Spent nuclear fuel continues to be generated domestically and abroad, and various studies are actively being conducted for interim dry storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The characteristics vary depending on the type of spent nuclear fuel and the initial specifications, and based on these characteristics, it is essential to estimate the burnup and enrichment of spent nuclear fuel as a nondestructive assay. In particular, it is important to estimate the characteristics of spent nuclear fuel with non-destructive tests because destructive tests cannot be performed on all encapsulated spent nuclear fuel in case of intrusion traces in safeguards. Data is made by measuring spent nuclear fuel directly to evaluate burnup of spent nuclear fuel, but computer simulation research is also important to understand its characteristics because past burnup history is not accurately written, and destructive testing is difficult. In Sweden, the dependency of the burnup history in source strength and mass of light-water reactor-type spent nuclear fuel was evaluated, and this part was also applied to MAGNOX in consideration of the possibility of being used to verify DPRK’s denuclearization. SCALE 6.2 TRITON modeling was performed based on public information on DPRK’s 5 MWe Yongbyon reactor, and the source strength of Nb-95, Zr-95, Ru-106, Cs-134, Cs-137, Ce-141, Ce- 144, Eu-154 nuclides were evaluated. Since the burnup of MAGNOX is lower than that of lightwater reactors, major nuclides in decay heat were not considered. The cooling period was evaluated based on 0, 5, 10, and 20 years. In case the discharge timing was different, the total period of discharge and reloading was the same, and the end-cycle burnup was the same, calculations showed that the source strength emitted from major nuclides was evaluated within 2-3% except for Ru-106 and Ce-144 nuclides. Even the burnup step of nuclear fuel is the same, and the reloaded length after discharge is different, i.e., the cooling period between is different at 5, 10, and 20, the source strength of Nb-95, Zr-95, Ce-144, and Cs-137 was evaluated as an error of 1%. Except for Ru-106 and Ce-144, nuclides are highly dependent on burnup. Compared to the case of light-water reactors, the possibility of a decrease in error needs to be considered later because the specific power is low. As a result, radionuclides in released fuel depend on the effects of burnup, discharged and reloaded period, and a cooling period after release, and research is needed to correct the cooling period within the future burnup history. In addition, in this study, it is necessary to select a scenario -based burnup because the standard burnup due to the statistical treatment of discharged fuels was not considered as conducted in previous studies.

Many radionuclides emit two or more gamma rays in a cascade once they decay. At this time, gamma rays are detected at the same time, and the signals are overlapped and measured as one added signal. This is called the summing coincidence effect, and it causes an error of more than 10% depending on the detection efficiency, measurement conditions, and target nuclide. It is known to be greater as the efficiency of the detector increases and as the distance between the source and the detector decreases. It is necessary to consider the summing coincidence effect since the efficiency of the HPGe detector owned by the KHNP CRI is as high as 65%. In this study, We would like to propose an appropriate gamma nuclide analysis method for radioactive waste generated from NPP by evaluating the influence on the summing coincidence effect.

The segmentation of activated components is considered as a one of the most important processes in decommissioning. The activated components, such as reactor vessel and reactor vessel internals, are exposed to neutron from the nuclear fuel and classified to intermediate, low, and very low-level wastes. As it is expected, the components, which are closed to nuclear fuel, exhibit higher degree of specific activity. After the materials were exposed to neutrons, their original elements transform to other nuclides. The primary nuclides in activated stainless steel are 55Fe, 63,59Ni, 60Co, 54Mn, etc. The previous study indicates that the specific activity of individual nuclide is strongly depends on the material compositions and impurities of the original materials. The 59Co is the one of the most important impurities in stainless steel and carbon steel. In this paper, the relationship between individual nuclides in activation analysis of activated components was studied. The systematic study on specific activity of primary nuclides will be discussed in this paper to understand the activation tendency of the components.

The treatment of waste generated during operation as a part of preparation for decommissioning is coming to the fore as a pending issue. Non-fuel waste stored in the spent fuel pool (SFP) of PWRs in Korea includes Dummy fuel, damaged fuel rod storage container, reactor vessel specimen cask, spent in-core instrumentation, spent control element assemblies, spent neutron source assemblies, burnable poison rods, etc. In order to treat such waste, it is necessary to classify radioactive waste level and analyze kinds of nuclide in accordance with legal requirements. In order to solve the problem, the items that KHNP-CRI is trying to conduct like followings. First, KHNP-CRI will identify the current status of non-fuel waste stored in the SFP of all domestic nuclear power plants. In order to consider the treatment of non-fuel waste, it is essential to know what kind of items and how many items are stored in the SFP. Second, to identify the dimension and characteristics of non-fuel waste stored in the SFP would be conducted. The configuration of non-fuel waste is important information to handle them. Third, the way to handle non-fuel waste would be deduced including analysis of their dimension, whether the equipment should be developed to handle each kind of non-fuel waste or not, how to transport them. In order to classify radioactive waste level and analyze the nuclide for the non-fuel waste, handling tools and the cask to transport them into the facility which nuclide analysis is able to be performed would be required. Fourth, the nuclide analysis technology would be identified. Also, domestic holding technology would be identified and which technology should be developed to classify the radioactive waste level for the non-fuel waste would be deduced. This preliminary study will provide KHNP-CRI with the insight for the nuclide analysis technology and future work which is following action for the non-fuel waste. Based on the result of above preliminary study, the feasibility of the research for the treatment of non-fuel waste would be evaluated and research plan would be established. In conclusion, the treatment of non-fuel waste stored in the spent fuel pool of domestic PWR should be considered to prepare the decommissioning. KHNP-CRI will identify the quantity, the dimension and kinds of non-fuel waste in the SFP of domestic PWR. Also, the various nuclide analysis technology would be identified and the technology which should be developed would be defined through this preliminary study.

The nuclide management technology for separating high-heat generating/high-mobility/long-lived nuclides from high-level wastes based on the chemical reactions is under development. In order to secure the reliability of nuclear non-proliferation and to implement the effective safeguards, it is necessary to consider the safeguards from the conceptual design phase of the novel technologies. However, there was no experience and research on safeguards for the chemical reaction based nuclide management technology. In order to development the available monitoring techniques for the safeguards of nuclide management technology, the possible diversion scenarios were developed and the material flows of major nuclear materials were analyzed according to the various diversion strategies for each unit process in this study. The diversion strategies in this study is limited to the diversion of nuclear materials according to the change of operational parameters (temperature, chemical reagents, pressures, etc). The nuclear material distribution behaviors under the abnormal conditions were analyzed and compared with normal conditions using the HSC Chemistry. The results will be used to determine the proper signals and feasible techniques to monitor the abnormal operations.