Korea has signed nuclear cooperation agreements (NCA) with 29 countries. Nuclear materials, materials, equipment, and technology transferred under the agreements are “internationally controlled materials (ICM)” under the Nuclear Safety Act. The main obligations imposed on those items include ensuring peaceful use, safeguards, physical protection, annual inventory reporting, and retransfer with supplier prior consent. The Nuclear Export and Import Control System (NEPS) handles the export control procedures for transferring ICM. After import, inventory management for ICM in Korea would be transitioning to an item-based system through the Obligation Tracking System for internationally controlled item (OTS) currently under development. A one-stop import and export control system for ICM can be established when information is well-linked between these two systems. This paper aims to derive a methodology for integrating NEPS and OTS. NEPS-OTS coupling begins at the receipt confirmation and shipment notification stages in NEPS. When importing ICM under NCA, the inventory change (code RF: receipt foreign) is entered in OTS by getting the information that has completed the receipt confirmation in NEPS. Conversely, during export, the information that has completed the shipment notification procedure in NEPS is linked to the OTS so that the entire cycle from import to re-export of the ICM can be concluded. Inventory verification for retransfer, checking that the book inventory remains positive value, is impossible under the current system. This issue can be resolved by enabling inventory information in OTS to be displayed in NEPS. Determining when and how to generate the obligation code for imported ICM is essential for NEPS-OTS coupling. Manual input may be necessary for some cases with multiple obligations. Nevertheless, it is more efficient from a system communication protocol to automatically generate and impose a single obligation based on the supplier country information in NEPS. Moreover, it is important to automatically link crucial information available in NEPS to reduce the administrative burden on OTS users and discrepancies between systems. Most required OTS data, such as country obligation, item categories, quantity, physical or chemical form, and receipt date, can be directly linked from NEPS. However, NEPS improvement is needed for digitizing the receiver information and facility data, like the material balance area. The NEPS-OTS integration involves sharing data as a system and encompasses the connection between export control and inventory management. Future work to link some information in NEPS -OTS with the KSIS could be suggested to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in managing ICM.

Strategic item export control aims to maintain international peace and safety and serves as a significant nuclear non-proliferation regime that directly impacts a nation’s security. Therefore, establishing an autonomous export control system at the state level is crucial, and one of the most efficient methods to achieve this is by enhancing an export company’s management system. Accordingly, many advanced countries, such as the United States, Europe, and Japan, have operated their own internal compliance programs (CP or ICP) to manage and screen the export of strategic items as a corporate social responsibility and risk mitigation measure. In Korea, which has a high dependence on trade, the need for CP was continuously confirmed, but the system was introduced in 2004, relatively late compared to other advanced countries. So far, the Korean government has made steady efforts to develop and establish the system and is actively encouraging businesses to obtain Compliance Program certification to autonomously manage strategic items. Major technologically advanced countries utilize technology transfer as a tool for economic sanctions, trade security, and strategic technology management, and they continue to strengthen their control regimes. In these countries, CP certification is considered a standard practice for export control among mid-sized and large enterprises. It serves as a vital risk management system that protects companies from unforeseen incidents. However, in Korea, the application of CP under the Foreign Trade Act is limited to dual-use items and does not extend to the nuclear export control system. Therefore, this paper analyzes international cases and CP requirements in countries like the United States, Japan, Europe, and Singapore. As a result of the review, the application of CP into Korea’s nuclear export control could be a coexistence means that can strengthen supply chain control as well as provide benefits not to impede technical research, international trade, and exchanges.

