and physical protection emergency plan.

Nuclear power plants (NPPs) are designed in consideration of redundancy, diversity, and independence to prevent leakage of radioactive materials from safety of view, and a contingency plan is established in case of DBA (Design Basis Accident) occurrence. In addition, NPPs have established contingency plans for physical attacks, including terrorist intrusions and bomb attacks. However, the level of contingency plan caused by cyberattacks is quite insufficient compared to the contingency plan in terms of safety and physical protection. The purpose of this paper is to present the problems of cyberattack contingency plan and methods to supplement it. The first problem with cyberattack contingency plan is that the initiating event for implementing the contingency plan is undecided. In terms of safety, the DBA is identified as an initial event, and each contingency plan is based on the initial events specified in the DBA such as Loss of Coolant Accident and Loss of Offsite Power. In terms of physical protection, each has a contingency plan by identifying bomb attacks and terrorist intrusions in Protected Area and Vital Area as initial events. On the other hand, in the contingency plan related to a cyberattack, an initial event caused by a cyberattack is not identified. For this, it is necessary to classify the attack results that may occur when the CDA is compromised based on the attack technique described in Design Basis Threat. Based on this, an initiating event should be selected and a contingency plan according to each initiating event should be established. The second problem is that there is no responsibility matrix according to the occurrence of the initiating event. From a safety point of view, when a DBA occurs, the organization’s mission according to each initial event is described in the contingency plan, and related countermeasures are defined in case of an accident through Emergency Operation Procedure. In the case of physical protection, referring to IAEA’s Regulatory Guide 5.54, the organization’s responsibility is defined in matrix form when an initial event such as a bomb attack occurs. In this way, the responsibility matrix to be carried out in case of initiating events based on the defined initial event should be described in the contingency plan. In this paper, the problems of the cyberattack contingency plan are presented, and for this purpose, the definition of the initial event and the need for a responsibility matrix when the initial event occurs are presented.

동북아 지역에서 미국과 중국이 세계 유일 초강대국의 지위를 두고 충 돌하는 사이에 일본은 재래식 군사력을 꾸준히 증강시키고 있으며, 러시아 는 영토확장 욕심을 우크라이나 침략전쟁을 통해 나타내고 있다. 국제사회 의 다양한 제재에도 불구하고 지속적으로 핵무장을 추구해온 북한은 이제 한국을 향한 핵무기 사용까지 노골적으로 언급하고 있다. 이처럼 변화하 고 있는 동북아 지역의 안보환경은 세계 10대 경제대국이자 재래식 군사 력 6위권에 있는 한국으로 하여금 독자적으로 생존할 수 있는 생존전략을 모색하도록 요구하고 있다. 동북아 지역에서 미국과 중국이 벌이고 있는 패권경쟁의 틈바구니에 놓인 한국이 독자적으로 생존하고 지속적으로 번 영하기 위해서는 최우선적으로 국민들의 호국정신부터 고양시킨 다음 한 국군을 정예화시켜야 한다. 최근 우크라이나와 러시아간에 진행되고 있는 전쟁상황을 보더라도 외부 위협에 대한 국민들의 저항의지를 고양시키는 것이 가장 중요한 것으로 입증되고 있다. 일대일로 전략을 통해 전 세계의 패권을 장악하려는 중국의 동진 위협에 대응하기 위해서는 미국의 인도- 태평양 전략에 적극적으로 참여해야 하며, 한-미-일 동맹관계를 강화해야 한다. 현실화된 북한의 핵과 미사일 위협은 한국의 생존에 결정적인 영향 을 미치므로 미국의 확장억제 정책에 대한 신뢰도를 높이고, 독자적인 핵 무장을 추진해서 자위권을 확보해야 한다. 낸시 펠로시 미국 하원의장의 대만 방문을 계기로 美·中 충돌 가능성이 더욱 높아져 가고 있다. 20세기 초 국제안보환경 변화에 제대로 대응하지 못해서 일본의 식민지가 되었던 과오를 되풀이하지 않기 위해서는 우리 스스로 생존능력을 갖춰야 한다.

In accordance with the Enforcement Decree of the Act on Physical Protection and Radiological Emergency, operators of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP)s must conduct full cyber security exercise once a year and partial exercise at least once every half year. Nuclear operators need to conduct exercise on systems with high attack attractiveness in order to respond to the unauthorized removal of nuclear or other radioactive material and sabotage of nuclear facilities. Nuclear facilities identify digital assets that perform SSEP (Safety, Security, and Emergency Preparedness) functions as CDA (Critical Digital Assets), and nuclear operators select exercise target systems from the CDA list and perform the exercise. However, digital assets that have an indirect impact (providing access, support, and protection) from cyber attacks are also identified as CDAs, and these CDAs are relatively less attractive to attack. Therefore, guidelines are needed to select the exercise target system in the case of unauthorized removal of nuclear or other radioactive material and sabotage response exercise. In the case of unauthorized removal of nuclear or other radioactive material, these situations cannot occur with cyber attacks and external factors such as terrorists must be taken into consideration. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the list of CDAs that terrorists can use for cyber attacks among CDAs located in the path of stealing and transporting nuclear material and conduct intensive exercise on these CDAs. A typical example is a security system that can delay detection when terrorists attack facilities. In the case of sabotage exercise, a safety-related system that causes an initiating event by a cyber attack or failure to mitigate an accident in a DBA (Design Basis Accident) situation should be selected as an exercise target. It is difficult for sabotage to occur through a single cyber attack because a nuclear facility has several safety concepts such as redundancy, diversity. Therefore, it can be considered to select an exercise target system under the premise of not only a cyber attack but also a physical attack. In the case of NPPs, it is assumed that LOOP (Loss of Offsite Power) has occurred, and CDA relationships to accident mitigation can be selected as an exercise target. Through exercise on the CDA, which is more associated with unauthorized removal of nuclear or other radioactive material and sabotage of nuclear facilities, it is expected to review the continuity plan and check systematic response capabilities in emergencies caused by cyber attacks.

