As part of the preparation of a glossary of terminologies related to the disposal of spent nuclear fuel, definitions of potentially issuable terminologies used in domestic regulations were inferred from relevant regulations or comparatively analyzed with foreign definitions. These terminologies are safety assessment and performance assessment, safety function and safety performance, disposal containers and package, isolation and containment, and so on. Their concise and easy-to-understand definitions have been proposed in order to obtain these opinions of stakeholders.

Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been operating the Post Irradiation Examination Facility (PIEF). The facility has many PIE equipment and one of them is a hydrogen analyzer for measuring hydrogen contents in Zr cladding of spent fuel. The cladding tube of fuel is oxidized in the core environment of high temperature and pressure and absorbs some of the hydrogen generated during the oxidation. The hydrogen content increases with the increase of burn-up, and causes hydriding of the material, which degrades the mechanical properties. Therefore, hydrogen content analysis of the cladding tube is required for the performance and integrity evaluation of spent fuel. In PIEF, the hydrogen analyzer extracts hydrogen gas from Zr cladding by the hot extraction method. The hydrogen gas flows with inert gas and oxidizes to H2O through a CuO reagent. Finally, an IR detector measures the hydrogen amount from the absorbed IR intensity at a specific wavelength. Because the equipment is in the glove box and has some consumable parts, the maintenance work was performed as a radiation work.

The PRIDE scale mechanical decladder is decladding apparatus for separating and recovering fuel material and cladding hull by horizontally slitting rod-cut. In order to enhance mechanical decladdng efficiency, the main requirements were considered as follows. Decladding of the fuel rods may be performed by rotation of three circular cutting blades inserted among the rollers arranged at 120° portion. In a mechanical decladder, a slitting assembly as a unit for slitting the cladding tube may include cutting blades for slitting and rollers for guiding extrusion of the cladding tube. Rotation of the cutting blades may be caused by the fuel rods being extruded from a plurality of rollers. Slitting intervals of rod-cuts having different diameters may be controlled by adding or removing a spacing plate between the cutting blade and a ranch bolt for fixing the slitting blade to the slitting assembly. An extrusion velocity with respect to the fuel rods may be controlled by a hydraulic pressure applied to the fuel rods. A force for cutting the fuel rods may be adjusted by controlling steel plates. Forces applied to a plurality of rollers may be generated by the hydraulic cylinder. The hydraulic pressure may be controlled by hydraulic pressure controller. The PRIDE scale mechanical decladder mainly consists of auto feeding module, hydraulic cylinder module and blade module. A load cell was installed between the hydraulic cylinder and the extrusion pin to measure the decladding force and slitting velocity, and a data acquisition system capable of obtaining data by using the RSC 232 was constructed. Also, the control panel can control the forward and backward movement of the extrusion pin, the hydraulic flow rate, and the hydraulic velocity. In the mechanical decladding test, 40 pieces of simulated rod-cuts were loaded in two auto feeding basket and slit by utilizing the 3-CUT blade modules in the housing, and hulls and simulated pellets were collected in the collection container. As a result, 80 pieces of simulated rodcut (brass pellets + Zry4 tube) were slit continuously without any problem. About 35 min was required to slit 80 rod-cuts and average decladding force was 260 kg. The decladding force of the ceramic simulated rod-cuts (castable) requires 25 kg less force than the brass pellets. Therefore, it is estimated that the spent fuel rod-cut can be fully split into three pieces using the mechanical decladder.

