Around the world, Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) have been operated since the 1950s and are used as a major power source. In Korea, Kori unit 1 stared commercial operation for the first time in 1978, and as of 2023, 25 units of NPPs are in operation. NPPs produce electricity for about 40 to 60 years after receiving an operating license, and after securing safety through a safety evaluation, the operating period is extended. NPPs that operate for a long time are systematically evaluated for safety at regular intervals through Periodic Safety Review (PSR) recommended by the IAEA. In Korea, PSR has been introduced and performed since 2000. This study reviewed the process of the PSR by comparing with the international PSR procedure. The PSR process is established through the IAEA SSG-25 document and proceeds in the order of establishment of basis document - individual factor evaluation - global assessment - integrated improvement plan. In Korea, PSR is carried out in a similar process, but there are some differences from the IAEA’s procedure. The safety factor review is conducted under the agreement of basis document between the licensee and the regulatory body, but the prior agreement procedure with the regulatory body is not reflected in Korea. As a result, if the licensee and the regulatory body have different opinions on the current licensing basis and the modern safety standards after the evaluation is performed, a difference may occur in the review results and safety enhancement items, which may lead to inefficient PSR progress. PSR is conducted for the continuous safe operation and management of NPPs, and it is important to refer to overseas standards and cases. Although procedures, guidelines, and regulatory requirements are in place in Korea, continuous review and improvement are required. It is necessary to improve procedures such as basis document and global assessment in order to more efficiently carry out PSR evaluation by regulatory agency and licensee’s safety enhancement actions of domestic NPPs

As a result of various generation, transmutation, and decay schemes, a wide variety of radionuclides exist in the reactor prior to accident occurrence. Considering all of the radionuclides as the accident source term in an offsite consequence analysis will inevitably take up excessive computer resources and time. Calculation time can be reduced with minimal impact on the accuracy of the results by considering only the nuclides that have a significant effect on the calculation among the potential radioactive sources that may be released into the environment. In earlier studies related to offsite consequence analysis, it is shown that the principal criteria for the radionuclide screening applied are as follows; radionuclide inventory in the reactor, radioactive half-life, radionuclide release fraction to the environment, relative dose contribution of nuclides within a specific group, and radiobiological importance. As a result, it is confirmed that 54, 60, and 69 nuclides are applied to the risk assessment performed in WASH-1400, NUREG-1150, and SOARCA (State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses) project in the United States, respectively. In addition, in this study, the technical consultations with domestic and foreign experts were carried out to confirm details on criteria and process for screening out radionuclides in offsite consequence analysis. In this paper, based on the literature survey and technical consulting, we derived the screening process of selecting a list of radionuclides to be considered in the offsite consequence analysis. The first step is to eliminate radionuclides with little core inventory (less than specific threshold) or very short half-lives. However, important decay products of radionuclides that have short half-lives should not be excluded by this process. The next step is to further eliminate radionuclides by considering contribution to offsite impact, which is defined as a product of radioactivity released to the environment (i.e. ‘inventory in the reactor’ times ‘release fraction to offsite’) and comprehensive dose (or risk) coefficient taking into account all exposure pathways to be included. The final step is to delete isotopes that contribute less than certain threshold to any important dose metric through additional computer runs for each important source term. Even though it is presumed that this process is applicable to existing light water reactors and the set of accidents that would be considered in PSA, some of the assumptions or specific recommendations may need to be reconsidered for other reactor types or set of accident categories.

At Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), aging management is performed as part of the Periodic Safety Review (PSR) in accordance with the Nuclear Safety Act. The purpose of the aging management program (AMP) is to manage the integrity of structures, systems and components (SSCs) in NPPs over time and use. Through this, aging deterioration is mitigated to increase equipment life and secure long-term operation safety. Fuel Oil Chemistry is one of the AMPs. Through this program, aging management is performed for storage tanks, piping and other metal components that contact with diesel fuel oil. The program is focused on managing loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and microbiologically-influenced corrosion (MIC) and fouling that leads to corrosion of the diesel fuel tank internal surfaces. The fuel oil aging management method currently applied to NPPs in Korea measures the concentration of water and particulate contamination in the oil, analyzed the trend, and periodically cleans and inspect the inside of tanks. Among them, in monitoring MIC, a direct analysis and monitoring of the amount of microorganisms may be more effective. In this study, a method for improving the MIC monitoring system for diesel fuel oil systems was reviewed by reviewing reference documents including NUREG 1801 and examining the methods actually applied in US NPPs.

