By the time the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) entered into force, there had been numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements between the parties regarding its rules on dispute settlement. However, the WTO dispute settlement system currently remains the most requested. The present article provides a comparative analysis of the procedures of dispute settlement under the CPTPP, the WTO DSU, and some RTAs. Among the novelties of the CPTPP mechanism compared to the WTO DSU are that it extends its scope to measures not yet introduced, offers more transparency, including the use of electronic means of communication, simplifies access for third parties, and provides financial compensation as a temporary remedy. Although the authors conclude that many of the CPTPP provisions repeat those of the WTO DSU and other RTAs between the CPTPP partners, there may be a desire to test the CPTPP mechanism in practice due to crises of the WTO Appellate Body.

The EU, China, and other WTO members recently released their concluded MPIA with its Annexes I and II as a temporary arrangement to deal with the appeals of panel rulings before the Appellate Body resumes its operation. The WTO dispute settlement mechanism is a complete unit with unique features and inherent logic. Although this arrangement maintains the two-tier process with arbitration to replace the appellate review, there is a fundamental difference between them, which is embodied not only in the dispute settlement process but also in the implementation of the rulings. The challenges that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism encounters are not limited to those procedural issues, but they are also connected with the substantive rules, with which the procedural issues should be jointly resolved. This is the correct way to deal with the current challenges and to reform the multilateral trade regime.

Bilateral agreements are not the optimal solution to address modern challenges regarding the resolution of investment disputes. The time has come for multilateral agreements to define a clear procedure for resolving investment disputes and the formation of arbitration for these purposes. On November 15, 2020, ASEAN members and five regional partners signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), arguably the largest free trade agreement in history. Although the RCEP agreement defines the basic principles of legal protection of investments, it does not contain a procedure for settling disputes directly between investors and parties to the agreement, i.e., Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), but rather postpones the issue for future negotiations. Nevertheless, a majority of countries understand the importance of investment protection and have significant outward FDI that will support stronger ISDS protections within a multilateral framework. Therefore, it is recommended that in the near future member countries will come to an agreement and adopt appropriate amendments to the RCEP regarding ISDS.

Hybrid dispute settlement mechanism is one of the characteristics of the UNCLOS. It is the combination of diplomatic measures and judicial proceedings. Among them, the ITLOS established in accordance with Annex VI, and two types of arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annexes VII and VIII are means for the disputes settlement firstly regulated in the UNCLOS. Especially, according to Article 287, an arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII has default jurisdiction in case one or both parties to a dispute are not covered by a declaration in force, or the parties to a dispute have not accepted the same procedure for the settlement of the dispute. These means of dispute settlement have supplemented and enhanced the source of law for international dispute resolution more diversified. This paper clarifies some aspects of compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions under the UNCLOS, evaluates the applicability of these procedures to the case of Vietnam in the disputes settlement on interpretation or application of the UNCLOS raising among countries in the South China Sea.

The primary purpose of this research is to propose the solution to the current crisis of the WTO dispute settlement system focusing on Article 25 of the WTO Agreement. The Dispute Settlement Understanding is one of the significant successes of the WTO. Recent years, however, have witnessed the difficulties and challenges facing the multilateral trading system along with rising anti-globalization and trade protectionism. The Appellate Body (AB) has been experiencing an unprecedented crisis of dysfunction mainly due to the US’s boycott of appointing the new members. The WTO Members, including China, have thus proposed various reforms in response to the crisis. However, they have not touched the core demands of the US. Because of the imminent crisis that the AB is about to stop operating, China should take urgent action with other WTO members, consider launching a majority voting program, design and use alternative appeal arbitration, and combine international rules with domestic deepening reforms.

The Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is facing serious crisis, which has impeded its normal function. To address this impasse, this article suggests a reform of the WTO’s dispute-settlement mechanism: the establishment of a new megamultilateral court to substitute for the Appellate Body. The first part of this paper addresses the reasons for considering this approach. The second part identifies how to establish a new mega-multilateral court within the WTO. The third part puts forward an idea of the function of the Dispute Settlement Body, which would serve as a forum for adjudicators and State Parties of the mega-multilateral court, in order to balance judicial independence, judicial accountability, and consistency. In discussing the reason for this reform, approaches to implementing it, and other examples of what form it might take, this article concludes that it is appropriate to establish a new mega-multilateral court within the WTO.

