When exporting nuclear-related items, export control is required from two perspectives: the control of “Trigger List Items” as controlled by Nuclear Supplier Groups (NSG) and the control of the “Items Subject to the Agreement” as specified in bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements. While Trigger List Items and Items Subject to the Agreement are largely similar, there are some items where they do not overlap. Furthermore, national law for controlling each item is different. The Trigger List Items are governed by the Foreign Trade Act, and the Items Subject to the Agreement (Internationally Controlled Items) are governed by the Nuclear Safety Act. As a result, the detailed procedures and requirements for controlling each item are quite distinct. For the Trigger List Items, export license must be obtained in accordance with the Foreign Trade Act. The details such as responsible authority, the items subject to license, license requirements and procedures, penalties are specified in the Public Notice on Import and Export of Strategic Goods. For the Items Subject to the Agreement, the process and obligations set forth in bilateral agreements and related administrative agreements are fulfilled in accordance with the Nuclear Safety Act. However, in contrast to the Trigger List Items, the details for complying with the agreements are not specified legally. Since most of the Items Subject to the Agreement are fall within the category of the Trigger List Items, the obligations in accordance with the agreements are reviewed and implemented during the export license assessment process. However, if the Items Subject to the Agreement are not are fall within the category of the Trigger List Items, there is a risk of control omission. For example, this applies to cases of exporting tritium and tritium removal facilities, which are not the Trigger List Items, to Canada and Romania. Moreover, since subjects to the agreement and compliance procedures are respectively different for 29 bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements signed with different countries, it is difficult for enterprise to recognize the appropriate procedures and obligations under the agreement by their own. The bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements establish legal obligations between state parties while NSG are non-legally binding arrangements. Therefore, it could be even more necessary to comply strictly with the agreements. Consequently, legal improvements are required for effective implementations of Nuclear Cooperation Agreements. While it may be challenging to institutionalize details of 29 Nuclear Cooperation Agreements, it is essential to legally specify key elements such as the list of items subject to agreements, responsible authority, requirements and procedures for implement the agreement obligations, and penalties. Furthermore, domestic awareness on compliance with Nuclear Cooperation Agreements is lower compared to the system of export license for Trigger List Items. The continuous outreach is also necessary, along with institutional improvements.

The Nuclear Export and Import Control System (NEPS) is currently in operation for nuclear export and import control. To ensure consistent and efficient control, various computational systems are either already in place or being developed. With numerous scattered systems, it becomes crucial to integrate the databases from each to maximize their utility. In order to effectively utilize these scattered computer systems, it is necessary to integrate the databases of each system and develop an associated search system that can be used for integrated databases, so we investigated and analyzed the AI language model that can be applied to the associated search system. Language Models (LM) are primarily divided into two categories: understanding and generative. Understanding Language Models aim to precisely comprehend and analyze the provided text’s meaning. They consider the text’s bidirectional context to understand its deeper implications and are used in tasks such as text classification, sentiment analysis, question answering, and named entity recognition. In contrast, Generative Language Models focus on generating new text based on the given context. They produce new textual content continuously and are beneficial for text generation, machine translation, sentence completion, and storytelling. Given that the primary purpose of our associated search system is to comprehend user sentences or queries accurately, understanding language models are deemed more suitable. Among the understanding language models, we examined BERT and its derivatives, RoBERTa and DeBERTa. BERT (Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers) uses a Bidirectional Transformer Encoder to understand the sentence context and engages in pre-training by predicting ‘MASKED’ segments. RoBERTa (A Robustly Optimized BERT Pre-training Approach) enhances BERT by optimizing its training methods and data processing. Although its core architecture is similar to BERT, it incorporates improvements such as eliminating the NSP (Next Sentence Prediction) task, introducing dynamic masking techniques, and refining training data volume, methodologies, and hyperparameters. DeBERTa (Decoding-enhanced BERT with disentangled attention) introduces a disentangled attention mechanism to the BERT architecture, calculating the relative importance score between word pairs to distribute attention more effectively and improve performance. In analyzing the three models, RoBERTa and DeBERTa demonstrated superior performance compared to BERT. However, considering factors like the acquisition and processing of training data, training time, and associated costs, these superior models may require additional efforts and resources. It’s therefore crucial to select a language model by evaluating the economic implications, objectives, training strategies, performance-assessing datasets, and hardware environments. Additionally, it was noted that by fine-tuning with methods from RoBERTa or DeBERTa based on pre-trained BERT models, the training speed could be significantly improved.

The Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) conducts various outreach activities, such as publishing brochures and holding seminars and briefings, to make regulated parties aware of the importance and necessity of the export control regime. The outreach program aims to increase compliance rates by generating interest in the export control regime among recipients and to increase communication to support compliance. In order to explore the long-term development of outreach activities, we analyze how KINAC conducts outreach. KINAC conducts nuclear export control outreach to organizations that deal with trigger list items and related technologies. Educational institutions with nuclear energy-related departments, research institutes related to nuclear energy and materials, and industrial companies that handle equipment used in nuclear power plants or nuclear materials were selected for outreach. The outreach program provides information on the export control regime for trigger list items, the strategic technology control regime, and the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. KINAC’s outreach programs can be categorized into education, exhibition, and publication. In the education program, we hold workshops and seminars for industrial companies, with customized content that considers the items handled by companies and the nature of technology transfer. We provide training for educational and research institutions focused on conducting research tasks and projects and transferring technology accordingly. As a result of the education program, there is a regret that the education for SMEs and educational institutions is not directly linked to the implementation of nuclear export control. The exhibition program operated a booth at nuclear-related exhibitions at least once a year. The booth distributed brochures or publications on the export control regime, conducted surveys to investigate awareness of the regime and conducted on-site consultations. The exhibition program effectively increased the understanding of the export control regime among the general public and potential regulated parties. However, it was only sometimes linked to the actual implementation of nuclear export control. The publication program produced promotional materials for use at education and exhibitions, as well as guidance materials on new and revised regulations. It used the agency’s online media to provide information on new and revised export control legislation and related issues. As a result of the publication program, various existing publications explaining the export control regime were consolidated into a single publication, increasing the efficiency and satisfaction of outreach.

Strategic item export control aims to maintain international peace and safety and serves as a significant nuclear non-proliferation regime that directly impacts a nation’s security. Therefore, establishing an autonomous export control system at the state level is crucial, and one of the most efficient methods to achieve this is by enhancing an export company’s management system. Accordingly, many advanced countries, such as the United States, Europe, and Japan, have operated their own internal compliance programs (CP or ICP) to manage and screen the export of strategic items as a corporate social responsibility and risk mitigation measure. In Korea, which has a high dependence on trade, the need for CP was continuously confirmed, but the system was introduced in 2004, relatively late compared to other advanced countries. So far, the Korean government has made steady efforts to develop and establish the system and is actively encouraging businesses to obtain Compliance Program certification to autonomously manage strategic items. Major technologically advanced countries utilize technology transfer as a tool for economic sanctions, trade security, and strategic technology management, and they continue to strengthen their control regimes. In these countries, CP certification is considered a standard practice for export control among mid-sized and large enterprises. It serves as a vital risk management system that protects companies from unforeseen incidents. However, in Korea, the application of CP under the Foreign Trade Act is limited to dual-use items and does not extend to the nuclear export control system. Therefore, this paper analyzes international cases and CP requirements in countries like the United States, Japan, Europe, and Singapore. As a result of the review, the application of CP into Korea’s nuclear export control could be a coexistence means that can strengthen supply chain control as well as provide benefits not to impede technical research, international trade, and exchanges.

