PURPOSES : This study aims to evaluate the traffic safety by collecting and analyzing vehicle speed and conflict frequency data based on the provision of information to vehicle drivers and crosswalk pedestrians under right-turn conditions. METHODS : Two evaluation scales, namely speed of access and number of conflicts, were used to quantitatively evaluate the effects of the new information provision method. Data on access speed and the number of conflicts according to information provision were collected and compared before and after information provision. RESULTS : Analysis of the pre- and post-spot speed reduction rates revealed an overall reduction rate of 32.6%. The conflict ratio was 81.0% before information provision but increased to 83.3% after information provision. CONCLUSIONS : When LED display information was provided, the effect of decelerating the approaching speed of vehicles in the rightturn torpedo section was statistically significant, but the reduction in the conflict ratio was not. Factors such as intersection status, traffic volume and vehicle speed, affect the approach speed and increase or decrease the number of conflicts. Regardless of whether information is provided, the average compliance rate of the Road Traffic Act when turning right in the channelization area is 16.7%, which is significantly different from the average compliance rate of 48.4% immediately after the Road Traffic Act was revised in July 2022.

In response to a regulatory mandate, all nuclear licensees are obligated to establish an information system that can provide essential information in the event of a radiation emergency by connecting the monitoring data of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) or equivalent system to the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS). Responding to this responsibility, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has established the Safety Information Transmission System (SITS), which enables the collection and real-time monitoring of safety information. The KAERI monitors and collects safety information, which includes data from the HANARO Operation Work Station (OWS) and the HANARO & HANARO Fuel Fabrication Plant (HFFP) Radioactivity Monitoring System (RMS), and the Environmental Radiation Monitoring System (ERMS) & meteorological data. Currently, the transmission of this safety information to the AtomCARE server of the KINS takes place via the SITS server located in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). However, the multi-path of transmission through SITS has caused problems such as an increase in data transmission interruptions and errors, as well as delays in identifying the cause and implementing system recovery measures. To address these issues, a new VPN is currently being constructed on the servers of nuclear facilities that generate and manage safety information to establish a direct transmission system of safety information from each nuclear facility to the AtomCARE server. The establishment of a direct transmission system that eliminates unnecessary transit steps is expected to result in stable information transmission and minimize the frequency of data transmission interruptions. As of the improvement progress, a security review was conducted in the second and third quarters of 2022 to evaluate the security of newly introduced VPNs to the nuclear facility server, and based on the results of the review, security measures were strengthened. In the fourth quarter of 2022, the development of a direct transmission system for safety information began, and it is scheduled to be completed by the fourth quarter of 2023. The project includes the construction of the transmission system, system inspection, and comprehensive data stability testing. Afterward, the existing SITS located in the EOF will be renamed as the Safety Information Display System (SIDS), and there are plans to remove any unused servers and VPNs.

Natural radionuclides-containing substances (NORM) contain natural radionuclides and cause radiation exposure. In Korea, safety management measures were needed to deal with and dispose of radon mattresses containing monazite in relation to such NORM. However, there is no clear safety management system related to NORM waste in Korea. In order to manage this reasonably and systematically, it is necessary to investigate and analyze standards and management measures related to the treatment and disposal of NORM waste. Therefore, this study investigated and analyzed the exemption and clearance level of NORM waste regulations in international organizations and foreign countries. IAEA GSR Part 3, 2013/59/Euratom, ANSI/HPS N13.53, CRCPD SSRCR Part N, and ARPANSA Publications 15 safety management regulations were analyzed to investigate safety management standards for NORM waste. The exemption and clearance level in international organizations and foreign countries were compared and analyzed based on radioactive concentration and dose. In addition, the management measures proposed for each literature were also investigated. As a result of the analysis, IAEA GSR Part 3 applied 1 mSv as a regulatory exemption level, 1 Bq/g for uranium and thorium series as a clearance level, and 10 Bq/g for K-40 nuclides. The IAEA recommends a differential approach to the potential and scale of exposure. The EU applied 1 Bq/g to uranium and thorium families and 10 Bq/g to K-40 nuclides for both regulatory exemption and clearance levels. The EU recommended that it be managed in proportion to the scale and likelihood of exposure as a result of the action. It is analyzed that this is similar to the IAEA’s management plan. In the United States, there was no single federal government radioactive concentration and dose for NORM management. The management plan differed in management status and level from state to state, and K-40 was excluded from regulation unless it was intentionally enriched. In the case of Australia, the radioactive concentration of uranium and thorium was 1 Bq/g as a standard for regulatory exemption and 1 mSv as a dose. As a management plan, it was suggested to dispose of waste by means of accumulation, dilution/dispersion, and reclamation. It was also suggested that the scale of exposure, like international organizations, take into account the possibility. The results of this study are believed to be used as basic data for presenting domestic NORM waste treatment and disposal methods in the future.

