In the multilateral trading systems under the WTO, the national security exception plays a crucial role in balancing trade liberalisation against the security interest of a sovereign nation. The proper use of the national security exception is of particular importance in the disputes with mixed political, diplomatic and military elements. The EU has recently accused China of breaching WTO obligations by taking restrictive trade measures against Lithuania, thereby affecting free trade between the EU and China. This paper argues that the allegation would be frustrated by the application of the WTO’s national security exception, as the dispute is rooted in Lithuania’s breach of its commitment to the One-China principle, which is crucial to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Outside the WTO ruling system, a unilaterally imposed international sanction would be insufficient to alleviate the dispute between China and Lithuania and would lead to a deadlock in the multilateral trading system.

By the time the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) entered into force, there had been numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements between the parties regarding its rules on dispute settlement. However, the WTO dispute settlement system currently remains the most requested. The present article provides a comparative analysis of the procedures of dispute settlement under the CPTPP, the WTO DSU, and some RTAs. Among the novelties of the CPTPP mechanism compared to the WTO DSU are that it extends its scope to measures not yet introduced, offers more transparency, including the use of electronic means of communication, simplifies access for third parties, and provides financial compensation as a temporary remedy. Although the authors conclude that many of the CPTPP provisions repeat those of the WTO DSU and other RTAs between the CPTPP partners, there may be a desire to test the CPTPP mechanism in practice due to crises of the WTO Appellate Body.

The EU, China, and other WTO members recently released their concluded MPIA with its Annexes I and II as a temporary arrangement to deal with the appeals of panel rulings before the Appellate Body resumes its operation. The WTO dispute settlement mechanism is a complete unit with unique features and inherent logic. Although this arrangement maintains the two-tier process with arbitration to replace the appellate review, there is a fundamental difference between them, which is embodied not only in the dispute settlement process but also in the implementation of the rulings. The challenges that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism encounters are not limited to those procedural issues, but they are also connected with the substantive rules, with which the procedural issues should be jointly resolved. This is the correct way to deal with the current challenges and to reform the multilateral trade regime.

The primary purpose of this research is to propose the solution to the current crisis of the WTO dispute settlement system focusing on Article 25 of the WTO Agreement. The Dispute Settlement Understanding is one of the significant successes of the WTO. Recent years, however, have witnessed the difficulties and challenges facing the multilateral trading system along with rising anti-globalization and trade protectionism. The Appellate Body (AB) has been experiencing an unprecedented crisis of dysfunction mainly due to the US’s boycott of appointing the new members. The WTO Members, including China, have thus proposed various reforms in response to the crisis. However, they have not touched the core demands of the US. Because of the imminent crisis that the AB is about to stop operating, China should take urgent action with other WTO members, consider launching a majority voting program, design and use alternative appeal arbitration, and combine international rules with domestic deepening reforms.

The Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is facing serious crisis, which has impeded its normal function. To address this impasse, this article suggests a reform of the WTO’s dispute-settlement mechanism: the establishment of a new megamultilateral court to substitute for the Appellate Body. The first part of this paper addresses the reasons for considering this approach. The second part identifies how to establish a new mega-multilateral court within the WTO. The third part puts forward an idea of the function of the Dispute Settlement Body, which would serve as a forum for adjudicators and State Parties of the mega-multilateral court, in order to balance judicial independence, judicial accountability, and consistency. In discussing the reason for this reform, approaches to implementing it, and other examples of what form it might take, this article concludes that it is appropriate to establish a new mega-multilateral court within the WTO.

As the most frequent and most successful user of the dispute settlement system of the WTO, the US has welcomed judicial clarifications by WTO dispute settlement bodies whenever they confirmed legal claims of the US. Yet, the Trump administration increasingly rejects judicial findings against the US trade restrictions as violating the WTO prohibitions of “add(ing) to or diminish(ing) the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.” This contribution criticizes the illegal US ‘blocking’ of the WTO Appellate Body and the underlying, hegemonic nationalism and protectionist interest group politics. It suggests that reasonable and responsible citizens benefitting from the WTO trading, legal and dispute settlement systems must resist illegal power politics, for instance, by supporting a WTO Adjudication@me.too “enlightenment campaign” pressuring democratic institutions and governments to protect rule of law and judicial remedies in international trade as prescribed by parliaments when they approved the WTO Agreement.