Since its accession to the WTO in 2001, China has been involved in 21 cases as complainant, 44 as respondent, and 179 as a third party. However, China-related cases have not overburdened the WTO dispute settlement system. Instead, China has assisted in the development of international trade law through the creative interpretations of different provisions achieved in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings. This article seeks to provide an overview of China’s participation in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and contribution to the rules over the past decade. In doing so, the article not only highlights the jurisprudential and doctrinal contributions of some of the critical disputes, but also examines the role of various interest groups and stakeholders in shaping China’s dispute settlement activity. Overall, the article provides an overview of China’s WTO dispute settlement activities and its role in assisting the development of international trade law.

The era of globalization has created a proverbial ‘rush’ to utilize trade and investment in developing nations. Growing fear over the abuse of developed nations’ bargaining power in these areas led the WTO to adopt remedial measures ensuring the protection of developing nations during disputes. The WTO’s dispute settlement system is unequivocally the most comprehensive form of the resolution of disputes among its Member States. Despite the numerous privileges and safeguards offered to developing Members States, reluctance and a lack of understanding in using the WTO dispute resolution process remain within these nations. This paper explains the options available to these nations, in an attempt to attract to use the dispute resolution process, and offers key insight on future amendments that can facilitate developing Member’s participation in the future. It will further articulate the statutory safeguards and favors provided to developing countries in DSS.

Considering the large number of civil, commercial and investment disputes that arise between Chinese investors and their counterparts along the Belt and Road, it is necessary to establish a dispute settlement mechanism. The open, cooperative and non-institutionalized features of the Belt and Road Initiative require the reform and improvement of China’s domestic dispute settlement mechanism for foreign civil, commercial and investment disputes; and bilateral and multilateral dispute settlement mechanisms between or among China and the Belt and Road countries should be strengthened. When appropriate, China may propose the establishment of a multilateral dispute settlement mechanism that is especially designed for the Initiative. The status quo of dispute settlement mechanisms between China and the Belt and Road countries necessitates the establishment of a preset mechanism that uses arbitration as the primary approach, litigation as the secondary approach, and mediation as an alternative.

해운산업이 성장함에 따라 선박 연료유시장 및 관련 산업도 크게 성장하였으며, 많은 국가들이 국가산업으로 성장시키기 위하여 경제적·제도적·정치적 노력을 다하고 있다. 그럼에도 불구하고 연료유 수급 시 발생되는 분쟁은 연료유 공급항을 중심 으로 매년 지속적으로 발생되고 있다. 더욱이 이러한 분쟁은 계약 당사자 간의 중재, 조정 및 합의에 따라 해결될 지라도 국가 신뢰도 하락 및 연료유 공급 시장 약화 등과 같은 결과를 초래하기도 한다. 이 논문에서는 연료유 수급 시 발생되는 분쟁을 사전에 방지하고 효율적으 로 해결하기 위하여 선박 연료유의 특성 및 국제적 기준, 국제협약에 따르는 연료유 규정에 대하여 알아보며 수급량 및 품질에 관한 분쟁 발생 시 선박소유 자 및 수급책임자의 효과적인 대응방안에 대하여 알아보고자 한다.

From the twentieth century on, legalization process has been evident in international relations. As a core issue of international law and relation, dispute settlement between States has been evolving from its tit-for-tat strategy to diplomatic and then legal control. Based on the GATT DSP, the WTO DSM has achieved significant progress in legalization. In particular, as more DSM decision have been complied by member States, legalization process of trade dispute resolution via WTO is regarded promising. From the viewpoint of the legalization theory, in comparison to the GATT, the compliance of the WTO DSM’s decisions have become more precise. The WTO members have granted more authorities to its panel of the AB or DSB. It means that in the aspect of compliance of the WTO DSM’s decisions, the degree of delegation to the DSB has been lifted to a higher level.

