Strategic item export control aims to maintain international peace and safety and serves as a significant nuclear non-proliferation regime that directly impacts a nation’s security. Therefore, establishing an autonomous export control system at the state level is crucial, and one of the most efficient methods to achieve this is by enhancing an export company’s management system. Accordingly, many advanced countries, such as the United States, Europe, and Japan, have operated their own internal compliance programs (CP or ICP) to manage and screen the export of strategic items as a corporate social responsibility and risk mitigation measure. In Korea, which has a high dependence on trade, the need for CP was continuously confirmed, but the system was introduced in 2004, relatively late compared to other advanced countries. So far, the Korean government has made steady efforts to develop and establish the system and is actively encouraging businesses to obtain Compliance Program certification to autonomously manage strategic items. Major technologically advanced countries utilize technology transfer as a tool for economic sanctions, trade security, and strategic technology management, and they continue to strengthen their control regimes. In these countries, CP certification is considered a standard practice for export control among mid-sized and large enterprises. It serves as a vital risk management system that protects companies from unforeseen incidents. However, in Korea, the application of CP under the Foreign Trade Act is limited to dual-use items and does not extend to the nuclear export control system. Therefore, this paper analyzes international cases and CP requirements in countries like the United States, Japan, Europe, and Singapore. As a result of the review, the application of CP into Korea’s nuclear export control could be a coexistence means that can strengthen supply chain control as well as provide benefits not to impede technical research, international trade, and exchanges.

The ROK government has developed the Nuclear Export and Control System (NEPS) to implement export control activities. Although it was launched in 2008 as a system that can work with classification, licensing, nuclear material approval, government-to-government assurance, complying with nuclear cooperation agreement (NCA) handled through official documents. In order to enhance systematic management for items subject to NCA, KINAC developed a new module for the procedure (hereinafter referred to as “NCA module”) and opened it in 2022. This paper presents the module’s development background, key features, and current operation status. The NCA module prioritizes functional expansion and flexibility, distinct from other tasks for the following reasons. First, the export control duties of classification, export license, and approval for NM are based on domestic law, leading to predetermined target items, application forms, and processes that change only through statutory amendments. In contrast, the implementation of NCA has numerous procedural variables, varying across countries in scope, content, and procedures. Therefore, if the function is over-standardized, there would be many exceptions that the system cannot resolve in practice. Second, the existing NEPS process entails a one-time decision or approval for each application, while the implementation of the agreement encompasses four related procedures for each item: prior notification, written confirmation, shipment notification, and receipt confirmation. Even some steps may be omitted depending on the case. The other difference is the working process. The implementation of NCA must be initiated from the government, so the existing methods, beginning with the licensee filling a form, cannot be adopted as it is. The NCA module has adopted a new reference numbering system to resolve these challenges. It enables the creation of multiple procedures under one reference number on an item to expand the tasks and make it possible to omit some steps or to reflect case-by-case concerns in each stage. It also provides a consolidated view of multiple notifications related to a single item, ensuring to deal with even long-running tasks without missing any obligations until the final procedure. Moreover, some of the data in the NCA module is extensible by allowing users to manage the list themselves. For example, the system can respond to new agreements by allowing users to add and modify codes that distinguish counterparty countries. As a result, the current NCA module accommodates a variety of implementation scenarios, including split shipments, the procedural omissions, and the modification of additional counterparties, offering enhanced flexibility and adaptability.

The Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) conducts outreach to promote and educate regulated entities on the export control regime’s purpose, importance, and implementation. Outreach activities help to reduce regulatory blind spots and minimize domestic and international penalties for non-compliance. The need for outreach is growing as domestic and international policies are changing rapidly, and the scope of export regulations is expanding due to increased exports of nuclear power plants. In order to explore the long-term development direction of outreach activities, we will analyze the trends of nuclear export control and the outreach activities of related organizations. Here are some key trends in nuclear export controls. In recent years, countries worldwide have been reorganizing their supply chains for critical industries, focusing on their own and friendly countries, and strengthening their trade policies in security aspects such as export control and technology protection. Following the trend of international sanctions against Russia, the Korean government has implemented domestic export control measures similar to those of the international community, such as blocking the export of strategic goods to Russia. In addition, the number of strategic goods classifications and export licenses has been increasing as Korea promotes the export of new nuclear power plants. In line with carbon neutrality, it is expected to revitalize and diversify nuclear energy-related export businesses, such as joint research on fourth-generation nuclear power plants and SMRs. Finally, the scope of exports is expanding from ‘goods’ such as existing nuclear reactors to ‘technology’-oriented transfers. The means of technology transfer are diversifying with the development of information and communication technologies such as cloud services, email, video conferencing, and large-capacity removable storage devices. Next, look at the outreach activities of nuclear export control organizations. The Korean Security Agency of Trade and Industry (KOSTI) is an organization that implements export controls on dualuse items. It puts much effort into one-on-one consulting services with companies and has established and operated various online training programs. It also actively utilizes online promotional materials such as card news and videos. The export control agencies of major countries have a common trend of expanding outreach to research institutions, providing export control guides tailored to the characteristics of each field, holding annual seminars and conferences, and operating educational programs

