PURPOSES : This study estimates the effects of traffic safety policies (e.g., the Minsik Act) on the seriousness of traffic accidents in children protection zones. METHODS : A difference-in-differences framework in which the change in the gap of seriousness of traffic accidents occurring in children protection zones and those occurring outside the zone before and after the implementation of the Minsik Act was applied. Furthermore, a placebo test, in which the samples are restricted to a specific period, is irrelevant to the time of students going to school. RESULTS : On average, when the factors causing traffic accidents are not controlled, the degree of damage in traffic accidents in children protection zones appears to be more serious The introduction of the Minsik Act has been shown to reduce the damage from traffic accidents in children protection zones. In particular, illegal U-turns and signal violations increased the severity of traffic accidents in children protection zones, and trucks caused the greatest damage. CONCLUSIONS : The traffic safety policy for children protection zones (Minsik Act) is effective in improving traffic safety by simply “strengthening legal regulations.” This strengthens the importance of traffic safety education to prevent drivers from engaging in driving behaviors such as illegal U-turns and traffic signal violations. It is necessary to ensure the traffic safety of children by establishing a truck operation policy that bypasses children protection zones.

Once systems, structures and components (SSCs) of dry storage systems are classified with respect to safety function or safety significance (i.e., safety classification), appropriate engineering rules can be applied to ensure that they are designed, manufactured, maintained, managed (e.g. aging management) etc. In Unites States, the systems, structures and components (SSCs) consisting DSSs are classified into two or several grades (i.e., class A, B and C or not important to safety, and important to safety (ITS) or not important to safety (NITS)) with respect to intended safety function and safety significance. This classification methods were based on Regulatory Guide 7.10 (i.e., guidance for use in developing quality assurance programs for packaging). Also, in Korea, SSCs of DSSs should be classified into ITS and NITS in much the same as method based on Regulatory Guide 7.10. In that guidance, for providing graded approach to manage the SSCs of packaging, they were trying to classifying SSCs in accordance with radiological consequences. But there was limitations that the provided classification criteria was still qualitative, so that it was not enough for managing the SSCs according to graded approach. On the other hand, in some other nuclear facilities (i.e., nuclear power plant, radioactive waste management facility and disposal facility etc.), quantitative criteria relevant to radiological consequence (i.e., radiation doses to workers or to the public) or inventory of radioactivity are existed so that it can be applied for classifying safety classes. In summary, the study on the application safety classification that applied quantitative criteria to perform safety classification of SSCs in DSS is inadequate or insufficient. The purpose of this study is proposing the preliminary framework for estimating safety significance of SSCs in DSS which can be utilized in our further advanced studies. In this study, a framework was established to estimate the safety significance of SSCs related to radiation shielding and confinement using MCNP® 6.2 and Microsoft Excel. Referring to the methodology of IAEA Specific Safety Guide 30, we assumed severity for failures of components that could lead to degradation of the SSC’s performance. The safety class of SSC was decided based on the impact of SSC’s failure on consequences.

This paper provides a study on the application and proposals of safety culture, new public management and social amplification of risk framework via ship accidents in Korea. This document analyzes what are the concept of safety culture, new public management as well as social amplification and risk framework and describes how 3 issues act, harmonize, interrelate through M/V Sewol accident. Korean government is needed to apply social amplification of risk framework to the in order to promote the safety culture in the maritime administration. Hence, this paper proposes safety framework in order to prevent and resolve future unexpected accident especially for maritime field.

Successful development of weapon systems requires a stringent verification and validation (V&V) process due to the nature of the weapons in which continual increase of operational capability makes the system requirements more complicated to meet. Thus, test and evaluation (T&E) of weapon systems is becoming more difficult. In such a situation, live fire tests appear to be effective and useful methods in not only carrying out V&V of the weapon systems under development, but also increasing the maturity of the end users operability of the system. However, during the process for live fire tests, a variety of accidents or mishaps can happen due to explosion, pyro, separation, and so on. As such, appropriate means to mitigate mishap possibilities should be provided and applied during the live fire tests. To study a way of how to accomplish it is the objective of this paper. To do so, top-level sources of hazard are first identified. A framework for T&E is also described. Then, to enhance the test range safety, it is discussed how test scenarios can be generated. The proposed method is based on the use of the anticipatory failure determination (AFD) and multiple event tree analysis (ETA) in analyzing range safety. It is intended to identify unexpected hazard components even in the environment with constraints. It is therefore expected to reduce accident possibilities as an alternative to the traditional root-cause analysis.

According to ISO 26262 (the international standard on functional safety for automotive industry), the functional safety should be considered during the whole automotive systems life cycle from the design phase throughout the production phase. In order to satisfy the standard, the automotive and related industry needs to take appropriate actions while carrying out a variety of development activities. This paper presents an approach to coping with the standard. Analyzing the standard indicates that the safety issues of the automotive systems should be handled with a system's view whereas the conventional approach to solving the issues has been practiced with focus on the component's level. The aforementioned system's view implies that the functional safety shall be incorporated in the system design from both the system's life-cycle view and the hierarchical view for the structure. In light of this, the systems engineering framework can be quite appropriate in the functional safety development and thus has been taken in this paper as a problem solving approach. Of various design issues, the analysis and verification of the safety requirements for functional safety is a key study subject of the paper. Note, in particular, that the conventional FMEA (failure mode effects analysis) and FTA (fault tree analysis) methods seem to be partly relying on the insufficient experience and knowledge of the engineers. To improve this, a systematic method is studied here and the result is applied in the design of an ABS braking system as a case study.

The recent trend in the war fields on the globe may be characterized by the network-centric warfare, which would, in turn, make the concept of weapon systems be changed. To this end, the concept of system of systems (SoS) has been introduced in literature. An SoS is a collection of multiple systems, each of which is an independent system and can be interoperable with each other. Thus, in defense domain each SoS is a big weapon system as a whole operated in actual environment and each element of it is also an independent smaller weapon system, but they should be interoperable via network among each other. The safety results studied for each elementary system alone may not be fully applicable to the whole SoS. As such, the objective of this paper is to study how to make the SoS safety requirements be distributed down over the interoperable elementary systems. Since handling the interoperability requires a technique of systems architecture, a standard method called the DoD Architectural Framework (DoDAF) has been used here to derive a solution. Using DoDAF, the safety requirements were first analyzed in the operability environment. The results were then studied to be included in an integrated model of both the systems design and safety processes. A further study of present paper would facilitate ensuring safety in the development of SoS weapon systems in practice.