The implementation system of the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body is an important component of the WTO dispute settlement procedure. Where there is any disagreement between disputing parties as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings, a winning party may refer the matter to a compliance panel and the Appellate Body. If a losing party is found to have failed to comply with the recommendations and rulings, DSB may authorize the winning party to retaliate. This article analyzes the implementation system of the WTO dispute settlement procedure in comparison with other systems of ‘second-order’ compliance in international law. Also, attention will be directed to the relationship between the WTO retaliation and countermeasures in general international law. Countermeasures under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, in particular, have a legal nature akin to that of countermeasures under the law of State responsibility.

The RCEP rules are the basic guarantee for the settlement of international trade competition disputes. Only by establishing fair competition in relevant markets can the objectives of the Free trade Agreement be fully realized. Therefore, we should study the RCEP rules and summarize the shortcomings of the RCEP rules. In view of these deficiencies, a scientific and reasonable solution to the RCEP international competition dispute settlement rules will be found to solve the practical difficulties existing in the relevant rules of international competition dispute settlement, so as to promote the better realization of the objectives and purposes of international competition dispute settlement, and ultimately provide a fair market environment for further promoting the development of foreign trade of all countries.

게임 이용자들은 게임을 즐기기 위해 유료 콘텐츠를 구입하게 된다. 이는 미성년자도 마찬가지 이다. 미성년자가 게임 콘텐츠를 할 때 가장 많이 이용하는 결제 방식은 각종 상품권을 이용한 결제이다. 이 외에도 이용하는 결제 방식은 휴대폰 과금에 의한 결제, 부모의 신용카드 정보 입력을 통한 결제 등이 있다. 그런데 이러한 결제 방식은 그 편리함으로 인하여 보다 용이하게 결제가 이루어짐에 따라 그에 따른 분쟁 또한 지속적으로 증가하고 있다. 이러한 미성년자 게임 결제와 관련된 분쟁에 의해 이용자와 게임 사업자가 모두 피해를 보고 있어서 경우에 따라서는 사회적 문제로 대두되기도 한다. 본 논문에서는 이러한 분쟁을 예방하고 효율적으로 해결하기 위해 먼저 미성년자 게임 결제와 관련이 있는 법제도를 조사ㆍ분석하고, 미성년자 게임 결제 관련 분쟁사례를 분석함으로서 미성년자 결제에 대한 환불 정책(제도) 표준화를 위한 자료를 제시하고자 한다.

분쟁의 평화적 해결에 관해 ‘국제연합헌장’은 다음과 같이 규정하고 있다: 국제연합의 어떠한 회원국도 그의 계속이 국제 평화와 안전의 유지를 위협하는 분쟁에 대해 안보리에 주의를 환기 시킬 수 있으며(제35조), 안보리는 분쟁의 어떠한 단계에 있어서도 적절한 조정의 절차와 방법을 권고할 수 있다(제36조 제1항). 안보리는 권고를 함에 있어서 일반적 으로 법적 분쟁을 ‘국제사법재판소규정’이 정하는 바에 따라 당사국에 대하여 국제사법재판 소에 회부하여 해결할 것을 고려하여야 한다(제36조 제3항). 일본정부는 1954년 9월 25일 독도영유권 문제를 먼저 분쟁으로 간주하고 그 분쟁을 국제 사법재판소에 제소하여 해결할 것을 한국정부에 제의한 바 있으며, 이에 대해 한국정 부는 1954년 10월 22일 한국의 권리를 어떠한 국제재판소에 의해 확인받아야 할 이유가 없다는 것을 근거로 일본정부의 제의를 거절했다. 2012년 8월 10일 이명박대통령의 역사 적인 독도방문에 대해 일본정부는 8월 24일 독도문제를 국제사법재판소에 제소하여 해결하 자고 제의해온 바 있다. 역시 한국정부는 이를 일축했다. 독도영유권 분쟁의 해결에 관한 일본정부의 기본적인 전략은 ‘국제연합헌장’ 제36조의 규정에 따른 안보리에 권고 결의를 통해 분쟁을 국제사법재판소에 제소하는 것으로 추정된 다. 이에 대한 한국정부의 대응전략을 수립함에 있어서 한국정부는 독도영유권 문제를 분쟁 화하는 일이 없도록 하고, 안보리가 ‘국제연합헌장’ 제36조의 규정에 따라 국제사법재판소 에 제소하라는 권고결의를 해도 이 분쟁을 국제사법재판소에 제소하지 아니하는 것을 고려 해야 한다.