As drones expand beyond military purposes to the private sector, the level of use of drones in various fields is increasing. However, the world was shocked by the attempt to attack with a drone equipped with a C4 bomb in the US and the attempt to assassinate a head of state using a drone in Venezuela. Drone threats to domestic nuclear power plants are also increasing due to the expansion of drone use, terrorist threats, and North Korea’s invasion of drones. Overseas, various drone threats to nuclear power plants have occurred. In October 2014, French electricity company Electricite de France confirmed that it had observed unauthorized drones over seven nuclear power plants across France. A drone threat occurred at the Savannah River Site (SRS), a U.S. Department of Energy facility that processes and stores nuclear materials. In 2016, eight drones were observed by security personnel. In 2016, a drone flew over the cooling tower of the Liebstadt nuclear power plant in Switzerland, and publicly shared the filmed video on YouTube. In July 2018, Greenpeace activists intentionally crashed a drone into the outer wall of the spent fuel building in Boughey, France. In January 2019, they used drones to drop smoke bombs and release videos at Orangeo’s nuclear facility containing irradiated fuel. In January 22, Sweden saw drones flying over three nuclear power plants. Drone was also seen at the Forsmark nuclear power plant on Friday and at two other Swedish nuclear power plants in Oskarshamn and Ringhals on Monday. Anti-drone technology to counter the threat of drone terrorism is also developing. Anti-drone technology detects, tracks, and identifies illegal drones to neutralize them. Various technologies such as radar, EO/IR cameras, Lidar, sensor, and RF scanners are being developed for drone detection. Depending on the detection technology, it has advantages such as detection distance and remote control drone detection. However, there are also disadvantages, such as obstacles, weather condition, and the inability to detect drones that do not transmit signals. Methods such as jammer, capture, and destruction have been developed for incapacitation technology. While it has advantages such as stability and portability, it has disadvantages such as limited use and damage to the surroundings. Accordingly, it is necessary to draw realistic measures to defend against the threat of nuclear power plants by paying constant attention to the various detection, identification, and neutralization anti-drone systems that continue to evolve.

Among the public notices of the NSSC, five notices related to safeguards, including “Education of Nuclear Control, International Regulatory Materials, Preparation of Regulation of NMAC (Nuclear Material Accounting and Control), the National Inspection of NMAC, and Reporting of International Regulatory Materials” The regulations on the National Inspection of NMAC have remained the same since some revisions were made on December 26, 2017, raising the need to revise the public notice due to changes in the domestic and international safeguards regulatory environment. Accordingly, this paper analyzes the public notice of the National Inspection of NMAC and proposes the revision direction. The regulation regarding the National Inspection of NMAC comprises sections such as Purpose and Definition, Types - Scope - Frequency of the National Inspection, Notification of the National Inspection’s plan, and Management of Violation. Appendices include the contents of the violation table, explanations regarding types of violations, and various forms related to the National Inspection, which are attached separately. IAEA mentioned that ROK was selected as a pilot country for the Improved SLA (State-Level Approach) project starting in November 2020. IAEA explained that a quantitative and standardized methodology was adopted and developed for this purpose. As a result, the Unannounced Inspection at LWR facilities will transition to the Random Interim Inspection. Additionally, the Physical Inventory Verification in CANDU facilities will increase to once a year per reactor. This status will change the frequency and intensity of inspection at domestic nuclear facilities. Furthermore, domestically, there is an ongoing trend of continuous growth and diversification of nuclear facilities. In light of the changing domestic and international safeguards environment, it is necessary to set a direction for revising the regulation regarding the National Inspection of NMAC that was partially amended in 2017 to align with the current status. Firstly, due to the increased burden on operators resulting from the increased number of IAEA inspections following the application of Improved SLA, there is a need to streamline the National Inspection of NMAC frequency to enhance overall regulatory efficiency. Furthermore, the definition section should also be revised to include matters related to the regulation to reflect the current reality accurately. Considering the operation and name changes of new domestic nuclear facilities, there may be a need to add or modify computer input codes. While pursuing the revision of regulations regarding the National Inspection of NMAC, an analysis of the need for revision of other regulations related to safeguards should also be conducted, and directions should be set. Through this process, improving the regulatory framework that forms the basis of safeguards can help prevent confusion among operators and promote regulatory efficiency. We can better cope with these changes by proactively adapting to the rapidly changing domestic and international nuclear environment.

