Wolsong unit 1, the first PHWR (Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor) in Korea, was permanent shut down in 2019. In Korea, according to the Nuclear Safety Act, the FDP (Final Decommissioning Plan) must be submitted within 5 years of permanent shutdown. According to NSSC Notice, the types, volumes, and radioactivity of solid radioactive wastes should be included in FDP chapter 9, Radioactive Waste Management, Therefore, in this study, activation assessment and waste classification of the End shield, which is a major activation component, were conducted. MCNP and ORIGEN-S computer codes were used for the activation assessment of the End shield. Radioactive waste levels were classified according to the cooling period of 0 to 20 years in consideration of the actual start of decommissioning. The End shield consists of Lattice tube, Shielding ball, Sleeve insert, Calandria tube shielding sleeve, and Embedment Ring. Among the components composed for each fuel channel, the neutron flux was calculated for the components whose level was not predicted by preliminary activation assessment, by dividing them into three channel regions: central channel, inter channel, and outer channel. In the case of the shielding ball, the neutron flux was calculated in the area up to 10 cm close to the core and other parts to check the decrease in neutron flux with the distance from the core. The neutron flux calculations showed that the highest neutron flux was calculated at the Sleeve insert, the component closest to the fuel channel. It was found that the neutron flux decreased by about 1/10 to 1/20 as the distance from the core increased by 20 cm. The outer channel was found to have about 30% of the neutron flux of the center channel. It was found that no change in radioactive waste level due to decay occurred during the 0 to 20 years cooling period. In this study, activation assessment and waste classification of End Shield in Wolsong unit 1 was conducted. The results of this study can be used as a basis for the preparation of the FDP for the Wolsong unit 1.

In Korea, the construction of dry storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel is being promoted through the 2nd basic plan for high-level radioactive waste management. When operating dry storage facilities, exposure dose assessment for workers should be performed, and for this, exposure scenarios based on work procedures should be derived prior. However, the dry storage method has not yet been sufficiently established in Korea, so the work procedure has not been established. Therefore, research is needed to apply it domestically based on the analysis of spent nuclear fuel management methods in major overseas leading countries. In this study, the procedure for receiving and storing spent nuclear fuel in a concrete overpack-based storage facility was analyzed. Among the various spent nuclear fuel management systems, the metal overpack-based HI-STAR 100 system and the concrete overpackbased HI-STORM 100 system are quite common methods in the United States. Therefore, in this study, work procedures were analyzed based on each final safety analysis report. First, the HI-STAR 100 overpack enters the facility and is placed in the transfer area. Remove the impact limiter of the overpack and install the alignment device on the top of the overpack. Place the HI-TRAC, an on-site transfer device, on top of the alignment unit and remove the lids of the two devices to insert the canister into the HI-TRAC. When the canister transfer is complete, reseat the lid to seal it, and disconnect the HI-TRAC from the HI-STAR 100. Raise the canister-loaded HI-TRAC over the alignment device on the top of the HI-STORM 100 overpack and remove the lids of the two devices that are in contact. Insert the canister into the HI-STORM 100 and reseat the lid. The HI-STORM 100 loaded with spent nuclear fuel is transferred to the designated storage area. In this study, the procedure for receiving and storing spent nuclear fuel in a concrete overpack-based storage facility was analyzed. The main procedure was the transfer of canisters between overpacks, and it was confirmed that HI-TRAC was used in the work procedure. The results of this study can be used as basic data for evaluating the exposure dose of operating workers for the construction of dry storage facilities in Korea.

본 연구에서는 칡의 효율적인 제거 방법을 모색하기 위해 국내외의 사례를 비교하였다. 칡은 척박한 토지에서도 생장이 왕성한 특성을 가져 사면침식을 억제하는 식물로 이용되기도 하였다. 그러나 칡은 덩굴을 형성하여 조림목을 감고 올라가 생장하므로 심할 경우에는 조림목의 고사를 유발한다. 최근에는 생활권 수목에 대한 관심의 증가로 조경수에 대한 피해가 주목을 받고 있다. 칡은 물리적, 화학적 및 생물학적 방법으로 제거한다. 국내에서는 덩굴 및 주두부 제거 등 물리적 제거 방법과 제초제를 사용하는 화학적 방법을 주로 사용하고 국외에서는 화학적 방법에 주로 의존한다. 물리적 방법은 환경오염이 적은 이점이 있으나 상당한 노동력과 비용이 소요된다. 화학적 방법은 즉각적으로 제거 효과가 나타나지만 약제 사용에 의한 환경오염과 기상조건의 제약이 있다. 생물학적 방법은 화학적 방법의 환경오염을 해결하기 위해 개발되었으나 제거 효과가 느리게 나타나고 조림지에 적용 시 조림목과 하층식생에 미치는 영향에 대한 우려가 있다. 향후 고효율성을 담보하며 친환경적인 생력화 칡 제거 기술에 대한 연구와 적용이 필요하다.

