Earthquakes of magnitude 3.0 or greater occur in Korea about 10 times on average yearly, and the number of earthquakes occurring in Korea is increasing. As many earthquakes have recently occurred, interest in the safety of nuclear power plants has increased. Nuclear power plants are equipped with many cabinet-type control facilities to regulate safety facilities, and function maintenance is required during an earthquake. The seismic performance of the cabinet is divided into structural and functional performances. Structural performance can be secured during the design procedure. Functional performance depends on the vibration performance of the component. Therefore, it is necessary to confirm the seismic performance of the components. Generally, seismic performance is confirmed through seismic simulation tests. When checking seismic performance through seismic simulation tests, it is difficult to determine the effect of frequency and maximum acceleration on an element. In this paper, shaking table tests were performed using various frequencies and various maximum accelerations. The seismic performance characteristics of the functions of electrical equipment components were confirmed through tests.

In this study, the impact load resulting from collision with the fuel rods of surrogate spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies was measured during a rolling test based on an analysis of the data from surrogate SNF-loaded sea transportation tests. Unfortunately, during the sea transportation tests, excessive rolling motion occurred on the ship during the test, causing the assemblies to slip and collide with the canister. Hence, we designed and conducted a separate test to simulate rolling in sea transportation to determine whether such impact loads can occur under normal conditions of SNF transport, with the test conditions for the fuel assembly to slide within the basket experimentally determined. Rolling tests were conducted while varying the rolling angle and frequency to determine the angles and frequencies at which the assemblies experienced slippage. The test results show that slippage of SNF assemblies can occur at angles of approximately 14° or greater because of rolling motion, which can generate impact loads. However, this result exceeds the conditions under which a vessel can depart for coastal navigation, thus deviating from the normal conditions required for SNF transport. Consequently, it is not necessary to consider such loads when evaluating the integrity of SNFs under normal transportation conditions.

A comparison and validation between the analysis and vibration test data of a nuclear fuel assembly were conducted. During the comparison and validation process, various parameters that govern the vibration behavior of the fuel assembly were determined, including nuclear fuel rod’s stiffness, spring constants of the dimple and spring of support structures, and damping coefficients. The calibration of the vibration analysis model aimed to find analysis parameters that can accurately simulate the vibration behavior of the test data. For calibration, power spectral density (PSD) diagrams were generated for both the measured signals from the test and the calculated signals from the analysis. The correlation coefficient between these two PSD plots was calculated. To find the analysis parameters, each parameter was defined as a variable with an appropriate range. Latin hypercube sampling was used to generate multiple sample points in the variable space. Analysis was performed for the generated sample points, and PSD plot correlation coefficients were calculated. Using the generated sample points and their corresponding results, a Gaussian Process Regression model was implemented for PSD plot correlation coefficients and the maximum PSD value. Based on the constructed surrogate model, the optimal analysis parameters were easily found without additional computations. Through this method, it was confirmed that the analysis model using the optimal parametes appropriately simulates the vibration behavior of the test.

Currently, the development of evaluation technology for vibration and shock loads transmitted to spent nuclear fuel and structural integrity of spent nuclear fuel under normal conditions of transport is progressing in Korea by the present authors. Road transportation tests using surrogate spent nuclear fuel were performed in September, 2020 using a test model of KORAD-21 transportation cask and sea transportation tests were conducted from September 30 to October 4, 2021. Finally, the shake table tests and rolling test were conducted from October 31 to November 2, 2022. As a result of the sea transportation test data analysis, an impact load resulting from the collision of objects was measured on fuel rods of a surrogate spent nuclear fuel assemblies during the rolling test was observed. Excessive rolling motion occurred on the ship during the rolling test, causing the surrogate spent nuclear fuel assemblies to slip and collide with the canister. To analyze under which conditions such impact loads occur and whether this event is possible under normal conditions of transport of spent nuclear fuel, a test was designed to simulate the rolling test in sea transportation and was performed. The rolling test was conducted on ACE7 and PLUS7 assemblies, respectively, varying the rolling angle and rolling frequency to determine at which angles and frequencies the assemblies experienced slippage. According to the test results, slippage of the used nuclear fuel assemblies can occur due to rolling motion at angles of approximately 14° or higher, leading to the possibility of generating impact loads. It was observed that the rolling angle is a more major factor for slippage than the rolling frequency. This exceeds the conditions under which a vessel can be permitted to depart for coastal navigation, thus it is considered to deviate from the normal conditions of transport of spent nuclear fuel. Therefore, it is not necessary to consider such loads for evaluating the integrity of spent nuclear fuel during normal transportation conditions.