Cs-137, a radioactive isotope of caesium, is a commonly occurring fission product that is generated during the nuclear fission of U-235 and other fissionable isotopes in both nuclear reactors and weapons. Due to its long half-life of about 30 years and propensity to accumulate in sediments and marine organisms, Cs-137 is considered a major radionuclide for environmental radioactivity monitoring. In April 2021, as the Japanese government decided to discharge Fukushima contaminated water into the sea, the monitoring of marine radioactivity in South Korea has become increasingly significant. In this study, as an initial step towards establishing a standardized procedure for analyzing radioactive caesium in seawater, the radioactivity of Cs-137 was analyzed on a 2 L of seawater spiked with 10 Bq of Cs-137 standard solution supplied by KRISS. The seawater was collected from Im-nang Beach, situated at a distance of approximately 2 kilometers from DIRAMS. The radioactivity of Cs-137 in seawater was determined according to the improved AMP procedure presented by M.Aoyama in 2000. The seawater was pretreated using Ammonium Phosphomolybdate (AMP) coprecipitation, which has a high selectivity for caesium (Kd = ~5500), and the activity of Cs-137 was determined by gammaspectroscopy and subsequently corrected via the weight yield. The weight yield of the dried AMP/Cs compound was more than 93%. For the gamma-spectroscopy analysis, the AMP/Cs compound was dissolved in a cylindrical U8 beaker with NaOH to ensure that its shape and volume were consistent with the CRM (KRISS, 221U890-1) used to calibrate the detector. The dissolved compound was then positioned directly onto the detector housing and subjected to a measurement duration of 80,000 seconds utilizing a p-type HPGe (Ortec, GEM60) with a relative efficiency of 54%. The activity of Cs-137 was determined to be 10.81 Bq, confirming the reproducibility of the AMP coprecipitation and weight yield methods. The present experiment was carried out using a 2 L sample, but a large volume of seawater would be required to achieve a sufficient minimum detectable activity (MDA) for Cs-137 in natural seawater. Thus, a standardized procedure for analysis of radioactive caesium in natural seawater will be established through the analysis of a large volume of seawater in future studies.

As nuclear power plants are operated in Korea, low and intermediate-level radioactive wastes and spent nuclear fuels are continuously generated. Due to the increase in the amount of radioactive waste generated, the demand for transportation of radioactive wastes in Korea is increasing. This can have radiological effect for public and worker, risk assessment for radioactive waste transportation should be preceded. Especially, if the radionuclides release in the ocean because of ship sinking accident, it can cause internal exposure by ingestion of aquatic foods. Thus, it is necessary to analyze process of internal exposure due to ingestion. The object of this study is to analyze internal exposure by ingestion of aquatic foods. In this study, we analyzed the process and the evaluation methodology of internal exposure caused by aquatic foods ingestion in MARINRAD, a risk assessment code for marine transport sinking accidents developed by the Sandia National Laboratory (SNL). To calculate the ingestion internal exposure dose, the ingestion concentrations of radionuclides caused by the food chain are calculated first. For this purpose, MARINRAD divide the food chain into three stages; prey, primary predator, and secondary predator. Marine species in each food chain are not specific but general to accommodate a wide variety of global consumer groups. The ingestion concentrations of radionuclides are expressed as an ingestion concentration factors. In the case of prey, the ingestion concentration factors apply the value derived from biological experiments. The predator's ingestion concentration factors are calculated by considering factors such as fraction of nuclide absorbed in gut, ingestion rate, etc. When calculating the ingestion internal exposure dose, the previously calculated ingestion concentration factor, consumption of aquatic food, and dose conversion factor for ingestion are considered. MARINRAD assume that humans consume all marine species presented in the food chain. Marine species consumption is assumed approximate and conservative values for generality. In the internal exposure evaluation by aquatic foods ingestion in this study, the ingestion concetration factor considering the food chain, the fraction of nuclide absorbed in predator’s gut, ingestion rate of predator, etc. were considered as influencing factors. In order to evaluate the risk of maritime transportation reflecting domestic characteristics, factors such as domestic food chains and ingestion rate should be considered. The result of this study can be used as basis for risk assessment for maritime transportation in Korea.

