The North Korean mission is inseparable from the South-North unification policy. In addition, the opinions of neighboring counties are also important. Such are the perimeters of the North Korean mission. This study attempts to examine North Korean mission, particularly the reconstruction of North Korean Church within the process of South North unification process. The reconstruction of the North Korean Church, as North Korean mission and unification movement, is a policy issue amidst the unification process. It is a policy that can create a basis within the North Korea and effectively manage the personnel, financial and mission resources of the South Korean Church. At the same time, the reconstruction of the North Korean Church joins the reunification process of the Korean peninsular with the North Korean mission purposes. The current situation is created by the ideological conflict between the conservative versus liberal elements within the Korean Church in regard to the North Korean mission and unification movement. In addition, there is a great disparity in the approach towards the reconstruction of the North Korean Church. The problems are three-fold: 1) Who is the protagonist of the North Korean mission? Is it the South Korean Church? or is it the North Korean Church? In case it it’s the latter, the term North Korean mission does not apply. 2) The phrase “North Korean mission” implies an imbedded view of the South North division. 3) Should the North Korean “Chosun Christian Association” be accepted as a partner in the North Korean mission? Or should it be viewed as a mission object? The best means of North Korean mission is to have the “Chosun Christian Association” take the leading role in the reconstruction of the North Korean Church. Since, however, it is the South Korean Church that is taking action to prepare for such an event, mutual cooperation between the two is essential. The reconstruction of the North Korean Church cannot be achieve by the South Korean Church alone. In addition, the reconstruction of North Korean Church is linked to the Korean war, a factor behind the division of the Korean Church into the liberal and conservative camp. The anti-communist stance of the South Korean regime was another factor that unified the right wing Christians. Attempts by the “Korean Christian Association” to reconstruct the North Korean Church within this approach involved, not only efforts to reconstruct the North Korean Church, but various aid programs. However, such aid programs were commonly perceived to be the work of mission organizations and not the conservative South Korean Church. Furthermore, the “Korean Christian Association,” which advocated the reconstruction of the North Korean Church, were mistakenly criticized as an organization that were only interested in the reconstruction of the Northern Church. Therefore, the reconstruction effort of the Northern Church must be newly reinterpreted. The role of the Church, from a mission history perspective, is to be a bridgehead of mission, a center of training for workers, and center of mission field. As such, though the reconstruction of the Northern Church is premature, efforts to prepare for such an event, financial preparation, training center for mission workers and confidence building between the South and North through information and assistance projects can be viewed within the context of the unification process. The North Korean mission through the reconstruction of the Northern Church within the context of the unification process can promote the unification capability of South and North. It is futuristic unification policy of the Southern Church. Precedents for the reconstruction of the Northern Church must be found from similar cases following the liberation from Japan and post-Korean war and examined strategically. The North Korean mission must conclude with the reconstruction of the North Korean Church.

The article deals with the roles of Chinese Christian NGOs for social service and the implications for North Korea. The article consists of 4 parts: Chinese NGOs and the roles for social service, possibility of Chinese Christian NGOs for social service, the implications for North Korea, and missionary tasks of Korean Churches for both China and North Korea. The first part discusses necessity of NGOs for social service in China which has been in sufferings such as gap of the rich and the poor, and unemployment due to the economic reform policies of China. The reform policy motivated to establish many kinds of NGOs in Chinese civil society. Under the socialist political rule Chinese NGOs are characterized with the supplementary roles for Chinese authority or mediation roles between the authority and people. The second part analyzes the Chinese Christian NGOs and their social roles. Under the religious policies of the Chinese regime, the history and theology of the three-self church and so-called the home-based church are described. Their social roles are analyzed in the perspective of NPO which is existed for public service. Particularly the activities of the Amity Foundation, an excellent Christian NGO in China are emphasized. The third part describes some possibilities of Christian NGOs for social service in North Korea which has just started to exercise the economic reform policy. During implementing the policy most of North Korean people have been suffered from social problems such as gap between the rich and the poor. NGOs can contribute to relieve North Korean from social poverty. Also the society needs some Christian NGOs. In conclusion the article suggests two tasks to the Korean Churches in the perspective of NGO. First, the Churches are asked to support to establish Christian NGOs in North Korea such as the Amity Foundation in China. Second, the Churches should reflect their mission policies for China which emphasized on conversion and church planting. Instead the Churches are asked to support to develop Christian NGOs in China.

