Because most spent nuclear fuel storage casks have been designed for low burnup fuel, a safety-significant high burnup dry storage cask must be developed for nuclear facilities in Korea to store the increasing high burnup and damaged fuels. More than 20% of fuels generated by PWRs comprise high burnup fuels. This study conducted a structural safety evaluation of the preliminary designs for a high burnup storage cask with 21 spent nuclear fuels and evaluated feasible loading conditions under normal, off-normal, and accident conditions. Two types of metal and concrete storage casks were used in the evaluation. Structural integrity was assessed by comparing load combinations and stress intensity limits under each condition. Evaluation results showed that the storage cask had secured structural integrity as it satisfied the stress intensity limit under normal, off-normal, and accident conditions. These results can be used as baseline data for the detailed design of high burnup storage casks.

In this research, a detailed analysis of the decay heat contributions of both actinides and non-actinides (fission fragments) from spent nuclear fuel (SNF) was made after 50 GWd·tHM−1 burnup of fresh uranium fuel with 4.5% enrichment lasted for 1,350 days. The calculations were made for a long storage period of 300 years divided into four sections 1, 10, 100, and 300 years so that we could study the decay heat and physical disposal ratios of radioactive waste in medium- and long-term storage periods. Fresh fuel burnup calculations were made using the code MCNP, while isotopic content and then decay heat were calculated using the built-in stiff equation solver in the MATLAB code. It is noted that only around 12 isotopes contribute more than 90% of the decay heat at all times. It is also noted that the contribution of actinides persists and is the dominant ether despite decreasing decay heat, while the effect of fission products decreases at a very rapid rate after about 40 years of storage.

A transfer cask serves as the container for transporting and handling canisters loaded with spent nuclear fuels from light water reactors. This study focuses on a cylindrical transfer cask, standing at 5,300 mm with an external diameter of 2,170 mm, featuring impact limiters on the top and bottom sides. The base of the cask body has an openable/closable lid for loading canisters with storage modules. The transfer cask houses a canister containing spent nuclear fuels from lightweight reactors, serving as the confinement boundary while the cask itself lacks the confinement structure. The objective of this study was to conduct a structural analysis evaluation of the transfer cask, currently under development in Korea, ensuring its safety. This evaluation encompasses analyses of loads under normal, off-normal, and accident conditions, adhering to NUREG-2215. Structural integrity was assessed by comparing combined results for each load against stress limits. The results confirm that the transfer cask meets stress limits across normal, off-normal, and accident conditions, establishing its structural safety.

The objective of this study is development of graphite-boron composite material as a replacement for metal canisters to Improve the heat dissipation and radiation shielding performance of dry spent nuclear fuel storage system and reduce the volume of waste storage system. KEARI research team plan to use the graphite matrix manufacturing technology to pelletize the graphite matrix and adjust the content of phenolic resin binder to minimize pore formation. Specifically, we plan to adjust the ratio of natural and synthetic graphite powder and use uniaxial pressing technology to manufacture black graphite matrix with extremely high radial thermal conductivity. After optimizing the thermal conductivity of the graphite matrix, we plan to mix it with selected boron compounds, shape it, and perform sintering and purification heat treatments at high temperatures to manufacture standard composite materials.

In this study, a fracture evaluation of the spent nuclear fuel storage canister was conducted. Stainless steel alloys are typically used as the material for canisters, and therefore, a separate destructive evaluation is not required for safety analysis reports. However, in this research, a methodology for conducting a destructive evaluation was proposed for assessing the acceptability of cracks detected during in-service inspections for long-term storage due to reasons such as stress corrosion cracking. For the fracture evaluation, analytical equations provided in the design code such ASME were employed, and finite element method (FEM) based linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) was performed to validate the effectiveness of the analytical equations. Impact analyses such as tip-over of the storage cask on a concrete pad were performed, and the fracture evaluation using stresses resulting from the impact analysis under accident conditions and residual stresses from welds were carried out. Through this research, geometric dimensions for cracks exceeding the fracture criteria were established.