Natural radionuclides-containing substances (NORM) contain natural radionuclides and cause radiation exposure. In Korea, safety management measures were needed to deal with and dispose of radon mattresses containing monazite in relation to such NORM. However, there is no clear safety management system related to NORM waste in Korea. In order to manage this reasonably and systematically, it is necessary to investigate and analyze standards and management measures related to the treatment and disposal of NORM waste. Therefore, this study investigated and analyzed the exemption and clearance level of NORM waste regulations in international organizations and foreign countries. IAEA GSR Part 3, 2013/59/Euratom, ANSI/HPS N13.53, CRCPD SSRCR Part N, and ARPANSA Publications 15 safety management regulations were analyzed to investigate safety management standards for NORM waste. The exemption and clearance level in international organizations and foreign countries were compared and analyzed based on radioactive concentration and dose. In addition, the management measures proposed for each literature were also investigated. As a result of the analysis, IAEA GSR Part 3 applied 1 mSv as a regulatory exemption level, 1 Bq/g for uranium and thorium series as a clearance level, and 10 Bq/g for K-40 nuclides. The IAEA recommends a differential approach to the potential and scale of exposure. The EU applied 1 Bq/g to uranium and thorium families and 10 Bq/g to K-40 nuclides for both regulatory exemption and clearance levels. The EU recommended that it be managed in proportion to the scale and likelihood of exposure as a result of the action. It is analyzed that this is similar to the IAEA’s management plan. In the United States, there was no single federal government radioactive concentration and dose for NORM management. The management plan differed in management status and level from state to state, and K-40 was excluded from regulation unless it was intentionally enriched. In the case of Australia, the radioactive concentration of uranium and thorium was 1 Bq/g as a standard for regulatory exemption and 1 mSv as a dose. As a management plan, it was suggested to dispose of waste by means of accumulation, dilution/dispersion, and reclamation. It was also suggested that the scale of exposure, like international organizations, take into account the possibility. The results of this study are believed to be used as basic data for presenting domestic NORM waste treatment and disposal methods in the future.

Since 2018, Central Research Institute of Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP–CRI) has been operating an X-ray irradiation system with a maximum voltage of 160 kV and 320 kV X-ray tube to test personal dosimeters in accordance with ANSI N13.11-2009 “Personnel Dosimetry Performance- Criteria for Testing”. This standard requires that dosimeters for the photon category testing be irradiated with the X-ray beams appropriate to the ISO beam quality requirements. KHNP-CRI has implemented the fourteen X-ray reference radiation beams in compliance with ISO-4037-1, 2, and 3. When installing the X-ray irradiation system, KHNP-CRI evaluated the uncertainties of dose conversion coefficients for deep and shallow doses, based on “Catalogue of X-ray spectra and their characteristic data – ISO and DIN radiation qualities, therapy and diagnostic radiation qualities, unfiltered X-ray spectra” published by Physikalisch Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB). A CdTe detector (X-123, AMPTEK) with disk type collimators made of tungsten was used to acquire X-ray spectra. The detector was located at 1 m from the center of the target material in the Xray tubes. Six uncertainty factors for the dose conversion coefficients for the fourteen X-ray beams were chosen as follows; the minimum and maximum cut-off energies Emin and Emax, the air density (ρ), the accuracy of the high-voltage of the X-ray tube, statistics of the pulse height spectra and the unfolding method. For example, uncertainty of each quantity for a HK30 beam was calculated to be 0.3%, 2.32%, 0.19%, 1.25%, and 0.13%, and 0.18%, respectively. The combined standard uncertainty for the deep dose conversion coefficient of the HK30 beam was calculated to be 2.67%. The coverage factor corresponding to a 95 percent confidence interval was obtained as k = 1.8 using a Monte Carlo method, which is slightly lower the coverage factor of k = 1.95 for a Gaussian distribution. This seems to result from that two dominant uncertainties, the unfolding uncertainty and minimum cut-off energy uncertainty, follow a rectangular distribution.