As the demand for nuclear power increases as a means to achieve carbon neutrality, concerns about nuclear proliferation have also grown. Consequently, significant researches have conducted to enhance nuclear non-proliferation resistance. Among these research, nuclear material attractiveness is a methodology used to evaluate how appealing a particular material is for potential use in nuclear weapons, based on the characteristics of that material. Existing nuclear material attractiveness assessments focused on materials like U, Pu, and TRU, which could be directly used in the production of nuclear weapons. However, these assessments did not consider how the properties of nuclear materials change throughout the nuclear fuel cycle, with each facility process. This study assumed a scenario of the nuclear fuel cycle of graphite reduction reactors and analyzed including enrichment facilities and PUREX. This study used the FOM (Figure-Of-Merit) method developed by LANL (Los Alamos National Laboratory) for evaluating the nuclear material attractiveness. The FOM formula consists of three parameters such as critical mass, heat content, and dose The critical mass of targe materials and the dose evaluation were conducted using the Monte Carlo N-Particle code. The heat content was calculated using the ORIGEN code embedded in the Scale code. In particular, if U-238 is dominant in the facility’s materials, such as mining and refining facilities, and critical mass evaluation is unpractical. Therefore, 1SQ (Significant Quantity) of that uranium was assumed as the critical mass value for the FOM evaluation, even though 1SQ is not identical to the critical mass As a result of this study, the attractiveness of Pu produced by PUREX among all nuclear fuel cycle facilities was 2.7616, which was the most attractive to be diverted to nuclear weapons. Through this study, it was shown that the proliferation risk of the nuclear facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle and risk of diversion among those facilities.

In the contemporary digital age, the rapid pace of technological advancement has elevated concerns regarding unauthorized technology transfers. These illicit transfers not only pose economic threats but also have the potential to compromise national security, strain international relationships, and impede technological innovation. Recognizing these challenges, the United States, as a technological leader, has implemented stringent laws and regulations to counteract such activities. Unauthorized technology transfer or disclosure is treated seriously within the United States. It can be subject to various laws, including export control regulations, economic sanctions, and Nonproliferation laws. Export control measures such as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), targeting defense items, and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), focused on dual-use items, are enforced. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) regulations oversee U.S. trade sanctions. At the same time, the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Non-proliferation Act (INKSNA) penalizes those aiding proliferation activities in these countries. Such unauthorized transfers could undermine global security by violating international agreements like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States employs a multi-faceted approach to counter these threats, including international partnerships, strengthened export controls, diplomatic efforts, and rigorous enforcement. Beyond the legal aspects, unauthorized technology transfer carries significant economic, national security, and global trade implications. Intellectual property (IP) theft can result in economic losses, national security risks, and strained trade relations. Legal protections against IP theft encompass Patents, Trade Secrets, Copyright, and Trademark Acts. In conclusion, unauthorized technology transfers and IP theft present multi-faceted challenges with far-reaching implications for global security, economic prosperity, and international relations. The comprehensive approach taken by the United States, which combines legal measures, diplomatic engagement, and collaborative efforts, serves as a valuable example that South Korea can learn from and enhance to keep technological advancements and ensure a secure digital future.

Emerging technologies are innovative technologies currently under development or in the early stages of introduction. These technologies have the potential to impact a wide range of industries and sectors significantly and may, therefore, be subject to export controls. The list of emerging technologies subject to export controls varies from country to country and constantly changes as new technologies are developed. For example, the U.S., EU, and South Korea have responded to these changes by adding software and technologies related to artificial intelligence and machine learning to their export control lists. Nevertheless, export control of emerging technologies still presents challenges and limitations. The rapid pace of technological advancement makes it difficult for export control regulations to keep up. For export control purposes, international cooperation on information sharing and control methods is necessary for most countries to control similar items. Several new technologies in the nuclear field may be subject to export controls. These technologies include advanced reactors, nuclear fuel cycle technologies, and nuclear waste management technologies. Small modular reactors (SMRs) and fourth-generation reactors are being developed as advanced technologies, and new technologies are being developed to improve the nuclear fuel cycle. There is also active development of technologies for space applications utilizing nuclear reactors, such as the Nuclear Thermal Propulsion System and the Nuclear Electric Propulsion System. As these technologies may include new systems and items not in existing export control, they may pose a proliferation risk or may include software design know-how for advanced materials, it is necessary to consider whether and how they should be subject to export control to prevent nuclear proliferation. Overall, export controls are an essential issue in the emerging technology and nuclear energy sectors. Countries are moving toward strengthening regulations and international cooperation to overcome these challenges and ensure safe technology transfer, and South Korea should actively participate and lead this trend.

