When exporting nuclear-related items, export control is required from two perspectives: the control of “Trigger List Items” as controlled by Nuclear Supplier Groups (NSG) and the control of the “Items Subject to the Agreement” as specified in bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements. While Trigger List Items and Items Subject to the Agreement are largely similar, there are some items where they do not overlap. Furthermore, national law for controlling each item is different. The Trigger List Items are governed by the Foreign Trade Act, and the Items Subject to the Agreement (Internationally Controlled Items) are governed by the Nuclear Safety Act. As a result, the detailed procedures and requirements for controlling each item are quite distinct. For the Trigger List Items, export license must be obtained in accordance with the Foreign Trade Act. The details such as responsible authority, the items subject to license, license requirements and procedures, penalties are specified in the Public Notice on Import and Export of Strategic Goods. For the Items Subject to the Agreement, the process and obligations set forth in bilateral agreements and related administrative agreements are fulfilled in accordance with the Nuclear Safety Act. However, in contrast to the Trigger List Items, the details for complying with the agreements are not specified legally. Since most of the Items Subject to the Agreement are fall within the category of the Trigger List Items, the obligations in accordance with the agreements are reviewed and implemented during the export license assessment process. However, if the Items Subject to the Agreement are not are fall within the category of the Trigger List Items, there is a risk of control omission. For example, this applies to cases of exporting tritium and tritium removal facilities, which are not the Trigger List Items, to Canada and Romania. Moreover, since subjects to the agreement and compliance procedures are respectively different for 29 bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements signed with different countries, it is difficult for enterprise to recognize the appropriate procedures and obligations under the agreement by their own. The bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements establish legal obligations between state parties while NSG are non-legally binding arrangements. Therefore, it could be even more necessary to comply strictly with the agreements. Consequently, legal improvements are required for effective implementations of Nuclear Cooperation Agreements. While it may be challenging to institutionalize details of 29 Nuclear Cooperation Agreements, it is essential to legally specify key elements such as the list of items subject to agreements, responsible authority, requirements and procedures for implement the agreement obligations, and penalties. Furthermore, domestic awareness on compliance with Nuclear Cooperation Agreements is lower compared to the system of export license for Trigger List Items. The continuous outreach is also necessary, along with institutional improvements.

An Internal Compliance Program (ICP) is a system through which enterprise internally manage their own export control processes to ensure compliance with domestic export control laws. Around the world, ICPs are actively utilized as a means of export control for strategic items. However, they are not mostly applied to the Trigger List Items. However, advanced countries such as the United States and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) have been actively researching the potential application of ICPs to the Trigger List Items recently. This paper suggests additional considerations that should be taken into account when applying an ICP to the Trigger List Items. The key elements of classical ICP include Top-level management commitment to compliance; Risk analysis; Organizational structure/chain of responsibilities; Human and technical resources allocated to the management of exports; Workflow management and operational procedures; Record -keeping and documentation; Selection of staff; training and awareness-raising; Process-/Systemrelated controls (ICP audit)/Corrective Measures; Physical and technical security. An ICP for Trigger List Items must encompass all these core elements. Additionally, as the nuclear industry often involves collaborative projects participating with various companies, the effectiveness of the ICP could be enhanced through the operation of consultation groups among participating companies. Furthermore, enterprises must take into account the unique characteristics of Trigger List Items that differ from other strategic items, when making requirements of the ICP establishment. First, export requirements related to safety measures and physical protection should be reviewed to export the Trigger List Items. The procedure and obligations in aspects of internationally controlled items should also be reviewed. Moreover, active support from enterprises for GTGA procedures should also be included, since the Government to Government Assurance (GTGA) procedure is additionally required for the export of Trigger List Items, in contrast to other strategic items. Additionally, for materials categorized within Trigger List Items, such as deuterium and heavy water, should be controlled based on their end-use and cumulative quantity, which Government cannot effectively manage without enterprise supports. Therefore, enterprises must establish an internal material management system based on the end-use and cumulative quantity of these materials under ICP.