After the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan, concerns have increased about radioactive releases from nuclear power plants (NPPs) into the environment. Analysis of annual radioactive effluent release reports (ARERRs) shows that from 2000 to 2020, abnormal releases of radioactive effluent occurred in 703 out of 1,323 Reactor·years in the United States, accounting for 53% of the total number of reactors in 63 PWRs. Furthermore, when examining incidents and malfunctions recorded in Korea’s Operational Performance Information System of Nuclear Power Plant (OPIS) during the same period, it can be estimated that abnormal releases occurred in 9 out of the 324 Reactor·years in PWRs and PHWRs. Meanwhile, database on radioactive releases from NPPs worldwide was collected, and events of abnormal/unplanned releases were investigated. Based on the data collected from 195 NPPs in 8 countries (South Korea, the United States, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, and Canada) over a period of 21 years, totaling 4,607 Reactor·years, a program called K-IRED (KHUIntegrated Radioactive Effluent Database) was developed using MS Access. Using K-IRED, three methodologies have been developed to predict abnormal events based on the annual radioactive releases for each NPPs and radionuclide (or radionuclide group). Three newly developed methodologies were applied to the 63 NPPs (1,323 Reactor·years) in the United States, categorized by radionuclides (or radionuclide groups). Assuming an increase in radioactive effluent due to abnormal events, the annual increase rate of radioactive effluent was calculated for each methodology and the results were analyzed. The optimal methodology among the three was derived, and the applicability of predicting abnormal events in other NPPs beforehand was examined. Therefore, by predicting abnormal or unplanned releases from NPPs to the environment in advance, it is possible to prevent accidents and reduce public concerns, as suggested by results of this study.

Detectors used for nuclear material safeguards activities are using scintillator detectors to quickly calculate the uranium enrichment at various nuclear material handling facilities. In order to measure the uranium enrichment, a region of interest is set around 185.7 keV which is the main gamma emission energy of uranium-235 in which the proportional relationship between the amount of uranium-235 and the net count is used. It is necessary to perform channel/energy calibration that a specific channel of the multi-channel analyzer is set to 185.7 keV. Most detector manufacturers have a built-in calibration source so that it is automatically performed when the detector starts to operate. In addition, the scintillator detector requires attention because the channel/energy gain may change depending on the ambient temperature so that a calibration source is used to compensate for this. In this paper, the spectral features are examined from among the scintillator detectors seeded with calibration sources used for safeguards activities. For this purpose, FLIR’s Identifinder-2 R400 T2 model and Canberra’s NAID model were used. HM-5 contains about 15nCi of Cs-137 and a photoelectric peak occurs at 662.1 keV. NAID contains about Am-241 of 55 nCi which alpha decays and subsequently emits gamma rays of 59.5 keV and 26.3 keV. The major difference among the detectors occurs in the background spectrum due to the difference in the source. From that kind of spectral features, it can be confirmed that the equipment is operating properly only when the spectrum by the corresponding calibration source is accurately known. The results of this study will enable a better understanding of the characteristics of scintillator detectors used for uranium enrichment analysis. Therefore, it is expected to be used as basic research for related software utilization as well as development in the future.