Currently, low and intermediate-level radioactive wastes and spent nuclear fuels are continuously generated in Korea. For the disposal of the radioactive wastes, the transport demand is expected to increase. Prior to transportation, it is necessary to evaluate the radiation risk of transportation to confirm that is not high. In Korea, there is no transportation risk assessment code that reflects domestic characteristics. Therefore, foreign assessment codes are used. In this study, before developing the overland transportation risk assessment code that reflects domestic characteristics, we analyzed the radiation risk assessment methodology in transportation accident codes developed in other countries. RADTRAN and RISKIND codes were selected as representative overland transportation risk assessment codes. For the two codes we analyzed accident scenarios, exposure pathways, and atmospheric diffusion. In RADTRAN, the user classifies accident severity for possible accident scenarios, and the user inputs the probability for each accident severity. On the other hand, in the case of RISKIND, the accident scenarios are classified and the probabilities are determined according to the NRC modal study (LLNL, 1987) in consideration of the cask impact velocity, cask impact angle, and fire temperature. In the case of RISKIND, the accident scenarios are applied only to transportation of spent nuclear fuel, and cannot be defined for low and intermediate-level radioactive waste. However, in the case of RADTRAN, since the severity and probability of accidents are defined by user, it can be applied to low and intermediate-level radioactive wastes. As the exposure pathways considered in transportation accident, both RADTRAN and RISKIND consider external exposure (cloudshine and groundshine), and internal exposure (inhalation, resuspension inhalation and ingestion). In the case of RADTRAN, additionally, external exposure due to loss of shielding (LOS) is considered. Atmospheric diffusion calculation is essential to determine the extent to which radioactive materials are diffused. In both RADTRAN and RISKIND, atmospheric diffusion calculations are based on Gaussian diffusion model. Users must input Pasquill stability class, release height, heat release, wind speed, temperature and mixing height, etc. Additionally, RADTRAN can input weather information relatively simply by inputting only the Pasquill stability class fraction and selecting the US average weather option. This study results will be used as a basis for developing radioactive waste overland transportation risk assessment code that reflects domestic characteristics.

Water electrolysis is an efficient method to enrich heavy hydrogen isotopes (tritium and deuterium) in the aqueous phase. Although an alkaline water electrolyzer has been commercialized for mass production of hydrogen, such a method requires additional purification steps to remove electrolytes from the final concentrates. On the other hand, proton exchange membrane water electrolysis (PEMWE) does not require additional electrolyte treatment steps, and PEMWE is operated at higher current density compared to the alkaline water electrolysis. In this study, we investigated deuterium and tritium separation from light water by PEMWE. Separation behaviors at the anode and cathode were analyzed, and H/D and H/T separation factors were compared.