Korea has signed nuclear cooperation agreements (NCA) with 29 countries. Nuclear materials, materials, equipment, and technology transferred under the agreements are “internationally controlled materials (ICM)” under the Nuclear Safety Act. The main obligations imposed on those items include ensuring peaceful use, safeguards, physical protection, annual inventory reporting, and retransfer with supplier prior consent. The Nuclear Export and Import Control System (NEPS) handles the export control procedures for transferring ICM. After import, inventory management for ICM in Korea would be transitioning to an item-based system through the Obligation Tracking System for internationally controlled item (OTS) currently under development. A one-stop import and export control system for ICM can be established when information is well-linked between these two systems. This paper aims to derive a methodology for integrating NEPS and OTS. NEPS-OTS coupling begins at the receipt confirmation and shipment notification stages in NEPS. When importing ICM under NCA, the inventory change (code RF: receipt foreign) is entered in OTS by getting the information that has completed the receipt confirmation in NEPS. Conversely, during export, the information that has completed the shipment notification procedure in NEPS is linked to the OTS so that the entire cycle from import to re-export of the ICM can be concluded. Inventory verification for retransfer, checking that the book inventory remains positive value, is impossible under the current system. This issue can be resolved by enabling inventory information in OTS to be displayed in NEPS. Determining when and how to generate the obligation code for imported ICM is essential for NEPS-OTS coupling. Manual input may be necessary for some cases with multiple obligations. Nevertheless, it is more efficient from a system communication protocol to automatically generate and impose a single obligation based on the supplier country information in NEPS. Moreover, it is important to automatically link crucial information available in NEPS to reduce the administrative burden on OTS users and discrepancies between systems. Most required OTS data, such as country obligation, item categories, quantity, physical or chemical form, and receipt date, can be directly linked from NEPS. However, NEPS improvement is needed for digitizing the receiver information and facility data, like the material balance area. The NEPS-OTS integration involves sharing data as a system and encompasses the connection between export control and inventory management. Future work to link some information in NEPS -OTS with the KSIS could be suggested to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in managing ICM.

The ROK government has developed the Nuclear Export and Control System (NEPS) to implement export control activities. Although it was launched in 2008 as a system that can work with classification, licensing, nuclear material approval, government-to-government assurance, complying with nuclear cooperation agreement (NCA) handled through official documents. In order to enhance systematic management for items subject to NCA, KINAC developed a new module for the procedure (hereinafter referred to as “NCA module”) and opened it in 2022. This paper presents the module’s development background, key features, and current operation status. The NCA module prioritizes functional expansion and flexibility, distinct from other tasks for the following reasons. First, the export control duties of classification, export license, and approval for NM are based on domestic law, leading to predetermined target items, application forms, and processes that change only through statutory amendments. In contrast, the implementation of NCA has numerous procedural variables, varying across countries in scope, content, and procedures. Therefore, if the function is over-standardized, there would be many exceptions that the system cannot resolve in practice. Second, the existing NEPS process entails a one-time decision or approval for each application, while the implementation of the agreement encompasses four related procedures for each item: prior notification, written confirmation, shipment notification, and receipt confirmation. Even some steps may be omitted depending on the case. The other difference is the working process. The implementation of NCA must be initiated from the government, so the existing methods, beginning with the licensee filling a form, cannot be adopted as it is. The NCA module has adopted a new reference numbering system to resolve these challenges. It enables the creation of multiple procedures under one reference number on an item to expand the tasks and make it possible to omit some steps or to reflect case-by-case concerns in each stage. It also provides a consolidated view of multiple notifications related to a single item, ensuring to deal with even long-running tasks without missing any obligations until the final procedure. Moreover, some of the data in the NCA module is extensible by allowing users to manage the list themselves. For example, the system can respond to new agreements by allowing users to add and modify codes that distinguish counterparty countries. As a result, the current NCA module accommodates a variety of implementation scenarios, including split shipments, the procedural omissions, and the modification of additional counterparties, offering enhanced flexibility and adaptability.