The decommissioning of the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) is a long-term project of more than 15 years and will be carried out as a project, which will require project management skills accordingly. The risk of decommissioning project is a combination of many factors such as the decommissioning plan, the matters licensed by the regulatory agency, the design and implementation of dismantling, the dismantling plan and organization, and stakeholders. There will be some difficulties in risk management because key assumptions about many factors and the contents of major risks should be well considered. Risk management typically performs a series of processes ranging from identification and analysis to evaluation. In order to analyze and evaluate risks here, identification of potential risks is the first step, and in order to reasonably select potential risks, various factors mentioned should be considered. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to identify possible risks that should be considered for the decommissioning project in various aspects. The risk of the decommissioning project can be defined using the hazard keyword, and the risk family presented in the IAEA safety series can also be referred. It would be better to approach the radiological or non-radiological risks that may occur in the dismantling work with the hazard keyword, and if the characteristics of the decommissioning project are reflected, it would be a good idea to approach it on a risk family basis. There are 10 top risks in the risk family, 25 risks at the level 2 and 61 risks at the level 3 are presented. It may be complex to consider these hazards and risks recommended as risk families at the same time, so using the results of safety evaluation as input data for risk identification can be a reasonable approach. Therefore, this study intended to derive the possible risks of the decommissioning project based on the risk family structure. At this point, the reflection of the safety assessment results was intended to be materialized by considering the hazards checklist. As a result, this study defined and example of 38 possible risks for the decommissioning project, considering the 10 top risk family and lower level risk categories. This result is not finalized, and it will be necessary to further strengthened through expert workshops or HAZOP in the future.

One aspect of securing safety from the operation of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) is to evaluate the impact on residents at the facility’s exclusive area boundary to confirm that the radiological risk is below the allowable level. Normally, the risks from gaseous and liquid effluents are evaluated during the operation of facilities. Meanwhile, in order to be approved for the decommissioning plan, the environmental risks caused by activities during dismantling is also evaluated. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the exposure pathways considered in evaluating the risks to nearby residents from the operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities and to examine the differences. The emission rate by radionuclide is calculated by evaluating the amount of leak from nuclear fuel during the operation of the facility through design data of the NPP. Each of the liquid and gaseous effluents is calculated, and the exposure dose received by nearby residents is calculated by considering the exposure pathways with these emission rates. In order to initiate the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, approval of the Final Decommissioning Plan (FDP) must be obtained. The FDP chapter shall describe the results of the environmental impact assessment of the decommissioning. It will not differ significantly in the exposure pathways during operation. However, the decommissioning of nuclear facilities is ultimately to remove Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCs) and to remove the regulation of the Nuclear Safety Act by ensuring that sites and remaining buildings meet the criteria for the license termination. In terms of release and reuse of nuclear facilities, the exposure dose to be considered in evaluating the dose can be considered for two main types: the site and the remaining building. The factors affecting the exposure pathways considered in assessing the environmental impacts considered in the operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities are due to gaseous and liquid effluents. However, the difference should reflect the impact of NPP operations and decommissioning activities when evaluating the amount of radionuclides released by these effluents. Decommissioning should consider the impact after decommissioning, which is the effect of the receptor by radionuclides remaining on the site and in the remaining buildings. At this time, the effects of the source from the soil and the source from the surface of the building should be considered for the external and internal exposure pathways.

For licensees who face the decommissioning project for the first time, even if they can utilize their experience in operation, they should be well prepared and assessed for the risks of dismantling activities reflecting the characteristics of decommissioning. This can be included in the risk management of the decommissioning project, but what we want to discuss in this study is the evaluation of the industrial risk of the actual work before the dismantling work is carried out. We would like to focus more on the review of dismantling activities subject to industrial risk assessment and a series of processes for risk assessment. The dismantling work plan will need to obtain approval from the supervisory department before work on the Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCs) can be carried out. At this time, risk assessment may be included among many safety-related required documents, which are divided into radiological and non-radiological risks. The target activities at Level 1 level can include preparation for dismantling and maintenance of facilities, dismantling big components, removing the contamination of concrete structures, managing radioactive waste, etc. In addition, it can be composed of preparation work, removal of connections, lifting/installation, cutting, radiation/radioactivity measurement, and withdrawal as detailed work stages of each item’s activities. For domestic nuclear decommissioning projects, two major performance organizations, licensees and contractors, must be considered. Regarding risk assessment, the licensee will have a supervisory department controlling decommissioning activities and an HSE department at the site, and a process will need to be established in consideration of the contractor’s work organization. Therefore, activities in the risk assessment process may be established. In this study, risk assessment was reviewed as safety-related matters to be considered when carrying out the dismantling work. Safety-related risk assessment is a necessary procedure for performing practical dismantling activities, and this should be considered well in advance. Therefore, work activities and criteria were established for risk assessment, and the performance process was assumed to apply them. In terms of the performance organization and the responsibilities and roles of the processes to be performed by each organization were constructed, and this can be referred to in the process of preparing for the decommissioning project.