Notice of the NSSC No.2021-14 defines the term ‘Neutron Absorber’ as a material with a high neutron absorption cross section, which is used to prevent criticality during nuclear fission reactions and includes neutron absorbers as target items for manufacture inspection. U.S.NRC report of the NUREG-2214 states that the subcriticality of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in Dry Storage Systems (DSSs) may be maintained, in part, by the placement of neutron absorbers, or poison plates, around the fuel assemblies. This report mentions the need for Time-Limited Aging Analysis (TLAA) on depletion of Boron (10B) in neutron absorbers for HI-STORM 100 and HISTAR 100. Also, this report mentions that 10B depletion occurs during neutron irradiation of neutron absorbers, but only 0.02% of the available 10B is to be depleted through conservative assumptions regarding the neutron flux or accumulated fluence during irradiation, which supports the continued use of the neutron absorbers in the SNF dry storage cask even after 60 years of evaluated period. There are several types of commercially available neutron absorbers, broadly classified into Boron Carbide Cermets (e.g., Boral®), Metal Matrix Composites (MMC) (e.g., METAMIC), Borated Stainless Steel (BSS), and Borated Al alloy. While irradiation tests for neutron absorbers are primarily conducted during wet storage systems, there are also some prior studies available on irradiation tests for neutron absorbers during dry storage systems. For examples, there is an analysis of previous research on high-temperature irradiation test of metallic materials and identification of limitations in existing methodologies were conducted. Furthermore, an improvement plan for simulating the high-temperature irradiation damage of neutron absorbers was developed. In report published by corrosion society summarizes the evaluation results of the degradation mechanisms for Stainless Steel- and Al-based neutron absorbers used in SNF dry storage systems.

International Atomic Energy Agency defines the term “Poison” as a substance used to reduce reactivity, by virtue of its high neutron absorption cross-section, in IAEA glossary. Poison material is generally used in the reactor core, but it is also used in dry storage systems to maintain the subcriticality of spent fuel. Most neutron poison materials for dry storage systems are boron-based materials such as Al-B Carbide Cermet (e.g., Boral®), Al-B Carbide MMC (e.g., METAMIC), Borated Stainless Steel, Borated Al alloy. These materials help maintain subcriticality as a part of the basket. U.S.NRC report NUREG-2214 provides a general assessment of aging mechanisms that may impair the ability of SSCs of dry storage systems to perform their safety functions during longterm storage periods. Boron depletion is an aging mechanism of neutron poison evaluated in that report. Although that report concludes that boron depletion is not considered to be a credible aging mechanism, the report says analysis of boron depletion is needed in original design bases for providing long-term safety of DSS. Therefore, this study aimed to simulate the composition change of neutron poison material in the KORAD-21 system during cooling time considering spent fuel that can be stored. The neutron source term of spent fuel was calculated by ORIGEN-ARP. Using that source term, neutron transport calculation for counting neutrons that reach neutron poison material was carried out by MCNP®-6.2. Then, the composition change of neutron poison material by neutron-induced reaction was simulated by FISPACT-II. The boron-10 concentration change of neutron poison material was analyzed at the end. This study is expected to be the preliminary study for the aging analysis of neutron poison material about boron depletion.

Due to the saturation of spent fuel pool of nuclear power plant in Korea, temporary storage for spent fuel will be installed, and spent fuel will be stored and managed in dry cask for a considerable period of time. Since spent nuclear fuel must withstand continuous decay heat, radiation and high internal pressure of the fuel rod in the cask, behavior of spent nuclear fuel is needed to be reviewed. Spent nuclear fuel used in Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) in Korea is stored in a wet storage currently, but it is going to store a temporary dry-storage facility on Kori site. Therefore, it is very important and meaningful to evaluate the behavior of nuclear fuel with realistic modeling. Also, domestic PWR nuclear fuel has various burn-up. In the past, the burn-up of nuclear fuel in light water reactors was low, but in order to increase power generation efficiency, the concentration of uranium was increased and the number of new fuel was increased. Therefore, a large amount of nuclear fuel with burn-up of 45,000 MWD/MTU or higher, generally called high burn-up, is also stored in the spent fuel pool (SFP). Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate by dividing three different burn-up such as, low, medium, and high burn-up. Thus, this study will review the behavior of nuclear fuel at different burn-up during the temporary storage period with FALCON (EPRI), computational code and analyze the factors affecting the integrity of nuclear fuel, including when the temporary storage is extended its additional lifetime. And this evaluation will contribute developing the spent fuel management plan in Korea.