This study aims to classify R&D activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle using the deep learning methodology. First, R&D data of the Republic of Korea were collected from the National Science & Technology Information Service (NTIS) for the years 2021, 2022, and 2023. We use keywords such as ‘nuclear,’ ‘uranium,’ ‘plutonium,’ and ‘thorium’ to find nuclear-related R&D projects in the NTIS database. Among the numerous R&D projects found through keyword searches, overlapping and medical-related R&D projects were excluded. Finally, 495 R&D projects conducted in 2021, 430 R&D projects conducted in 2022, and 296 R&D projects conducted in 2023 were obtained for analysis. After that, Safeguards experts determine whether the R&D projects are subject to declaration under the AP. The values of the content validity index (CVI) and content validity ratio (CVR) were used to verify whether the experts’ judgments were valid. The 1,218 collected and labeled data were then divided 8:2 into training and test datasets to see if deep learning could be applied to classify nuclear fuel cycle-related R&D activities. We use the Python and TensorFlow packages, including RNN, GRU, and CNN methods. First, the collected text information was preprocessed to remove punctuation marks and then tokenized to make it suitable for deep learning. After 20 epochs of training to classify the nuclear fuel cycle-related R&D activities, the RNN model achieved 97.30% accuracy and a 5.85% error rate on the validation dataset. The GRU model achieved 96.53% accuracy and a 9.06% error rate on the validation dataset. In comparison, the CNN model achieved 94.61% accuracy and a 2.57% error rate on the validation dataset. When applying the test dataset to each model, the RNN model had a test accuracy of 83.20%, the GRU test accuracy of 82.79%, and the CNN model had a test accuracy of 85.66% for the same dataset. This study applied deep learning models to labeled data judged by various experts, and the CNN model showed the best results. In the future, this study will continue to develop an optimum deep learning model that can classify nuclear fuel cycle-related R&D activities to achieve the purpose of safeguards measures from open-source data such as papers and articles.

Understanding the dispersion of xenon isotopes following a nuclear test is critical for global security and falls within the remit of both the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the International Noble Gas Experiment (INGE). This paper aims to show if it is possible to discriminate the source of xenon releases based on the atmospheric dispersion of xenon isotopes using HYSPLIT. Using ORIGEN and SERPENT simulations, four released scenarios are defined with four different fractionation times (i.e., 1 hour, 1 day, 10 days, and 30 days) after a 1kt TNT equivalent 235U explosion event. These time-delayed release scenarios were selected to certify the possibility of mis-determining xenon release source. We use the Lagrangian dispersion model for atmospheric dispersion to predict the concentration distribution of xenon isotopes under each scenario. The model allows us to better understand how these isotopes would distribute over time and space, offering valuable data for real-world detection efforts. To our knowledge, there have been no researches on the analysis of xenon isotopic ratios considering atmospheric dispersion. In this work, we focused on the atmospheric dispersion using HYSPLIT to characterize the xenon isotopic ratios from nuclear tests. In addition, we compared the xenon isotopic ratios obtained from the atmospheric dispersion with those from ORIGEN calculations, which would be helpful to discriminate the source of the xenon releases.