In our previous study, we developed a CFD thermal analysis model for a CANDU spent fuel dry storage silo. The purpose of this model is to reasonably predict the thermal behavior within the silo, particularly Peak Cladding Temperature (PCT), from a safety perspective. The model was developed via two steps, considering optimal thermal analysis and computational efficiency. In the first step, we simplified the complex geometry of the storage basket, which stored 2,220 fuel rods, by replacing it with an equivalent heat conductor with effective thermal conductivity. Detailed CFD analysis results were utilized during this step. In the second step, we derived a thermal analysis model that realistically considered the design and heat transfer mechanisms within the silo. We developed an uncertainty quantification method rooted in the widely adopted Best Estimate Plus Uncertainty (BEPU) method in the nuclear industry. The primary objective of this method is to derive the 95/95 tolerance limits of uncertainty for critical analysis outcomes. We initiated by assessing the uncertainty associated with the CFD input mesh and the physical model applied in thermal analysis. And then, we identified key parameters related to the heat transfer mechanism in the silo, such as thermal conductivity, surface emissivity, viscosity, etc., and determined their mean values and Probability Density Functions (PDFs). Using these derived parameters, we generated CFD inputs for uncertainty quantification, following the principles of the 3rd order Wilks’ formula. By calculating inputs, A database could be constructed based on the results. And this comprehensive database allowed us not only to quantify uncertainty, but also to evaluate the most conservative estimates and assess the influence of parameters. Through the aforementioned method, we quantified the uncertainty and evaluated the most conservative estimates for both PCT and MCT. Additionally, we conducted a quantitative evaluation of parameter influences on both. The entire process from input generation to data analysis took a relatively short period of time, approximately 5 days, which shows that the developed method is efficient. In conclusion, our developed method is effective and efficient tool for quantifying uncertainty and gaining insights into the behavior of silo temperatures under various conditions.

The objective of this study is development of graphite-boron composite material as a replacement for metal canisters to Improve the heat dissipation and radiation shielding performance of dry spent nuclear fuel storage system and reduce the volume of waste storage system. KEARI research team plan to use the graphite matrix manufacturing technology to pelletize the graphite matrix and adjust the content of phenolic resin binder to minimize pore formation. Specifically, we plan to adjust the ratio of natural and synthetic graphite powder and use uniaxial pressing technology to manufacture black graphite matrix with extremely high radial thermal conductivity. After optimizing the thermal conductivity of the graphite matrix, we plan to mix it with selected boron compounds, shape it, and perform sintering and purification heat treatments at high temperatures to manufacture standard composite materials.

Currently, the most promising fuel candidate for use in sodium fast reactors (SFRs) is metallic fuel, which is produced by a modified casting method in which the metallic fuel material is sequentially melted in an inert atmosphere to prevent volatilization, followed by melting in a graphite crucible, and then injection casting in a quartz (SiO2) mold to produce metallic fuel slugs. In previous studies, U-Zr metallic fuel slugs have been cast using Y2O3 reaction prevent coatings. However, U-Zr alloy-based metallic fuel slugs containing highly reactive rare earth (RE) elements are highly reactive with Y2O3-coated quartz (SiO2) molds and form a significant thickness of surface reaction layer on the surface of the metallic fuel slug. Cast parts that have reacted with nuclear fuel materials become radioactive waste. To decrease amount of radioactive waste, advanced reaction prevent material was developed. Each RE (Nd, Ce, Ln, Pr) element was placed on the reaction prevent material and thermal cycling experiments were carried out. In casting experiments with U-10wt% Zr, it was reported that Y2O3 layer has a high reaction prevent performance. Therefore, the reaction layer properties for RE elements with higher reactivity than uranium elements were evaluated. To investigate the reaction layer between RE and NdYO3, the reaction composition and phase properties as a function of RE content and location were investigated using SEM, EDS, and XRD. The results showed that NdYO3 ceramics had better antireaction performance than Y2O3.