ISO 9001:2005 is the international standard for implementing a Quality Management System (QMS), which provides a framework and principles for managing an organization’s quality management. The aim is to ensure that the organization continuously provides products and services that satisfy regulatory requirements. The “process approach” in ISO 9001 is defined as a systematic method of achieving organizational goals by comprehending and managing the interconnected processes as a cohesive system. Recently, KINAC has decided to develop standard processes in the field of R&D and performance management based on the framework of the ISO 9001:2015 quality management system. The objective of this study is to establish standardized processes for conducting research and development, as well as managing the outputs and performance of R&D activities. It involves identifying, designing, implementing, monitoring, and continually improving processes to ensure consistency, efficiency, and effective management of KINAC R&D and its achievements. Firstly, R&D and the research performance management process were defined, and the processes were categorized by function according to the requirements of ISO 9001:2015. Second, the ISO 9001 requirements were compared to the institute’s existing regulations and documents in order to identify any additional processes and procedures needed to meet the quality management requirements. Finally, the lists of quality documentation were determined for the institute’s QMS. As a result, a total of 30 QMS documents were listed, including 1 manual, 12 quality processes and procedures, and 17 quality instructions. The documents can be categorized into four process groups: the management and planning process group, the R&D and achievements management process group, the analysis and improvement process group, and the support process group. All input and output information of each process are connected and interrelated. The implementation of quality management standards and procedures for R&D in KINAC could lead to improved research practices, more reliable data collection and analysis, and increased efficiency in conducting R&D activities. For further study, it is planned to create detailed, high-quality documents that adhere to standard requirements and guidelines.

The National R&D Innovation Act emphasizes the improvement of the quality of R&D activities. The research institute is making efforts to improve the quality of research and effectively manage research implementation. KINAC has conducted various R&D projects regarding nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security, and their scope and scale have been gradually more widened and increased. It consequently becomes important how to successfully manage research projects and ensure their qualification with the growth and complexity of research in KINAC. Unfortunately, no attempt was made to introduce and apply project management methodologies. Therefore, the objective of this study is to introduce project management standards and guidelines as an initial step towards improving the overall research quality of the institute. Project management is the well-organized application of knowledge and techniques to efficiently and effectively initiate, plan, control, and close projects, in order to achieve specific goals and meet success criteria. There are some guidelines regarding project management, including PMBOK (the Project Management Body of Knowledge), PRINCE2 (Projects in Controlled Environments), ISO 21500 (Guidance on Project Management), and PMP (Project Management Professionals), etc. They are international standards that consist of processes, guidelines, and best practices for project management. They provide structured processes and approaches to plan, execute, monitor, control, and complete projects. By reviewing the guidelines, the commonly important factors, including schedule, cost, quality, resources, communication, and risk management were introduced to apply to KINAC R&D project implementation. In addition to the management standards, systematic efforts are also continued to enhance the R&D qualities of the institute. These efforts include the implementation of a quality management system (ISO 9001:2015), development of an integrated research achievements management system, regulation development, and distribution of guidebooks for project managers and researchers. These efforts have been evaluated as improving the quality of the research.

The Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) conducts various outreach activities, such as publishing brochures and holding seminars and briefings, to make regulated parties aware of the importance and necessity of the export control regime. The outreach program aims to increase compliance rates by generating interest in the export control regime among recipients and to increase communication to support compliance. In order to explore the long-term development of outreach activities, we analyze how KINAC conducts outreach. KINAC conducts nuclear export control outreach to organizations that deal with trigger list items and related technologies. Educational institutions with nuclear energy-related departments, research institutes related to nuclear energy and materials, and industrial companies that handle equipment used in nuclear power plants or nuclear materials were selected for outreach. The outreach program provides information on the export control regime for trigger list items, the strategic technology control regime, and the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. KINAC’s outreach programs can be categorized into education, exhibition, and publication. In the education program, we hold workshops and seminars for industrial companies, with customized content that considers the items handled by companies and the nature of technology transfer. We provide training for educational and research institutions focused on conducting research tasks and projects and transferring technology accordingly. As a result of the education program, there is a regret that the education for SMEs and educational institutions is not directly linked to the implementation of nuclear export control. The exhibition program operated a booth at nuclear-related exhibitions at least once a year. The booth distributed brochures or publications on the export control regime, conducted surveys to investigate awareness of the regime and conducted on-site consultations. The exhibition program effectively increased the understanding of the export control regime among the general public and potential regulated parties. However, it was only sometimes linked to the actual implementation of nuclear export control. The publication program produced promotional materials for use at education and exhibitions, as well as guidance materials on new and revised regulations. It used the agency’s online media to provide information on new and revised export control legislation and related issues. As a result of the publication program, various existing publications explaining the export control regime were consolidated into a single publication, increasing the efficiency and satisfaction of outreach.