Nuclear Material Accountancy (NMA) system quantitatively evaluates whether nuclear material is diverted or not. Material balance is evaluated based on nuclear material measurements based on this system and these processes are based on statistical techniques. Therefore, it is possible to evaluate the performance based on modeling and simulation technique from the development stage. In the performance evaluation, several diversion scenarios are established, nuclear material diversion is attempted in a virtual simulation environment according to these scenarios, and the detection probability is evaluated. Therefore, one of the important things is to derive vulnerable diversion scenario in advance. However, in actual facilities, it is not easy to manually derive weak scenario because there are numerous factors that affect detection performance. In this study, reinforcement learning has been applied to automatically derive vulnerable diversion scenarios from virtual NMA system. Reinforcement learning trains agents to take optimal actions in a virtual environment, and based on this, it is possible to develop an agent that attempt to divert nuclear materials according to optimal weak scenario in the NMA system. A somewhat simple NMA system model has been considered to confirm the applicability of reinforcement learning in this study. The simple model performs 10 consecutive material balance evaluations per year and has the characteristic of increasing MUF uncertainty according to balance period. The expected vulnerable diversion scenario is a case where the amount of diverted nuclear material increases in proportion to the size of the MUF uncertainty, and total amount of diverted nuclear material was assumed to be 8 kg, which corresponds to one significant quantity of plutonium. Virtual NMA system model (environment) and a divertor (agent) attempting to divert nuclear material were modeled to apply reinforcement learning. The agent is designed to receive a negative reward if an action attempting to divert is detected by the NMA system. Reinforcement learning automatically trains the agent to receive the maximum reward, and through this, the weakest diversion scenario can be derived. As a result of the study, it was confirmed that the agent was trained to attempt to divert nuclear material in a direction with a low detection probability in this system model. Through these results, it is found that it was possible to sufficiently derive weak scenarios based on reinforcement learning. This technique considered in this study can suggest methods to derive and supplement weak diversion scenarios in NMA system in advance. However, in order to apply this technology smoothly, there are still issues to be solved, and further research will be needed in the future.

A solution combustion process for the synthesis of hollandite (BaAl2Ti6O16) powders is described. SYNROC (synthetic rock) consists of four main titanate phases: perovskite, zirconolite, hollandite and rutile. Hollandite is one of the crystalline host matrices used for the disposal of high-level radioactive wastes because it immobilizes Sr and Lns elements by forming solid solutions. The solution combustion synthesis, which is a self-sustaining oxi-reduction reaction between a nitrate and organic fuel, generates an exothermic reaction and that heat converts the precursors into their corresponding oxide products in air. The process has high energy efficiency, fast heating rates, short reaction times, and high compositional homogeneity. To confirm the combustion synthesis reaction, FT-IR analysis was conducted using glycine with a carboxyl group and an amine as fuel to observe its bonding with metal element in the nitrate. TG-DTA, X-ray diffraction analysis, SEM and EDS were performed to confirm the formed phases and morphology. Powders with an uncontrolled shape were obtained through a general oxide-route process, confirming hollandite powders with micro-sized soft agglomerates consisting of nano-sized primary particles can be prepared using these methods.

The Radiation and Decommissioning Laboratory of Central Research Institute (CRI) of Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co. (KHNP) performs research to technically support the effective management of radiological hazards to avoid risks to civilians, the workers, and the environment from the radiological risks. The laboratory mainly consists of three technical groups: decommissioning and SF technology group, radiation and chemistry group, and radwaste and environment group. The groups carry out various R&D such as decommissioning, spent fuel management, radiation protection, water chemistry management, and radioactive waste management. The laboratory also technically supports the calibration of radiometric instruments as a Korea Laboratory Accreditation Scheme (KOLAS), approval for decommissioning, guidance for radioactive waste management, state-of-the-art technology evaluations, and technology transfer.

In South Korea, the exporters of items related to nuclear power generation are diversified. Consequently, there is a risk of illegitimate export by companies failing to recognize the export control system because the awareness about this system for the strategic items among the subcontractors of nuclear power facilities is limited. To prevent illegitimate export of the strategic items, it is necessary to conduct outreach activities regarding the export control system for the related companies. Additionally, the exporters and export license examiners should consider whether an export target is on the Denial List, who may divert the strategic items to weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control developed two systems for controlling illegitimate export of the Trigger List items. The first system, Nuclear Industry Information Collection and Analysis System, can gather information about the key nuclear industries in Korea and analyze the dealing of strategic items. The second system, Denied Persons Information Gathering System, can regularly gather information about the denied persons and provide the updated data to the exporters and regulatory examiners. These two systems can be used for outreach activities and export license examination to prevent illegitimate export of the strategic items.

In a steam turbine system for nuclear power plant, the exhaust loss consists of leaving loss, hood loss, turn-up loss and restriction loss. The exhaust loss during rated power operation of steam turbine equipment is inevitable, but it can be optimized by several factors such as last stage blade length, condenser vacuum and steam velocity. In this paper the relationship between the exhaust loss and electrical output of domestic nuclear power plants was quantitatively evaluated, and ways to reduce this loss were considered.