Korea has signed nuclear cooperation agreements (NCA) with 29 countries. Nuclear materials, materials, equipment, and technology transferred under the agreements are “internationally controlled materials (ICM)” under the Nuclear Safety Act. The main obligations imposed on those items include ensuring peaceful use, safeguards, physical protection, annual inventory reporting, and retransfer with supplier prior consent. The Nuclear Export and Import Control System (NEPS) handles the export control procedures for transferring ICM. After import, inventory management for ICM in Korea would be transitioning to an item-based system through the Obligation Tracking System for internationally controlled item (OTS) currently under development. A one-stop import and export control system for ICM can be established when information is well-linked between these two systems. This paper aims to derive a methodology for integrating NEPS and OTS. NEPS-OTS coupling begins at the receipt confirmation and shipment notification stages in NEPS. When importing ICM under NCA, the inventory change (code RF: receipt foreign) is entered in OTS by getting the information that has completed the receipt confirmation in NEPS. Conversely, during export, the information that has completed the shipment notification procedure in NEPS is linked to the OTS so that the entire cycle from import to re-export of the ICM can be concluded. Inventory verification for retransfer, checking that the book inventory remains positive value, is impossible under the current system. This issue can be resolved by enabling inventory information in OTS to be displayed in NEPS. Determining when and how to generate the obligation code for imported ICM is essential for NEPS-OTS coupling. Manual input may be necessary for some cases with multiple obligations. Nevertheless, it is more efficient from a system communication protocol to automatically generate and impose a single obligation based on the supplier country information in NEPS. Moreover, it is important to automatically link crucial information available in NEPS to reduce the administrative burden on OTS users and discrepancies between systems. Most required OTS data, such as country obligation, item categories, quantity, physical or chemical form, and receipt date, can be directly linked from NEPS. However, NEPS improvement is needed for digitizing the receiver information and facility data, like the material balance area. The NEPS-OTS integration involves sharing data as a system and encompasses the connection between export control and inventory management. Future work to link some information in NEPS -OTS with the KSIS could be suggested to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in managing ICM.

The Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) conducts outreach to promote and educate regulated entities on the export control regime’s purpose, importance, and implementation. Outreach activities help to reduce regulatory blind spots and minimize domestic and international penalties for non-compliance. The need for outreach is growing as domestic and international policies are changing rapidly, and the scope of export regulations is expanding due to increased exports of nuclear power plants. In order to explore the long-term development direction of outreach activities, we will analyze the trends of nuclear export control and the outreach activities of related organizations. Here are some key trends in nuclear export controls. In recent years, countries worldwide have been reorganizing their supply chains for critical industries, focusing on their own and friendly countries, and strengthening their trade policies in security aspects such as export control and technology protection. Following the trend of international sanctions against Russia, the Korean government has implemented domestic export control measures similar to those of the international community, such as blocking the export of strategic goods to Russia. In addition, the number of strategic goods classifications and export licenses has been increasing as Korea promotes the export of new nuclear power plants. In line with carbon neutrality, it is expected to revitalize and diversify nuclear energy-related export businesses, such as joint research on fourth-generation nuclear power plants and SMRs. Finally, the scope of exports is expanding from ‘goods’ such as existing nuclear reactors to ‘technology’-oriented transfers. The means of technology transfer are diversifying with the development of information and communication technologies such as cloud services, email, video conferencing, and large-capacity removable storage devices. Next, look at the outreach activities of nuclear export control organizations. The Korean Security Agency of Trade and Industry (KOSTI) is an organization that implements export controls on dualuse items. It puts much effort into one-on-one consulting services with companies and has established and operated various online training programs. It also actively utilizes online promotional materials such as card news and videos. The export control agencies of major countries have a common trend of expanding outreach to research institutions, providing export control guides tailored to the characteristics of each field, holding annual seminars and conferences, and operating educational programs

