There have been a variety of issues related to spent nuclear fuel in Korea recently. Most of the issues are related to intermediate storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. However, recently, various studies have been started in advanced nuclear countries such as the United States to reduce spent nuclear fuel, focusing on measures to reduce spent nuclear fuel. In this study, a simple preliminary assessment of the thermal part was performed for the consolidation storage method which separates fuel rods from spent nuclear fuel and stores them. The preliminary thermal evaluation was analyzed separately for storing the spent fuel in fuel assembly state and separating the fuel rods and storing them. The consolidation storage method in separating the fuel rods was advantageous in terms of thermal conductivity. However, detailed evaluation should be performed considering heat transfer by convection and vessel shape when storing multiple fuel bundles simultaneously.

After spent fuel is stored in a dry storage container, it becomes difficult to obtain information on the fuel’s characteristics. As a result, it is necessary to identify the characteristics of spent nuclear fuel in advance and secure the information necessary to establish delivery acceptance requirements for interim storage and disposal in the future. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the characteristics of spent fuel before loading dry storage casks. In order to prepare for the dry storage of spent fuel, information on the basic characteristics of the fuel is required. As part of this information, it is also necessary to establish calculation criteria for spent fuel burnup. Spent fuel burnup can be classified into three categories. The first is burnup evaluated using design codes (design burnup), the second is burnup measured by furnace instruments during power plant operation (actual burnup), and the third is burnup measured through measurement equipment (measured burnup). This paper describes a comparative evaluation of design burnup, actual burnup, and measured burnup for specific fuels (40 bundles).

As of 2023, there has been significant progress worldwide in the management of nuclear fuel’s spent radioactive waste (HLW). Several countries have made important strides in advancing their plans for the construction of deep geologic repositories (DGRs) to safely dispose of their nuclear waste. Finland led the way, with its nuclear waste management organization, Posiva Oy, submitting an application for an operating license for a DGR for spent fuel generated by the nuclear power plants of its owners. The facility, ONKALO, will be located on the island of Olkiluoto and is expected to begin final disposal in the mid-2020s. Sweden also approved SKB’s application to build a DGR in Forsmark, and an encapsulation plant next to the Clab interim storage facility. In Switzerland, Nagra selected Nordic Lagern as the site for the Swiss DGR, and is preparing the general license applications for the required facilities. Meanwhile, Canada’s Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) narrowed down the possible locations for its DGR to two, and expects to name its preferred site by fall 2024. The UK established four Community Partnerships to participate in the siting process for a DGR, with Nuclear Waste Services (NWS) responsible for identifying a site. Andra, the French organization responsible for managing all French radioactive waste, is expected to submit an application by the end of the year for a DGR in France that will contain HLW resulting from reprocessing of spent fuel assemblies from French nuclear power plants, as well as intermediate-level waste. Overall, the progress made by these countries represents a tangible and sustainable step forward in the management of spent fuel and HLW, and brings us closer to the safe and effective long-term disposal of nuclear waste.

Since the time to consider when evaluating leakage of spent fuel dry storage systems is very long, assumptions that continue to leak at the initial leakage rate are too conservative. Therefore, this study developed a dynamic methodology to calculate the change in leakage rate using time-varying variables and apply it to calculate the amount of radioactive leakage during the evaluation period. The developed dynamic methodology was then applied to calculate the leakage radiation source term for a hypothetical dry storage system and used to perform a public dose assessment. When applying the developed dynamic leakage rate evaluation methodology for more accurate confinement evaluation in case of containment damage of dry storage system, it was found that the change of leak rate with time is very insignificant if the hole diameter is small enough, and the leak rate decreases rapidly with time when a hole with a certain diameter or larger occurs. In the case of the accident condition, except when the hole is very large, it corresponds to the chocked flow condition, and the leak rate decreases rapidly as soon as the internal pressure is sufficiently lowered to enter the molecular and continuum flow region. In the case of a small hole diameter, the leakage volume is very small, so even if the dynamic methodology is applied, the evaluation results are not different from the case where the initial leakage rate continues, and when the hole diameter exceeds a certain value, the internal pressure drops according to the leakage volume, and the leakage rate decreases significantly. As a result of evaluating the dose to residents by applying the calculated radiation source term, it was confirmed that the dose criteria was exceeded when a hole with a diameter of about 4 μm occurred under off-normal conditions, and the dose standard was exceeded under accident conditions when a chocked flow occurred between the diameter of the hole and 2-3 μm, resulting in a rapid increase in the dose. The results of this study are expected to contribute to a more accurate evaluation of the confinement performance of storage systems, which will contribute to the design of optimal dry storage systems.