이 연구는 21세기에 들어 핵전력 강화에 전념하는 북한의 핵전략을 내 부적 법과 제도의 정비 사례를 통해 분석한다. 북한은 2012년 헌법 서문 을 개정하여 ‘핵보유국’임을 천명하였고, 2013년 “자위적 핵보유국의 지 위를 더욱 공고히 할 데 대하여(소위 핵보유국법)”와 2022년 “조선민주 주의인민공화국 핵무력정책에 대하여(소위 핵무력정책법)을 통해 핵전략 을 세부적으로 발전시키고 있다. 2013년 대비 2022년의 법률은 상당부 분 공세적, 권한위임형 핵전략을 보인다는 특징이 있다. 본 논문은 두 법 률의 내용 변화를 리케의 전략 3요소(목표, 방법, 수단)를 바탕으로 분석 하고, 비슷한 핵전략의 변화를 보였던 파키스탄의 사례와 비교하여 함의 를 도출한다. 결론적으로는 바틀렛의 모델을 바탕으로 북한 핵전략의 전 략적 균형 달성 여부를 고찰해본다.

Neutron resonance transmission technique was applied for assaying isotopic fissile materials produced in the pyro-process. In each process of the pyro-process, a different composition of the fissile material is produced. Simulation was basically performed on 235U and 239Pu assay for TRU-RE product, hull waste, and uranium addition. The resonance energies were evaluated for uranium and plutonium in the simulation, and the linearity in the detection response was examined on the fissile content variation. The linear resonance energies were determined for the analysis of 235U and 239Pu on the different fissile materials. For enriched TRU-RE assay, the sample condition was suggested; The sample density, content, and thickness are the key factors to obtain accurate fissile content. The detection signal is discriminated for uranium and plutonium in neutron resonance technique. The transmitted signal for fissile resonance has a direct relation with the content of fissile. The simulation results indicated that the neutron resonance technique is promising to analyze 235U and 239Pu for various types of the pyro-process material. An accurate fissile assay will contribute toward safeguarding the pyro-processing system.

To ensure radiological safety margin in the transport and storage of spent nuclear fuel, it is crucial to perform source term and shielding analyses in advance from the perspective of conservation. When performing source term analysis on UO2 fuel, which is mostly used in commercial nuclear power plants, uranium and oxygen are basically considered to be the initial materials of the new fuel. However, the presence of impurities in the fuel and structural materials of the fuel assembly may influence the source term and shielding analyses. The impurities could be radioactive materials or the stable materials that are activated by irradiation during reactor power operation. As measuring the impurity concentration levels in the fuel and structural materials can be challenging, publicly available information on impurity concentration levels is used as a reference in this evaluation. To assess the effect of impurities, the results of the source term and shielding analyses were compared depending on whether the assumed impurity concentration is considered. For the shielding analysis, generic cask design data developed by KEPCO-E&C was utilized.

원전 구조물의 실시간 모니터링 기술이 요구되고 있지만, 현재 운영 중인 지진 감시계통으로는 동특성 추출 등 시스템 식별이 제한 된다. 전역적인 거동 데이터 및 동특성 추출을 위해서는 다수의 센서를 최적 배치하여야 한다. 최적 센서배치 연구는 많이 진행되어 왔 지만 주로 토목, 기계 구조물이 대상이었으며 원전 구조물 대상으로 수행된 연구는 없었다. 원전 구조물은 미미한 신호대잡음비에도 강건한 신호를 획득하여야 하며, 모드 기여도가 저차 모드에 집중되어 있어 모드별 잡음 영향을 고려해야 하는 등 구조물 특성을 고려 해야 한다. 이에 본 연구에서는 잡음에 대한 강건도와 모드별 영향을 평가할 수 있는 최적 센서배치 방법론을 제시하였다. 활용한 지표 로서 auto MAC(Modal Assurance Criterion), cross MAC, 노드별 모드형상 분포를 분석하였으며, 잡음에 대한 강건도 평가의 적합성을 수치해석으로 검증하였다.

Given the limited terrestrial reserves of uranium (approximately 4.6 million tons), exploring alternative resources is necessary to secure a sustainable, long-term supply of nuclear energy. Uranium extraction from seawater (UES) is a potential solution since the amount of uranium dissolved in seawater (approximately 4.5 billion tons) is about 1,000 times that of terrestrial reserves. However, due to the ultra-low concentration of uranium in seawater (approximately 3.3 ppb), making UES economically viable is a challenging task. In this paper, we explore the potential of using thermal discharge from domestic nuclear power plants for uranium extraction. The motivation for this comes from previous research showing that the adsorption capacity of amidoxime-based adsorbents is proportional to the temperature of the seawater in which they are deployed. Specifically, a study conducted in Japan found that a 10°C increase in seawater temperature resulted in a 1.5-fold increase in adsorption capacity.