In compliance with the amended export control of strategic items and technology in Jan. 2014, KAERI should pay attention to the export control of ITT (Intangible Technology Transfer). To control an ITT (Intangible Technologies Transfer) effectively and efficiently, the Korean government encourages the R&D institute and universities obtaining the ICP (Internal Compliance Program) from the relevant authority, MOTIE. This means that the exporters can control the ITT by themselves, because the exporters know very well the counterparts of the trading and the exporting items and technologies. In fact, ICP is for export control of dual-use items and technology in Korea. However, KAERI has tried to obtain a license from the authority, MOTIE. In an effort to do so, KAERI completed enacting a new internal self–regulation for export controls in 2016, and proceeded to apply for an ‘AA’ license of ICP in 2017 and obtained the ICP license in 2018 and re-obtained the license in 2021 from the MOTIE. In light of KAERI’s case, to obtain the ‘AA’ license of ICP is one of the best methods to increase the ability of export controls. As of now, there is no R&D institutes sponsored by the Korean government to obtain the ‘AA’ license of ICP except KAERI. KAERI can provide the actual methods as a standard case to the R&D institutes in Korea for obtaining an ‘AA’ license of ICP. According to the internal regulation of KAERI for export control, KAERI implemented an inner self-audit for export control in Nov. 2022. This is the first real self-audit for export control at KAERI. The main purpose of the self-audit is to check the transfer management of ITT and the relationship of relevant office through the interview of the staffs in the ICP organization. KAERI self-audit planed specifically and implemented for the achievement of the basic principal of selfaudit. The specific contents of this self-audit is as follows - The interview of the relevant offices: physical protection office, manpower planning office, manpower management office, nuclear education and training center, technology transfer office and international cooperation office, nuclear control and management office - Building the self-audit checklist considering the characteristics of each office - The confirmation of the inner procedure and the status of management on the export controls Through the interview of the relevant office, KAERI checked the inner procedure and the status of management on the export controls and tried to provide the supplementary measures of each relevant offices. The followings are the main results of the inner self-audit implemented in Nov. 2022. - Generally, the staffs know the meaning and relevant regulation such as foreigner’s management and the intangible technology transfer - Each office reflects the necessities of export controls on the relevant regulation and procedures and make DB for the proper duty. However, there is no indication for export controls on the DB - In the case of foreigner’s temporary visit for simple work and site tour, there is a difficult situation not to be able to check all the visitors by checking the denial lists - If necessary, KAERI may build the TFT (Task force Team) for the efficiency of export controls - Others

The Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) and the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) operate the Nuclear Export and Import Control System (NEPS), an online comprehensive export and import control management system to guide the domestic nuclear export and import control regime and efficiently process the application, processing, and issuance of various civil complaints required for compliance. This paper analyzes the results of NEPS functional improvements made in 2022. First, NSSC and KINAC launched a nuclear plant technology follow-up system. Since establishing the Nuclear Plant Technology Export License (Plant License) system in 2015, large-scale nuclear power plant projects with a large amount of technology transfer have been issued a Plant License, allowing them to transfer technology without a separate individual export license. The recipient of a Plant License is not required to obtain an additional export license but to follow up on the transferred technology, such as checking whether it is a strategic technology and reporting quarterly transfer details. A dedicated system has been established to facilitate the follow-up of plant license projects. That has improved work efficiency for both the regulated and the regulator. Second, we have improved the procedures for retrieving and supplementing civil petitions. We added a function allowing civil petitioners to directly retrieve a civil petition to cancel a previously filed civil petition or to revise it themselves. In addition, we improved the procedure for supplementing a civil petition by setting a supplementation deadline for a reviewer’s request to modify a civil petition and sending a reminder before the expiration of the supplementation deadline. That enhances the convenience of the complainant and the examiner. Finally, we have changed the numbering system for export and import control reviews. Previously, the application number was a 15-digit system with an 8-digit date and 7-digit serial number. We have simplified the number by changing the three unused digits in the serial number to a single symbol that separates the type of application. That made it possible to utilize the number for relevant searches in the future. Also, simplifying the number has improved the efficiency of applying, processing, and consulting for civil affairs. In the future, NSSC and KINAC will continue to upgrade NEPS and make various functional improvements, and there will be many changes in system operation through cloud transfer in a few years.