In the late 80s, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological, became an internationally important issue, and in order to keep pace with the international situation, Korea amended the Foreign Trade Act in 1992 to legislate the export control of strategic goods. In addition, Korea joined the NSG, one of the international export control regimes, in 1995, and nuclear power operators are required to obtain export licenses in accordance with the NSG export control guidelines. In the nuclear export business, technical documents, equipment, materials, SW, etc. are exported to the importer, and the export items may include strategic items designated by the NSG, so operators must check whether they are strategic items and, if so, obtain an export license in accordance with foreign trade laws that reflect the NSG export control guidelines. In the case of processing and exporting goods or materials imported from another country, exporters must fulfill complex nuclear export control procedures, including obtaining the original supplier’s consent for re-transfer. In recent years, the international situation on export control has been more sensitive than ever, including the Russo-Ukrainian war, the U.S.-China semiconductor supremacy dispute, and U.S. lawsuits against domestic companies related to original technologies. In the worst-case scenario, a company may not be able to fulfill a contract due to export control issues. In order to facilitate the smooth export business of operators when exporting nuclear energy, ‘Nuclear Export Control Pre-Consulting’ is proposed to check compliance with export control requirements in advance and provide operators with customized export control implementation plans reflecting business characteristics. Through the pre-consultation, issues, requirements, and preparatory documents related to nuclear export control can be checked before the export business starts in earnest, i.e., when the decision to participate in the business is made, and the business can be supported to export smoothly by complying with the export control system. The most important aspect of pre-consultation is that domestic nuclear exporters need to know and apply for the program. To this end, the program will be actively promoted online and offline, and support will be provided for easy application through NEPS. In addition, procedures and outcomes will be continuously refined to ensure that the program is a means of ensuring full compliance with international nuclear non-proliferation norms for nuclear exports.

Under the Foreign Trade Act, an export license from the Nuclear Safety Commission is required to export items specified in Part 10 of Schedule 2 of the Public Notice of Exportation and Importation of Strategic Items (Trigger List Items). In the case of nuclear materials, deuterium, and heavy water, its cumulative amount determines whether it is trigger list item. An export license is required only if the cumulative amount exported to a single end-user country from January 1st to December 31st exceeds the regulation criteria. The reason for this cumulative control is to exclude small amounts of materials from the scope of control as they are considered less important in view of nuclear proliferation, but to prevent the possibility of acquiring large quantities of materials by importing small amounts several times. As a result, export control of nuclear material, deuterium, and heavy water requires different considerations than other Trigger List Items. First, materials exported by different companies must be consolidated to manage the cumulative amount. Second, it is necessary to continuously follow up the actual export status. If the material is not exported after it was classified as ‘non-Trigger List Items’, it should not be included in the cumulative amount. Third, there may be a difference between the accumulated quantities aggregated at the time of the classification and the time of the actual export. The classification should be changed if an export of the classified material is postponed or another export of same materials occurs before the export of the classified material. Fourth, the classification result of these materials should not be reused. Generally, the classification result could be reused within the expiration date (2 years) but in the case of substances. However, the reuse of classification result for materials should be limited as the classification results could be change depending on the cumulative amount. In addition, the sharing of classification results between different entities should also be restricted. The government approval procedures are required even for export of small amounts of nuclear materials which are less than the regulation criteria. The cumulative quantities of nuclear materials are systematically managed in the Nuclear Export & imPort control System (NEPS) through these procedures. NEPS is also linked to the custom clearance system of Korea Customs Service, which enables to track actual exports and the time of exports. However, cumulative quantities for the heavy water and deuterium are managed individually by classification reviewers. The annual export plans are received in advance from major entities which deal with the materials for nuclear uses, and the cumulative quantities for each application are managed manually. The systematic management has not been required as there were a few cases of exporting small quantities. However, systematic management may be required in the future as overseas expansion attempts from various companies in the nuclear field has been increasing. In addition, further study is needed on the criteria and system for calculating the cumulative amount. The time of aggregate the cumulative amount should be clarified by considering the difference between the time of classification and actual export. It is required to devise an efficient way to follow up the actual export.