Dry storage of nuclear fuel is compromised by threats to the cladding integrity, such as creep and hydride reorientation. To predict these phenomena, spent fuel simulation codes have been developed. In spent fuel simulation, temperature information is the most influential factor for creep and hydride formation. Traditional fuel simulation codes required a user-defined temperature history input which is given by separate thermal analysis. Moreover, geometric changes in nuclear fuel, such as creep, can alter the cask’s internal subchannels, thereby changing the thermal analysis. This necessitates the development of a coupled thermal and nuclear fuel analysis code. In this study, we integrated the 2D FDM nuclear fuel code GIFT developed at SNU with COBRA -SFS. Using this, we analyzed spent nuclear stored in TN-24P dry storage cask over several decades and identified conditions posing threats due to phenomena like creep and hydrogen reorientation, represented by the burnup and peak cladding temperature at the start of dry storage. We also investigated the safety zone of spent nuclear fuel based on burnup and wet storage duration using decay heat.

For safe and economical spent fuel management, assessing the integrity of the cladding, which is the first barrier to the escape of radioactive material, is very important. For the sake of risk assessment, it is essential to calculate the probability of failure of the spent fuel rods loaded inside the cask during the transportation or storage. However, due to the large amounts of calculations required, it is not practical to analyze every detail of the spent fuel rods and assemblies. This study presents a methodology to perform a cask-level analysis by sequentially simplifying the fuel rods and spent fuel assemblies for the calculation of fuel rod failure probability. A simplified single fuel rod model was generated by considering the material properties of a high burnup fuel rod stored in dry storage for approximately 5 years and the interfacial bonding conditions of the cladding tube. The simplified model produces the same deflection as the detailed model at the critical moment that produces a fracture plastic strain of 1%. The developed single fuel rod simplified model is assembled in a CE 16×16 configuration, and a methodology is presented in which the CE 16×16 assembly model is once again replaced by a simplified model with a cuboidal shape. Compression analyses were performed on each part of the CE 16×16 model to obtain isotropic property data, and a simplified model was created based on those data and the cross-sectional second moment values of the parts. A cask drop analysis was performed to validate the similarity of the CE 16×16 model and the simplified model by comparing important structural responses such as impact acceleration. The 20 simplified fuel assembly models and one detailed model were loaded into a cask to perform the drop analysis. For the detailed model, the impact acceleration was extracted for different loading positions and the corresponding impact load and pinch load were derived. The spring force and contact force corresponding to the pinch load were extracted by applying a Python script technique to extract the maximum value of them exerted on each fuel rod. The vulnerability of spent fuel rods to bending loads and the failure criteria were considered during the simplification process of a single fuel rod. From the extracted impact and pinch loads, the probability of failure of the spent fuel rods as a function of impact acceleration can be calculated.

A comparison and validation between the analysis and vibration test data of a nuclear fuel assembly were conducted. During the comparison and validation process, various parameters that govern the vibration behavior of the fuel assembly were determined, including nuclear fuel rod’s stiffness, spring constants of the dimple and spring of support structures, and damping coefficients. The calibration of the vibration analysis model aimed to find analysis parameters that can accurately simulate the vibration behavior of the test data. For calibration, power spectral density (PSD) diagrams were generated for both the measured signals from the test and the calculated signals from the analysis. The correlation coefficient between these two PSD plots was calculated. To find the analysis parameters, each parameter was defined as a variable with an appropriate range. Latin hypercube sampling was used to generate multiple sample points in the variable space. Analysis was performed for the generated sample points, and PSD plot correlation coefficients were calculated. Using the generated sample points and their corresponding results, a Gaussian Process Regression model was implemented for PSD plot correlation coefficients and the maximum PSD value. Based on the constructed surrogate model, the optimal analysis parameters were easily found without additional computations. Through this method, it was confirmed that the analysis model using the optimal parametes appropriately simulates the vibration behavior of the test.

In this study, a fracture evaluation of the spent nuclear fuel storage canister was conducted. Stainless steel alloys are typically used as the material for canisters, and therefore, a separate destructive evaluation is not required for safety analysis reports. However, in this research, a methodology for conducting a destructive evaluation was proposed for assessing the acceptability of cracks detected during in-service inspections for long-term storage due to reasons such as stress corrosion cracking. For the fracture evaluation, analytical equations provided in the design code such ASME were employed, and finite element method (FEM) based linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) was performed to validate the effectiveness of the analytical equations. Impact analyses such as tip-over of the storage cask on a concrete pad were performed, and the fracture evaluation using stresses resulting from the impact analysis under accident conditions and residual stresses from welds were carried out. Through this research, geometric dimensions for cracks exceeding the fracture criteria were established.

