21세기 들어 알코올 및 약물중독의 문제는 범죄, 실업, 가족구성원간의 갈등 및 불화, 마찰의 증가, 그리고 개인적 심리사회적 고통과 같은 심각한 사회문제의 주된 원인이 되고 있다. 이로 인해 개인은 신체적, 정신적, 사회적 건강의 위협을 받고 있으며, 많은 국가에서는 이러한 문제를 해결하기위해 많은 사회적, 경제적 대책을 모색하고 있다. 이러한 문제의 대응에 있어서는 물론 다양하고 구체적인 해결 방안이 제시될 수 있으나, 이러한 해결방안들은 궁극적으로 ‘예방 및 치료’ 또는 ‘처벌’이라는 두 가지로 견해로 구분되어 진다. 본 논문은 이러한 두 가지 견해를 중심으로, 미국사회가 알코올 및 마약중독에 관한 문제의 해결을 위해 어떠한 선택을 했는지에 대한 고찰을 진행하였다. 이러한 연구의 목적을 위해, 본 연구는 미국의 약물퇴치정책에 관한 소사(小史), 사회적 의미로서의 중독의 개념과 이에 따른 해결방안, 마약과 범죄와의 관련성, 치료의 효율성측면에 대한 고찰, 음주운전자의 치료와 처벌의 효율성에 대한 비교, 그리고 치료와 처벌에 관한 비용-효과 분석에 관해 논의하였다.

This study reexamined whether the philosophical conceptualization of punishment had the three attributes of retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation by having compared the Boston sample to the Seoul's. The scales used were Likert, Thurstone, and Guilford methods which were constructed by 9x9 multitrate-multimethod matrix. Campbell and Fiske(1959) as well as Bagozzi's Structural Equation model(1993) were applied. The result showed that the convergent and discriminant validity were proved when the confirmatory factor analysis was processed in the data analysis.

이 연구는 처벌이 사이버범죄에 대해 갖는 억제효과를 검증하는 것에 주목한다. 처벌의 영향력은 다른 주요 변인들을 통제할 경우 약해지는지를 알기 위해 부모와의 관계, 사이버범죄에 대해 갖는 태도, 충동성을 통제변인으로 사용하며, 아울러 처벌의 억제효과는 조건적일 것이라는 가설을 검증하기 위해 지각된 처벌가능성과 부모와의 관계, 사이버범죄에 대해 갖는 태도, 충동성 각각의 상호작용 효과를 고려했다. 서울시 남자 중, 고등학생 559명을 대상으로 조사한 결과에서는 현실에서의 범죄처럼 사이버범죄에 있어 처벌의 억제효과는 대체로 미약했으며, 오히려 사이버범죄에 대해 갖는 태도가 중요한 요인으로 제시되었다. 한편 조사결과에서는 처벌의 조건적 효과가 일부 유형의 사이버범죄에서만 부분적으로 지지되었다.