In Korea, the construction of dry storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel is being promoted through the 2nd basic plan for high-level radioactive waste management. When operating dry storage facilities, exposure dose assessment for workers should be performed, and for this, exposure scenarios based on work procedures should be derived prior. However, the dry storage method has not yet been sufficiently established in Korea, so the work procedure has not been established. Therefore, research is needed to apply it domestically based on the analysis of spent nuclear fuel management methods in major overseas leading countries. In this study, the procedure for receiving and storing spent nuclear fuel in a concrete overpack-based storage facility was analyzed. Among the various spent nuclear fuel management systems, the metal overpack-based HI-STAR 100 system and the concrete overpackbased HI-STORM 100 system are quite common methods in the United States. Therefore, in this study, work procedures were analyzed based on each final safety analysis report. First, the HI-STAR 100 overpack enters the facility and is placed in the transfer area. Remove the impact limiter of the overpack and install the alignment device on the top of the overpack. Place the HI-TRAC, an on-site transfer device, on top of the alignment unit and remove the lids of the two devices to insert the canister into the HI-TRAC. When the canister transfer is complete, reseat the lid to seal it, and disconnect the HI-TRAC from the HI-STAR 100. Raise the canister-loaded HI-TRAC over the alignment device on the top of the HI-STORM 100 overpack and remove the lids of the two devices that are in contact. Insert the canister into the HI-STORM 100 and reseat the lid. The HI-STORM 100 loaded with spent nuclear fuel is transferred to the designated storage area. In this study, the procedure for receiving and storing spent nuclear fuel in a concrete overpack-based storage facility was analyzed. The main procedure was the transfer of canisters between overpacks, and it was confirmed that HI-TRAC was used in the work procedure. The results of this study can be used as basic data for evaluating the exposure dose of operating workers for the construction of dry storage facilities in Korea.

The spent fuel is classified based on the arrangement of fuel rods, which is considered the primary characteristic data for selecting nuclear fuel. The reason for prioritizing the classification by fuel rod arrangement is that it has the greatest physical impact on the production, supply, operation, reactor type, rack size within the containment vessel, and specifications for the basket in the future dry storage system. Additionally, as mentioned earlier, various meanings of nuclear fuel types are distinguished according to the arrangement of fuel rod. The burnup and cooling period ranges are also important factors in the characterization analysis for the selection of spent fuel, the burnup range was set for both low and high burnup ranges and the cooling period is necessary to consider the reliability during handling of nuclear fuel thermal distribution within the storage system

Once systems, structures and components (SSCs) of dry storage systems are classified with respect to safety function or safety significance (i.e., safety classification), appropriate engineering rules can be applied to ensure that they are designed, manufactured, maintained, managed (e.g. aging management) etc. In Unites States, the systems, structures and components (SSCs) consisting DSSs are classified into two or several grades (i.e., class A, B and C or not important to safety, and important to safety (ITS) or not important to safety (NITS)) with respect to intended safety function and safety significance. This classification methods were based on Regulatory Guide 7.10 (i.e., guidance for use in developing quality assurance programs for packaging). Also, in Korea, SSCs of DSSs should be classified into ITS and NITS in much the same as method based on Regulatory Guide 7.10. In that guidance, for providing graded approach to manage the SSCs of packaging, they were trying to classifying SSCs in accordance with radiological consequences. But there was limitations that the provided classification criteria was still qualitative, so that it was not enough for managing the SSCs according to graded approach. On the other hand, in some other nuclear facilities (i.e., nuclear power plant, radioactive waste management facility and disposal facility etc.), quantitative criteria relevant to radiological consequence (i.e., radiation doses to workers or to the public) or inventory of radioactivity are existed so that it can be applied for classifying safety classes. In summary, the study on the application safety classification that applied quantitative criteria to perform safety classification of SSCs in DSS is inadequate or insufficient. The purpose of this study is proposing the preliminary framework for estimating safety significance of SSCs in DSS which can be utilized in our further advanced studies. In this study, a framework was established to estimate the safety significance of SSCs related to radiation shielding and confinement using MCNP® 6.2 and Microsoft Excel. Referring to the methodology of IAEA Specific Safety Guide 30, we assumed severity for failures of components that could lead to degradation of the SSC’s performance. The safety class of SSC was decided based on the impact of SSC’s failure on consequences.

