인도 태평양 지역의 지정학적 긴장이 고조됨에 따라 안보 연구에서 쿼 드의 중요성이 점점 더 커지고 있다. 이 글에서는 일본이 쿼드를 다시 주창하기로 한 원인을 살펴본다. 연구에 따르면 쿼드에 대한 일본의 입 장은 쿼드의 소다자주의적 특성과 일본의 국내 정치라는 두 가지 요인에 의해 영향을 받는 것으로 나타났다. 소다자주의적 특성은 쿼드가 일본이 참여하기에 '편리한' 플랫폼이라는 점을 시사하며, 국내 정치 측면에서는 아베 총리가 두 번의 임기 동안 주장한 가치 외교가 쿼드와 잘 부합한다 는 점을 드러낸다. 결과적으로 쿼드는 일본에게 실질적인 지정학적 '도구 '로 기능하고 있다.

Any type of nuclear arms control or disarmament agreement requires some form of verification measure. Existing nuclear arms control treaties drew upon previous agreements such as the INF treaty, START, and IAEA nuclear safeguards inspections. However, previous treaties focused on limiting specific types of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles or reducing the total number of nuclear weapons rather than eliminating the nuclear enterprise as a whole. A potential nuclear disarmament verification treaty or agreement will depend on the geopolitical environment of the time as well as the national policies and priorities of each signatory state. Although research on the gradual reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons is still ongoing, several states have cooperated to conduct experiments, exercises, and simulations on the procedures and technologies required for nuclear disarmament verification. Three of these efforts are the LETTERPRESS simulation conducted by the Quadrilateral Nuclear Verification Partnership (QUAD), NuDiVe Exercise conducted by the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), and the Menzingen experiment organized by the UNIDIR in partnership with the Swiss Armed Forces, Spiez Laboratory, Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security, and the Open Nuclear Network. These contain aspects for the development of a potential nuclear disarmament verification. The LETTERPRESS exercise conducted in 2017 tested potential activities and equipment inspectors might utilize in a nuclear weapon facility. The IPNDV NuDiVe exercises conducted in 2021 and 2022 tested the activities and equipment required for the verified dismantlement of a warhead within a dismantlement facility. Finally, the Menzingen experiment conducted in 2023 tested the practical procedures for the verification of a nuclear weapon’s absence at a storage site. This paper will analyze the three cases to offer considerations on the procedures and technologies future nuclear disarmament verification might include.