Since the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, concerns about intentional aircraft crashes into nationally critical facilities have soared in countries around the world. The United States government advised nuclear utilities to strengthen the security of nuclear power plants against aircraft crashes and stipulated aircraft crash assessment for new nuclear facilities. Interest in military missile attacks on nuclear facilities has grown after Russia attacked Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, where spent nuclear power dry storage facility is operated. Spent nuclear fuel dry storage facilities in nuclear power plant sites should also strengthen security in preparation for such aircraft crashes. Most, but not all, spent nuclear fuel dry storage facilities in Europe, Japan and Canada are operated within buildings, while the United States and Korea operate dry storage facilities outdoors. Since all of Korea’s dry storage systems are concrete structures vulnerable to crash loads and are exposed to the outside, it is more necessary to prepare for aircraft crash terrorist attacks due to the Korea’s military situation. Residents near nuclear power plants are also demanding assessment and protective measures against such aircraft crashes. However, nuclear power plants, including spent nuclear fuel dry storage facilities, are strong structures and have very high security, so they are unlikely to be selected as targets of terrorism, and spent nuclear fuel dry storage systems are so small that aircraft cannot hit them accurately. Collected opinions on the assessment of aircraft crash accidents at spent nuclear fuel dry storage facilities in nuclear power plant sites were reviewed. In addition, the current laws and regulatory requirements related to strengthening the security of new and existing nuclear power plants against intentional aircraft crashes are summarized. Such strengthening of security can not only ensure the safety of on-site spent nuclear fuel dry storage facilities, but also contribute to the continuous operation of nuclear power plants by increasing resident acceptance.

In Korea, the construction of dry storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel is being promoted through the 2nd basic plan for high-level radioactive waste management. When operating dry storage facilities, exposure dose assessment for workers should be performed, and for this, exposure scenarios based on work procedures should be derived prior. However, the dry storage method has not yet been sufficiently established in Korea, so the work procedure has not been established. Therefore, research is needed to apply it domestically based on the analysis of spent nuclear fuel management methods in major overseas leading countries. In this study, the procedure for receiving and storing spent nuclear fuel in a concrete overpack-based storage facility was analyzed. Among the various spent nuclear fuel management systems, the metal overpack-based HI-STAR 100 system and the concrete overpackbased HI-STORM 100 system are quite common methods in the United States. Therefore, in this study, work procedures were analyzed based on each final safety analysis report. First, the HI-STAR 100 overpack enters the facility and is placed in the transfer area. Remove the impact limiter of the overpack and install the alignment device on the top of the overpack. Place the HI-TRAC, an on-site transfer device, on top of the alignment unit and remove the lids of the two devices to insert the canister into the HI-TRAC. When the canister transfer is complete, reseat the lid to seal it, and disconnect the HI-TRAC from the HI-STAR 100. Raise the canister-loaded HI-TRAC over the alignment device on the top of the HI-STORM 100 overpack and remove the lids of the two devices that are in contact. Insert the canister into the HI-STORM 100 and reseat the lid. The HI-STORM 100 loaded with spent nuclear fuel is transferred to the designated storage area. In this study, the procedure for receiving and storing spent nuclear fuel in a concrete overpack-based storage facility was analyzed. The main procedure was the transfer of canisters between overpacks, and it was confirmed that HI-TRAC was used in the work procedure. The results of this study can be used as basic data for evaluating the exposure dose of operating workers for the construction of dry storage facilities in Korea.

In the wake of the Fukushima NPP accident, research on the safety evaluation of spent fuel storage facilities for natural disasters such as earthquakes and tsunamis has been continuously conducted, but research on the protection integrity of spent fuel storage facilities is insufficient in terms of physical protection. In this study, accident scenarios that may occur structurally and thermally for spent fuel storage facilities were investigated and safety assessment cases for such scenarios were analyzed. Major domestic and international institutions and research institutes such as IAEA, NEA, and NRC provide 13 accident scenario types for Spent Fuel Pool, including loss-of-coolant accidents, aircraft collisions, fires, earthquakes. And 10 accident scenario types for Dry Storage Cask System, including transportation cask drop accidents, aircraft collisions, earthquakes. In the case of Spent Fuel Pool, the impact of the cooling function loss accident scenario was mainly evaluated through empirical experiments, and simulations were performed on the dropping of spent nuclear fuel assembly using simulation codes such as ABAQUS. For Dry Storage Cask System, accident scenarios involving structural behavior, such as degradation and fracture, and experimental and structural accident analyses were performed for storage cask drop and aircraft collision accidents. To evaluate the safety of storage container drop accidents, an empirical test on the container was conducted and the simulation was conducted using the limited element analysis software. Among the accident scenarios for spent fuel storage facilities, aircraft and missile collisions, fires, and explosions are representative accidents that can be caused by malicious external threats. In terms of physical protection, it is necessary to analyze various accident scenarios that may occur due to malicious external threats. Additionally, through the analysis of design basis threats and the protection level of nuclear facilities, it is necessary to derive the probability of aircraft and missile collision and the threat success probability of fire and explosion, and to perform protection integrity evaluation studies, such as for the walls and structures, for spent fuel storage facilities considering safety evaluation methods when a terrorist attack occurs with the derived probability.