The recent fentanyl dispute between China and the US adds the academic value to the efforts to examine the respective legal regime of public international law and the WTO law on narcotics trafficking. On the one hand, public international law offers a comprehensive framework to address narcotics trafficking but as demonstrated by Chinese proofs, its function is undermined by weak enforcement. On the other hand, there exist some useful mechanisms in the WTO law to combat narcotics trafficking but their weaknesses can also be easily spotted. More importantly, the alarm of the global threat of illicit trade is ringing, which requires our raising awareness to it. Recently, the UNCTAD and the OECD have already taken the initiative to discuss the collective actions, by means of conferences or reports, to deal with illicit trade. In the long run, it will be indispensable to establish an operational governance framework on the international level to effectively curb illicit trade.

Since its accession to the WTO in 2001, China has been involved in 21 cases as complainant, 44 as respondent, and 179 as a third party. However, China-related cases have not overburdened the WTO dispute settlement system. Instead, China has assisted in the development of international trade law through the creative interpretations of different provisions achieved in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings. This article seeks to provide an overview of China’s participation in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and contribution to the rules over the past decade. In doing so, the article not only highlights the jurisprudential and doctrinal contributions of some of the critical disputes, but also examines the role of various interest groups and stakeholders in shaping China’s dispute settlement activity. Overall, the article provides an overview of China’s WTO dispute settlement activities and its role in assisting the development of international trade law.

During the last quarter-century, globalisation processes affected changes in the world economy in the form of intensifying competition in the international and internal markets. The result is the creation of a global marketplace that is mostly indifferent to national borders and governmental influences. This development has generated widespread interest in competitiveness. Competitiveness affects international relations, especially nowadays, given the changing position of the global leaders and the growth of new economic powers such as China. China has come a long way and has the opportunity to be a global leader in several required fields that will be the cornerstones of global growth in the next decades. Led by China, emerging economies are increasing their share in the worldwide economy and intensifying competition in nearly all sectors. It creates new threats and challenges for players in the global economy, and growing competitiveness must be efficient. The article evaluates the Chinese competitiveness in comparison with the World Trade Organization members by the Data Envelopment Analysis in the pre-in-post crisis period and considering the Fourth Industrial Revolution shifting humanity into a new phase.

The era of globalization has created a proverbial ‘rush’ to utilize trade and investment in developing nations. Growing fear over the abuse of developed nations’ bargaining power in these areas led the WTO to adopt remedial measures ensuring the protection of developing nations during disputes. The WTO’s dispute settlement system is unequivocally the most comprehensive form of the resolution of disputes among its Member States. Despite the numerous privileges and safeguards offered to developing Members States, reluctance and a lack of understanding in using the WTO dispute resolution process remain within these nations. This paper explains the options available to these nations, in an attempt to attract to use the dispute resolution process, and offers key insight on future amendments that can facilitate developing Member’s participation in the future. It will further articulate the statutory safeguards and favors provided to developing countries in DSS.

Millions of people worldwide use the Internet. One of the many uses derived from the Internet is the development of digital trade. Digital trade thus lends itself to distinctive issues. The WTO members recognized the benefits digital trade offers and have developed a work program to facilitate the digital trade. However, their efforts have stalled, slowing down the anticipated progress. The author will try to address how the WTO supports and deals with digital trade. This essay briefly discusses the historical advancement of the Internet; defines the concept of digital trade and its development in the international market; analyzes how existing WTO agreements have dealt with digital trade; and then addresses recent trade agreements particularly the USMCA. The USMCA was chosen because it involves the largest economy in the world and the US could use its provisions as template for future trade agreements