The Nuclear Export and Import Control System (NEPS) is currently in operation for nuclear export and import control. To ensure consistent and efficient control, various computational systems are either already in place or being developed. With numerous scattered systems, it becomes crucial to integrate the databases from each to maximize their utility. In order to effectively utilize these scattered computer systems, it is necessary to integrate the databases of each system and develop an associated search system that can be used for integrated databases, so we investigated and analyzed the AI language model that can be applied to the associated search system. Language Models (LM) are primarily divided into two categories: understanding and generative. Understanding Language Models aim to precisely comprehend and analyze the provided text’s meaning. They consider the text’s bidirectional context to understand its deeper implications and are used in tasks such as text classification, sentiment analysis, question answering, and named entity recognition. In contrast, Generative Language Models focus on generating new text based on the given context. They produce new textual content continuously and are beneficial for text generation, machine translation, sentence completion, and storytelling. Given that the primary purpose of our associated search system is to comprehend user sentences or queries accurately, understanding language models are deemed more suitable. Among the understanding language models, we examined BERT and its derivatives, RoBERTa and DeBERTa. BERT (Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers) uses a Bidirectional Transformer Encoder to understand the sentence context and engages in pre-training by predicting ‘MASKED’ segments. RoBERTa (A Robustly Optimized BERT Pre-training Approach) enhances BERT by optimizing its training methods and data processing. Although its core architecture is similar to BERT, it incorporates improvements such as eliminating the NSP (Next Sentence Prediction) task, introducing dynamic masking techniques, and refining training data volume, methodologies, and hyperparameters. DeBERTa (Decoding-enhanced BERT with disentangled attention) introduces a disentangled attention mechanism to the BERT architecture, calculating the relative importance score between word pairs to distribute attention more effectively and improve performance. In analyzing the three models, RoBERTa and DeBERTa demonstrated superior performance compared to BERT. However, considering factors like the acquisition and processing of training data, training time, and associated costs, these superior models may require additional efforts and resources. It’s therefore crucial to select a language model by evaluating the economic implications, objectives, training strategies, performance-assessing datasets, and hardware environments. Additionally, it was noted that by fine-tuning with methods from RoBERTa or DeBERTa based on pre-trained BERT models, the training speed could be significantly improved.

An Internal Compliance Program (ICP) is a system through which enterprise internally manage their own export control processes to ensure compliance with domestic export control laws. Around the world, ICPs are actively utilized as a means of export control for strategic items. However, they are not mostly applied to the Trigger List Items. However, advanced countries such as the United States and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) have been actively researching the potential application of ICPs to the Trigger List Items recently. This paper suggests additional considerations that should be taken into account when applying an ICP to the Trigger List Items. The key elements of classical ICP include Top-level management commitment to compliance; Risk analysis; Organizational structure/chain of responsibilities; Human and technical resources allocated to the management of exports; Workflow management and operational procedures; Record -keeping and documentation; Selection of staff; training and awareness-raising; Process-/Systemrelated controls (ICP audit)/Corrective Measures; Physical and technical security. An ICP for Trigger List Items must encompass all these core elements. Additionally, as the nuclear industry often involves collaborative projects participating with various companies, the effectiveness of the ICP could be enhanced through the operation of consultation groups among participating companies. Furthermore, enterprises must take into account the unique characteristics of Trigger List Items that differ from other strategic items, when making requirements of the ICP establishment. First, export requirements related to safety measures and physical protection should be reviewed to export the Trigger List Items. The procedure and obligations in aspects of internationally controlled items should also be reviewed. Moreover, active support from enterprises for GTGA procedures should also be included, since the Government to Government Assurance (GTGA) procedure is additionally required for the export of Trigger List Items, in contrast to other strategic items. Additionally, for materials categorized within Trigger List Items, such as deuterium and heavy water, should be controlled based on their end-use and cumulative quantity, which Government cannot effectively manage without enterprise supports. Therefore, enterprises must establish an internal material management system based on the end-use and cumulative quantity of these materials under ICP.