Radiation dose rates for spent fuel storage casks and storage facilities of them are typically calculated using Monte Carlo calculation codes. In particular, Monte Carlo computer code has the advantage of being able to analyze radiation transport very similar to the actual situation and accurately simulate complex structures. However, to evaluate the radiation dose rate for models such as ISFSI (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation) with a lot of spent fuel storage casks using Monte Carlo computational techniques has a disadvantage that it takes considerable computational time. This is because the radiation dose rate from the cask located at the outermost part of the storage facility to hundreds of meters must be calculated. In addition, if a building is considered in addition to many storage casks, more analysis time is required. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the efficiency of the computational techniques in order to evaluate the radiation dose rate for the ISFSI using Monte Carlo computational codes. The radiation dose rate evaluation of storage facilities using evaluation techniques for improving calculation efficiency is performed in the following steps. (1) simplified change in detailed analysis model for single storage cask, (2) create source term for the outermost side and top surface of the storage cask, (3) full modeling for storage facilities using casks with surface sources, (4) evaluation of radiation dose rate by distance corresponding to the dose rate limit. Using this calculation method, the dose rate according to the distance was evaluated by assuming that the concrete storage cask (KORAD21C) and the horizontal storage module (NUHOMS-HSM) were stored in the storage facility. As a result of calculation, the distance to boundary of the radiation control area and restricted area of the storage facility is respectively 75 m / 530 m (KORAD21C case), and 20 m / 350 m (NUHOMS-HSM case).

Some Spent Fuel Pools (SFPs) will be full of Spent Nuclear Fuels (SNFs) within several years. Because of this reason, building interim storage facilities or permanent disposal facilities should be considered. These storage facilities are divided into wet storage facilities and dry storage facilities. Wet storage facility is a method of storing SNF in SFP to cool decay heat and shielding radiation, and dry storage facility is a method of storing SNF in a cask and placing on the ground or storage building. However, wet storage facilities have disadvantages in that operating costs are higher than that of dry storage facilities, and additional capacity expansion is difficult. Dry storage facilities have relatively low operating costs and are relatively easy to increase capacity when additional SNFs need to be stored. For this reason, since the 1990s, the number of cases of applying dry storage facilities has been increasing even abroad. Dry storage facilities are divided into indoor storage facilities and outdoor storage facilities, and outdoor storage facilities are mostly used to take advantage of dry storage facilities. In the case of outdoor storage facilities, the cask in which SNFs are stored is placed on a designed concrete pad. During this storage, the boring heat generated by SNFs cools into natural convection and the cask shields the radiation that SNFs generates. However, if an accident such as an earthquake occurs and the cask overturns during storage, there may be a risk of radiation leakage. Such a tip-over accident may be caused by the cask slipping due to the vibration of an earthquake, or by not supporting the cask properly due to a problem in the concrete pad. Therefore, in the case of outdoor dry storage facilities, it is necessary to evaluate the seismic safety of concrete pads. In this paper, various soil conditions were applied in the seismic analysis. Soil conditions were classified according to the shear wave velocity, and the shear wave velocity was classified according to the ground classification criteria according to the general seismic design (KDS 17 10 00). The concrete pad was designed with a size that 8 casks can be arranged at regular intervals, and 11# reinforcing bars were used for the design of the internal reinforcement of the concrete pad according to literature research. The cask was designed as a rigid body to shorten the analysis time. The soil to which the elastic model was applied was designed under the concrete pad, and infinite elements were applied to the sides and bottom of the soil. The effect on the concrete pad and cask by applying a seismic wave conforming to RG 1.60 to the bottom of the soil was analyzed with a finite element model.