Article 3(1) of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Settlement of Traffic Accidents (hereinafter ‘Traffic Special Act’) provides that “A driver of a vehicle who commits a crime provided for in Article 268 of the Criminal Act by reason of a traffic accident shall be punished by imprisonment without prison labor for not more than five years or by a fine not exceeding 20 million won”. This regulates Non-real Status Crime, and ‘traffic’ stipulated herein is interpreted as objective circumstances of conduct. Additionally, driver stipulated in the Traffic Special Act seems to be defined as ‘a person driving or who has driven.’ This stems from legislator’s preference for compressed expression in terms of legislative technical efficiency. It is understood to be the result of preference for ’driver’, which is a compressed expression, rather than the descriptive phrase such as “anyone who is under the circumstances of operating a vehicle or driving” (Article 3(1) of the Traffic Special Act, Article 151 of the Road Traffic Act is identical) or “anyone who is driving or have driven” (Article 3(1) & 4(1) of the Traffic Special Act). The background of the subject judgment corresponds to [Case 2] where a non-driver (different occupation), who is a person lacking status, collaborates with an ‘occupational’ driver, who is a person with status. In this case non-driver, who lacks the status as an ‘occupational’ driver, has a status for a different occupation, and consequently shall be punished according to the statutory penalty for Co-principals of Traffic Special Act along with the person with status as ‘occupational’ driver (Article 33 of the Criminal Act). The reason is that the person lacking status has its own unique occupational negligence derived from the different occupation apart from the occupational driver, being guilty as Co-Principals of Bodily Injury by Negligence of the Criminal Act - Article 3 of the Traffic Special Act supercede Article 268 of the Criminal Act based on the existence of special relation. As regards to the contravention of Article 3(1) of the Traffic Special Act, where ‘traffic’ situation, which is the condition of punishment, and 12 exception clauses, which are the conditions of prosecution, exist only in respect of occupational driver, the person lacking such status also is inevitably guilty for Co-Principals of Traffic Special Act. As an inevitable outcome, Article 3(2) of the Traffic Special Act, which is a special case of non-prosecution against the clearly expressed intention of the victim, also applies to the person lacking such status. However, since the Principle regarding the Indivisibility of Criminal Complaint does not apply to an offence which cannot be prosecuted against the clearly expressed intention of the victim, declaration of an injured party of his/her intention not to prosecute two or more Co-Principals does not take effect in respect to the other accomplices. Therefore, Article 4(1) of the Traffic Special Act, stipulating special cases of comprehensive insurance coverage, is interpreted to limit the scope of personal application to only ‘driver’ according to its literal reading. “Exceptions must be interpreted narrowly”(ingularia non sunt extendenda), which is a principle of limitation, must apply to the above. The subject judgment is evaluated to confirm the non-application of the special cases of insurance to non-driver, i.e. comprehensive insurance coverage not taking effect to non-driver. This point is at least considered to be in line with the established precedent that the principle of Subjective Indivisibility of Criminal Complaint shall not apply mutatis mutandis to offence which cannot be prosecuted against the clearly expressed intention of the victim. Nonetheless, it is extremely regrettable that the subject judgment only declares such purport without any detailed grounds.

Although the Republic of Korea has made remarkable economic development, the government’s corruption index is at the lowest level among OECD countries, and it is a fact that corruption can not escape from the widespread state in many fields. In order to achieve the growth engine of the nation, this liquidation of corruption is an essential element. From this national mission, Kim Young–Ran’s proposal was presented at the 19th National Assembly for the purpose of clearing up corruption and enhancing integrity of the public societies. After consultation between the public hearing and the related organizations, the “Kim Young–Ran Law” was enacted, the “Act on the Prohibition of Illegal Filing and Receipt of Money, etc.”. Article 1 of the Act stipulates that the illegal appeal against public officials and the receipt of money such as public officials shall be prohibited so as to ensure the fair performance of public officials and ensure public confidence in public institutions. Although the legitimacy of these legislative purposes is all affirmative, there is criticism that the enactment of the law without a careful examination of the effects of the law has had a significant negative impact on the national economy as well as unconstitutional regulations. In this paper, the criticism of the decision of the Constitutional Court and the unfairness of this law are examined through the critical analysis of the unconstitutional judgment decision of the case 2015 HUNMA 236, 2015 HUNMA 412, 2015 HUNMA 662, 2015 HUNMA 673. And the unconstitutionality of the law. The amendment should amend and supplement the legislation to ensure that political power is provided to prevent institutional abuse, such as media and means for static elimination.

Korean Supreme Court’s case, 2015 Do 15798 sentenced on January 14, 2016 dismissed the defendants’ appeal. In the case the executives of the Housing Redevelopment and Maintenance Association substantially performed their duties even after they had lost their authorities. The court, however, stated that the fairness of performance, social trust should be protected as long as they were registered as executives in the association’s register at the time. It also pointed out that the executives’ duties were not transferable or sellable. In order to logically justify the judgment the concept of ‘public official’ should be expanded in terms of legal principle. Korean Constitutional Court, however, had considered this kind of concept expansion as an unconstitutional interpretation in its 2011 Heonba 117 case. It logically follows that the Supreme Court should not make judgement such as the above appeal case which can be an unconstitutional interpretation. It cannot be interpreted that City Maintenance Law’s article 84 which regulates ‘legal fiction of public officials in applying penal provisions’ includes ‘the substantial executives’ of the above appeal case. This is a ‘double legal fiction’ which exceeds interpretation of legal texts permitted by Criminal Law and also a wrong analogy prohibited by the law. There can be a practical need to punish a certain act. It is, however, impossible to punish the act without any relevant legal stipulation. This is the principle of legality. The solution to a defect in legislation is not an analogical interpretation, but, simply, legislation.