About 83% of the information systems of administrative and public agencies are operated by agencies, and most of them are vulnerable to security due to the small scale of operation, insufficient facilities, and lack of dedicated personnel. To address these issues, the Ministry of the Interior and Safety announced in June 2021 that, as part of the “Second Basic Plan for E-Government,” all information systems of administrative and public agencies will be converted to a cloud-based integrated management operating environment by 2025 to provide stable public services. Accordingly, relevant laws and guidelines should be researched and analyzed to prepare for the cloud conversion of the Nuclear Export and Import Control System (NEPS) operated by the Export and Import Control Office of the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC). The Cloud Computing Act defines cloud computing, establishes a basic plan and implementation plan, provides support for promoting the adoption of cloud computing by state institutions, supports the construction of integrated information and communication facilities based on cloud computing technology, provides cost and technical support, and regulates cloud security certification, and applies the Personal Information Protection Act and the Act on Promotion of Information and Communication Network Utilization and Information Protection to protect personal information. The E-Government Act defines integrated standards and principles for information resources, support for the use of cloud computing services, classification standards for information resources, and integrated standards for calculating the size and capacity of information systems. The Notice on Standards for Using Cloud Computing Services and Securing Safety for Administrative Agencies and Public Institutions specifies the standards for using cloud computing services and measures to secure stability for administrative agencies, contracts for using cloud computing services, and ensuring continuity of cloud computing services. The Basic Guidelines on National Information Security stipulate the establishment and implementation of security measures, system security, user security, security management, information and communication network security separating internal network and internet network, and cloud computing security measures, and stipulate the NIS security review when introducing private cloud services. In order to convert NEPS to the cloud computing services, network, and software design plans, transfer plans, and cloud operation plans will be established in compliance with the relevant laws and guidelines. And future research will include researching the system status of major public and private cloud service providers and analyzing their advantages and disadvantages.

The Internal Compliance Program (ICP) is a framework for promoting compliance with laws and regulations and minimizing violations. It aims to prevent law breaches, by raising awareness of the compliance within the organization, which leads to enhance the credibility of the organization, and to prepare for audits. From the perspective of nuclear export control, ICP can be used to verify the company’s credibility by following NSG Guidelines and is expected to contribute to preventing the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons in the international community. However, ICP system is not globally established, and the NSG does not provide official guidelines for ICP. Therefore, this study aims to analyze the “Good Practices for Internal Compliance Programs for Nuclear and Nuclear-Related Exports” provided by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to find ways to apply and activate ICPs for domestic exporters. The form of ICP could vary depending on company’s size and internal environments, but it should be organized as follows. First, an internal department should be established so as to implement the ICP, and an executive who has export control knowledge should be assigned as the Chief Export Control Officer (CECO). The CECO, establish and revise ICP operating procedures and manual, organize contact point to communicate internally and externally. Second, measures should be established minimize risks in the export process, including business development transaction screening, supply chain, research and development, human resource, and intangible technology transfer risks. Third, internal control system should be established for export control compliance. The CECO should conduct regular assessments to ensure compliance and strengthen the organization’s internal export compliance processes. Fourth, an export-related training program should be periodically conducted for employees. In addition, as soon as the CECO becomes aware of, CECO should review the matter, take corrective action, and report to the relevant national authorities, when a violation of domestic export control laws or suspicious circumstances are captured. Nuclear export control plays an important role in ensuring nuclear nonproliferation. Republic of Korea has been implementing the ICP system for Dual-Use Items under the Foreign Trade Act, but not for Trigger List Items. Therefore, introduction of ICP for Trigger List Items is expected significantly contribute to nuclear nonproliferation. The subjects of ICP will be initially targeted to major nuclear enterprises, then gradually expanded to all nuclear enterprises. Further researches are needed to introduce on ICP for Trigger List Items.