When exporting nuclear-related items, export control is required from two perspectives: the control of “Trigger List Items” as controlled by Nuclear Supplier Groups (NSG) and the control of the “Items Subject to the Agreement” as specified in bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements. While Trigger List Items and Items Subject to the Agreement are largely similar, there are some items where they do not overlap. Furthermore, national law for controlling each item is different. The Trigger List Items are governed by the Foreign Trade Act, and the Items Subject to the Agreement (Internationally Controlled Items) are governed by the Nuclear Safety Act. As a result, the detailed procedures and requirements for controlling each item are quite distinct. For the Trigger List Items, export license must be obtained in accordance with the Foreign Trade Act. The details such as responsible authority, the items subject to license, license requirements and procedures, penalties are specified in the Public Notice on Import and Export of Strategic Goods. For the Items Subject to the Agreement, the process and obligations set forth in bilateral agreements and related administrative agreements are fulfilled in accordance with the Nuclear Safety Act. However, in contrast to the Trigger List Items, the details for complying with the agreements are not specified legally. Since most of the Items Subject to the Agreement are fall within the category of the Trigger List Items, the obligations in accordance with the agreements are reviewed and implemented during the export license assessment process. However, if the Items Subject to the Agreement are not are fall within the category of the Trigger List Items, there is a risk of control omission. For example, this applies to cases of exporting tritium and tritium removal facilities, which are not the Trigger List Items, to Canada and Romania. Moreover, since subjects to the agreement and compliance procedures are respectively different for 29 bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements signed with different countries, it is difficult for enterprise to recognize the appropriate procedures and obligations under the agreement by their own. The bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements establish legal obligations between state parties while NSG are non-legally binding arrangements. Therefore, it could be even more necessary to comply strictly with the agreements. Consequently, legal improvements are required for effective implementations of Nuclear Cooperation Agreements. While it may be challenging to institutionalize details of 29 Nuclear Cooperation Agreements, it is essential to legally specify key elements such as the list of items subject to agreements, responsible authority, requirements and procedures for implement the agreement obligations, and penalties. Furthermore, domestic awareness on compliance with Nuclear Cooperation Agreements is lower compared to the system of export license for Trigger List Items. The continuous outreach is also necessary, along with institutional improvements.

The development of advanced nuclear facilities is progressing rapidly around the world. Newly designed facilities have differences in structure and operation from existing nuclear facilities, so Safeguards by Design (SBD), which applies safeguards at the design stage, is important. To this end, designers should consider the safeguardability of nuclear facilities when designing the system. Safeguardability represents a measure of the ease of safeguards, and representative evaluation methodologies are Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) and Safeguardability Check-List (SCL). Those two have limitations in the quantification of safeguardability. Accordingly, in this study, the Safeguardability Evaluation Method (SEM), which has clear evaluation criteria based on engineering formulas, was developed. Nuclear Material Accountancy (NMA), a key element of Safeguards, requires the Material Balance Area (MBA) of the target facility and performs Material Balance Evaluation (MBE) based on the quantitative evaluation of nuclear materials entering or leaving the MBA. In this study, about 10 factors related to NMA were developed, including MBA, Key Measurement Point (KMP), Uncertainty of a detector, Radiation signatures, and MUF (Material Unaccounted For). For example, one of the factors, MUF is used in MBA to determine diversion through analysis of unquantified nuclear materials and refers to the difference between Book Inventory and Physical Inventory, as well as errors occurring during the process in bulk facilities, errors in measurement, or intentional use of nuclear materials. This occurs in situations such as attempted diversion, and accurate MUF evaluation is essential for solid Safeguards implementation. MUF can be evaluated using the following formula (MUF=(PB+X-Y)-PE). The IAEA’s Safeguards achievement conditions (MUF < SQ) should be met. Considering this, MUF-related factors were developed as follows. (􀜵􀜧􀜯 = 1 − 􀯆􀯎􀮿 􀯌􀯊 ) In this way, about 10 factors were developed and described in the text. This factors is expected to serve as an important factor in evaluating the safeguardability of NMA, and in the future, safeguardability factors related to Containment & Surveillance (C&S) and Design Information Verification (DIV) will be additionally developed to conduct a comprehensive safeguardability evaluation of the target facility. This methodology can significantly enhance safeguardability during the design stage of nuclear facilities.