In Korea, most temporary storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel are nearing saturation. As an alternative to this, the 2nd basic plan for high-level radioactive waste management specified the operation plan of dry interim storage facility. Meanwhile, the NSSC No. 2021-19 stipulates that it is necessary to evaluate the possibility and potential effect of accident before operating interim storage facility. Therefore, this study analyzed the categories of accident scenarios that may occur in dry storage facility as part of prior research on this. We investigated the case of categorization of dry storage facility accident scenarios of IAEA, NRC, KAREI, and KINS. The IAEA presented accident scenarios that could occur in on-site dry storage facility operated with silo and cask method. NRC has classified accident scenarios in dry storage facility and estimated the probability of accidents for each. KAERI and KINS selected major accident scenarios and analyzed the processes for each, in preparation for the introduction of dry storage facility in Korea in the future. Overall, a total of 10 accident scenarios were considered, and the scenarios considered by each institution were different. Among 10 scenarios, cask drop and aircraft collision were included in the categorization of most institutions. The results of this study can be used as basic data for cataloging accidents subject to safety evaluation when introducing dry interim storage facility in Korea in the future.

In nuclear facilities, a graded approach is applied to achieve safety effectively and efficiently. It means that the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that are important to safety should be assured to be high quality. Accordingly, SSCs that consist of nuclear facilities should be classified with respect to their safety importance as several classes, so that the requirements of quality assurance relevant to the designing, manufacturing, testing, maintenance, etc. can be applied. Guidance for the safety classification of SSCs consisting of nuclear power plants and radioactive waste management facilities was developed by U.S.NRC and IAEA. Especially, in guidance for nuclear power plants, safety significance can be evaluated as following details. The single SSC that mitigates or/and prevents the radiological consequence or hazard was assumed to be failure or malfunction as the initiating event/accident occurred and the following radiological consequence was evaluated. Considering both the consequence and frequency of the occurrence of the initiating event/accident, the safety significance of each SSC can be evaluated. Based on the evaluated safety significance, a safety class can be assigned. The guidance for the safety classification of the spent nuclear fuel dry storage systems (DSS) was also developed in the United States (NUREG/CR-6407) and the U.S.NRC acknowledges the application of it to the safety classification of DSS in the United States. Also, worldwide including the KOREA, that guidance has been applied to several DSSs. However, the guidance does not include the methodology for classifying the safety or the evaluated safety significance of each SSC, and the classification criteria are not based on quantitative safety significance but are expressed somewhat qualitatively. Vendors of DSS may have difficulties to apply this guidance appropriately due to the different design characteristics of DSSs. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to evaluate the safety significance of representative SSCs in DSS. A framework was established to evaluate the safety significance of SSCs performing safety functions related to radiation shielding and confinement of radioactive materials. Furthermore, the framework was applied to the test case.

As regulations on carbon emissions increase, the interest in renewable energy is also increasing. However, the efficiency of renewable energy generation is highly low and has limitations in replacing existing energy consumption. In terms of this view, nuclear power generation is highlighted because it has the advantage of not emitting carbon. And accordingly, the amount of spent nuclear fuel is going to increase naturally in the future. Therefore, it will be important to obtain the reliability of containers for transporting safely and storing spent nuclear fuel. In this study, a method for verifying the integrity and airtightness of a metal cask for the safe transportation and storage of spent nuclear fuel was studied. Non-destructive testing, thermal stability, leakage stability, and neutron shielding were demonstrated, and as a result, suitable quality for loading spent nuclear fuel could be obtained. Furthermore, it is meaningful in that it has secured manufacturing technology that can be directly applied to industrial field by verifying actual products.

There have been a variety of issues related to spent nuclear fuel in Korea recently. Most of the issues are related to intermediate storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. However, recently, various studies have been started in advanced nuclear countries such as the United States to reduce spent nuclear fuel, focusing on measures to reduce spent nuclear fuel. In this study, a simple preliminary assessment of the thermal part was performed for the consolidation storage method which separates fuel rods from spent nuclear fuel and stores them. The preliminary thermal evaluation was analyzed separately for storing the spent fuel in fuel assembly state and separating the fuel rods and storing them. The consolidation storage method in separating the fuel rods was advantageous in terms of thermal conductivity. However, detailed evaluation should be performed considering heat transfer by convection and vessel shape when storing multiple fuel bundles simultaneously.