Nuclear fuel assemblies are exposed to high temperature and high pressure environments underwater for long periods of time in a reactor, leading to deterioration of the assembly structure. These assembly consists of fuel rods, grids, a top nozzle, a bottom nozzle and guide tubes. In particular, the integrity of the guide tube made of Zircaloy-4 is a very important part in handling the assembly. In the Post Irradiation Examination Facility (PIEF), there are 14×14 Westinghouse STD assemblies that have lost their handleability due to the top nozzle being removed for damaged fuel rod test. To handle these assemblies, it is reasonable to use cut guide tubes whenever possible. Therefore, it is necessary to determine the irradiation embrittlement state of the guide tube before designing or manufacturing parts that can connect the top nozzle and the guide tubes. Therefore, in this paper, the location for installing the top nozzle-guide tube connection parts was selected in the height range of 3,460 to 3,713 mm, and guide tube specimens were made within that range. Offset strain was derived from the load-displacement curve obtained through compression testing to confirm whether the ductility of guide tubes was maintained. As a result, there was no significant difference in strength and ductility of the guide tube within the above length range. In addition, it was confirmed that the ductility was maintained enough to install the top nozzle-guide tube connection parts. Therefore, it is judged that there will be no problem even if the top nozzle-guide tube connection parts are installed in the guide tube to restore the handleability of the assemblies.

Post Irradiation Examination Facility (PIEF) is a test facility for nuclear fuel research and development and performance evaluation. From the past to the present, assemblies and fuel rods have been transported from nuclear power plants (NPP) several times, and various destructive and non-destructive tests have been performed. Among these, in the case of the 14×14 Westinghouse STD assemblies that are transported as a whole assembly, the top nozzle is connected to the guide tube by welding. Therefore, the fuel rods could not be removed from the assembly at the NPP, so the assemblies were transported to PIEF as is. Then, after cutting between the top nozzle and the guide tube in the pool, and the fuel rods were extracted and tested. In order to transport the assembly in the future, it is necessary to maintain stability by inserting the dummy rod into the unit cell from which the fuel rod is extracted. However, since the length of the dummy rod is almost 4 m and the diameter is about 10 mm, the dummy rod often bends while passing through the dimple spring of the grid. Additionally, when dummy rods are inserted into unit cells that are continuously empty after the fuel rods are extracted, there may be cases where the dummy rods are not inserted into the desired unit cell but are bent and incorrectly inserted into the next unit cell. The moment the dummy rods are inserted into the dimple spring of grid, a load is applied to the dummy rod due to the tension of the spring. If it can be inserted while offsetting the load, the work can be performed more smoothly. Accordingly, an underwater handling tool was developed that can be inserted while offsetting the tension of the spring. Using this handling tool applies a load to the dummy rod and rotates the dummy rod itself, offsetting the tension of the spring and allowing the dummy rod to be inserted without bending. This handling tool is equipped with a shock absorbing device to protect the dummy rod and spring, and a module to rotate the dummy rod. As a result of inserting the dummy rod using the developed handling tool, it was possible to easily insert the dummy rod into unit cells that were previously impossible to insert.