To ensure the long-term supply and sustainability of uranium fuel, exploring alternative resources is essential, particularly considering that terrestrial reserves of uranium are limited (about 4.6 million tons). Since the amount of uranium dissolved in seawater is approximately 1000 times that of terrestrial reserves (i.e., about 4.5 billion tons), uranium extraction from seawater (UES) can be an alternative resource. However, the ultra-low concentration of uranium in seawater (about 3.3 ppb) poses a significant challenge in achieving economic feasibility for UES. This paper introduces case studies on the cost analysis of systems for recovering uranium from seawater, specifically focusing on braided fiber-based adsorbents developed by JAEA and ORNL. The cost analysis has been conducted based on using the deployment of these adsorbents on the bottom of the sea, which is a passive deployment method, thereby reducing the total costs of recovery. The analysis results can be used to identify R&D areas necessary for reducing cost components, making UES economically feasible.

Safeguards systems and measures are determined through diversion scenario analysis based on the facility design information submitted to the IAEA when a new nuclear facility is introduced. While the concept of safeguards-by-design (SBD), which considers the safeguards from the design phase for a facility operator to minimize unplanned changes or disruption to facility operations as well as for the IAEA to increase the efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards implementation, has been emphasized for more than a decade, there is no practical tool or guidance on how to apply it. In this study, we develop a diversion path analysis tool and introduce how to apply SBD using it. A diversion path analysis tool was developed based on the elements that constitute diversion and the algorithm generated based on the initial information of facility and nuclear material flow. The results of utilizing the analysis tool depending on a different level of facility information and the safeguards set-ups were compared through examples. Taking a typical light water reactor as an example, the test analyzed the automatic generation of dedicated routes, configuration of safeguards measures, and diversion path analysis. Through this, the application and limitations of the analysis tool are discussed, and ideas for utilization according to the SBD concept and necessary regulatory guidance are proposed. The results of this study are expected to be directly utilized to domestic nuclear control during the regulation process for a construction of new nuclear power systems, and furthermore, to enhance national credibility in the engagement with the IAEA for implementation of safeguards.

Nuclear Forensics is recognized as a essential component in the nuclear non-proliferation verification sector by the international community. It is being advanced under the leadership of the IAEA, the U.S., and the EU. Both the U.S.’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and the international collaborative organization, the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG), have proposed to establish a relationship between the production timing and radiochronometry of nuclear materials or samples to utilize in the field of nuclear forensics. Radiochronometry of nuclear materials is calculated based on the Bateman equation, incorporating factors with uncertainties derived from tests, experiments, and analyses. The results from the nuclear activity radiochronometry also encompass uncertainties, affecting their reliability. This study examined the mathematical uncertainty calculations related to the results of nuclear activity radiochronometry, focusing on calculation methods, contribution rates per factor, and sensitivities. Uncertainty factors for the Bateman equation-based radiochronometry were observed in the decay constants for each nuclide type and the uncertainty in the radioactive ratio of the tracer nuclide. The sensitivity for each factor revealed that the uncertainty in the radioactive ratio of the signature nuclide contributed more significantly than the uncertainty in decay constants for each nuclide type. Each factor displayed a distinct sensitivity curve relative to the radioactive ratio. As it approaches a radioactive equilibrium, the sensitivity tends to increase infinitely, indicating a corresponding trend of infinite increase in uncertainty. Because the time and curve shape to reach radioactive equilibrium vary depending on the signature nuclide, it’s essential to choose an appropriate signature nuclide based on the anticipated period and analysis requirements for nuclear activity radiochronometry. However, radiochronometry using mathematical methods is limited to the relationship between parent and daughter nuclides, presenting the potential for underestimation of uncertainty factors like decay constants. Future research will need to focus on uncertainty calculation methods through computational simulations, especially using the Monte Carlo method, to overcome the limitations of mathematical approaches and potential underestimations.