The number of North Korean defectors has increased from the 1990s. This phenomena has sought some significance as the reunification of the Koreas is being considered. It can shed insight on problems of socio-psychological adaptation. The dynamic process of the defectors' adaptation to the South Korean society may model a process of adaptation needed on a wider scale of and when reunification of Korea is achieved. North Korean defectors in South Korea are experiencing various difficulties in the capitalist society of South Korea including different value, identity problem, difficulties of social life, economic unrest, and psychological and emotional uneasiness. In this study, their problems and difficulties are analyzed for developing adaptation process. The process of adaptation for defectors can be divided into four stages: pre-awareness, awareness, adaptation and settlement. Particularly, mental and psychological difficulties are stumbling blocks to their adaptation. They need education for social adaptation and counseling programs. In fact, many South Koreans do not understand the North Korean defectors' difficulties in their process of adaptation. South Korean people need to accept North Korean defectors as their brothers and sisters, as persons of the same nation. Reunification is not restoration of the original state before the division. True reunification is to restore a broken relationship between the North and South.

This study concentrates on analyzing the realities of the early childhood education in North Korea. After the liberation of Korea, the North drew all of their policies out of Karl Marx’s and Nikolai Lenin’s socialistic ideology. The early childhood education policy has been one of the policies to fulfill Marx’s ideology which after the establishment of the juche ideology in 1970 replaced the child nurture education ideology. North Korea’s child nurture education ideology can be classified as first, growing the child into a revolutionary juche type person. Second, make them recognize Kim Il Sung as the only leader for the juche ideology. Third, educate them to be guardians for the revolution of communism. And finally, it can be classified as the liberation of the female from children fostering and family duties. After the death of their chief Kim Il Sung in 1994, their system changed by focusing on Kim Jung Il. During 1999, in which North Korean law and ordinances experienced fast changes, the 1976 enacted [early childhood education law] underwent additions and rectifications. Looking at North Korea’s early childhood education based on those changes, children now are receiving collectively nurture education at early childhood education institutions such as day nursing centers and Kindergarten, if early at age of 1 month. Early childhood education expenses are all covered by the government and society. The basic idea of the preschool system is to raise them strong and implant a communistic mind early on. In North Korea children age 1 month to 3 years old receive nurture education at the day nursing center, and children of age 4 years to 5 years receive their education at the Kindergarten. They maintain a same age grouping system. Especially in Kindergarten the preschool education of the higher classes are regarded as compulsive education. North Korea’s early childhood education has a lot to do with the woman’s liberation of household responsibilities. Therefore the configuration of the childcare institutions is divided regarding women employment patterns. Thus, there are childcare institutions in which they can entrust their child for one day, one week, 10 days, or even for one month. The purpose of North Korea’s early childhood education is to prepare the ground for the school education in which the main focus is on ideology. Particularly in 1995, after Kim Il Sung’s death, they published an education guide with the title ‘Children have to be well educated from early on’and thereby enforced ideology education for children. It appeared that the main context about the ideology education is based on stories about Kim Il Sung’s and Kim Jung Il’s childhood. According to the principal of North Korea’s educational constitution they enforce intellectual education, culture of aesthetic sentiments and physical education to create an overall developed communistic being which has combined aspects of revolutionary-, working class conversions and virtue and knowledge. In terms of intellectual education in which classes are focused on the teacher, nowadays tend to practice more active participation methods which involve singing and observations, most of the class material is still about Kim Il Sung and Kim Jung Il. An efficient way to transmit educational context is to make them aware, classify them into age and physiological characteristics and assuring a unified way of teaching, and so on. The training for new teachers of formal school education and early childhood education falls to the obligation of each province. Thus, every district has the obligation and responsibility to educate new teachers or caretakers of the day nursing center and Kindergarten through formal school education channels. In case of shortage of teachers and caretakers they use informal school education channels to supply of those. Furthermore present teachers are required to take re-education classes to provide for excellent performance. This re-education is exists to extend the teachers pragmatic political abilities and to put emphasized meaning on the revolutionary worldview.

