현재 과학기술의 발전에 따라 많은 영향을 받고 있는 한 분야로 운송수단의 무인화가 있으며, 이러한 영향은 해상운송분야에도 미치고 있다. 특히 무인선 박의 건조와 운항이 시범단계이지만 현실화되고 있다. 그러나 기술의 발전에 비하여 사이버 공격에 대한 대응은 취약한 실정이며, 이에 따라 사이버 보안 문제 또한 대두되고 있다. 따라서 자율운항선박 상용화 이전에 사이버 위험에 대한 대응도 선결되어야 할 중요한 과제 중 하나라고 생각된다. 본 연구는 향 후 해상 사이버 위험이 불러올 해상운송 법제와의 법리적 문제점에 대한 선행 적 연구로서 기여하고자 하는데 그 목적이 있다. 해상 사이버 위험이 심화되어 감에 따라 제기되는 문제로는 우선 “사이버 공 격에 대응하기 위하여 과거보다 높은 사이버 보안 기준치가 요구되는 현 상황 에서 해상운송인이 ‘전통적인 감항능력주의의무’만을 갖추었을 때, 이는 선박 의 감항성을 갖추기 위한 의무를 다하였다고 볼 수 있는가?”라는 질문이다. 이 를 축약하여 풀어내자면, “사이버 보안은 해상운송인의 감항능력주의의무에 포 함되는 사안인가?” 하는 문제이다. 이와 더불어 해상운송인의 감항능력주의의 무가 인정되었을 경우, “사이버 해킹은 우리 상법상 해상운송인의 면책사유 중 ‘해적행위나 그 밖에 이에 준한 행위’의 범위에 포함될 수 있을 것인가?”라는 질문을 해볼 수 있을 것이다. 그리고 이것이 해적행위로 인정된다면, 해상운송 인은 손해에 대한 책임이 면책된다고 볼 것이다. 그러므로 이 논문에서는 해상 사이버 위험과 관련된 상사법적 주요 쟁점인 해상운송인의 감항능력주의의무로써의 사이버 감항성과 해상운송인의 면책사 유의 포함 여부가 쟁점인 사이버 해적행위에 대한 법리적 고찰을 수행한다.

Transient ischemic attack (TIA) indicates high risk for major stroke and is considered a medical emergency. Diffusion-weighted imaging (DWI) enables detection of acute ischemic lesions. The clinical significance of DWI positive lesions in TIA is obscure and its prevalence, clinical features are not established. Therefore, we performed a clinical, etiological and prognostic analysis through a cross-sectional analysis of 235 TIA patients, grouped according to presence of DWI lesion. Clinical features, underlying risk factors for stroke, outcome and rate of recurrence were analyzed. 3 months follow-up of modified Rankin Scales (mRS) were done with telephone survey. DWI positive lesions were present in 14.0% of patients. Etiological factors significantly associated with DWI lesions in TIA patients were male sex (p = 0.038), stroke history (p = 0.012) and atrial fibrillation (p < 0.001). Presence of at least one medium or high risk of cardioembolism from TOAST classification were not associated with lesions when excluding association to atrial fibrillation (p = 0.108). Clinical features showed no significant difference. Whether the patients had lesion-positive DWI was not related to an increase in mRS score during the hospital stay or at the 3-month follow-up after discharge. Future studies should include multi-center samples with large numbers, considering each unique medical environment. Routine acquisition of follow-up DWI for proper evaluation of the tissue-based definition of TIA should also be considered.

A bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) should define what is subject to the agreement and when. Nuclear Materials (NM) are the subject of NCA with almost all countries, and the definition used in these agreements is borrowed from Article 20 of the IAEA Charter. The IAEA’s definition of NM as consisting of special fissionable material and source material and describes the types of material each contains. In order to control the export of NM under national laws and implement NCA, not only the types of NM but also quantitative criteria are required. This is because controlling small quantities of NM is impossible, unnecessary, and would create excessive administrative burdens. For this reason, the NSG guidelines establish a quantitative threshold of NM requiring control. Nevertheless, no quantitative thresholds have been agreed upon for NM subject to a NCA. Whether NM transferred is subject to the NCA is primarily a matter for the supplier states to determine. The supplier states make the decision based on quantitative criteria defined in their own export control laws. ROK identifies NM that require export licenses by reflecting the same criteria as the NSG guidelines in Foreign Trade Laws and its Notifications. Less than 500 kg of Natural Uranium, 1,000 kg of Depleted Uranium, 1,000 kg of Thorium, and 50 effective grams of special fissionable materials do not require an export license and is therefore not subject to NCA. In the US, the quantitative threshold for requiring an export license is different from that of ROK. For example, special fissionable materials that are not Pu are required if the individual shipment exceed 1 effective gram or 100 effective grams per year. The difference in the quantitative thresholds for NM between the two countries mean that the same item may be subject to NCA under US standards, but not under ROK’s. For example, the export of 8 grams of highly enriched uranium (93%) contained in a neutron detector would not be subject to the NCA in ROK, but would be considered NM subject to a NCA and required a special license in the US. Of course, in order to ensure the application of safeguards and physical protection to all NM transferred between the two countries, the agreement may not include a quantitative threshold for NM. However, the absence of such a threshold can lead to different conclusions by the two countries on the same item and make it challenging to control retransfers. The definition of quantitative standards will be necessary in the supplementary administrative arrangement for the practical control and management of NM subject to the NCA.