This study presents a method for analyzing the surface temperatures of specific facilities, such as the 5 MWe reactor within the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex, to explore its potential utility in monitoring suspected nuclear-related activities in North Korea using thermal infrared (TIR) satellite imagery (Landsat series). TIR band data is utilized to derive surface temperatures in the specified areas, and the temperatures are analyzed on a monthly basis to examine any patterns within these regions. This research provides a pattern-of-life on temperature variation for the target areas through multiple TIR image datasets, offering additional information to analyze facilities’ operational status in remote and inaccessible regions.

Arms control treaties during the Cold War generally used national technical means (NTM) to verify treaty compliance. This was because signatory states refused to agree on on-site inspection (OSI) measures since it would require some level of intrusion. Efforts on nuclear arms control such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) or Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) initially included some form of OSI but could not continue due to refusal from signatory states. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) treaty concluded between the US and the Soviet Union in 1978 was significant since both states agreed on a highly intrusive verification measure. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the new START also called for OSI measures similar to the INF. Alongside reducing a significant number of nuclear warheads and limiting specific types of nuclear warhead delivery vehicles, these treaties also provided basic models for conducting on-site inspection (OSI). OSI measures primarily rely on the political agreement between signatory states. However, the structure, types of inspections, number of inspections allowed, and technology/equipment used in each of the regimes also differ according to the objectives of each treaty. The INF treaty and START are salient cases as basic models for current nuclear disarmament verification research. Thus, this paper will conduct a case study on the procedures and mechanisms required for nuclear arms control verification in terms of OSI. Using the implications drawn from the INF treaty and START, this paper offers considerations for a potential nuclear disarmament verification.

Any type of nuclear arms control or disarmament agreement requires some form of verification measure. Existing nuclear arms control treaties drew upon previous agreements such as the INF treaty, START, and IAEA nuclear safeguards inspections. However, previous treaties focused on limiting specific types of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles or reducing the total number of nuclear weapons rather than eliminating the nuclear enterprise as a whole. A potential nuclear disarmament verification treaty or agreement will depend on the geopolitical environment of the time as well as the national policies and priorities of each signatory state. Although research on the gradual reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons is still ongoing, several states have cooperated to conduct experiments, exercises, and simulations on the procedures and technologies required for nuclear disarmament verification. Three of these efforts are the LETTERPRESS simulation conducted by the Quadrilateral Nuclear Verification Partnership (QUAD), NuDiVe Exercise conducted by the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), and the Menzingen experiment organized by the UNIDIR in partnership with the Swiss Armed Forces, Spiez Laboratory, Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security, and the Open Nuclear Network. These contain aspects for the development of a potential nuclear disarmament verification. The LETTERPRESS exercise conducted in 2017 tested potential activities and equipment inspectors might utilize in a nuclear weapon facility. The IPNDV NuDiVe exercises conducted in 2021 and 2022 tested the activities and equipment required for the verified dismantlement of a warhead within a dismantlement facility. Finally, the Menzingen experiment conducted in 2023 tested the practical procedures for the verification of a nuclear weapon’s absence at a storage site. This paper will analyze the three cases to offer considerations on the procedures and technologies future nuclear disarmament verification might include.