The recent nuclear crisis triggered by North Korea on October 9, 2006 and the subsequent changes of political environment of the Korean Peninsula and surrounding superpower countries demand the Korean Christians to think seriously about the impending future of the South-North relationship and the possibility of the reunification of two Koreas no matter what kind of process may be taking place during the course of reunification. Even the possibility of sudden collapse of the North Korean regime has been cautiously proposed. At least many politicians and observers agree to the reality that the Koreas are in the first stage of reunification after the historical South-North Summit Talks in 1990. What does Korean Christianity do for the impending reunification of the Koreas? Do we have a master plan for the future other than the old paradigm of nationalistic approach by the radical proponents of “Unification Theology” during the 1970s and 1980s? Do we have a mission plan for North Korean Christianity after the reunification other than the imperialistic church planting based on South Korean Christians' denominational lines? What if there is a sudden collapse of North Korea? The present author aims to provide a comprehensive outlook for the leaders of South Korean Christianity to review the possible scenarios of reunification process by examining the expecting results of reunification and/or collapse. The author predicts that there will be (1) massive migration of North Koreans to South Korea (2) minor territorial conflict with China (3) the rapid dismantle of North Korean society (4) the rapid rise of unemployment rate (5) the rise of anti-North Koreans sentiment (6) the dissatisfaction of North Koreans increases. To verify these predictions, the author investigates the preceeding case of reunification in Germany, the role of East German Church in the process of reunification and the following results, and the lesson that could be gathered from the cases of North Korean refugees who have tried to settle in South Korean society. As conclusion, the present author suggests to South Korean Church to prepare the followings: (1) the theological enterprises for the soft-landing of North Koreans' Ju-che Philosophy (2) the theological articulation for preventing social anomie among North Koreans (3) Making South Korean churches as a strong mediating structure to make a political space (4) Interpreting the Christian Gospel with the theology of peaceful reconciliation and mutual endurance (5) Becoming a member of reunification governance (6) Paradigm shift from “nationalistic strategy” to “global-dimension reunification plan”.

Zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt mag es noch eine wissenschaftliche Fantasievorstellung sein, über die Reform des Strafvollzugs auf dem Gebiet Nordkoreas nach der koreanischen Wiedervereinigung zu sprechen, schliesslich ist die Herstellung der koreanischen Einheit ein politisch sehr komplizierter Prozess. Trotzdem muss man sich bereits jetzt auf die koreanische Einheit und die damit verbundenen rechtlichen Probleme vorbereiten. Diese Notwendigkeit wird besonders deutlich, wenn man die Nachwirkungen der deutschen Wiedervereinigung betrachtet. Ich denke, dass eine Untersuchung zur Reform des Strafvollzugs auf dem Gebiet Nordkoreas bereits heute dringend geboten ist und für die Zukunft des gesamten koreanischen Strafvollzugs von nicht zu unterschätzender Bedeutung. Natürlich unterscheidet sich die koreanische Situation von der deutschen im November des Jahres 1989 in wesentlichen Punkten. Dennoch denke ich, dass auch etliche politische und rechtliche Probleme nach der koreanischen Vereinigung den deutschen ähneln werden. So ist Korea in der glücklichen Lage, dass es bei der Lösung dieser Probleme von den deutschen Erfahrungen lernen kann. In diesem Aufsatz möchte ich zunächst analysieren, wie der Geltungsbereich des Strafvollzugsgesetzes auf das Gebiet der ehemaligen DDR ausgedehnt wurde und welche rechtlichen Probleme damit in der Praxis verbunden waren(II). Im Weiteren möchte ich die Festsetzung einer einheitlichen Bemessungsgrundlage für alle Gefangenen nach der koreanische Wiedervereinigung untersuchen sowie den Orientierungsrahmen zur Reform des Strafvollzugs auf dem Gebiet Nordkoreas diskutieren(III). Abschliessend soll aufgezeigt werden, welche Konsequenzen diese Änderungen für das koreanische Strafvollzugsgesetz haben wird(IV).