Around the world, Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) have been operated since the 1950s and are used as a major power source. In Korea, Kori unit 1 stared commercial operation for the first time in 1978, and as of 2023, 25 units of NPPs are in operation. NPPs produce electricity for about 40 to 60 years after receiving an operating license, and after securing safety through a safety evaluation, the operating period is extended. NPPs that operate for a long time are systematically evaluated for safety at regular intervals through Periodic Safety Review (PSR) recommended by the IAEA. In Korea, PSR has been introduced and performed since 2000. This study reviewed the process of the PSR by comparing with the international PSR procedure. The PSR process is established through the IAEA SSG-25 document and proceeds in the order of establishment of basis document - individual factor evaluation - global assessment - integrated improvement plan. In Korea, PSR is carried out in a similar process, but there are some differences from the IAEA’s procedure. The safety factor review is conducted under the agreement of basis document between the licensee and the regulatory body, but the prior agreement procedure with the regulatory body is not reflected in Korea. As a result, if the licensee and the regulatory body have different opinions on the current licensing basis and the modern safety standards after the evaluation is performed, a difference may occur in the review results and safety enhancement items, which may lead to inefficient PSR progress. PSR is conducted for the continuous safe operation and management of NPPs, and it is important to refer to overseas standards and cases. Although procedures, guidelines, and regulatory requirements are in place in Korea, continuous review and improvement are required. It is necessary to improve procedures such as basis document and global assessment in order to more efficiently carry out PSR evaluation by regulatory agency and licensee’s safety enhancement actions of domestic NPPs

Decommissioning plan of nuclear facilities require the radiological characterizations and the establishment of a decommissioning process that can ensure the safety and efficiency of the decommissioning workers. By utilizing the rapidly developed ICT technology, we have developed a technology that can acquire, analyze, and deliver information from the decommissioning work area to ensure the safety of decommissioning workers, optimize the decommissioning process, and actively respond to various decommissioning situations. The established a surveillance system that monitors nuclide inventory and radiation dose distribution at dismantling work area in real time and wireless transmits data for evaluation. Developed an evaluation program based on an evaluation model for optimizing the dismantling process by linking real-time measurement information. We developed a technology that can detect the location of dismantling workers in real time using stereovision cameras and artificial intelligence technology. The developed technology can be used for safety evaluation of dismantling workers and process optimization evaluation by linking the radionuclides inventory and dose distribution in dismantling work space of decommissioning nuclear power plant in the future.

Dry active waste (DAW) contains substantial amount of cellulose related materials. The DAW are usually classified as low and/or very low-level waste. In Korea, three types of disposal facilities have been considered: silo, engineering barrier, and land-fill. Currently, only the silo type disposal facility is in operation. Around 27 thousand drums were disposed in silo. Massive amount of cement concrete is used in construction of silo. The ground waste, which flow through the concrete structure, shows higher pH than as it is. It is generally known that the pH of silo is ~12.47 in Korea, when considering construction material, filling material, and property of ground water. It is expected that the cellulose in DAW will be partially transformed to isosaccharinic acid (ISA). It is generally accepted that the ISA plays a negative role in safety analysis of disposal facility by stimulation of specific nuclides. Various factors affect the degradation of cellulose containing radioactive waste, such as degree of polymerization, pH of disposal condition, interaction between concrete structure and ground water, etc. In this paper, the disposal safety analysis of cellulose containing radioactive, usually paper, cotton, wood, etc., are studied. The degradation of cellulose with respect to degree of polymerization, pH of neighboring water, filling material of silo, etc. are reviewed. Based on the review results, it is reasonable to conclude that the substantial amount of DAW could be disposed in silo.