As temporary storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) are becoming saturated, there is a growing interest in finding solutions for treating SNF, which is recognized as an urgent task. Although direct disposal is a common method for handling SNF, it results in the entire fuel assembly being classified as high-level waste, which increases the burden of disposal. Therefore, it is necessary to develop SNF treatment technologies that can minimize the disposal burden while improving long-term storage safety, and this requires continuous efforts from a national policy perspective. In this context, this study focused on reducing the volume of high-level waste from light water reactor fuel by separating uranium, which represents the majority of SNF. We confirmed the chlorination characteristics of uranium (U), rare earth (RE), and strontium (Sr) oxides with ammonium chloride (NH4Cl) in previous study. Therefore, we prepared U-RE-SrOx simulated fuel by pelletizing each elements which was sintered at high temperature. The sintered fuel was again powdered by heating under air environment. The powdered fuel was reacted with NH4Cl to selectively chlorinate the RE and Sr elements for the separation. We will share and discuss the detailed results of our study.

After Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in 2011, Concerns about accident of spent fuel pool increase. In Korea, the time of saturation of spent fuel pool is coming, but regulatory measures and safety evaluation are insufficient when occurring spent fuel pool accident. Thus, it is necessary to review of spent fuel pool accident in foreign countries to establish regulatory measures and safety evaluation of spent fuel pool accident suitable for domestic spent fuel pool. Therefore, we reviewed spent fuel pool accident that occurred at Fukushima Unit 4, SONGS Unit 2 and PAKS. In Japan, spent fuel pool accident occurred at Fukushima NPP in 2011. Tsunami was cause of the accident. Station Black Out occurred at Fukushima NPP and Emergency Diesel Generator lost their functions due to Tsunami. As a result, Loss of cooling happened in spent fuel pool at Fukushima NPP. For Unit 4, wall of spent fuel pool in Unit 4 was damaged due to hydrogen explosive, so loss of coolant in spent fuel pool of Unit 4 occurred. After the accident, the temperature of spent fuel pool increases to 75°C, but there was no damage to the spent fuel. In USA, spent fuel pool accident occurred at SONGS Unit 2 in 2013. The debris of nearby ocean is cause of the accident. The debris entered the system through a damaged Salt Water Cooling pump suction strainer. The debris obstructed flow through the Component Cooling Water heat exchanger and operation of Salt Water Cooling. The maximum spent fuel pool temperature during this event was 25.6°C. It was a value that satisfied the technical specifications of the SONGS NPP. In Ukraine, spent fuel pool accident occurred at PAKS in 2003. Unintentionally opened valve of cleaning tank is cause of the accident. Loss of coolant occurred in spent fuel pool of PAKS. Due to loss of coolant, spent fuels were exposed to the vapor state atmosphere, and oxidation occurred in the cladding tube of the spent fuel that rose to 1,400°C. In this study, Review of spent fuel pool accident in major foreign countries was conducted as basic studies for establishing regulatory measures and safety evaluation of spent fuel pool in Korea. Causes of each accident were different by structure of spent fuel pools. Result of this study will be contributed to establish safety measures of spent fuel pool accident suitable for domestic spent fuel pool facility.

