Introduction The attributes of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) have a significant influence on the actions of the organization and, ultimately, firm performance (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Kashmiri, Nicol, & Arora, 2017). Recently, there has been growing interest in one particular CEO attribute, i.e., narcissism and how this individual characteristic affects actions taken by the firm and the outcomes achieved. Narcissistic CEOs have been described as “having an inflated self-concept that is enacted through a desire for recognition and a high degree of self-reference when interacting with others (Resick, Whitman, Weingarden, & Hiller, 2009: pg. 1367).” Prior research has found that CEOs with a more narcissistic personality make riskier decisions by changing the company’s strategy more often (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007), making acquisitions more frequently and of larger targets (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007), adopting discontinuous technologies (Gerstner, König, Enders, & Hambrick, 2013), and expanding international business activities (Oesterle, Elosge, & Elosge, 2016). The results of previous studies show that by pursuing decisions with greater risk and involving the firm in wide-ranging efforts, the actions of narcissistic CEOs lead to fluctuating firm performance (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007) and diminishes the positive effect of various firm activities. While these prior studies have provided valuable insight, the strong emphasis on the organizational actions taken as a consequence of the narcissistic CEO has not added to our understanding of the relationship between CEOs who seek personal affirmation, admiration, and attention and important intervening variables for firm performance such as corporate brand reputation. Corporate brand reputation signals the status of an organization and influences the actions of capital markets, investors, consumers, and applicants in the job market (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). Managers actively work to construct favourable corporate brand reputations through the actions the firm takes and the information selectively released to the media and public. Yet, the literature suggests that narcissistic CEOs spend time focusing on how to enhance their own image rather than on achieving organizational goals (Resick et al., 2009). In this regard, the attention-seeking CEO likely becomes a focal point for the corporate brand. However, no research to date has examined the relationship between the narcissistic CEO’s personality and the effects of corporate brand reputation. This study fills the gap in the literature by investigating how CEO narcissism influences the effectiveness of corporate brand reputation on firm performance. Theoretical development The literature on corporate brands noted that corporate brand reputation is a critical intangible asset that affects firm performance (Roberts & Dowling, 2002). Stakeholders use corporate brand reputation as a means to compare and contrast competitors Researchers have noted various advantages for highly reputable firms: customers are willing to pay more for offerings (Roberts & Dowling, 2002) and accept new product innovations (Dowling, 2002); managers accept lower remuneration (Tavassoli, Sorescu, & Chandy, 2014) and receive higher payoff for investments (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999). These types of advantages allow for greater performance. Thus, consistent with prior literature, we argue the following: Hypothesis 1: Corporate brand reputation has a positive effect on future firm performance. Research has shown that CEO narcissism diminishes the effect of the firm’s positive actions. Petrenko, Aime, Ridge, and Hill (2016) argue that narcissistic CEOs pursue Corporate Social Responsibility efforts (CSR) as a means to enhance their own image. Yet, the authors found that the narcissistic CEOs actually reduce the positive affect of CSR initiatives. Likewise, Engelen, Neumann, and Schmidt (2016) examined the effect CEO narcissism had on the relationship between entrepreneurial orientation and performance finding that CEO narcissism lessens the positive effect of entrepreneurial orientation. These results are due to the narcissistic CEOs perpetual need for attention and self-affirmation which leads to unconcentrated work initiatives and a lack of attention to the needs of employees. When subordinates’ needs are ignored they develop a sense of powerlessness, incompetence and a lack of desire to present their own ideas. This environment diminishes entrepreneurial engagement (Engelen et al., 2016; Wales, Patel, & Lumpkin, 2013). In line with this view, we believe the attention-seeking narcissistic CEO competes with the development of the corporate brand and will dampen the positive effect of highly reputable brands on firm performance. Thus, we argue the following: Hypothesis 2: CEO narcissism diminishes the positive effect of corporate brand reputation on firm performance. Method We compiled a unique unbalanced panel composed of data from COMPUSTAT, ExecuComp, and Fortune Most Admired Companies listing. Our sample includes 993 firm-year observations consists of 237 CEOs from 144 U.S companies on eight-year