Nuclear security event involving nuclear and other radioactive materials outside of regulatory control (MORC) has the potential to cause severe consequences for public health, the environment, the economy and society. Each state has a responsibility to develop national nuclear security measures including nuclear forensics to respond to such events. In Japan, national nuclear forensics capability building efforts mainly based on research and development (R&D) have been conducted since 2010, in accordance with national statement of Japan at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington DC. Most of that work is undertaken at the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN) of the Japan Atmic Energy Agency (JAEA) in close cooperation with other competent authorities. The ISCN has made increased contributions to the enhancement of international nuclear security by establishing technical capabilities in nuclear forensics and sharing the achievements with the international community. The ISCN has mainly engaged in R&Ds for establishing and enhancing nuclear forensics technical capability. As for the laboratory capability, several new pieces of analytical equipment have been introduced for nuclear forensics R&D purposes. High-precise measurement techniques validated in the past nuclear forensics incidents have been established, and novel techniques that can contribute to the more timely and confident nuclear forensics signature analysis have been developed. The ISCN has been also developed a proto-type nuclear forensics library based on the data of nuclear materials possessed for past nuclear fuel cycle research in JAEA. These technical capability developments have been conducted based on the cooperation with international partners such as the U.S. Department of Energy and EC Joint Research Center, as well as participation in exercises organized by Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (NF-ITWG). Recent R&D works have been mainly based on the needs of domestic competent authorities, such as first responders and investigators, and aim to develop technologies covering the entire spectrum of nuclear forensics processes from crime scene investigation to laboratory analysis and interpretation. One important key issue is the enhancement of technical capability for post-dispersion nuclear forensics. For instance, the ISCN has carried out the development of radiation measurement equipment coupled with the low-cost and mobile radiation detectors that uses machine-learning algorithms for quick and autonomous radioisotope identification to support first responders during crime scene investigations. Laboratory measurement techniques for samples collected at a post-dispersion crime scene are also among the important technical issues studied at the ISCN. The application of emerging technologies to nuclear forensics has also been studied. This includes the application of deep leaning models to nuclear forensics signature interpretation that could provide more confident results, as well as the development of contamination imaging technology that could contribute to the analytical planning on the samples in collaboration with conventional forensics. Many analytical techniques have been developed and the capability to analyze nuclear and other radioactive materials for nuclear forensics purposes has been considerably matured over the past decade. The challenges of post-dispersion samples, collaboration with conventional forensics and the development of novel signatures will be more important in the near future. Therefore, the ISCN will promote the R&Ds to further enhance the technical capabilities solving these issues. In addition, the ISCN is also promoting to expand the nuclear forensics research into universities and other research institutes in Japan. This is expected to contribute to the establishment of a domestic nuclear forensics network that enables to respond timely and flexibly to the MORC incidents, and to the maturation of nuclear forensics as a new academic field.

이 글의 목표는 원자력 안전규제의 ‘전문성과 독립성 조화의 관점’에서 원자력안전위원회를 구성·운영하는 것이 바람직하다는 점을 논증하는 것이다. 2018년 7월부터 4개월에 걸쳐 5명의 원자력안전위원회 위원들이 결격사유를 이유로 자진 사임한 사태에서 확인할 수 있듯이, 「원자 력안전위원회의 설치 및 운영에 관한 법률」 제10조(결격사유)는 원자력 안전위원회의 독립성을 확보하여 실효성 있는 안전규제를 실시하겠다는 애초의 취지와는 달리 위원회의 정상적인 운영 자체를 막고 있는 실정이다. 따라서 이제는 원자력 안전규제기관의 전문성이나 독립성의 일면만을 강조할 것이 아니라, 전문성과 독립성의 관계를 어떻게 설정하는 것이 바람직 한지에 대해 성찰할 필요가 있다. 이를 위해 본 논문은 원자력 안전규제기관이 전문성과 독립성을 확보해 온 역사적인 맥락을 안전규제의 전문성과 독립성 조화의 관점에서 분석한다. 이 글에서 제시하는 원자력안전위원회의 핵심적인 향후 과제는 안전규제의 전문성과 독립성 조화의 원칙을 실행하는 차원에서 위원의 결격 사유를 적정화하는 동시에 이해충돌방지의무 규정을 강화하고, 기술적 전문가를 포함한 구성원의 다양성을 확보하는 것이다. 그리고 원자력안전위원회의 실질적 독립성을 확보하기 위해 위원회를 대통령 직속 기구로 승격 하고, 상임위원의 인원을 확대하는 방향으로 나아갈 것을 제안한다.