In Korea, the construction of dry storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel is being promoted through the 2nd basic plan for high-level radioactive waste management. When operating dry storage facilities, exposure dose assessment for workers should be performed, and for this, exposure scenarios based on work procedures should be derived prior. However, the dry storage method has not yet been sufficiently established in Korea, so the work procedure has not been established. Therefore, research is needed to apply it domestically based on the analysis of spent nuclear fuel management methods in major overseas leading countries. In this study, the procedure for receiving and storing spent nuclear fuel in a concrete overpack-based storage facility was analyzed. Among the various spent nuclear fuel management systems, the metal overpack-based HI-STAR 100 system and the concrete overpackbased HI-STORM 100 system are quite common methods in the United States. Therefore, in this study, work procedures were analyzed based on each final safety analysis report. First, the HI-STAR 100 overpack enters the facility and is placed in the transfer area. Remove the impact limiter of the overpack and install the alignment device on the top of the overpack. Place the HI-TRAC, an on-site transfer device, on top of the alignment unit and remove the lids of the two devices to insert the canister into the HI-TRAC. When the canister transfer is complete, reseat the lid to seal it, and disconnect the HI-TRAC from the HI-STAR 100. Raise the canister-loaded HI-TRAC over the alignment device on the top of the HI-STORM 100 overpack and remove the lids of the two devices that are in contact. Insert the canister into the HI-STORM 100 and reseat the lid. The HI-STORM 100 loaded with spent nuclear fuel is transferred to the designated storage area. In this study, the procedure for receiving and storing spent nuclear fuel in a concrete overpack-based storage facility was analyzed. The main procedure was the transfer of canisters between overpacks, and it was confirmed that HI-TRAC was used in the work procedure. The results of this study can be used as basic data for evaluating the exposure dose of operating workers for the construction of dry storage facilities in Korea.

Once systems, structures and components (SSCs) of dry storage systems are classified with respect to safety function or safety significance (i.e., safety classification), appropriate engineering rules can be applied to ensure that they are designed, manufactured, maintained, managed (e.g. aging management) etc. In Unites States, the systems, structures and components (SSCs) consisting DSSs are classified into two or several grades (i.e., class A, B and C or not important to safety, and important to safety (ITS) or not important to safety (NITS)) with respect to intended safety function and safety significance. This classification methods were based on Regulatory Guide 7.10 (i.e., guidance for use in developing quality assurance programs for packaging). Also, in Korea, SSCs of DSSs should be classified into ITS and NITS in much the same as method based on Regulatory Guide 7.10. In that guidance, for providing graded approach to manage the SSCs of packaging, they were trying to classifying SSCs in accordance with radiological consequences. But there was limitations that the provided classification criteria was still qualitative, so that it was not enough for managing the SSCs according to graded approach. On the other hand, in some other nuclear facilities (i.e., nuclear power plant, radioactive waste management facility and disposal facility etc.), quantitative criteria relevant to radiological consequence (i.e., radiation doses to workers or to the public) or inventory of radioactivity are existed so that it can be applied for classifying safety classes. In summary, the study on the application safety classification that applied quantitative criteria to perform safety classification of SSCs in DSS is inadequate or insufficient. The purpose of this study is proposing the preliminary framework for estimating safety significance of SSCs in DSS which can be utilized in our further advanced studies. In this study, a framework was established to estimate the safety significance of SSCs related to radiation shielding and confinement using MCNP® 6.2 and Microsoft Excel. Referring to the methodology of IAEA Specific Safety Guide 30, we assumed severity for failures of components that could lead to degradation of the SSC’s performance. The safety class of SSC was decided based on the impact of SSC’s failure on consequences.