An administrative agreement (AA) was signed between NSSC and UAE FANR in January 2023 under Article 5 of the ROK-UAE Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. The AA aims to enhance regulatory efficiency in safeguards and export control. This study reviewed the export control measures for the items subject to the agreement (ISA) and implementation procedures under ROK-UAE AA by comparing them with other countries cases. First of all, the ROK-UAE AA distinguishes between ISA and the inventory management target items. Technology is divided into two categories, one requiring consent for retransfer and the other, considering the characteristics of technology that is free to be copied and deleted, and thus less useful for inventory management. Only the former is included in the annual report, which differs from the ROK-Canada or ROK-Japan NCA, which includes all technologies subject to the agreements in the annual report. When ROK notifies export information, it is mandatory to specify whether the technology requires consent for retransfer. Furthermore, some technologies should be controlled as strategic information, even if excluded from the annual report, so efforts to prevent confusion are required. Secondly, the ROK-UAE AA covers all items in INFCIRC/254/rev.9/part1, unlike the ROK-U.S. and ROK-Canada NCA, which listed equipment subject to them. This is significant because it clarifies the criteria for regulation by increasing the consistency between the trigger list items in the domestic law and the ISA. However, the expanded ISA scope could result in some changes in export control procedures. For example, when importing nuclear material (NM) from the US, only uranium was controlled as ISA, and the packages were not considered. In contrast, when exporting fuel assemblies (FA) for UAE, both uranium and zirconium cladding should be treated as ISA. To this end, NEPS was improved to implement the features of the ROK-UAE AA. Consideration of the criteria and methods for imposing obligations under the agreement is essential because this is the first case of Korea concluded AA under exporting NPP and as a supplier of FA. Generally, the obligations for NM are imposed by the country of origin, conversion, and enrichment countries. Canada and EU recognize the fuel fabrication process as a substantial transformation and impose customs origin where the process takes place. Hence, NM fabricated from Canadian equipment is also subject to the same obligations as NM of Canadian origin. From this perspective, it would be appropriate to ensure ROK acts as a supplier and controls when exporting domestically manufactured FA. Moreover, a proper national obligation code system will be required to specify Korea’s control rights.

Trades are classified as a direct trade, in which an exporter and an importer directly conclude a contract to execute a transaction, and an indirect trade, in which a transaction is conducted through a third party. A license issued by NSSC is required for the indirect trade of Trigger List Items although the items do not cross the Korea’s borders. This study would summarize characteristics for each type of the indirect trade, and suggest things considered from the perspective of regulations. Sensitive items such as weapons of mass destruction could be illegally transferred through black trade, and the role of brokers is important. Therefore, Korea controls indirect trade of Trigger List Items in a more conservative approach, although NSG guidelines does not include it as a control scope. Advanced countries in export control field such as the US, UK, and Canada also controls on indirect trade. One of the indirect trade types is an intermediate trade in which the goods are imported from a foreign country and exported to another foreign country without being brought into the trader’s country. Another type is a merchandising trade which is a form of brokerage between exporter from a foreign country and importer from another foreign country. Both types have one thing in common that the goods are not crossed the trader’s country. The difference is that an intermediate trader directly participates in the contract and earn a difference between import and export amount, whereas a merchandising trader just arranges the transaction and earns a brokerage fee. The profits from the intermediate trade are considered as export records, while merchandising trade profits are not considered export records. In other words, only the intermediary trade is considered as an export. Also, the license types are different for each of them. An export license should be issued for the intermediate trade of Trigger List Items, whereas a brokerage license should be issued for the merchandising trade of Trigger List Items. The definition of export in the Foreign Trade Act includes intermediate trade for only goods, but technology is missing, although the sub-regulation specifies the intermediate trade including both. The technology need to be added as it can be the subject of intermediate trade in spite of intangible characteristics. Also, outreach activities are more needed as nuclear industry awareness on export control for both trades is low.