As goods and services powered by AI continue to proliferate, scholarly opinion seems to consider that current WTO law is insufficient to regulate trade in AI-powered products. The following reasons can help explain this perceived insufficiency of the WTO law: (a) AI-powered products are difficult to categorise within the perceived goods/services dichotomy under WTO law, thus causing uncertainties as to the applicable legal regime; and (b) the WTO law has yet to respond to the need for national governments to strike a balance between trade and controversial trade practices regarding AI-powered products. This paper argues that while current WTO law is far from perfect, it does partly regulate trade in AI-powered products. The following observations substantiate the partial regulation of trade in AI-powered products by the WTO law: (a) AI-powered products cannot escape existing WTO disciplines on trade in goods and trade in services, by virtue of either the involvement of AI or the perceived goods/services dichotomy; and (b) efforts to balance trade/non-trade interests associated with trade in AI-powered products are allowed under the GATT/GATS’ ‘public morals’ and security exceptions.

The trade war between the US and China in the Trump era has become a momentous event in the world economy. It is necessary to see how trade relations between them have played out within the WTO from a historical perspective. Since the Opium Wars, both economic and political concerns have changed the relationship between these two countries. The escalation from a trade conflict to trade war shows the rivalry between the US and China for hegemony in the twenty-first century’s regional and world politics. The economic, technological, and manufacturing competition that is a part of hegemonic rivalry is not totally new; this is borne out by the history of the US-China economic relations. The escalation of this ‘trade war’ now has spill-over effects on other countries, being beyond the normative framework of the WTO. There is an impasse in this ongoing saga, but the silver lining is that there will be a re-construction of the multilateral trading system.

The US has invoked Article XXI of the GATT 1994 to justify its tariff measures on imports of steel and aluminum. However, the US’ tariff measures are not imposed for the protection of the US “essential security interests” but for economic and trade reasons. They do not satisfy the conditions listed under Article XXI (b) (i) to (iii) and should not be justified by them. They should not be considered as either national security measures or safeguard measures, but as ordinary trade restriction measures that are inconsistent with the WTO rules and the US obligations. A panel or the Appellate Body not only has the jurisdiction to review this dispute, but is also capable of making findings and providing a recommendation. Even if the US has the discretion to impose tariff measures under Article XXI (b), whether it has been acted in good faith, is still subject to the WTO review. As regards the tariff measures, the US has not acted in good faith.

This article assesses the compliance of China’s domestic laws in the area of intellectual property rights protection with the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which China obliged to accept upon its entrance into the WTO. It also discusses the implications which result from the implementation and enforcement of the intellectual property rights in China for doing business in China. The significance of intellectual property rights protection for achieving the strategic objects formulated by China’s policy-makers and China’s reputation in the world is tackled, as well. Qualitative research based on the concept of compliance showed that China’s compliance with its TRIPS obligation should be evaluated with respect to different country-specific as well as country non-specific factors. However, the experience from the historical development of the leading world inventors, such as Japan or the United Kingdom, should also be considered.

China’s economic success and trade expansion since the 1980s is one of the most important economic achievements, which lifted more populations out of extreme poverty than any other time and place in history. This achievement has been made possible by trade-led development policies successfully adopted by China. China also joined the WTO in 2001, after fifteen years of negotiations with its trade partners, and is subject to WTO legal disciplines requiring the transparency of its trade-related decisions and procedures. This article examines China’s economic reform, which led to its accession into the WTO, and reviews China’s trade and development policies under the WTO. In addition, this article discusses China’s participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure. There has been a concern as to whether China will be compliant with the requirements under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). The article shows that China has become an active participant and has maintained well under the terms of the DSU.

This research offers a concise retrospect on the South-South Coalition Strategy within multilateral trade negotiations of the GATT/WTO framework. The SSC strategy evolved in the postwar era, when the South integrated itself to demand for a New International Economic Order featured by fairness of outcome in international economic rules and activities. It then encountered an opponent trend of neo-liberalism, through which the South practically decided to sectoral exchange of economic interests with the North. From the new millennium onward, the South is learning to adopt a more issue-specific SSC strategy in trade negotiations. Although a question is arising for the future of SSC because of some emerging nations rising out from the traditional South group, a timely reflection from an evolutionary perspective would facilitate the understanding of the SSC strategy for weak countries to establish a fairer international economic order.