Safety-related items in the decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) can largely consider safety for workers and residents. At this time, the effects of radioactive contamination on the Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCs) are caused by the performance of work related to Decontamination and Dismantlement (D&D) activities. Classification according to dismantling activities will be important, and the decay factor of radionuclides and the impact of contaminations due to plant characteristic (thermal and electrical capacity) in estimation of exposure dose from such activities will be considered compared to other overseas NPPs. Therefore, this study will consider some factors to consider for comparison with overseas cases in estimating worker exposure dose. To assess worker exposure doses, the classification of decommissioning activities must first be made. It should be classified including large components that can be generally considered, and the contents should be similar to compare with overseas cases. In case of decommissioned NPPs with prior experience, it is possible to predict worker’s exposure with respect to plant capacity, but this does not seem to have a specific correlation when reviewing the related data. Depending on the plant capacity, the occurrence of contamination of radioactive materials may have some correlation, but it cannot be determined that it has causality with the worker’s dose when dismantling. In addition, it is expected that the effects of workers’ exposure doses will vary depending on when the highly contaminated SSCs will be dismantled from permanent shut down. Therefore, the decay correlation coefficient for this high radiation dose works should be considered. If the high radiation dose work is performed before the base year, a correlation coefficient larger than 1 value will be applied, and in the opposite case, a value less than 1 will be applied. Whether or not to perform Full System Decontamination (FSD) is also an important consideration that affects worker dose, and correlation factors should be applied. In this study, the matters to be considered when estimating worker dose for dismantling NPPs were reviewed. This suggests factors to be reflected in the work classification and dose results for comparison with overseas NPP experiences. Therefore, when doing the workers’ dose estimation, it is necessary to derive a normalized doses considering each correlation factor when comparing with overseas cases along with dose estimation for the dismantling activities.

The Derived Concentration Guideline Level (DCGL) using RESRAD code is generally obtained for the reuse of the site and remaining buildings of the decommissioning of nuclear facilities. At this time, the evaluation first considers wide DCGL assuming homogenous contamination for the entire target site. The DCGL derived through this will be compared with the actual contamination measured at the Final Status Survey (FSS) stage to determine whether the site is compliance with criteria. Guidelines for Survey units are presented in MARSSIM and suggested in Class 1 through 3. Therefore, DCGL for the survey unit of a certain smaller area is established by applying a correction factor from wide DCGL, which is define as an Area Factor (AF). Therefore, this study reviewed the AF applied in overseas cases, reviewed the necessary factors for derivation, and compared them by applying factors to the preliminary experimental target area for domestic nuclear installations. The AF is the ratio of the dose from the base-case contaminated area to the dose from a smaller contaminated area with the same radioactive concentration. To this end, an unrestricted resident farmer scenario was applied as the site reuse scenario, which deals with all exposure pathways considered in the RESRAD. The potential exposure pathways considered in resident farmer scenarios are largely divided into external and internal exposures, which are based on NUREG/CR-5512. In addition, in order to calculate the AF, a change in the contaminated area occurs, and accordingly, a variable that varies according to the area, i.e., length parallel to aquifer flow (LCZPAQ), the contaminated fraction of plant food ingested (FPLANT), the contaminated fraction of meat and milk (FMEAT and FMILK), is accompanied. As the contamination area decreases, these variables decrease, and the criteria for reduction were reflected through overseas cases. In this study, three nuclides (C-14, Co-60, and Cs-137) were assumed as representative nuclides, and the area of the contaminated site was selected as 50,000 m2 and reduced at a certain rate. As a result, each nuclide showed different characteristics, but in general, AF increases as the area decreases. Compared to the area of this study, AF values were calculated to be smaller than those of overseas cases, but it was confirmed that the area of the values showed similar patterns. In addition, in the case of C-14, the slope of AF increased rapidly as the area decreased, while Co-60 and Cs-137 showed similar slopes.