Various types of spent fuel assembly in nuclear power plants have been transported to a post irradiation examination facility (PIEF) in KAERI to examine the mechanical and chemical properties of fuel and cladding. Once the fuel assembly arrive at PIEF, it is dismantled in a pool area to extract the fuel rods. Dismantling of the fuel assembly is performed by cutting the top nozzle. Currently, couple of dismantled assemblies have been stored in a storage pool without the top nozzle in PIEF. These assemblies cannot be handled directly using a gantry crane in the pool, and thus are contained in a special basket to handle. In this research, we developed a restoration method for a dismantled spent fuel assembly, especially for 16×16 Korea Optimized Fuel Assembly (KOFA). After reviewing the original design document and reports of KOFA, two tools are devised; an assembly tool and a tightening tool for a bolt. Since the top nozzle and dismantled KOFA can be re-assembled using a bolt, we follow the original design, size, and materials of the previously used bolt. The bolt to restore the top nozzle of KOFA is made of 321 stainless steel and has a design that fits the guideline of DIN 13-21 international standard. Our procedure can potentially be used to restore and repair the dismantled spent fuel assembly.

It is very important that the confinement of a spent fuel storage systems is maintained because if the confinement is damaged, the gaseous radioactive material inside the storage cask can leak out and have a radiological impact on the surrounding public. For this reason, leakage rate tests using helium are required for certificate of compliance (CoC) and fabrication inspections of spent fuel storage cask. For transport cask, the allowable leakage rate can be calculated according to the standardized scenario presented by the IAEA. However, for storage cask, the allowable leakage rate is determined by the canister, facility, and site specific information, so it is difficult to establish a standardized leakage rate criterion. Therefore, this study aims to establish a system that can derive system-specific leakage test criteria that can be used for leakage test of actual storage systems. First, the variables that can affect the allowable leakage rate for normal and accident conditions were derived. Unlike transportation systems, for storage systems, the dose from the shielding analysis and the dose from the confinement analysis are summed up to determine whether the dose standard is satisfied, and even the dose from the existing nuclear facilities is summed up during normal operation condition. For this reason, the target dose is used as an input variable when calculating the allowable leakage rate for the storage system. In addition, the main variables are the distance from the boundary of the exclusive area, the number of cask, the inventory of nuclide material in the cask, the free volume, and the internal and external pressure. Utilizing domestic and US NRC guidelines, we derived basic recommended values for the selected variables. The GASPARII computer code that can evaluate the dose to the public under normal operating conditions was utilized. Using the above variables, the allowable leakage rate is calculated and converted to the allowable criteria for helium leakage rate test. The developed system was used to calculate the allowable leakage rate for normal and accident conditions for a hypothetical storage system. The leakage rate criteria calculation system developed in this study can be useful for CoC and fabrication inspections of storage systems in the future, and a GUI-based program will be built for user convenience.

To investigate the mechanical integrity of spent nuclear fuel, the failure behavior of the cladding tube was examined under accident conditions. According to the SNL report, the failure behavior of cladding can be broadly classified into two types. The first is failure due to bending load caused by falling. The second is failure due to pinch load caused by space grid. In this study, mechanical integrity was evaluated through the stress intensity factor applied to the crack in failure behavior due to bending load. Since the exact value of the impact load due to fall was unknown, the load was applied by increasing the value up to 200 G in 20 G increments. The size of the crack is an important input variable, and 300 um was given by referring to the EPRI report, and the elastic modulus, a material property that determines the stress field, was given 75.22 GPa by referring to the FRAPCON code. Since the relationship between the direction of stress and the direction of the crack is also a major variable, simulations were conducted for both cracks perpendicular to and parallel to the stress direction. It was confirmed that at a load of 200 G, when the crack was parallel to the stress direction, stress concentration did not occur and had a very low stress intensity factor 0.01 􀜯􀜲􀜽√􀝉. When perpendicular to the direction of stress, the stress intensity factor showed a value of 1 􀜯􀜲􀜽√􀝉. However, considering that the critical value of the stress intensity factor due to hydride is 5 􀜯􀜲􀜽√􀝉, it can be seen that perpendicular result also ensures the mechanical integrity of the cladding.