period, 2009-2016. Data on CEOs were collected from the ExecuComp databases. Financial performance data were from COMPUSTAT. Firm reputation was obtained from firm’s published score in the Fortune “Most Admired Companies” survey in a given year. The fortune rating is obtained through surveys from executives and directors, and has been widely used in previous research (Love, Lim, & Bednar 2017). Our independent and control variables are measured in the year prior to the one in which the survey ratings are published. CEO narcissism is invariant meaning narcissism is a relatively stable disposition similar to Chatterjee and Hambrick’s (2011) and obtained by averaging data from the second and third years of each CEO’s tenure (t + 1 and t + 2). First year of the CEO’s tenure was not considered because of frequently mentioned anomalies reported at first year. CEO narcissism was measured with the same way as Chatterjee and Hambrick’s (2011). Thus, it combines indicators for (1) the prominence of the CEO’s photograph in the company’s annual report; (2) the CEO’s prominence in the company’s press releases; (3) the CEO’s use of first-person singular pronouns in interviews; (4) the CEO’s cash relative pay where cash compensation divided by that of the second-highest paid executive in the firm; and (5) the CEO’s non-cash relative pay where non-cash compensation divided by that of the second-highest-paid executive in the firm. Dependent variables were measures annually and consider available data after the second-year tenure of CEO (n > 2), yielding a 380 firm-years, 61 CEOs for testing our hypothesis. Firm performance was measured with Tobin’s Q (TQ), calculated by dividing the firm’s market value by firm’s asset replacement costs. We have the CEO, the firm, and the industry level control variables. CEO level control variables are CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO gender, CEO stock ownership as the percentage of company stock owned by the CEO, whether the CEO was also board chairman (duality). Firm-level control variables are firm’s the prior year performance, firm size (natural logarithm of revenues t+n–1), firm age, for each dependent variable, to consider strategy or performance tendencies, we included performance value for the firm in the year prior to the start of the CEO’s tenure (t – 1). Industry control variables are dummies for the industry sector (manufacturing, regulated and services industries), the industry average (for all firms in the sample, always excluding the focal firm) in each year (t + n), for each dependent variable to be able to control for industry tendencies. To control for endogeneity i.e. narcissistic CEOs are drawn to certain situations and/or that some conditions, we followed exactly the same procedure of Chatterjee and Hambrick’s (2011). Thus, we regressed CEO narcissism on firm revenues, age, ROA, and calendar year for the year prior to the CEO’s start, ROA change between first and second years of CEO tenure, measures in t+1, namely power (CEO/chair duality and CEO ownership), CEO age, industry dummies. Using the regression coefficients of the significant variables, we calculated each CEO’s predicted narcissism score and included that value as an endogeneity control in our analyses. We used generalized estimating equations (GEE) (Liang & Zeger, 1986), which derive maximum likelihood estimates and accommodate non-independent observations. Due to multiple observations for almost all firms, there is non-independency in our model. We specified a Gaussian (normal) distribution with an identity link function. The covariance structure of the repeated measurement was autoregressive of order one (AR(1)). We used robust variance estimators in our estimations. We used the xtgee routine in Stata 14.2. Results and conclusions The results provide considerable support for hypotheses 1 and 2. Hypothesis 1 predicted that corporate reputation has a positive effect on firm performance (b = .02, p < .01). CEO narcissism is a moderating effect between corporate brand reputation and firm performance. Specifically, CEO narcissism diminishes the positive effect of corporate reputation on firm performance (b = -.04, p < .05). Besides, CEO narcissism have a negative main effect on firm performance (b = -.14, p < .05). Corporate reputation is an intangible asset for firms and positively associated with firm performance according to our results. Little is known so far about the CEO and corporate brand relationship and the role of CEO brands in creating value for the company (Bendisch, Larsen, & Trueman, 2013). We investigated how CEO narcissism influence the relationship between firm’s reputations and firm performance which have not been investigated so far. Since CEOs are the face of the company and it contributes to corporate brand value, narcissistic CEOs might diminish the effect of corporate brand reputation on firm performance with their actions and messages. We find support for our ideas. As a future research, we suggest investigating this issue for different industry sectors and different firm performance measures. Besides, the process of what type of actions of CEOs might diminish brand value should be investigated further. When narcissistic CEOs reduce corporate brand reputation, another potential topic worth to investigate further.