Understanding the dispersion of xenon isotopes following a nuclear test is critical for global security and falls within the remit of both the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the International Noble Gas Experiment (INGE). This paper aims to show if it is possible to discriminate the source of xenon releases based on the atmospheric dispersion of xenon isotopes using HYSPLIT. Using ORIGEN and SERPENT simulations, four released scenarios are defined with four different fractionation times (i.e., 1 hour, 1 day, 10 days, and 30 days) after a 1kt TNT equivalent 235U explosion event. These time-delayed release scenarios were selected to certify the possibility of mis-determining xenon release source. We use the Lagrangian dispersion model for atmospheric dispersion to predict the concentration distribution of xenon isotopes under each scenario. The model allows us to better understand how these isotopes would distribute over time and space, offering valuable data for real-world detection efforts. To our knowledge, there have been no researches on the analysis of xenon isotopic ratios considering atmospheric dispersion. In this work, we focused on the atmospheric dispersion using HYSPLIT to characterize the xenon isotopic ratios from nuclear tests. In addition, we compared the xenon isotopic ratios obtained from the atmospheric dispersion with those from ORIGEN calculations, which would be helpful to discriminate the source of the xenon releases.

Transport packages have been developed to transport the decommissioning waste from the nuclear power plant. The packages are classified with Type IP-2 package. The IAEA requirements for Type IP-2 packages include that a free drop test should be performed for normal conditions of transport. In this study, drop tests of the packages were performed to prove the structural integrity and to verify the reliability of the analysis results by comparing the test and analysis results. Half-scale models were used for the drop tests and drop position was considered as 0.3 m oblique drop on packages weighing more than 15 tons. The strain and impact acceleration data were obtained to verify the reliability of the analysis results. Before and after the drop tests, radiation shielding tests were performed to confirm that the dose rate increase was within 20% at the external surface of the package. Also, measurement of bolt torque, and visual inspection were performed to confirm the loss or dispersion of the radioactive contents. After each drop test, slight deformations occurred in some packages. However, there was no loss of pretension in the lid bolts and the shielding thickness was not reduced for metal shields. In the package with concrete shield, the surface dose rate did not increase and there was no cracks or damage to the concrete. Therefore, the transport packages met the legal requirements (no more than a 20% increase of radiation level and no loss or dispersion of radioactive contents). Safety verifications were performed using the measured strain and acceleration data from the test, and the appropriate conservatism for the analysis results and the validity of the analysis model were confirmed. Therefore, it was found that the structural integrity of the packages was maintained under the drop test conditions. The results of this study were used as design data of the transport packages, and the packages will be used in the NPP decommissioning project in the future.

It is likely to occur internal exposure for workers in Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) due to the intake of radionuclide. To assess the internal exposure dose the measurement of activity for remain radionuclide is necessary. The Whole Body Counters (WBCs) are commonly used for measurement of remain radionuclide activity in human body. Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., Ltd. (KHNP) conduct performance test of WBCs in all NPPs for every year to confirm the performance of equipment. The performance test is conducted using unknown sources and the participants of the comparison test submit the radionuclide and activity of the unknown sources measured by WBC as a result. The performance indicator and criteria for WBC recommended in the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N13.30 report published in 2011 are applied. The performance indicator is Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) and criteria is 0.25 or less. The results of performance test performed in 2022 for all WBC is meet the ANSI N13.30 criteria. And the RMSE values are confirmed from 0.01 to 0.23. This means that the residual radioactivity measurement results using WBC are reliable.