Currently, the development of evaluation technology for vibration and shock loads transmitted to spent nuclear fuel and structural integrity of spent nuclear fuel under normal conditions of transport is progressing in Korea by the present authors. Road transportation tests using surrogate spent nuclear fuel were performed in September, 2020 using a test model of KORAD-21 transportation cask and sea transportation tests were conducted from September 30 to October 4, 2021. Finally, the shake table tests and rolling test were conducted from October 31 to November 2, 2022. As a result of the sea transportation test data analysis, an impact load resulting from the collision of objects was measured on fuel rods of a surrogate spent nuclear fuel assemblies during the rolling test was observed. Excessive rolling motion occurred on the ship during the rolling test, causing the surrogate spent nuclear fuel assemblies to slip and collide with the canister. To analyze under which conditions such impact loads occur and whether this event is possible under normal conditions of transport of spent nuclear fuel, a test was designed to simulate the rolling test in sea transportation and was performed. The rolling test was conducted on ACE7 and PLUS7 assemblies, respectively, varying the rolling angle and rolling frequency to determine at which angles and frequencies the assemblies experienced slippage. According to the test results, slippage of the used nuclear fuel assemblies can occur due to rolling motion at angles of approximately 14° or higher, leading to the possibility of generating impact loads. It was observed that the rolling angle is a more major factor for slippage than the rolling frequency. This exceeds the conditions under which a vessel can be permitted to depart for coastal navigation, thus it is considered to deviate from the normal conditions of transport of spent nuclear fuel. Therefore, it is not necessary to consider such loads for evaluating the integrity of spent nuclear fuel during normal transportation conditions.

For efficient design and manufacture of PWR spent fuel burnup detector, data simulated with various condition of spent fuel in the NPP storage pool is required. In this paper, to derive performance requirements of spent fuel burnup detector for neutron flux and dose rates were evaluated at various distances from CE16 and WH17 types of fuel, representatively. The evaluation was performed by the following steps. First, the specifications of the spent fuel, such as enrichment, burnup, cooling time, and fuel type, were analyzed to find the conditions that emit maximum radioactivity. Second, gamma and neutron source terms of spent fuel were analyzed. The gamma source terms by actinides and fission products and neutron source terms by spontaneous and (α, n) reactions were calculated by SCALE6 ORIGAMI module. Third, simulation input data and model were applied to the evaluation. The material composition and dose conversion factor were referred as PNNL-15870 and ICRP-74 data, respectively and dose rates were displayed with the MCNP output data. It was assumed that there was only one fuel modeled by MCNP 6.2 code in pool. The evaluation positions for each distance were selected as 5 cm, 10 cm, 25 cm, 50 cm, and 1 m apart from the side of fuel, respectively. Fourth, neutron flux and dose rates were evaluated at distance from each fuel type by MCNP 6.2 code. For WH 17 types with a 50 GWd/MTU burnup from 5 cm distance close to fuel, the maximum neutron flux, gamma dose rates and neutron dose rates are evaluated as 1.01×105 neutrons/sec, 1.41×105 mSv/hr and 1.61×101 mSv/hr, respectively. The flux and dose rate of WH type were evaluated to be larger than those of CE type by difference in number of fuel rods. The relative error for result was less than 3~7% on average secured the reliability. It is expected that the simulated data in this paper could contribute to accumulate the basic data required to derive performance requirements of spent fuel burnup detector.