On January in 2013, a district judge made a constitutional suit to the Constitutional Court whether voluntary prostitution is unconstitutional. The key point is that the legal interest of the punishing voluntary prostitution is obscure, to punish it is not accorded with the properness of manner and the minimum of victim, and it is questionable in point of equal protection. The question that voluntary prostitution is unconstitutional is during debate since long time ago. Some says it should not be punished because everybody has a sexual self-determination, others it is crime because it is immoral, and the others it is controlled by the state because it is harmful to the moral people. I make a couple of proposals in the following points. Firstly, because the legal interest of punishing voluntary prostitution is obscure, so that it should not be punished. Secondly, punishing voluntary prostitution is unconstitutional because everybody has a sexual self-determination and buying or selling sexual service is absolutely depending on the individual. Thirdly, punishing voluntary prostitution is out of the principle because it goes against with the ultima ratio rule. Fourthly, punishing all the patterns of voluntary prostitution is not possible and punishing some peculiar types of prostitution does not accord with equal protection. Finally, punishing voluntary prostitution is against the principle of less restrictive alternative because everybody has a right to have a sex without force with another. So punishing voluntary prostitution is unconstitutional. However, if the Constitutional Court proclaims that it is unconstitutional, it would give a shock to the ordinary people because they do not have an open mind with it. So I dare to say that punishing voluntary prostitution is committed to the ‘factual’ decriminalization for a while before punishing adultery is unconstitutional proclaimed by the Constitutional Court.

Das Bundesverfassungsgericht erklärte am 15.5.1995, dass die Strafverfolgung von Spionagehandlungen, die durch die Staatsbürger der DDR vom Boden der DDR aus begangen wurden, gegen Art. 2 GG in Verbindung mit dem Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit verstieße. Danach hat der Bundesgerichtshof seine entgegenstehende frühere Auffassung in BGHSt 39, 260 aufgegeben und vertritt im vorliegenden Urteil in Anlehnung an das Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts nunmehr folgende Auffassung: “(…) derjenigen Personen (…), die als Staatsbürger der DDR Spionagestraftaten gegen die Bundesrepublik Deutschland oder deren Verbündete allein vom Boden der DDR aus begangen haben und im Zeitpunkt des Wirksamwerdens der Einheit Deutschlands dort ihren Lebensmittelpunkt hatten, ergibt sich unmittelbar von Verfassungs wegen ein Verfolgungshindernis. (…) Dieselben Gründe gelten darüber hinaus für Bürger der DDR, die im Zeitpunkt der Wiedervereinigung ihren Lebensmittelpunkt in der DDR hatten, wenn sie Spionagestraftaten gegen die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (…) auch in anderen Staaten begangen haben, in denen sie vor Strafverfolgung wegen solcher Taten aus Rechtsgründen sicher waren und diese Sicherheit auch für sie erst durch die Wiedervereinigung entfallen ist.″ Zu fragen ist hier, ob die deutsche Theorie der Verfolgungshindernis im Falle der koreanischen Wiedervereinigung auch für diejenigen anwendbar wäre, die ihre Spionagestraftaten gegen Südkorea vor der Wiedervereinigung vom Boden des Nordkoreas aus begangen haben. Diese Frage ist allerdings negativ zu beantworten, denn Nordkorea gilt bloß als eine „antistaatliche Vereinigung“ bei seiner „antistaatlischen Handlungen“ gegen Südkorea wie Spionagetätigkeiten; es wird also nicht als einen Staat mit seiner Souveränität betrachtet, während die DDR von der BRD als einen souveränen Staat bzw. als ein Teilstaat des Gesamtdeutschlands anerkannt war. So ist die Theorie der Verfolgungshindernis nicht einfach im Falle der koreanischen Wiedervereinigung bzw. Unrechtsaufarbeitung zu übertragen. Selbst wenn Nordkorea seine Souveränität zuerkannt würde, wären Spionagestraftaten zu bestrafen, weil ihre einst gegen den liberalen Rechtsstaat gerichtete Rechtswidrigkeit nicht einfach durch die Wiedervereinigung entfällt, welche für Nordkorea bedeutet, dass die Sicherheit vor der Strafverfolgung wegen der Spionagestraftaten entfällt.