The purpose of this study is to provide technical issues in upgrade and modification of fuel handling equipment at operating nuclear power plants. The improvement for safety function and performance enhancement of fuel handling equipment has been going on for 20 years since the early 2000’s. This improvement is recently focused on the replacement of components through the performance analysis and the operation and maintenance plan based on replacement cycle of its component. Additionally, it is required to secure spare parts so that it can be operated at all times with compatibility and standardization to other domestic nuclear power plants. The fuel handling equipment is consisted of refueling machine, upender and carriage of fuel transfer system, spent fuel handling machine, new fuel elevator and various tools, and the equipment are linked in systematic interlocks. Fuel handling is a critical task during a nuclear power plant refueling outage. Even minor component defects may stop operation of the whole system and have a significant impact on the overall system process. To achieve this goal, major components that are expected to be replaced for reliable operation are summarized as follows; 1) motor assembly with AC servomotors and driver for bridge, trolley and hoist of refueling machine and spent fuel handling machine, 2) winch motor and drive for upender and carriage of fuel transfer system, 3) operator control console with a HMI PC base PLC (Programmable Logic Controller) control system, 4) positioning and load weighing sensors such as an encoder and a load cell with its support for periodic calibration and maintenance, 5) main power drapped style festoon cable assembly for bridge of refueling machine, 6) pneumatic control assembly for gripper operation of refueling machine, 7) active components (e. g., air motor, hydraulic cylinder and limit switch) to be removable and reinstallable without requiring the water level to be lowered. It is advisable to utilize such various information as it can help to improve reliability of fuel handling as a critical path in upgrade and modification of fuel handling equipment at operating nuclear power plants.

The damaged spent fuel rods must be stabilized by encapsulation or dry re-fabrication technologies before geological disposal. For applying the dry re-fabrication technology, we manufactured a vertical type furnace to perform the fuel material recovery from damaged fuel rods by oxidative decladding technology. As driving forces to accelerate oxidative decladding rate, magnetic vibration and pulse hammering generated by a pneumatic cylinder were used in this study. The oxidative decladding efficiency and recovery rate of fuel oxide powder with rod-cut length, oxidation temperature and time, oxygen concentration, and gas mixtures were investigated using simfuel rod-cuts in a vertical furnace for fuel material recovery and powder quality improvement. The oxidative decladding was performed for 2.5-10 h as following operation parameters: simfuel rod-cut length of 50-200 mm, oxidative temperature from 450 to 580°C, oxygen concentration of 49.5 or 75.6%, and gas mixtures in O2/Ar or O2/N2. In magnetic vibration, oxidative decladding was progressed only at bottom portion of fuel rodcut. Whereas, oxidative decladding in pulse hammering was occurred at both top and bottom portions of fuel-rod. In pulse hammering method, the oxidative decladding conditions to declad rod-cuts of 50- 200 mm in length were established to achieve both decladding efficiency of ~100% and fuel material recovery rate of > 99%. These conditions were as follows: oxidation temperature and time at 500°C and 2.5-10 h, oxygen concentration at 75.6% under O2/N2 gas mixtures. As operation conditions for a pneumatic cylinder, stroking, actuating, and waiting times were 0.5, 3, and 12 s.

Spent nuclear fuels released from the reactor are stored in cooling pools and then stored in dry storage casks. During the transition from the wet storage to dry storage cask, a vacuum drying process is used to remove residual water in the cask. During the vacuum drying process, gas pressure is reduced to below 400 Pa to promote evaporation and water removal. KAERI is developing a PWR single assembly (PLUS7) test equipment to simulate the thermal flow in spent fuel assembly. In this study, the thermal conductivity of air at low pressure was derived to perform the thermal analysis of the canister in vacuum. In addition, thermal analyses were performed for the canister with backfill gases of helium, air, and a vacuum in the vertical orientation using the COBRA-SFS code. At low pressure, the thermal conductivity of air depends on pressure and temperature. The reduced thermal conductivity, kr (W/m-K) was calculated using the curve fit for air at reduced pressure in thin gaps presented in the General Electric Fluid Flow Handbook. 􀝇􀯥/􀝇􀬴 = 􀬵 􀬵􀬾 􀮼􀯍/􀯉􀰋 Where, k0 is the thermal conductivity at atmospheric pressure (W/m-K), P is the reduced (vacuum) pressure (Pa), δ is the gap size (m), T is the temperature (K), and C is the Lasance constant (7.657E-5 N/m-K). The thermal conductivity of air decreases as the pressure decreases. The reduced thermal conductivity of air at pressures of 400 Pa and 40 Pa was calculated to be 0.97 and 0.77, respectively. For the analysis in vacuum, no enhancement of the convective heat transfer was assumed (Nu=1.0). For the helium backfill, the peak cladding temperature was the lowest and the axial temperature profile was the flattest due to the higher thermal conductivity and lower density of the helium. For the vacuum backfill, the peak cladding temperature was the highest and temperature gradient was the sharpest due to the only radiative heat transfer effect in the fuel assembly.