북한에서는 중등과정 기상학 내용을 지리학 분야에서 배운다. 본 연구는 북한 지리교과서에 나오는 기상학분야 용어를 남한의 지구과학 교과서에서 사용하는 용어와 비교하여 같은 의미이면서 다른 용어 40개를 발췌하여 각 용어에 대해 전남지방 고등학생들이 이해하는 정도를 비교하였다. 용어의 이해도 조사는 전남지역 소재 2개 고등학교 89명을 대상으로 하였다. 고등학생들이 남한 용어에 대한 이해 수준은 북한용어의 이해 수준에 비해 평균적으로 30% 정도 높다. 더운전선, 합치기과정, 하루변화, 비탈면 등 9개의 북한 용어는 오히려 남한 용어보다 이해 수준이 높다. 이해 수준이 보다 낮은 3때 용어 가운데 2때 용어는 북한 고유어를 이용하여 최근 만들어진 것들이다. 남한의 용어 대부분은 한자어, 외래어 등에서 유래한 용어로 이루어져 있으며 대체로 북한 고유어로 새로 만들어진 용어보다 더 높게 이해되고 있다.

This paper reports the current situation of English and English education in North Korea. Two approaches are taken to achieve the goal: One is to examine social attitudes and government approaches to English education. Interviews with defectors from North Korea, newspaper reports and other related literature are used. The other is to analyze middle school English textbooks and research articles to reveal the current practice of English language teaching at schools. The results show that North Korean government and people are interested in learning and teaching English and they take various measures to improve English learning to meet national or individual goals. English seems to be considered as a way of improving their economic situations and finding a better opportunity for many North Korean people. However, English education in North Korea is still limited in terms of resources including learning materials and native teachers of English. Also academic research and practices in English education are still heavily influenced by Kim Ilsung and Kim Jungil’s words so that scientific investigations are limited. It is an impending issue to narrow a gap in English education between South and North Koreas to overcome difficulties encountered in the future.

The number of North Korean defectors has increased in the 1990's. One particular fact is that many North Korean defectors are religious persons living in South Korea. Their motivation for accepting religion was that they had received various types of support from Christian missionaries and/or Christians in foreign countries, or in South Korea itself. This is the result of missionary work on their behalf. There were many who joined churches which had helped them when they came to South Korea. A few of them entered theological college or seminary. Among them some had theological education at underground seminaries in China and performed ministry for North Korean defectors. They entered theological schools for more systematic education. Some started theological education by themselves. Some began it because of North Korea mission. Some are practicing ministry for other North Korean defectors, while others have established churches. This is a very positive aspect for/by North Korean defectors themselves, and area of will continue as mission for North Korean defectors after the reunification of Korea. North Korean defectors convey their difficulties in theological education, but express their need for it. Having a religious life and studying theology are different matters. Many of them stayed outside of the traditional school system for a long time. This makes them quite challenged when adapting to school life. Many also experience the difficulties of foreign languages, and different educational systems, which exist between North and South Korea. The students are lonely and need faithful friends. Although they study theology, they need counseling, to help them have balance and succeed in a new and different environment. Moreover, tuition is one of their real problems and often blocks them in their studies or ability to study. Most of them serve churches, as Sunday school teachers or serve on a North Korean Mission committee within the church. There are many churches in South Korea, but only a few provide these students with a meaningful position in the church setting. Although the students may experience trial and error, in their new life, it is necessary for them to be provided for in the ministerial fields. For their future and the future of the two Korea, it is important for them to have practical experiences of ministry in various fields. South Korean churches should face up to the fact that it is important not only send them to theological schools, but to also nurture them and train them to be faithful and Christ driven ministers. Before entering theological schools, North Korean defectors must seriously consider whether they have a conviction to study theology. Second, it is important for them to have a confession of faith that they live with Jesus Christ as their Savior. Third, they should have correct understanding of theology. Fourth, they must have healthy view of ecclesiology. Fifth, they should open their heart to serve not only in the North Korean mission field, but also in varied areas of ministry. Sixth, although it seems that North Korean defectors have a good Christian faith, it is not desirable to recommend North Korean defectors to study theology without considering their faith and calling. South Korean churches or other supporters should select North Korean defectors through careful conversations and counseling. South Korean churches should nurture North Korean defectors as they grow in their Christian faith. Some of the churches will want to prepare them as future missionaries to their home towns after reunification. They will be in the vanguard of missionaries to North Korea after reunification. Their missionary work probably will be more effective than that of others who will enter the North for the first time.