Working during decommissioning of nuclear facilities can subject workers to a number of industrial health and safety risks. Such facilities can contain hazardous processes and materials such as hot steam, harsh chemicals, electricity, pressurized fluids and mechanical hazards. Workers can be exposed to these and other hazards during normal duties (including slips, trips and falls, driving accidents and drowning). Industrial safety accidents, along with their direct impacts on the individuals involved, can negatively affect the image of nuclear facilities and their general acceptance by the public. Industrial safety is the condition of being protected from physical danger as a result of workplace conditions. Industrial safety program in a nuclear context are the policies and protections put in place to ensure nuclear facility workers are protected from hazards that could cause injury or illness. Preventive actions are those that detect, preclude or mitigate the degradation of a situation. They can be conducted regularly or periodically, one time in a planned manner, or in a predictive manner based on an observed condition. Corrective actions are those that restore a failed or degraded condition to its desired state based on observation of the failure or degradation. In industrial safety, the situations or conditions of interest are those observed via the performance monitoring, investigations, audits and management reviews. Preventive and corrective actions are those designed to place or return the system to its desired state. Preventive actions where possible are preferred as they eliminate the adverse condition prior to it occurring. When an accident or incident occurs, the primary focus is on obtaining appropriate treatment for injured people and securing the scene to prevent additional hazards or injuries. Once the injured personnel have been cared for and the scene has been secured, it is necessary to initiate a formal investigation to determine the extent of the damage, causal factors and corrective actions to be implemented. Certain tools may be needed to investigate such incidents and accidents. Initial identification of evidence immediately following the incident includes a list of people, equipment and materials involved and a recording of environmental factors such as weather, illumination, temperature, noise, ventilation and physical factors such as fatigue and age of the workers. The five Ws (what, who, when, where and why) are useful to remember in investigation of incidents and accidents.

Kori Unit 1 was permanently shut down in 2017 and is preparing to be dismantled. Decommissioning nuclear power plants is expected to generate a lot of decommissioning waste. Therefore, a radioactive waste treatment complex will be built on the site to safely and effectively the process of decommissioning waste generated from the Kori Unit 1, and the details are specified in the decommissioning plan. Therefore, a safety assessment should be conducted according to the facility’s normal and abnormal operations to construct a radioactive waste treatment complex. Currently, a safety assessment for a radioactive waste treatment complex can be conducted by the Safety Assessment Framework (SAFRAN) Tool based on the Safety Assessment Driving Radioactive Waste Management Solutions (SADRWMS) methodology developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The SAFRAN Tool can be calculated radiation dose and hazard quotient (HQ) for workers and the public under normal and abnormal conditions of the radioactive waste treatment complex. When evaluating the radiation dose for the public due to releasing radioactive materials into the air or discharging radioactive materials into liquids, the radiation dose is calculated using the amount discharged or released from the treatment complex, and the Pathway Dose Factors (PDFs) derived from the generic environmental model given in the IAEA Safety Reports Series No.19. PDFs, which reflect the specific site data rather than the generic environmental model data, should be calculated and evaluated when performing the safety evaluation of the radioactive waste treatment complex to be built on the Kori site. In addition, in the SAFRAN tool, there is an inconvenience in that it must be calculated separately by radionuclides to calculate the contribution of dose or HQ for each radionuclide. Therefore, in this study, a safety assessment tool for a radioactive waste treatment complex was developed using Visual Basic by supplementing the limitations of the SAFRAN tool. This tool was developed to allow users to choose whether to apply PDFs based on the IAEA SRS-19 based on the generic environmental model or PDFs calculated to reflect the specific site data. Furthermore, the tool considered all types of decommissioning wastes that may occur during the decommissioning of the Kori Unit 1 and the treatment process scheduled to be introduced. Therefore, this study is expected to be used as basic data when conducting the safety assessment of radioactive waste treatment complex scheduled to be introduced in Korea.

Concerns with colloids, dispersed 1~1,000 nm particles, in the LILW repository are being raised due to their potential to enhance radionuclide release. Due to their large surface areas, radionuclides may sorb onto mobile colloids, and drift along with the colloidal transport, instead of being sorbed onto immobile surfaces. To prevent adverse implications on the safety of the repository, the colloidal impact must be evaluated. In this paper, colloid analysis done by SKB is studied, and factors to be considered for the safety assessment of colloids are analyzed. First, the colloid generation mechanism should be analyzed. In a cementitious repository, due to a highly alkaline environment, colloid formation from wastes may be promoted by the decomposition of organic materials, dissolution of inorganic materials, and corrosion of metals. Radiolysis is excluded when radionuclide inventory is moderate, as in the case of SKB. Second, colloid stability should be evaluated to determine whether colloids remain in dispersion. Stable colloids acquire electric charges, allowing particles to continuously repel one another to prevent coagulation. Thus, stability depends on the pH and ionic condition of the surroundings, and colloid composition. For instance, under a highly alkaline cementitious environment, colloids tend to be negatively charged, repelling each other, but Ca2+ ion from cement, acting as a coagulant, makes colloid unstable, promoting sedimentation. As in the case of SKB, the colloidal impact is assumed negligible in the silo, BMA, and BTF due to their extensive cement contents, but for BLA, with relatively less cement source, the colloidal impact is a potential concern. Third, colloid mobility should be assessed to appraise radionuclide release via colloid transport. The mobility depends on the density and size of colloids, and flow velocity to commence motion. As a part of the assessment, the filtration effect should also be included, which depends on pore size and structure. As in the case of SKB, due to static hydraulic conditions and engineering barriers, acting as efficient filters, colloidal transport is expected to be unlikely. In the domestic underground repository, the highly alkaline environment would lead to colloid formation, but due to high Ca2+ concentration and low flow velocity, colloids would achieve low stability and mobility, thus colloidal impact would be a minor concern. In the future, with further detailed analysis of each factor, waste composition, and disposal condition, reliable data for safety evaluation could be generated to be used as fundamental data for planning waste acceptance criteria.