In the late 80s, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological, became an internationally important issue, and in order to keep pace with the international situation, Korea amended the Foreign Trade Act in 1992 to legislate the export control of strategic goods. In addition, Korea joined the NSG, one of the international export control regimes, in 1995, and nuclear power operators are required to obtain export licenses in accordance with the NSG export control guidelines. In the nuclear export business, technical documents, equipment, materials, SW, etc. are exported to the importer, and the export items may include strategic items designated by the NSG, so operators must check whether they are strategic items and, if so, obtain an export license in accordance with foreign trade laws that reflect the NSG export control guidelines. In the case of processing and exporting goods or materials imported from another country, exporters must fulfill complex nuclear export control procedures, including obtaining the original supplier’s consent for re-transfer. In recent years, the international situation on export control has been more sensitive than ever, including the Russo-Ukrainian war, the U.S.-China semiconductor supremacy dispute, and U.S. lawsuits against domestic companies related to original technologies. In the worst-case scenario, a company may not be able to fulfill a contract due to export control issues. In order to facilitate the smooth export business of operators when exporting nuclear energy, ‘Nuclear Export Control Pre-Consulting’ is proposed to check compliance with export control requirements in advance and provide operators with customized export control implementation plans reflecting business characteristics. Through the pre-consultation, issues, requirements, and preparatory documents related to nuclear export control can be checked before the export business starts in earnest, i.e., when the decision to participate in the business is made, and the business can be supported to export smoothly by complying with the export control system. The most important aspect of pre-consultation is that domestic nuclear exporters need to know and apply for the program. To this end, the program will be actively promoted online and offline, and support will be provided for easy application through NEPS. In addition, procedures and outcomes will be continuously refined to ensure that the program is a means of ensuring full compliance with international nuclear non-proliferation norms for nuclear exports.

Under the Foreign Trade Act, an export license from the Nuclear Safety Commission is required to export items specified in Part 10 of Schedule 2 of the Public Notice of Exportation and Importation of Strategic Items (Trigger List Items). In the case of nuclear materials, deuterium, and heavy water, its cumulative amount determines whether it is trigger list item. An export license is required only if the cumulative amount exported to a single end-user country from January 1st to December 31st exceeds the regulation criteria. The reason for this cumulative control is to exclude small amounts of materials from the scope of control as they are considered less important in view of nuclear proliferation, but to prevent the possibility of acquiring large quantities of materials by importing small amounts several times. As a result, export control of nuclear material, deuterium, and heavy water requires different considerations than other Trigger List Items. First, materials exported by different companies must be consolidated to manage the cumulative amount. Second, it is necessary to continuously follow up the actual export status. If the material is not exported after it was classified as ‘non-Trigger List Items’, it should not be included in the cumulative amount. Third, there may be a difference between the accumulated quantities aggregated at the time of the classification and the time of the actual export. The classification should be changed if an export of the classified material is postponed or another export of same materials occurs before the export of the classified material. Fourth, the classification result of these materials should not be reused. Generally, the classification result could be reused within the expiration date (2 years) but in the case of substances. However, the reuse of classification result for materials should be limited as the classification results could be change depending on the cumulative amount. In addition, the sharing of classification results between different entities should also be restricted. The government approval procedures are required even for export of small amounts of nuclear materials which are less than the regulation criteria. The cumulative quantities of nuclear materials are systematically managed in the Nuclear Export & imPort control System (NEPS) through these procedures. NEPS is also linked to the custom clearance system of Korea Customs Service, which enables to track actual exports and the time of exports. However, cumulative quantities for the heavy water and deuterium are managed individually by classification reviewers. The annual export plans are received in advance from major entities which deal with the materials for nuclear uses, and the cumulative quantities for each application are managed manually. The systematic management has not been required as there were a few cases of exporting small quantities. However, systematic management may be required in the future as overseas expansion attempts from various companies in the nuclear field has been increasing. In addition, further study is needed on the criteria and system for calculating the cumulative amount. The time of aggregate the cumulative amount should be clarified by considering the difference between the time of classification and actual export. It is required to devise an efficient way to follow up the actual export.