The IAEA states that in the event of sabotage, nuclear material and equipment in quantities that can cause high radiological consequences (HRC), as well as the minimum systems and devices necessary to prevent HRC, must be located within one or more vital areas. Accordingly, in Article 2 of the ACT ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY, the definition of the vital area is specified, and a nuclear facility operator submits a draft to the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission to establish vital areas and must obtain approval from Nuclear Safety and Security Commission. Since the spent fuel pool and new fuel storage area are areas where nuclear material is used and stored, they can be candidates for vital areas as direct targets of sabotage. The spent fuel pool is a wet spent fuel storage facility currently operated by most power plants in Korea to cool and store spent nuclear fuel. Considering the HRC against sabotage, it is necessary to review whether sepnt fuel pool needs to establish a vital area. In addition, depending on the status of plant operation during the spent fuel management cycle, the operation status of safety systems to mitigate accidents and power system change, so vital areas in fuel handling building (including spent fuel pool) also need to be adjusted flexibly. This study compares the results of the review on whether the essential consideration factors are reflected in the identification of essential safety systems and devices to minimize HRC caused by sabotage in the spent fuel storage system with the procedure for identifying the vital area in nuclear power plants. It was reviewed from the following viewpoints: Necessity to identify necessary devices to minimize the radiation effects against sabotage on the spent fuel pool, Review of necessary elements when identifying vital areas to minimize the radiation effects of spent fuel pool against sabotage, Necessity to adjust vital areas according to the spent fuel management cycle. The main assumptions used in the analysis of the vital area of the power plant need to be equally reflected when identifying vital areas in spent fuel pool. And, the results of this study are for the purpose of minimizing the radiological consequences against sabotage on the spent fuel storage system including the spent fuel pool and used to establish regulatory standards in the spent fuel storage stage.

PURPOSES : The purpose of this research was to select sites that are appropriate for the storage of individual protective gear that can be used by traffic-controlling police when chemical terrorism occurs. METHODS : A storage facility, which is classified as Class A in the Act on Safety Action at Facilities Vulnerable to Terrorism, is defined for use in the event of soft-target chemical terrorism. Considering the number of controlled intersections and the police stations/substations within a radius of 750 m, the jurisdiction of traffic police and grade of protective gear were identified using ammonia, which has the widest protection boundary among known chemical terrorism substances. RESULTS : The results indicate that mobilization should only occur after the police have put on protective gear at the nearby station, regardless of the police district. Additionally, Class B protective gear should be furnished if there is a police station/substation within the jurisdiction, whereas Class C protective gear should be furnished if there is police station/substation outside of the jurisdiction. CONCLUSIONS : Because it is inefficient to keep protective gear at all police stations/substations, appropriate sites should be selected in accordance with chemical terrorism action strategy.

강우의 변화가 없다고 가정하더라도 도시화가 진행될수록 불투수성 면적이 증가하고 유역 표면이 도시화 이전보다 매끈하게 진행됨에 따라 첨두유량의 크기는 증가하고 첨두유량이 발생하는 시간이 이전보다 빨라진다. 도시화 이전보다 침투량이 감소함에 따라 유출체적 또한 증가된다. 근래에는 기후 변화로 인하여 과거보다 강우량이 증가되어 도시 내 첨두유량과 유출체적은 크게 증가되는 추세에 있다. 그러므로 도시수문환경 변화의 주된 요인은 강우량의 증가, 불투수성면적 증가, 유역표면의 매끈함, 개발을 통한 배수구역의 변화, 과다한 지하수 채수 등이라 할 수 있다. 도시방재 측면에서 홍수량 변화에 영향을 주는 인자는 강우량의 증가는 차지하더라도 불투수성 면적의 증가이다. 그러므로 도시 유역내 홍수량의 저감을 통한 도시방재성능을 제고하기 위해서는 증가된 불투수성면적을 투수성면적으로 환원하는 방안이 근본적인 대책이라 할 수 있다. 하지만 거의 포화적으로 개발된 도시특성에 비추어 볼 때, 투수성 면적의 복원은 많은 시간과 예산이 수반된다. 더구나 투수성 면적 복원과 같은 유역대책은 도입되는 지역이 도심내 작은 규모로 산재되어 있고 그의 효과도 파격적으로 눈에 띄지 않아 정부나 지자체에서 적극적인 도입을 주저하고 있는 실정이다. 본 연구는 방재성능 제고에 통상 도입되고 있는 유하시설의 개선 방안과 저류시설의 도입 방안을 설정한 개선방안 절차를 제시하였다. 개선방안 절차의 적정성을 판단하기 위하여 용산배수구역을 표본지구로 선정하였으며 수문학 및 수리학적 분석과 경제성 분석을 통하여 개선방안 절차의 적용성 여부를 판단코자 하였다.

지표수의 수문순환 및 성분의 변동 영향 요소로는 강우, 증발, 토양수분 등의 자연적인 요소와 도시화 및 유역내 저류시설물 등의 인위적인 요소가 있다. 특히, 장기 유출 변동에 영향을 끼치는 인위적인 요소 중 저류시설을 대표적으로 들 수 있는데, 이들 영향은 단기적으로는 유출 감쇄특성의 변화, 장기적으로는 저류량 증가에 따른 건기 계절유량의 증가, 년 유황 또는 유출 특성의 변화 등의 영향을 예측할 수 있다. 우리나라와 같은 인공 저류시설이 산재한 지역에