Fault activity acts as the greatest risk factor in relation to the stability of the radioactive waste disposal facilities and nuclear power plant site, and for this reason, geological studies on areas with past fault activity history must precede site evaluation studies. This study aims to trace the fault activity history of large fault zones, including the Yangsan fault in the southeastern part of the Korean Peninsula, where two major earthquakes occurred, and to obtain fault activity direction information that is the basis for stability evaluation. The 3D-Shape Preferred Orientation (SPO) of particles in the fault rock created by the earthquake was investigated to analyze the direction of fault plane activity, and the age of fault activity was estimated through Illite Age Analysis (IAA) analysis. It is expected that the large-scale fault activity information in the southeastern part of the Korean Peninsula obtained through the SPO and IAA analysis can be used as basic data for safety evaluation of existing or future nuclear power plants and radioactive waste facilities.

To prevent the release of radionuclides into the biosphere, disposal facilities for radioactive waste should be located to provide isolation from the accessible biosphere for tens of thousands to a million years after closure. During the period of interest, the constantly evolving natural environment and possible geological events of the site can cause disturbances to the containment function of the repository. Thus, for the long-term safety assessment of the repository, the possible long-term change of natural barrier should be considered. Due to the characteristics of radionuclides that transport mainly through the groundwater, understanding the long-term evolution of groundwater flow and geochemical properties is essential to assess the long-term changes in the natural barrier performance. The changes in characteristics of natural rocks and geological structures are one of the main factors that determine the hydrological and geochemical characteristics of the deep underground. In this study, we plan to develop a methodology to estimate these future geological evolutions in order to assess the possibility of hazardous events of the site that can affect hydrological or geochemical properties over the period of interest, and also in order to verify the change in the geological environment is within the safe performance range even after the period of interest. However, it is very unreliable to predict future changes in the natural environment because it is very heterogeneous, complex, and difficult to observe directly. For the preliminary study of the project, we reviewed cases of future evolution prediction researches with regard to the geological environment of disposal site and methods they applied to reduce the uncertainty of the prediction. The results will be used to establish basic data for future studies on the long-term evolution of hydraulic-mechanics performance of natural barrier and long-term evolution of geochemical performance around KURT site. In addition, it can contribute to construct long-term evolution scenario of the geological environment around future URL site.

The timescale of safety assessment for a geological disposal system is considered up to hundreds of thousands of years when the radionuclides in spent nuclear fuel decay to levels comparable to natural radioactivity. During this long period, a variety of climate changes are expected to occur, including variations in temperature and precipitation as well as long-term sea level changes and glacial cycles. These climate changes can either directly affect water balance components or indirectly affect water balance by altering terrain and vegetation that have an impact on water balance. Water balance is a significant element of safety assessment, because it affects the radionuclide transport via groundwater flow, which in turn affects the radiological risk to humans and other biotas. Therefore, it is important to understand the hydrologic response to climate changes for proving the long-term safety of the disposal system. To this end, this study performed hydrological simulations using the SWAT (Soil and Water Assessment Tool) for several climate change scenarios. SWAT is the watershed-scale hydrological model developed by the USDA-ARS (United States Department of Agriculture - Agricultural Research Service) and has been widely used to quantify the water balance in a watershed. It calculates the hydrologic cycle based on the water balance equation with different physical processes for water balance components such as evapotranspiration, surface runoff, and groundwater recharge. This study assumed several climate change scenarios (e.g., variations in temperature and precipitation, sea level change, and formation of permafrost) and analyzed how the components of the water balance would respond under different scenarios and which scenarios would have the greatest impact on the water balance. These findings can provide valuable insights for future long-term safety assessments on the Korean Peninsula and can also be used as input data for the biosphere module of APro (Adaptive process-based total system performance assessment framework).