According to Article 3(2) of the NPT and NSG the Guidelines, the exporting country should be guaranteed the import country’s willingness to implement nuclear non-proliferation and the level of implementation before the transfer of Trigger List Items. Also, unknown or new end-users could be officially identified through GA procedure. Accordingly, Korea government requests the importing country a formal Governmental Assurance (GA), before issuing an export license. This study summarizes GA items and characteristics. First, GA is The NSG guidelines suggests four items that should be assured by importing countries: peaceful use of export items, full-scope safeguards application, physical protection measures, and retransfer control. Therefore, these four items are generally requested based on the NSG guidelines. However, if they are already guaranteed by bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement, the GA could be based on the nuclear cooperation agreement. The GA procedure could be omitted in the case of concluding an administrative agreement that imposes another implementation procedure. The levels of requested GA requested vary with the countries, since the NSG guidelines are just recommendations that are not legally enforceable. Korea requests the level based on the NSG guidelines. Among the four GA items, peaceful use of export items is the most fundamental obligation, and levels of safeguards and physical protection of the importing country could be verified in advance by reviewing the conclusion status of international agreement with the IAEA. Thus, the important thing for the licensee to consider is to decide the level of retransfer control. The NSG guidelines suggest two levels of retransfer control, taking into account the sensitivity of the export items and the level of safeguards in the end-user country, which is either to receive GA from the third receiving country at an equivalent level with that originally requested from exporting country, or to get a prior consent by the exporting country. The latter should be approached more carefully, as requiring a prior consent is not only to have authority, but also to have responsibility when problem occurs. In addition, the level of retransfer control must be decided through sufficient reviewing on the transaction characteristics, it may affect the domestic export industry.

In the previous study, the types of North Korea’s strategic items, foreign trading partners, and export items were investigated. From North Korea’s typical trade paths, it is possible to predict the paths through which North Korea’s strategic items are illegally exported upon denuclearization. Trading partners of North Korea are the potential importing countries or end-users of strategic items, which can be disguised or concealed as if it is general export items during typical export procedures. So, in this study, transfer paths of North Korea’s export items are examined by utilizing KOTRA statistics, including item type HS code and its total price. Also, AnyLogic, a comprehensive simulation modeling tool, the simulation will be conducted to identify the paths for illegal transfer and calculate the time required. The information on North Korea’s trading partners and items is used for establishing export scenarios in which strategic items are transferred to other countries through North Korea’s ports, airports, railroads, and roads. To be specific, China, Russia, and South Korea, countries that share a border with North Korea, export items transported only by land; the items will arrive first in the referred three countries. Since the types of items, North Korea transacts with each country are different, the total amount and frequency of transactions are different; the probability of strategic items being included in general export items and transferred during customs clearance also varies. Even if it does not border North Korea, North Korea can export items through ports to countries adjacent to the coastline, and North Korea can even export items to any country by airspace even if it is not adjacent to the coastline. So, all publicly open ports, airports, railways, and roads are surveyed. Their geographic information, such as EPSG 4326 and EPSG 3857 coordinate system, are applied to confirm and visualize valid export paths starting from North Korea. In conclusion, effective export paths in North Korea are identified based on North Korea’s each major transportation hub by using AnyLogic simulation. It is possible to predict the paths through which North Korea’s strategic items will be transferred by combining information on major export items and countries that North Korea mainly transacts with.

Investigating major trading partners and items with North Korea is informative in terms that it can predict the path through which North Korea’s strategic items will transfer to non-nuclear-weapon states when North Korea denuclearizes. By analyzing North Korea’s trading partners and the items, it is possible to identify the relevant countries through which items arrive from the first importing country to the end-user in the process of exporting items and to predict the way how North Korea disguise or conceal their strategic items among general items during normal export procedures. As of 2020, North Korea’s major trading partners are China, Russia, Vietnam, India, Nigeria, and Switzerland. Compared to 2019, Mozambique, Tanzania, Ghana, and Thailand entered the top 10, while Brazil, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and South Africa pushed out of the top 10. North Korea’s trade dependence on China accounts for 88.2%, making it the largest trading partner for years, and it shows that North Korea is mainly conducting trade with Asian and African countries. North Korea’s most important export items are mineral products (HS 25-27) and steel & metal products (HS 72-83) and the most significant import items are mineral products (HS 25-27) and oils & fats & prepared foods (HS 15-24). In 2017, due to UN Security Council sanctions for North Korea’s international ballistic missile (ICBM) test-fire, North Korea’s exports from 3 billion dollars fell by 90% to less than 300 million dollars. This is the result of most of North Korea’s major export items included in the export ban, and changes have occurred in its export items. In 2020, export fell to less than 100 million dollars due to border lockdown measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19, which also affected the change of North Korea’s major export items. Although North Korea does not officially publish its foreign trade statistics, in order to review North Korea’s trade information, KOTRA statistics are utilized. KOTRA statistics provide only two digits of HS code number, so it is challenging to identify detailed item classification. Moreover, these statistics are based on the export amount, so it is difficult to determine the exact quantity of export items. It is expected that information on North Korean trading partners and items will be used to predict potential transferable export methods of North Korea’s strategic items when North Korea denuclearizes.