The effects of an individual effective dose from radioactive contamination that will remain during site reuse after the decommissioning of nuclear facilities is generally assessed using the RESRAD code. The calculated results should meet the site reuse criteria presented by regulators, 0.25 mSv/yr in the United States and 0.1 mSv/yr in Korea. After completion of decommissioning, the dose is not subject to measurement, resulting in Derived Concentration Guideline Level (DCGL) remaining at the site that is practically consistent with the dose criteria. In order to assess dose using the RESRAD code, various requirements will need to be considered and determined, where the selection of input parameters is one of the important factors in the dose assessment. In addition, appropriate selection of site-specific parameters is important to reflect the site characteristics of each decommissioned Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). Therefore, this study intends to analyze the impact of site-specific parameters by referring to the cases of overseas decommissioned NPPs. In order to evaluate doses using RESRAD code, a site reuse scenario must first be selected. In general, in the case of unrestricted reuse, the resident farmer scenario can be applied, so the resident farmer scenario was also selected in this study. In addition, once a resident farmer scenario is selected, input parameters are selected according to the scenario, and the input parameter inputs a single value or distribution according to the deterministic or probabilistic evaluation method. Therefore, since this study is to evaluate the effect on site-specific parameters, a single value was applied as a deterministic evaluation method. For the 10 site-specific parameters considered in overseas cases, the difference was set twice using the F9 function key in the RESRAD code and the results were analyzed. In this study, we used prior research data targeting domestic nuclear facility for sensitivity analysis. Related parameters include the category of contamination layer, soil, water transport, ingestion, and occupancy. The parameters that appeared as the greatest influence among the 10 parameters were different in radionuclide on the contaminated zone. We showed the changes according to the difference in input parameters was presented using the graph provided by the RESRAD code. As a result, in the evaluation for Co-60 in this study, no significant change was observed. However, in case of H-3, several parameters values were changed, indicating that the effect on dose will be different depending on the site characteristics of the nuclear facilities.

Radioactive materials depositied after nuclear accident or radiological emergency result in radiation exposure to individuals living in long-term contaminated territories. Therefore, the remedial actions should be taken on affected areas for the evacuated residents to return to their homes and normal lifestyle. Meanwhile, radiation exposure occurs through various pathways by work types during the site clean-up. Therefore, dose assessment is crucial to protect emergency workers and helpers from the potential radiological risk. This study estimated the exposure dose to individuals decontaminating the areas contaminated with 60Co, 63Ni, 90Sr, 134Cs, 137Cs, and then calculated the maximum workable soil concentration to comply with the reference level of 20 mSv/y for transition to existing exposure situations. For the realistic assessment, the detailed exposure scenarios depending on the types of work (excavation, collection, transportation, disposal, landfill), and the relevant exposure pathways were used. In addition, with the LHS (Latin Hypercube Sampling) - PRCC (Partial Rank Correlation Coefficient) method, sensitivity analysis was performed to identify the influence of the input parameters and their variation on the model outcomes. As a result, the most severe exposure-induced type was identified as the excavator operation with an annual individual dose of 4.75E-01 mSv at the unit soil concentration (1 Bq/g), from which the derived maximum workable soil concentration was 4.21E+01 Bq/g. Dose contribution by isotopes were found to be 60Co (55.63%), 134Cs (32.01%), and 137Cs (12.28%), and the impact of 63Ni and 90Sr were found to be negligible. Dose contribution by exposure pathways decreased in the following order: ground-shine, soil ingestion, dust inhalation, and skin contamination. Furthermore, the most high sensitive input parameters and their PRCC were found to be as the dilution factor (0.75) and as the exposure time (0.63). In conclusion, the results are expected to contribute to optimize radiation protection strategeis for recovery workers and to establish appropriate response procedures to be applicable in areas with high deposition density after a radiological or nuclear emergency.