An administrative agreement (AA) was signed between NSSC and UAE FANR in January 2023 under Article 5 of the ROK-UAE Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. The AA aims to enhance regulatory efficiency in safeguards and export control. This study reviewed the export control measures for the items subject to the agreement (ISA) and implementation procedures under ROK-UAE AA by comparing them with other countries cases. First of all, the ROK-UAE AA distinguishes between ISA and the inventory management target items. Technology is divided into two categories, one requiring consent for retransfer and the other, considering the characteristics of technology that is free to be copied and deleted, and thus less useful for inventory management. Only the former is included in the annual report, which differs from the ROK-Canada or ROK-Japan NCA, which includes all technologies subject to the agreements in the annual report. When ROK notifies export information, it is mandatory to specify whether the technology requires consent for retransfer. Furthermore, some technologies should be controlled as strategic information, even if excluded from the annual report, so efforts to prevent confusion are required. Secondly, the ROK-UAE AA covers all items in INFCIRC/254/rev.9/part1, unlike the ROK-U.S. and ROK-Canada NCA, which listed equipment subject to them. This is significant because it clarifies the criteria for regulation by increasing the consistency between the trigger list items in the domestic law and the ISA. However, the expanded ISA scope could result in some changes in export control procedures. For example, when importing nuclear material (NM) from the US, only uranium was controlled as ISA, and the packages were not considered. In contrast, when exporting fuel assemblies (FA) for UAE, both uranium and zirconium cladding should be treated as ISA. To this end, NEPS was improved to implement the features of the ROK-UAE AA. Consideration of the criteria and methods for imposing obligations under the agreement is essential because this is the first case of Korea concluded AA under exporting NPP and as a supplier of FA. Generally, the obligations for NM are imposed by the country of origin, conversion, and enrichment countries. Canada and EU recognize the fuel fabrication process as a substantial transformation and impose customs origin where the process takes place. Hence, NM fabricated from Canadian equipment is also subject to the same obligations as NM of Canadian origin. From this perspective, it would be appropriate to ensure ROK acts as a supplier and controls when exporting domestically manufactured FA. Moreover, a proper national obligation code system will be required to specify Korea’s control rights.

When exporting nuclear power plants to a third country, the U.S. conditions import countries to join the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol. At the Korea-U.S. summit, Korea also agreed to maintain equal non-proliferation standards. This paper first analyzes how the U.S. applies the conditions for joining additional protocols to export control policies. The U.S. Atomic Energy Act is a general law in the field of nuclear power that governs both civilian and military use of nuclear power. Article 123 stipulates matters related to “cooperation with other countries.” According to Article 123, the United States must conclude a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with another country that stipulates nuclear non-proliferation obligations for nuclear cooperation to a “significant” extent. Article 123 of the Nuclear Energy Act presents nine conditions for signing the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, and matters related to safeguards are stipulated in Nos. 1 and 2, and only IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) is specified as requirements under the current law. As a result of analyzing the countries of the nuclear cooperation agreements currently signed by the United States, the United States is evaluating the AP in terms of the policy as an essential item. Among the nuclear agreements with the United States, three countries, Egypt, Brazil, and Argentina do not have AP in effect. Among them, Brazil and Argentina are recognized by the IAEA as replacing the ABACC with the AP, so only Egypt is not a member of the AP. The nuclear agreement between the U.S. and Egypt was signed in 1981 before the AP existed, and all recently signed agreements were identified as AP-effective countries. As a result of reviewing the U.S. export control laws, the U.S. did not legislate the AP as a condition for peaceful nuclear exports. Reflecting the NSG export control guidelines, AP was legislated as an export license requirement only in exporting sensitive nuclear technology (enrichment, reprocessing). However, it is confirmed that the U.S. policy applies AP entry into force as one of the main requirements for determining whether it is harmful to nuclear exports, along with the conclusion of the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, the application of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and military alliance. The appropriate scope of application of the Additional Protocol in Korea and its application plan will be suggested through future research.