The License on Technology Export of Nuclear Plant is a system that permits the export of strategic technologies for large-scale NPP projects collectively during the project period. So, an issuance of the export license could be omitted for each transfer of technology, but Post Strategic Items Confirmation must be performed before the transfer as a follow-up obligation. Sometimes, transfers of technology have been urgently required during the project. As Post Strategic Items Confirmation process takes up to 15 working days, it may be difficult to respond to urgent situations timely, which may cause setbacks on the project. Therefore, Urgent Technology Transfer System, which allows to transfer technology without prior Post Strategic Items Confirmation, was established to reduce a burden on licensee and improve the efficiency of regulation. This system applies only to the License on Technology Export of Nuclear Plant. In other words, the technology transferred through Urgent Technology Transfer System (hereinafter referred as Urgent Transfer Technology) does not pose any problem with regard to export control because it is already licensed. In addition, the Urgent Transfer Technology should be considered as a strategic technology until Post Strategic Items Confirmation, which means that the Urgent Transfer Technology is more strictly controlled than the generally transferred technology. Also, the Urgent Technology Transfer System does not apply to intangible technology transfers such as technical support through personnel dispatch. The system could be only used in specific conditions which are stipulated for each licensed project in advance in order to prevent indiscriminate abuse of the system by licensee. Licensees are required to report quarterly the stipulated condition corresponding to each Urgent Technology Transfer case, and it would be checked through post-site inspection whether the actual reason for the transfer meets the consulted condition. Moreover, the deadline of application on Post Strategic Items Confirmation after the Urgent Technology Transfer is stipulated for licensee so as not to omit the classification procedure. This Urgent Technology Transfer System does not apply to dual-use items. If the Urgent Transfer Technology is classified as a non-Trigger List Item through the Post Strategic Items Confirmation, it is outside the scope of the NSSC’s export license. In this case, the technology may be subject to an export license of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE). However, if the technology is classified to be a dual-use item after Urgent Technology Transfer, it may result in unauthorized transfer because it has already been transferred. Licensee must apply to classification of MOTIE before Urgent Technology Transfer if the technology being transferred may be related with Dual-use Items. It is easy for licensee to overlook due to the low awareness about this system. Therefore, outreach activities are necessary to raise licensee’s awareness by explaining the Urgent Technology Transfer System and current issues in detail. Consultation with MOTIE may be needed for the improvement on issues.

Acid rain due to air pollution has been believed to be harmful to vegetation and crops, either by direct deposition on the foliage or by indirect leaching of nutrients from the soil. This study was conducted to investigate physiological response and damage of soybean caused by acid rain in the glasshouse at the experimental station of Seoul National University. Soybean (Glycine max L.) cv. Sinpaldal was subjected to simulated acid rain (SAR) two times a week from R2 stage until its maturity. The pH values of SAR treatments were ranged from 2 to 5 together with tap water treatment (pH 7±0.2) as a control. The SAR was composed of H2SO4 and HNO3 at the ratio of 2:1 (v/v). SAR treatment at pH 2 caused clear visual damage on leaves and pods with severe chlorosis and necrosis even after the first SAR was applied, while those at pH greater than 3 showed no clear visual damage. Chlorophyll content (expressed as SPAD value) tended to decrease with decreasing pH with significant reduction at pH 2 as compared with pH values greater than 3. Photosynthesis also showed decrease with decreasing pH with significant reduction at pH 3 and 2. Soybean yield and its components were also affected by SAR treatment, particularly significant at pH 2.