In general, after the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, buildings on the site can be demolished or reused. The NSSC (Nuclear Safety and Security Commission) Notice No. 2021-11 suggests that when reusing the building on the decommissioning site, a safety assessment should be performed to confirm the effect of residual radioactivity. However, in Korea, there are currently no decommissioning experiences of nuclear power plants, and the experiences of building reuse safety assessment are also insufficient. Therefore, in this study, we analyzed the foreign cases of building reuse safety assessment after decommissioning of nuclear facilities. In this study, we investigated the Yankee Rowe nuclear power plant, Rancho Seco nuclear power plant, and Hematite fuel cycle facility. For each case, the source term, exposure scenario, exposure pathway, input parameter, and building DCGLs were analyzed. In the case of source term, each facility selected 9~26 radionuclides according to the characteristics of facilities. In the case of exposure scenario, building occupancy scenario which individuals occupy in reusing buildings was selected for all cases. Additionally, Rancho Seco also selected building renovation scenario for maintenance of building. All facilities selected 5 exposure pathways, 1) external exposure directly from a source, 2) external exposure by air submersion, 3) external exposure by deposited on the floor and wall, 4) internal exposure by inhalation, and 5) internal exposure by inadvertent ingestion. For the assessment, we used RESRAD-BUILD code for deriving building DCGLs. Input parameters are classified into building parameter, receptor parameter, and source parameter. Building parameter includes compartment height and area, receptor parameter includes indoor occupancy fraction, ingestion rate, and inhalation rate, and source parameter includes source thickness and density. The input parameters were differently selected according to the characteristics of each nuclear facility. Finally, they derived building DCGLs based on the selected source term, exposure scenario, exposure pathway, and input parameters. As a result, it was found that the maximum DCGL was 1.40×108 dpm/100 cm2, 1.30×107 dpm/100 cm2, and 1.41×109 dpm/100 cm2 for Yankee Rowe nuclear power plant, Rancho Seco nuclear power plant, and Hematite fuel cycle facility, respectively. In this study, we investigated the case of building reuse safety assessment after decommissioning of the Yankee Rowe nuclear power Plant, Rancho Seco nuclear power plant, and Hematite fuel cycle facility. Source terms, exposure scenarios, exposure pathways, input parameters, and building DCGLs were analyzed, and they were found to be different depending on the characteristics of the building. This study is expected to be used in the future building reuse safety assessment after decommissioning of domestic nuclear power plants. This work was

The 2-round Delphi survey and Focus Group Interview (FGI) survey method, in this study, are sequentially applied for the level analysis of the high-level radioactive waste (HLW) management technologies, that are classified into transport/storage, site evaluation, and disposal categories. The 2- round Delphi survey was conducted on domestic 56 experts in the HLW field in Korea, and survey answers were managed with questionnaires distributed by e-mail. In the FGI survey, domestic 24 experts from management field were formed into three groups to conduct in-depth interviews. Past research achievements including journal papers, intellectual properties and the expert opinions presented at expert hearing on HLW technology were used as reference materials. As a result of the survey, in this study, the average domestic technology level compared to the leading countries was 83.1% in transport area, 79.6% in storage area, 62.2% in site evaluation area, and 57.4% in disposal area, respectively. When compared to the former level analysis results in 2017, technology level of transport-storage area increased by 8.6%, and the site evaluation-disposal technology area decreased by 7.27%. The highest factor that increase the level of technology in the transport-storage field was due to the increased R&D program resulting on journal papers, intellectual properties. In addition, the decrease factor in the level of technology in the site evaluation-disposal field was mainly due to relatively low R&D program when compared to the leading countries. Suggested method for the level survey can be used to find out the basic data of the lower tech technologies, to estimate the efficient research budgets and to prepare the R&D human resources. With this regards, R&D roadmap can be matured with suggested prediction method for the domestic technology level on HLW.

The analysis of uranium migration is crucial for the accurate safety assessment of high-level radioactive waste (HLW) repository. Previous studies showed that the migration of the uranium can be affected by various physical and chemical processes, such as groundwater flow, heat transfer, sorption/ desorption and, precipitation/dissolution. Therefore, a coupled Thermal-Hydrological-Chemical (THC) model is required to accurately simulate the uranium migration near the HLW repository. In this study, COMSOL-PHREEQC coupled model was used to simulate the uranium migration. In the model, groundwater flow, heat transfer, and non-reactive solute transport were calculated by COMSOL, and geo-chemical reaction was calculated by PHREEQC. Sorption was primarily considered as geo-chemical reaction in the model, using the concept of two-site protolysis nonelctrostatic surface complexation and cation exchange (2 SP NE SC/CE). A modified operator splitting method was used to couple the results of COMSOL and PHREEQC. Three benchmarks were done to assess the accuracy of the model: 1) 1D transport and cation exchange model, 2) cesium transport in the column experiment done by Steefel et al. (2002), and 3) the batch sorption experiment done by Fernandes et al. (2012), and Bradbury and Baeyens (2009). Three benchmark results showed reliable matching with results from the previous studies. After the validation, uranium 1D transport simulation on arbitrary porewater condition was conducted. From the results, the evolution of the uranium front with sequentially saturating sites was observed. Due to the limitation of operator splitting method, time step effect was observed, which caused the uranium to sorbed at further sites then it should. For further study, 3 main tasks were proposed. First, precipitation/ dissolution will be added to the reaction part. Second, multiphase flow will be considered instead of single phase Darcy flow. Last, the effect of redox potential will be considered.