The article is to find out the task and orientation in Christian missions toward North Korea. First of all, it subscribes the various approaches of Christian missions toward North Korea such as the emic approach, the epic approach, and the holistic approach. Then, it describes the historical changes of the paradigm in the society of North Korea. North Koreans have evaluated Christianity negatively as the spy of the american imperialism. From the end of 1980s, however, they have changed their minds that Christianity must have been a religion of charity for the national unity. Finally, the article concludes that the task and orientation in Christian missions toward North Korea should be cooperative between South and North Korean Christians and future-oriented finding felt-needs of North Korean Christians.

"Ju-chae" ideology can be likened to the driving force that support, maintain, and fosters the North Korean society. Since the defection of Party Secretary general Hwang, Jang Yeup, however, the meaning of "Ju-chae" is being transformed, signifying the construction of a strong fatherland. Nevertheless, "Ju-chae" continues to be a strong ideological strength underlying the North Korean society in general. The 1995 food shortage was an occasion which shook the very foundation of North Korean establishment. The resulting economic reforms initiated in July 1st of 2002 leaves the impression believe that the leading consideration of the North Korean society is economic rather than political. Signs of such changes gave occasion for South Korean churches to reexamine their North Korean mission strategies. In other words, Christianity does not translate into anti-"Ju-chae" nor is anti-Christianity signify "Ju-chae." In between the early years of the North Korean government till the official recognition of religion in 1972 was the Korean war. While the traditionally this period is viewed a period in which the North Korean government attempted to eradicate religion, judging from events, it is a period in which official religion is transformed into an unofficial religion and all religion hostile to the government is eradicated. Christian church is included in this category. The Korean war resulted in anti-American feeling and Christianity was considered as an American religion. Anti-Christian activity became the ideological basis of "Ju-chae" ideology. The self-reliance or Kim, Il-sung-nism which form the basis of "Ju-chae" is linked to attempt to preserve the North Korean establishment from foreign powers. To this point, the North Korean government is viewed as in the forefront of Christian oppression. In reality, North Korea is known to execute believers for their faith. However, Christian leaders are known to hold high offices in North Korea. Furthermore, underground church is known to exist till today. This can be viewed as evidence that the North Korean church, rather than anti-Christian, merely views the Church as anti-government. Thus, "Ju-chae" and Christianity, instead of being antithetical, merely differs in methodology. Any attempt to evangelize North Korea must take into consideration the renewed interest in economy in North Korea. Because North Korea is concentration its energy towards economy, North Korean mission must work to integrate its activities with economic assistance. The fact that North Korean situation can change overnight by the actions of Kim Jung Il is the longstanding problem. Variation in North Korean politics is a handicap. But we must not forget that the economic problems of North Korea is unavoidable and must plan our mission strategy accordingly. Currently in North Korea, the introduction of cell-phone and computers are allowing outside news and information to enter North Korea and this leads to speculation that a return to the past is not an option for North Korea. Therefore, we must look at "Ju-chae" as a difference in type. It is time detailed mission strategy is formed in connection with North Korean economy, particularly in association with the special economic area created in Gae-sung.

본 연구는 효율적인 국립공원 탐방로 관리를 위해 탐방로 이용행태 및 이용 관련 탐방객 인식을 파악하여 탐방로 이용 기초자료의 제공에 목적을 두고 수행되었다. 이를 위해 북한산 및 치악산국립공원의 주요 탐방로에서 이용자 설문조사를 실시하였다. 연구결과, 조사대상 두 국립공원의 탐방로에는 수목 뿌리 노출. 암석 노출, 노폭확대가 주요 훼손유형으로 나타났으며 경사지의 시설도입 및 정비와 훼손된 노면의 정비가 가장 필요한 관리 및 정비의 우선순위로 지적되었다. 본 연구결과를 살펴볼 때, 입지적 특성과 이용목적에 따라 훼손유형이 다르게 나타날 수 있으며 이에 따라 탐방로 정비 및 관리 우선순위도 차별적으로 적용되어야할 것으로 판단된다. 본 연구에서 제시된 결과는 국립공원 탐방로 관리방안 마련에 있어 유용한 기초정보를 제공할 것으로 기대된다.