Al-B4C neutron absorbers are currently widely used to maintain the subcriticality of both wet and dry storage facilities of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), thus long-term and high-temperature material integrity of the absorbers has to be guaranteed for the expected operation periods of those facilities. Surface corrosion solely has been the main issue for the absorber performance and safety; however, the possibility of irradiation-assisted degradation has been recently suggested from an investigation on Al-B4C surveillance coupons used in a Korean spent nuclear fuel pool (SFP). Larger radiation damage than expectation was speculated to be induced from 10B(n, α)7Li reactions, which emit about a MeV α-particles and Li ions. In this study, we experimentally emulated the radiation damage accumulated in an Al-B4C neutron absorber utilizing heavy-ion accelerator. The absorber specimens were irradiated with He ions at various estimated system temperatures for a model SNF storage facility (room temperature, 150, 270, and 400°C). Through the in-situ heated ion irradiation, three exponentially increasing level of radiation damages (0.01, 0.1, and 1 dpa or displacement per atom) were achieved to compare differential gas bubble formation at near surface of the absorber, which could cause premature absorber corrosion and subsequential 10B loss in an SNF storage system. An extremely high radiation damage (10 dpa), which is unlikely achievable during a dry storage period, was also emulated through high temperature irradiation (350°C) to further test the radiation resistance of the absorber, conservatively. The irradiated specimens were characterized using HR-TEM and the average size and number density of radiation-induced He bubbles were measured from the obtained bright field (BF) TEM micrographs. Measured helium bubble sizes tend to increase with increasing system (or irradiation) temperature while decrease in their number density. Helium bubbles were found from even the lowest radiation damage specimens (0.01 dpa). Bubble coalescence was significant at grain boundaries and the irradiated specimen morphology was particularly similar with the bubble morphology observed at the interface between aluminum alloy matrix and B4C particle of the surveillance coupons. These characterized irradiated specimens will be used for the corrosion test with high-temperature humid gas to further study the irradiation-assisted degradation mechanism of the absorber in dry SNF storage system.

Long-term safe storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) determines sustainability of the current light water reactor (LWR) fleet. In the U.S., SNF is stored in stainless steel canister in dry cask storage system (DCSS) after spending several years in wet pool storage system while there is no DSCC in Republic of Korea. The SNF storage time in DSCC is expected to be multiple decades since no permanent geological repositories are identified in both countries. One limiting factor for extended storage of SNF in DSCC is chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking (CISCC) in the welded regions of the stainless steel canisters. The propensity for the occurrence of CISCC has warranted the development of the mitigation and repair technologies to ensure the safe and long-term storage for both present and new canister although no CISCC failure was reported yet. This study investigates cold spray deposition coatings of 304 L and 316 L stainless steels on prototypical stainless steel canisters such as sensitized flat and C-ring samples. The cold spray technology has been identified as the most promising approach by Extended Storage Collaboration Program (ESCP) driven by Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). The talk includes microstructural characterization, adhesion strength measurement, residual stress evaluation, and corrosion behavior of the coated materials in boiling MgCl2 solution and electrochemical corrosion tests in NaCl solution. In addition, the capability of repair of cracks on the canister surface using the coating technology will be presented.

In Korea, research on the introduction of dry storage facility is being conducted as an alternative to saturation of temporary storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel. The introduction of dry storage facilities requires a radiological impact assessment on the workers of the facility, and for this, an appropriate exposure scenario must be derived through work procedure analysis. In this study, the procedure for storing spent nuclear fuel in dry storage facilities was analyzed based on the case of evaluating the radiological impact of workers in dry storage facilities abroad. We investigated cases of radiological impact assessment on workers at on-site dry storage facilities by PNNL, Dominion, and P. F. Weck. PNNL and Dominion analyzed the storage work procedure of the VSC (Vertical Storage Cask) method using CASTOR V/21, TN-32, respectively, and conducted a radiological impact assessment. P. F. Weck analyzed the storage work procedure of various spent nuclear fuel casks for VSC and HSM (Horizontal Storage Module), conducted a radiological impact assessment. As a result of comparing the procedure for storing spent nuclear fuel by case, it was found that the storage procedure was determined by the storage method and the cask type. In the case of VSC method, canister-type casks and basket-type casks are used, and the storage procedure are partially different according to each. Canister-type cask requires repackaging from transfer overpack to storage overpack, but basket-type cask doesn’t require that procedure. In the case of the HSM method, only the canister type cask was found to be used. However, the storage procedure was different depending on the type of HSM system. Depending on the type of HSM system, the necessity of cask for on-site transport was different. In this study, we investigated and analyzed the work procedure according to the storage method of dry storage facilities abroad. It was found that the dry storage procedure of spent nuclear fuel different according to the storage method and type of cask. The results of this study can be used as basic when deriving the exposure scenario for spent nuclear fuel dry storage workers suitable for the domestic situation.