In order to enter a nuclear power plant, access approval is required in advance, and biometric information such as fingerprints of visitors must be registered when issuing a key card, and only those certified through biometric equipment can enter the nuclear facilities (Protected area II). Fingerprint recognizers and facial recognizers are installed and operated in domestic nuclear facilities for access control. Domestic nuclear facilities establish and implement a protection system in accordance with physical protection requirements under the “Act on Physical Protection and Radiological Emergency” and “Physical Protection Regulations” of each nuclear facility. Detailed implementation standards are specified in Regulation Standard (RS) documents established and distributed by KINAC. Biometrics are mentioned in a KINAC RS-104 (Access Control) document. In this study, it was analyzed what points should be considered in order to prepare for performance tests and establish plans for biometric devices. In order for the results of performance evaluation of biometric devices to obtain high reliability and to be applied to nuclear facilities in the future, standardized performance evaluation targets, procedures, standards, and environments must be created. In order to collect samples such as fingerprints for performance evaluation, the size roll of the sample shall be determined, and the appropriateness of the sample size shall be evaluated in consideration of reliability and error range. In addition, the analysis results for the characteristics (gender, age, etc.) of the sample should be presented. When collecting samples, conflicts with other laws such as personal information protection should be considered, and the reliability of the performance test result data should be analyzed and presented. Quality evaluation should also be performed on forged biometric information data such as silicon fingerprints. In addition, when establishing a performance evaluation plan, a systematic evaluation procedure should be established by referring to domestic and foreign certification and evaluation systems such as the Korea Internet & security Agency (KISA). In order to improve the completeness of the access control system using the biometrics of nuclear facilities, it is necessary to test the performance of biometric devices and to install and operate only devices that have the ability to defend against counterfeit technology. In this study, it was analyzed what points should be considered in order to prepare for performance tests and establish plans for biometric devices.

Currently, the development of evaluation technology for vibration and shock loads transmitted to spent nuclear fuel and structural integrity of spent nuclear fuel under normal conditions of transport is progressing in Korea by the present authors. Road transportation tests using surrogate spent nuclear fuel were performed in September, 2020 using a test model of KORAD-21 transportation cask and sea transportation tests were conducted from September 30 to October 4, 2021. In order to investigate amplification or attenuation characteristics, according to the load transfer path, a number of accelerometers were attached on a ship cargo hold, cradle, cask, canister, disk assembly, basket, and surrogate fuel assemblies and to investigate the durability of spent nuclear fuel rods, strain gages were attached on surrogate fuel assemblies. A ship named “JW STELLA” which has similar deadweight (5,000 ton) of existing spent nuclear fuel transportation ships was used for the sea transportation tests. The ship is propelled by 1,825 hp two main engines with two 4-bladed propellers. There are two major vibration sources in the ship. One is the vibration from waves and the other is the vibration from the engine and propeller system. The sensor locations on the ship were determined considering the vibration sources. The sea transportation test was performed for 5 days, the test data were measured successfully. The ship with the test model was departed from Changwon and sailed to Uljin, sailed west to Yeonggwang and then returned to Changwon. In addition to sailing on a designated test route, circulation test, braking/acceleration test, depth of water test, and rolling test were conducted. As a result of the preliminary data analysis of the sea test, power spectral densities and shock response spectrums were obtained according to the different test conditions. The vibratory loads caused by the wave mainly occurred in the frequency range of 0.1 to 0.3 Hz. The vibratory loads caused by the propeller occurred near the n/rev rotating frequencies, such as 5, 10, 20 Hz etc. However, those frequencies are far from the natural frequencies of local mode of the fuel rods, so it is considered that the vibratory loads from the wave and the propeller do not have a significant influence on the structural integrity of the fuel rods. Among all the test cases, maximum strain occurred at SG31 near the bottom nozzle on the test; the magnitude was 73.62 micro strain. Based on the analyzed road and sea transportation test data, a few input spectra for the shaker table test will be obtained and the shaker table test will be conducted in 2022. It is expected that the detailed vibration characteristics of the assembly which were difficult to identify from the test results can be investigated.

북한은 2017년 9월 3일 풍계리 핵실험장에서 6차 지하 핵실험을 단행하였다. 이전에 수행했던 핵실험들과 달리 풍계리 핵 실험장 주변에서 몇 차례의 유발지진이 발생하였고 이로 인해 지하에 갇혀 있던 방사성제논이 대기 중으로 방출되는데 영향을 끼쳤을 것으로 예상된다. 본 연구에서는 북한의 6차 핵실험 이후에 발생한 유발지진을 고려하여 핵실험으로 발생한 방사성제논의 몇 가지 방출 시나리오에 따른 대기확산 모의실험을 본 연구진이 개발한 LADAS (Lagrangian Atmospheric Dose Assessment System) 모델에 기상청의 수치예보자료를 적용하여 수행하였다. 방사성제논의 가능한 검출 위치와 시간을 찾기 위해, 1일 간격 및 1주일 간격의 지연방출뿐만 아니라 유발지진으로 유출된 지연방출 시나리오도 설정하였다. 포괄 적핵실험금지조약기구(Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization)에서 운영중인 전세계관측망(International Monitoring System)과 원자력안전위원회의 133Xe 탐지 결과는 유발지진으로 유출된 방사성제논의 방출 시나리오에 따른 모의실험의 결과와 대체로 부합되었다.