A radiation shielding resin with thermal stability and high radiation shielding effect has been developed for the neutron shielding resin filled in the shielding shell of dry storage/transport cask for spent nuclear fuel. Among the most commercially available neutron shielding resins, epoxy and aluminum hydroxide boron carbide are used. But in case of the resin, hydrogen content enhances the neutron shielding effect through optimization of aluminum hydroxide, zinc borate, boron carbide, and flame retardant. We developed a radiation shielding material that can increase the boron content and have thermal stability. Flame retardancy was evaluated for thermal stability, and neutron shielding evaluation was conducted in a research reactor to prove the shielding effect. As a result of the UL94 vertical burning test, a grade of V-0 was received. Therefore, it was confirmed that it had flame retardancy. According to an experiment to measure the shielding rate of the resin against neutron rays using NRF (Neutron Radiography Facility), a shielding rate of 91.54% was confirmed for the existing resin composition and a shielding rate of 96.30% for the developed resin composition. A 40 M SANS (40 M Small Angle Neutron Scattering Instrument) neutron shielding rate test was performed. Assuming aging conditions (6 hours, 180 degrees), the shielding rate was analyzed after heating. As a result of the experiment, the developed products with 99.8740% and 99.9644% showed the same or higher performance.

Spent fuel from the Wolsong CANDU reactor has been stored in above-ground dry storage canisters. Wolsong concrete dry storage canisters (silos) are around 6 m high, 3 m in outside diameter, and have shielding comprised of around 1 m of concrete and 10 mm of steel liner. The storage configuration is such that a number of fuel bundles are placed inside a cylindrical steel container known as a Fuel Basket. The canisters hold up to 9 baskets each that are 304 L stainless steel, around 42” in diameter, 22” in height, and hold 60 fuel bundles each. The operating license for the dry storage canisters needs to be extended. It is desired to perform in-situ inspections of the fuel baskets to very their condition is suitable for retrieval (if necessary) and that the temperature within the fuel baskets is as predicted in the canister’s design basis. KHNP-CNL (Canadian Nuclear Lab.) has set-up the design requirements to perform the in-situ inspections in the dry storage canisters. This Design Requirements applies to the design of the dry storage canister inspection system.

When damaged nuclear fuel is stripped and re-fabricated into stabilized pellets, it is necessary to analyze the characteristics of the stabilized pellets, such as density, leaching behavior, and compressive strength, for final disposal. In this study, simulated nuclear fuel with UO2 and burn-up of 35 GWd/tU and 55 GWd/tU was used to measure the compressive strength of the stabilization pellet. In order to change the density of the sintered pellet, a sintered pellet was prepared by heat treatment at 1,550°C and 1,700°C for 6 hours in a reducing atmosphere of 4% H2/Ar. In the case of UO2, the density was 10.4 g/cm3 (94.5% of T.D.) and 10.6 g/cm3 (96.6% of T.D.) depending on the sintering temperature (1,550°C, 1,700°C). In the case of simulated fuel with a burn-up of 35 GWd/tU, the density was 8.8 g/cm3 (80.9% of T.D.) and 10.2 g/cm3 (93.6% of T.D.) depending on the sintering temperature (1,550°C, 1,700°C). In the case of simulated fuel with a burn-up of 55 GWd/tU, the density was 8.3 g/cm3 (77.0% of T.D.) and 10.0 g/cm3 (92.3% of T.D.) depending on the sintering temperature (1,550°C, 1,700°C). It was found that the compressive strength of simulated nuclear fuel decreased with increasing burn-up and increased with increasing density. In the case of UO2, the compressive strengths were 717.8 MPa and 897.4 MPa when the densities were 10.4 g/cm3 and 10.6 g.cm3, respectively. In the case of simulated nuclear fuel with a burn-up of 35 GWd/tU, the compressive strengths were 472.1 MPa and 732.3 MPa when the densities were 8.8 g/cm3 and 10.2 g/cm3. In the case of simulated nuclear fuel with a burn-up of 55 GWd/tU, the compressive strengths were 301.4 MPa and 515.5 MPa when the densities were 8.3 g/cm3 and 10.0 g/cm3, respectively.