Spent nuclear fuel continues to be generated domestically and abroad, and various studies are actively being conducted for interim dry storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The characteristics vary depending on the type of spent nuclear fuel and the initial specifications, and based on these characteristics, it is essential to estimate the burnup and enrichment of spent nuclear fuel as a nondestructive assay. In particular, it is important to estimate the characteristics of spent nuclear fuel with non-destructive tests because destructive tests cannot be performed on all encapsulated spent nuclear fuel in case of intrusion traces in safeguards. Data is made by measuring spent nuclear fuel directly to evaluate burnup of spent nuclear fuel, but computer simulation research is also important to understand its characteristics because past burnup history is not accurately written, and destructive testing is difficult. In Sweden, the dependency of the burnup history in source strength and mass of light-water reactor-type spent nuclear fuel was evaluated, and this part was also applied to MAGNOX in consideration of the possibility of being used to verify DPRK’s denuclearization. SCALE 6.2 TRITON modeling was performed based on public information on DPRK’s 5 MWe Yongbyon reactor, and the source strength of Nb-95, Zr-95, Ru-106, Cs-134, Cs-137, Ce-141, Ce- 144, Eu-154 nuclides were evaluated. Since the burnup of MAGNOX is lower than that of lightwater reactors, major nuclides in decay heat were not considered. The cooling period was evaluated based on 0, 5, 10, and 20 years. In case the discharge timing was different, the total period of discharge and reloading was the same, and the end-cycle burnup was the same, calculations showed that the source strength emitted from major nuclides was evaluated within 2-3% except for Ru-106 and Ce-144 nuclides. Even the burnup step of nuclear fuel is the same, and the reloaded length after discharge is different, i.e., the cooling period between is different at 5, 10, and 20, the source strength of Nb-95, Zr-95, Ce-144, and Cs-137 was evaluated as an error of 1%. Except for Ru-106 and Ce-144, nuclides are highly dependent on burnup. Compared to the case of light-water reactors, the possibility of a decrease in error needs to be considered later because the specific power is low. As a result, radionuclides in released fuel depend on the effects of burnup, discharged and reloaded period, and a cooling period after release, and research is needed to correct the cooling period within the future burnup history. In addition, in this study, it is necessary to select a scenario -based burnup because the standard burnup due to the statistical treatment of discharged fuels was not considered as conducted in previous studies.

Physical protection education was legislated by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST) in November 2010. KINAC (Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control) was designated as the exclusive institution for physical protection education and training by MEST in October 2011, and it has since functioned as the sole institution responsible for this critical aspect of nuclear security education in the country. Over the past decade, KINAC has undertaken a variety of training initiatives aimed at enhancing the capabilities of nuclear operators’ physical protection personnel. Furthermore, it has consistently pursued annual curriculum revisions based on insights gleaned from surveys and workshops. In conventional curriculum assessments, general surveys often rely on Likert scale or short-answer questions as primary indicators, mainly due to their ease of data processing. Descriptive questions, while capable of capturing diverse opinions, have historically been relegated to a secondary role owing to the inherent challenges associated with data analysis. While physical protection education has made concerted efforts to solicit diverse opinions through descriptive questions, difficulties in organizing and leveraging this valuable data have resulted in it primarily serving as reference material. This study introduces a novel approach by employing ChatGPT, a chatbot, to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the descriptive questions from the physical protection education survey administered in the first half of 2023. The primary objective is to formulate a robust plan for curriculum enhancement based on a wide spectrum of opinions. Following the completion of physical protection training by 2,014 individuals in the first half of 2023, a survey was distributed, yielding an impressive response rate of 95.7% with 1,927 respondents. Chatbots were harnessed to extract major keywords and perform frequency analyses on approximately 360 responses to descriptive questions in the survey. The analysis revealed that certain keywords emerged with notable frequency, in the following order: “drone” (mentioned 51 times), “access management” (mentioned 28 times), “inspection and search” (mentioned 27 times), and “cybersecurity” (mentioned 20 times). Further analysis of these major keywords and related content revealed a consensus among trainees that there is a pressing need to incorporate topics addressing drone threats and responses, as well as strategies to fortify access management into the curriculum. This study underscores the potential to harness standardized data analysis techniques to synthesize and integrate trainees’ subjective opinions, thereby providing a solid foundation for the refinement of the curriculum.