국제지질자원인재개발센터는 지질자원 분야의 국내·외 인적자원개발을 목적으로 설립되었으며, 개원 이래 교육 훈련 목표 성과를 달성하며 운영되고 있다. 이 연구에서는 국제지질자원인재개발센터 성과의 객관성을 확인하기 위하여 교육인증과정 수료자를 대상으로 교육요구분석 및 교육훈련 과정 성과평가를 실시하였다. 교육요구분석을 위해 Borich 교육요구도와 Locus for Focus 방식을 활용하였다. 교육훈련 과정 성과평가는 성별, 연령별, 학력별, 수강구분에 따라 만족도 및 현업적용도 분석을 위해 설문조사 방식을 활용하였다. 연구결과, 지질학, 광물자원, 석유해저, 지구환경 분야 의 교육훈련 과정의 교육요구도가 도출되었으며, Locus for Focus 방식에 따라 교육과정 개발의 시급성을 판단하였다. 교육훈련 과정 성과평가 결과 광물자원, 지구환경 분야의 과정이 지질학 분야의 과정보다 학습성취에 대한 만족도가 높은 것으로 나타났다.

This paper reviewed the relationship between innovation(organization innovation, personnel innovation, product innovation, process innovation) and firm performance in small business. Based on the responses from 218 firms, the results of multiple regression analysis showed that personnel innovation, product innovation, and process innovation effect positively on all firm performance(sales, profit, market share, customer satisfaction), and organization innovation effects positively only on market share and customer satisfaction. The results of hierarchical regression analysis showed that technical innovation(product innovation, process innovation) effects more positively on sales, profit and customer satisfaction than administrative innovation(organization innovation, personnel innovation).

◉ 목적 : 본 연구는 감각통합치료가 지적장애아동의 문제행동의 개선에 미치는 영향에 대해 알아보고자 하는데 목적이 있다. ◉ 연구방법 : 본 연구는 과제이탈, 주의산만, 상동행동을 가지는 지적장애 9세 남아를 대상으로 실시하였다. 총 20회기, 주 3회, 40분, 1:1 감각통합치료를 통한 문제행동을 다중기초선 설계(multiple-based line)로 A-B설계를 사용하였으며 사건기록법으로 측정하고 분석하였다. ◉ 결과 : 대상아동은 감각통합치료를 통해서 과제이탈행동 23회에서 11.30회로 11.7회가 감소하였고, 주의산만은 22.57회에서 10.62회로 11.95회 감소하였고, 상동행동은 18.6회에서 7.4회로 11.2회 감소하였다. ◉ 결론 : 본 연구는 감각통합치료가 지적장애아동의 문제행동감소에 효과가 있는 것으로 나타났다.

소프트왜어 산업진흥볍 개정으로，공공부문 정보화 시장에 대기업 사업 참여가 제한되고 중소기업의 사업 참여가 증가될 것으로 예상된다. 이에 중소기업의 프로젝트 통합관리 및 소프트혜어 품질관리의 취약 부분을 보완하기 위한 조처로 PMO 제도를 법제화 하여，제도적，조직적 프로젝트관리를 통한 IS프로젝트의 성과를 향상을 하려는 것이다. IS 프로젝트 관리영역에 관련된 PMO에 대한 이론적 연구와 PMBOK 9 개 관리영역 중 3 개 핵심관리 영역 연관성 분석을 통해 PMO 업무 핵심 관리능력인 PMO 기능을 정의하였다. 또한 프로젝트 성과 및 영향 요인은 이론적 연구를 통해 성과 영향 요소 및 성과요소를 정의하였다. 제시한 연구모델의 실증적 검증은 공공부분 발주자，사업수행자，감리원을 대상으로 설문조사를 통하여 프로젝트의 성과 향상에 영향을 주는 PMO 활동의 기능 및 PMO운영 형태 상호관계를 실증적으로 검증하고자 연구모델을 수립한다.

◉ 목적 : 본 연구의 목적은 동화를 활용한 시-지각 프로그램을 개발을 통해서 지적장애 아동의 작업수행과 시-지각 기능이 향상되는지 알아보고자 하였다. ◉ 연구방법 : 시-지각 기능에 문제를 보이는 지적장애 만 10세 남자 아동 대상으로 부모님의 동의를 얻어 총 15회기, 주3회, 30분, 1：1 동화를 활용한 시－지각 훈련을 하였다. 프로그램을 위해 사전 사후 평가로 운동 시-지각 검사－3(Motor visual perception test-3 ; MVPT-3)을 사용하였고, 작업수행 평가를 위해서는 캐나다 작업수행 측정(Canadian Occupational Performance Measure : COPM)을 사용하였다. ◉ 결과 : 대상아동은 동화를 통한 시-지각 훈련을 통해서 원점수 28점에서 33점으로 만 6세 6개월에서 만 9세 6개월로 향상되었다. ◉ 결론 : 동화를 활용한 시-지각 훈련을 통해서 지적장애 아동의 시-지각 기능을 촉진시키는데 효과가 있음을 알 수 있었다. 대조군이 있는 집단연구를 통해서 프로그램의 일반화를 검증하는 것이 필요하다고 사료된다.

Information systems introduction and application are increasing suddenly from the enterprises while approaching the information age. It requires to manage the IS performance and understand quality of information systems for obtaining the competitive power of the enterprise through IS. Six Sigma is widely recognized today as a process improvement methodology that can cut costs and eliminate defects in information industry as well as manufacturing processes. This study provides a framework for managing performance of information systems which are used to obtain competitive advantage.