Separating nuclides from spent nuclear fuel is crucial to reduce the final disposal area. The use of molten salt offers a potential method for nuclide separation without requiring electricity, similar to the oxide reduction process in pyroprocessing. In this study, a molten salt leaching technique was evaluated for its ability to separate nuclides from simulated oxide fuel in MgCl2 molten salts at 800°C. The simulated oxide fuel contained 2wt% Sr, 3wt% Ba, 2wt% Ce, 3wt% Nd, 3wt% Zr, 2wt% Mo, and 89wt% U. The separation of Sr from the simulated oxide fuel was achieved by loading it into a porous alumina basket and immersing it in the molten salt. The concentration of Sr in the salt was measured using ICP analysis after sampling the salt outside the basket with a dip-stick technique. The separated nuclides were analyzed with ICP-OES up to a duration of 156 hours. The results indicate that Ba and Sr can be successfully separated from the simulated fuel in MgCl2, while Ce, Nd, and U were not effectively separated.

One of the most important factors in the delivery and acceptance requirements for dry storage of spent fuel is the burnup of spent fuel. Here, burnup has a unit of MWD/MTU and is used as a measure of how much nuclear fuel is depleted in a nuclear reactor. In addition, since it is one of the most basic characteristic information for the soundness evaluation of spent nuclear fuel, it is a required item not only by regulatory agencies but also by KORAD, the acquiring agency. The burnup of spent nuclear fuel is the burnup calculated through flux mapping using signals measured from in-reactor instruments during nuclear power plant operation (hereinafter: actual burnup) and the burnup calculated using the core design code (hereinafter: design burnup). In this paper, the design burnup of spent nuclear fuel discharged from OPR100 NPPs (Nuclear Power Plants) in Korea was recalculated to confirm the reliability of the actual burnup currently managed at the nuclear power plant. Basically, since spent nuclear fuel must maintain subcriticality under wet storage or dry storage, a burnup error of about 5% is considered as a conservative approach when evaluating the criticality safety of wet storage tanks and dry storage systems. Therefore, in this paper, we tried to verify whether the difference between actual burnup and design burnup for all spent nuclear fuel released from domestic OPR100 type light water reactor nuclear power plants is within 5%. As a result of the evaluation, the largest deviation between actual burnup and design burnup was about 1,457 MWD/MTU, and when converted into a percentage, it was about 3.3%. Therefore, it was confirmed that the actual burnup managed by OPR1000 NPPs in Korea has sufficient reliability. In the future, we plan to check the reliability of the performance burnup managed in WH NPPs, and some of them will be verified through measurement.

Molten Salt Reactor (MSR) is one of Generation-IV nuclear reactors that uses molten salts as a fuel and coolant in liquid forms at high temperatures. The advantages of MSR, such as safety, economic feasibility, and scalability, are attributed from the fact that the molten salt fuel in a liquid state is chemically stable and has excellent thermo-physical properties. MSR combines the fuel and coolant by dissolving the actinides (U, Th, TRU, etc.) in the molten salt coolant, eliminating the possibility of a core meltdown accident due to loss of coolant (LOCA). Even if the molten salt fuel leaks, the radioactive fission products dissolved in the molten salt will solidify with the fuel salt at room temperature, preventing potential leakage to the outside. MSR was first demonstrated at ORNL starting with the Aircraft Reactor Experiment (ARE) in 1954 and was extended to the 7.4 MWth MSRE developed in 1964 and operated for 5 years. Recently, various start-ups, including TerraPower, Terrestrial Energy, Moltex Energy, and Seaborg, have been conducting research and development on various types of MSR, particularly focusing on its inherent safety and simplicity. While in the past, fluoride-based molten salt fuels were used for thermal neutron reactors, recently, a chlorine-based molten salt fuel with a relatively high solubility for actinides and advantageous for the transmutation of spent nuclear fuel and online reprocessing has been developing for fast neutron spectrum MSRs. This paper describes the development status of the process and equipment for producing highpurity UCl3, a fuel material for the chlorine-based molten salt fuel, and the development status of the gas fission product capturing technologies to remove the gaseous fission products generated during MSR operation. In addition, the results of the corrosion property evaluation of structural materials using a natural circulation molten salt loop will also be included.