During PIV (Physical Inventory Verification), the IAEA has been inspecting the CANDU-Type spent fuels using an optical fiber-based scintillation detector. KINAC has developed a new verification instrument to deal with problems of the existing one such as low sensitivity, heavy and large dimension, and inconvenience-in-use. Our previous studies focused on how to develop the new instrument and had not included its performance tests. Field tests were carried out recently at Wolsung unit 4 to evaluate performance of the existing and new instruments. The objective of this paper is to discuss background noise produced in the optical fiber signal cable itself. The verification equipment for the CANDU-type Heavy Water Reactor spent fuels uses a scintillation detector to bond a scintillation material to the end of an optical signal cable. At this time, the radiation signal obtained by a data acquisition system is the signal generated from the scintillator (p-terphenyl organic scintillator) and the optical signal cable ; The signal produced in the optical cable itself is background noise to degrade the spent fuel verification equipment. To characterize the background radiation noise, the spent fuel bundles at Wolsung Unit 4 were measured using the optical fiber cable without the radiation scintillator. This signal is generated by reaction of the optical cable and the radiation emitted from the spent fuel. From experimental results, it was observed that the background noise signal of the optical cable increased as the optical cable went down in the downward direction, because the cable length irradiated by the radiation increased with the optical cable area in the spent fuel storage pool. Difference in the background noise signal was dependent on the location of the vertical direction and the signal of the new optical cable was up to about 5 times higher than that of the existing cable. While, the new cable has the cross-section area about 3.2 times larger than the old cable. Our past studies showed that total signal amplitude – sum of signals generated from the scintillator and optical fiber - of the new verification instrument was at least about 15 times greater than that of the existing one. Considering the total signal and background noise signal, from this measured results, it was confirmed that the scintillator characteristics – in particular, light output and decay time – has a dominant impact on the signal sensitivity of the newly developed instrument. More details will be discussed at the conference.

Since the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011, the development of accident tolerant fuel (ATF) has been actively pursued as an alternative to improve the safety of nuclear power plants. In addition, nuclear power plants containing ATF have recently been included as green energy in the 2022 EU taxonomy bill, receiving a lot of attention. Many countries are considering increasing 235U enrichment from 5 to 10 235U % for higher burnup and long cycle operation with ATF improving safety. To utilize ATF, the applicability of fuel storage systems such as new fuel storage vault, Region 1, and Region 2 must be determined. The purpose of this paper is to confirm the applicability of applying ATF, which is being developed in Korea, to the nuclear fuel storage system of Korean nuclear power plants. The nuclear power plant model used in the analysis is APR-1400, a representative Korean nuclear power plant model, and ATF model used in the analysis is Mo microcell UO2 pellet with CrAl coating, which is being developed in Korea. MCNP 6.2 has been used for multiplication factor calculations, and the TRITON/NEWT and ORIGEN-S modules of the SCALE code have been used for depletion calculations. From the analysis results, solutions and additional analysis would be necessary to satisfy criticality regulatory requirements to utilize ATF with increased enrichment.

Notice of the NSSC No.2021-14 defines the term ‘Neutron Absorber’ as a material with a high neutron absorption cross section, which is used to prevent criticality during nuclear fission reactions and includes neutron absorbers as target items for manufacture inspection. U.S.NRC report of the NUREG-2214 states that the subcriticality of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in Dry Storage Systems (DSSs) may be maintained, in part, by the placement of neutron absorbers, or poison plates, around the fuel assemblies. This report mentions the need for Time-Limited Aging Analysis (TLAA) on depletion of Boron (10B) in neutron absorbers for HI-STORM 100 and HISTAR 100. Also, this report mentions that 10B depletion occurs during neutron irradiation of neutron absorbers, but only 0.02% of the available 10B is to be depleted through conservative assumptions regarding the neutron flux or accumulated fluence during irradiation, which supports the continued use of the neutron absorbers in the SNF dry storage cask even after 60 years of evaluated period. There are several types of commercially available neutron absorbers, broadly classified into Boron Carbide Cermets (e.g., Boral®), Metal Matrix Composites (MMC) (e.g., METAMIC), Borated Stainless Steel (BSS), and Borated Al alloy. While irradiation tests for neutron absorbers are primarily conducted during wet storage systems, there are also some prior studies available on irradiation tests for neutron absorbers during dry storage systems. For examples, there is an analysis of previous research on high-temperature irradiation test of metallic materials and identification of limitations in existing methodologies were conducted. Furthermore, an improvement plan for simulating the high-temperature irradiation damage of neutron absorbers was developed. In report published by corrosion society summarizes the evaluation results of the degradation mechanisms for Stainless Steel- and Al-based neutron absorbers used in SNF dry storage systems.