This study attempted to examine how the airline safety reporting system affects the go-around that may occur when flight crew members operate an aircraft. In addition, we sought to determine how the captain's awareness of command responsibility intervenes and influences the relationship between safety reporting and go-around. The results of the study showed that among the official safety reporting subfactors, Response & Feedback had a statistically significant effect on go-around(ΔR2 = .009, p < .05). In the relationship between formal safety reporting and go-around, the moderating effect of command responsibility(β = .595, p < .05) showed statistically significant results. In addition, the interaction effect between Response & Feedback and Command & Responsibility was confirmed through a simple slope test, and as a result, it had a statistically significant effect when Command & Responsibility was low.

In this study, we attempted to examine how the management commitment and safety communication affect the safety behavior of flight crew members while performing their duties. In addition, we attempted to examine how the individual cultural values ​​of each flight crew are involved and influenced in such influence relationships. As a result of the study, among the sub-variables of safety behavior, the relationship between commitment to safety compliance and communication was found to have no statistically significant effect (∆R2 = .049, p = .5), and the relationship between commitment to safety participation and communication was found to had a statistically significant effect (∆R2 = .088, p < .001). As a result of examining the moderating effect of individual culture values ​​in the relationship between commitment to safety participation and communication, the moderating effect of uncertainty avoidance (β = .256, p < .05) showed statistically significant results, and management's commitment/communication The interaction effect between and uncertainty avoidance had a statistically significant effect when uncertainty avoidance was low, but was not statistically significant when uncertainty avoidance was high.