The case in this study has positive attitude in understanding the meaning of irresistible state when it comes to rape. This case offered explicit standard of cause and effect between the victim’s disability and irresistible state when offender is in charge of rape. When incidents occur, the victims are deemed able to make certain choices. Because their capacity is clearly vulnerable to external pressures and influences, and their ability to express that choice is undermined by imbalances of power in any given relationship. When the mental disabled victims do not understand what the sexual assault means exactly, it means that they do not have the power of sexual atonomy.

The original ruling took into consideration the fact that the accused was a Chaebol owner and applied the concurrent offence punishment provisions and the discretionary sentence reduction system to lower the inferior limit of the penalty, and passed a suspended sentence. In order to divert public criticism, the original ruling also ordered a huge payment as a social contribution fund as a means of a community service order according to article 62-2 of the penal code. But the Supreme Court construed the concept of a community service order in a restrictive manner as ‘work or manual labor that can be imposed by the hour up to 500 hours.' As a result of this construction the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the original judgment that ordered the payment of a social contribution fund as a community service order. The original court maintained the suspended sentence by imposing a 300 hour community service instead of the original social contribution fund payment. Consequently the fairness of the examination of the offence was greatly impaired by lowering the inferior limit of the penalty to 3 years in a case in which the accused was proven guilty of 11 separate offences including one of which the penalty is stipulated as ‘life sentence or imprisonment for more than 5 years.' This ruling disclosed the problematic issues of the concurrent offence punishment provisions and the discretionary sentence reduction system that grant judges excessive discretion on weighing penalties. It is also legislatively meaningful that the case raised issues on introducing new forms of ‘suspended sentence conditional orders' such as fund payment orders or damage recovery orders.

Article 9(1) of the Punishment of Tax Evaders Act (“PTEA”) stipulates that any person who evades tax obligations through fraud of other wrongful conduct shall be punished under the PTEA. So far, most of discussions surrounding Article 9(1) of the PTEA were focused on the meaning of “fraud” or “wrongful conduct.” In the case at hand, the focus was on the meaning of “tax evasion.” There has been much controversy and debate over this issue. The debate centers on the issue of whether a person who has properly reported the tax base and therefore cannot be said to have interfered with the tax authorities’ ability to impose and determine tax liabilities, but instead has hindered the collection of the tax, can be punished under the PTEA. In the recent Supreme Court Decision 2005 Do 9546 delivered February 15, 2007 the court ruled that even if there was no interference of the imposition or determination of tax, if there was interference of collection of tax, then the conduct should also be punished. The author of this paper fully agrees with the Supreme Court's decision for the following reasons: First, the legislative purpose of the PTEA is to secure the state’s tax revenues as well as realize the spirit of fairness and justice in tax collection. Moreover, although anyone can report tax returns properly, if that person deliberately attempts to avoid the collection of tax, that conduct cannot go unpunished. Tax returns, in the end, serve the purpose of facilitating tax collection. Second, on a practical level, hindrance of the imposition /determination of tax and the hindrance of collection are both unlawful behavior that bring on the same result, and therefore should be treated alike. In conclusion, the recent Supreme Court decision is significant in that it clarifies the interpretation of “tax evasion” as stipulated in Article 9(1) of the PTEA. More importantly, this interpretation is in accordance with the principle of the legal principle of Nullum crimen sine lege.