When a loss of coolant accident which causes a partial or a full drainage in the SFP would happen, Zircaloy-4 spent fuel cladding begin to react with high temperature air, and the heat generates by exothermic reaction between Zircaloy-4 cladding and surrounding air. Due to the heat, the ignition may occur in the surface of Zircaloy-4 cladding. If the Zr-fire phenomenon occurs during the accident in a SFP, the spent fuel cladding and pellets would be severely fragmented and powdered and it may bring about a massive release of radioactive source terms. Therefore, it is crucial to prevent the zirconium fire phenomenon for the spent fuel pool safety. However, a main cause to trigger the zirconium fire was not identified. In order to identify a possible mechanism of the Zr-fire phenomenon, OECD-NEA SFP Project I, II was initiated. In this paper, we reviewed the Zr-fire phenomenon which may occur in the spent fuel pool for complete loss of coolant accident scenario. The Spent Fuel Pool Project (hereinafter SFP project) is the experimental program to investigate the phenomena of spent fuel pool complete loss of coolant accident using a 17×17 PWR fuel assembly. In this section, the zirconium fire phenomenon which was observed from the SFP project is briefly investigated. This paper presented the fuel assembly temperature (i.e. zirconium alloy cladding temperature) and oxygen concentration profile of the SFP project phase-1 ignition test. At around 12.7 hour, the temperature abruptly increased and the oxygen concentration also dramatically decreased. This abrupt temperature escalation is the zirconium fire phenomenon. In order to investigate the mechanism of this zirconium fire phenomenon, behaviors of both temperature and oxygen concentration were fully compared. This paper reviewed the results of OECD-NEA SFP project experiment and then a mechanism of Zr-fire phenomenon was dscussed. It seems that the Zr-fire phenomenon might be a consequence of thermal mismatch between heat generation and dissipation. A large amount of heat might be generated by the air oxidation of Zircaloy-4 spent cladding immediately after the kinetic transition which is a breakaway phenomenon. This paper discussed the relationship between the breakaway phenomenon and the Zr-fire phenomenon in case of air oxidation of Zircaloy-4 spent cladding. This paper presents preliminary findings on the Zr-fire phenomenon from the open experiment data of the prototypic spent fuel severe accident scenario. These findings would enhance the understanding of Zircaloy-4 spent cladding air oxidation and severe accident scenario progression in a SFP.

Al-B4C neutron absorbers are currently widely used to maintain the subcriticality of both wet and dry storage facilities of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), thus long-term and high-temperature material integrity of the absorbers has to be guaranteed for the expected operation periods of those facilities. Surface corrosion solely has been the main issue for the absorber performance and safety; however, the possibility of irradiation-assisted degradation has been recently suggested from an investigation on Al-B4C surveillance coupons used in a Korean spent nuclear fuel pool (SFP). Larger radiation damage than expectation was speculated to be induced from 10B(n, α)7Li reactions, which emit about a MeV α-particles and Li ions. In this study, we experimentally emulated the radiation damage accumulated in an Al-B4C neutron absorber utilizing heavy-ion accelerator. The absorber specimens were irradiated with He ions at various estimated system temperatures for a model SNF storage facility (room temperature, 150, 270, and 400°C). Through the in-situ heated ion irradiation, three exponentially increasing level of radiation damages (0.01, 0.1, and 1 dpa or displacement per atom) were achieved to compare differential gas bubble formation at near surface of the absorber, which could cause premature absorber corrosion and subsequential 10B loss in an SNF storage system. An extremely high radiation damage (10 dpa), which is unlikely achievable during a dry storage period, was also emulated through high temperature irradiation (350°C) to further test the radiation resistance of the absorber, conservatively. The irradiated specimens were characterized using HR-TEM and the average size and number density of radiation-induced He bubbles were measured from the obtained bright field (BF) TEM micrographs. Measured helium bubble sizes tend to increase with increasing system (or irradiation) temperature while decrease in their number density. Helium bubbles were found from even the lowest radiation damage specimens (0.01 dpa). Bubble coalescence was significant at grain boundaries and the irradiated specimen morphology was particularly similar with the bubble morphology observed at the interface between aluminum alloy matrix and B4C particle of the surveillance coupons. These characterized irradiated specimens will be used for the corrosion test with high-temperature humid gas to further study the irradiation-assisted degradation mechanism of the absorber in dry SNF storage system.