Employees of nuclear licensees have to take the education for radiological emergency preparedness, as prescribed by presidential Decree. The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), as an educational institution designated by the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC), has been conducting field-oriented workplace education. This aims to enhance understanding of radiological emergencies that may occur in nuclear facilities and to strengthen response capabilities to prevent and deal with accidents in the event of radiation emergencies or radioactive disasters. To accomplish these educational goals, a paradigm shift from the previous theory-oriented curriculum to a participatory curriculum with high field applicability is needed to strengthen the ability to respond to nuclear or radiological emergencies. In addition, a feedback system is required to manage the quality of education and improve the curriculum. In this regard, KAERI sought ways to revitalize the education to strengthen the emergency response competencies. Based on the concept of the Systematic Approach to Training (SAT) methodology, which is recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the development and implementation of education and training for NPP personnel, an educational model and its feedback system were developed. Then, a field-oriented participatory curriculum operation and satisfaction survey were conducted to evaluate the educational effectiveness. Lastly, the survey results were discussed in a critique session to point out weaknesses and indicate areas for improvement, and then were used as data for educational quality assurance. This paper introduces the composition and effectiveness of KAERI’s SAT-based education model based on its recent three years of experience.

In the pressurized water nuclear reactors (PWRs), the upper and bottom head penetration nozzles, the geometric asymmetry of the welded part increases from the center to the outer part, increasing the possibility of defects. For this reason, it is important to perform early detection and management through analysis of defects occurring in the welded parts of upper and bottom penetration nozzles of reactor vessel. However, it is very difficult to operate boat sampling of the welding area because the spacing of the penetration nozzle of the bottom head of the reactor is very narrow. In addition, it is more difficult to collect welded specimens of bottom penetration nozzles by electrical discharge machining in a boric acid water environment of nuclear reactor. In this work, to overcoming these technical difficulties, we developed a boat sampling robot system, which is composed of the specimen collection electrode head, borate-mediated discharge electrode and control system. Also, we performed basic performance tests and summarize the results.

The site used for a nuclear facility can be released after decommissioning if the results of dose estimation meet the regulatory requirements and the site release is approved by the regulatory body. RESRAD-ONSITE, developed by the Argonne National Laboratory, is a computer code used to estimate the dose to the residents on radiologically contaminated sites. The dose estimation for site release should consider various exposure pathways, including inhalation, ingestion, and external exposure. This study used RESRAD-ONSITE to evaluate the internal exposure dose and identify radionuclides due to the intake of food produced on radiologically contaminated sites. The upper limit of the clearance level of radionuclides expected to remain at the site was used as the source terms for the dose evaluation. In addition, the amount of food intake per capita was obtained from eight countries using nuclear power generation as of 2020. The default values of RESRAD were used for other parameters except for intake by type of food and source terms. As a result of the dose evaluation, the contaminated water and vegetables showed a great contribution to the exposure dose. The dose due to tritium in drinking water was highest in the third year. In addition, regarding the intake of vegetables, the internal exposure due to 90Sr was the highest in the first year.

The phosphate industry is classified by IAEA as one of the Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM) industry sectors most likely to require regulatory consideration. The production of phosphorous fertilizers constitutes the major activity in the industry, which can give rise to exposures of workers and the public through the handling and usage of phosphate rock and residues associated with processing. During the production process, when phosphate rock is digested with acid to produce phosphoric acid, some radionuclides, particularly Radium, become concentrated in residues, such as the scale that tends to form inside pipes and vessels. The registered radioactivity of phosphate rock in South Korea is less than 1.7 Bq/g for U-238, but according to the IAEA SRS No. 49, the radioactivity of phosphate scale can be up to 1,000 times higher than the raw mineral. Therefore, this study evaluated the potential for worker exposure during maintenance related to the removal of scales at a fertilizer manufacturing facility producing phosphoric acid in Korea.