Since high-level radioactive wastes contain long-lived nuclides and emit high energy, they should be disposed of permanently through a deep geological disposal system. In Korea, the first (2016.07) and the second (2021.12) basic plans for the management of high-level disposal systems were proposed to select sites for deep geological disposal facilities and to implement business strategies. Leading countries such as Finland, Sweden and France have developed and applied safety cases to verify the safety of deep geological disposal systems. By examining the regulatory status of foreign leading countries, we analyze the safety cases ranging from the site selection stage of the deep geological disposal system to the securing of the permanent disposal system to the investigation, analysis, evaluation, design, construction, operation, and closure. Based on this analysis, we will develop safety case elements for long-term safety of deep geological disposal systems suitable for domestic situation. To systemically analyze data based on safety cases, we have established a database of deep geological disposal system regulations in leading foreign countries. Artificial intelligence text mining and data visualization techniques are used to provide database in dashboard form rather than simple lists of data items, which is a limitation of existing methods. This allows regulatory developers to understand information more quickly and intuitively and provide a convenient interface so that anyone can easily access the analyzed data and create meaningful information. Furthermore, based on the accumulated bigdata, the artificial intelligence learns and analyzes the information in the database through deep learning, and aims to derive a more accurate safety case. Based on these technologies, this study analyzed the legal systems, regulatory standards, and cases of major international leading countries and international organizations such as the United States, Sweden, Finland, Canada, Switzerland, and the IAEA to establish a database management system. To establish a safety regulation base suitable for the domestic deep geological disposal environment, the database is provided as data to refer to and apply systematic information management on regulatory standards and regulatory cases of overseas leading countries, and it is expected that it will play a key role as a forum for understanding and discussing the level of safety of deep geological disposal system among stakeholders.

Two sets of analyses for the cases of groundwater release to well and sea ecosystems were conducted for the environmental impact assessment of high-level radioactive waste disposal facilities. After obtaining the respective BDCF (Biosphere Dose Conversion Factor) results for the scenarios of well-farming and marine water fishing using different biosphere assessment conceptual models implemented in ECOLEGO, they were compared each other. The purposes of these analyses are to identify reference generic biosphere conceptual models and to get insight on model uncertainty. In this study, the endpoint used for the comparison of the ECOLEGO biosphere models was the socalled Biosphere Dose Conversion Factor (BDCF), which is defined as the maximum value of the total dose to the exposed group, in Sv/yr, resulting from a continuous unit release of 1 Bq/yr during the whole simulation time either to the well compartment (BDCF_Well) or to the marine water compartment (BDCF_Sea). The radionuclides considered in the comparison were Cs-137, I-129, Nb-94, Ni-59, Ni- 63, Sr-90 and Tc-99. The conceptual models used in the biosphere assessment of the releases to a well are based on models that have been used by the DOE (simple-soil model) and SKB (complex-soil model) in safety assessments of radioactive waste repositories, respectively. Difference between two conceptual models used in the assessment of the releases to a sea is the number of compartments representing the sea; i.e., one model represents the sea with one compartment for the water and one for the sediment (singlecompartment model), whereas the alternative model uses two compartments for the water and the sediments: one for the inner coast and one for the outer coast (double-compartment model). The results of the BDCF_Well to a farmer obtained with the DOE and SKB models are shown to be very close to each other. Despite the differences in conceptual models and parameters, the results are within a maximum difference of a factor of 4. The results from the SKB model were higher for all radionuclides. The values of the BDCF_Sea obtained with the single- and double-compartment models are shown to be larger differences with a maximum order of 2. For all studied radionuclides, the double-compartment model produces higher BDCFs than does the single-compartment model. The differences would be due to activity concentrations in both water and sediments. Since the hydrodynamic behavior assumed for flow in the sea could significantly influence the dilution volumes and hence the concentrations, it is found that site-specific investigations are necessary to establish an appropriate marine biosphere conceptual model.

The deep geologic repository (DGR) concept is widely accepted as the most feasible option for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuels. In this concept, a series of engineered and natural barrier systems are combined to safely store spent nuclear fuel and to isolate it from the biosphere for a practically indefinite period of time. Due to the extremely long lifetime of the DGR, the performance of the DGR replies especially on the natural geologic barriers. Assessing the safety of the DGR is thus required to evaluate the impacts of a wide range of geological, hydrogeological, and physicochemical processes including rare geological events as well as present water cycles and deep groundwater flow systems. Due to the time scale and the complexity of the physicochemical processes and geologic media involved, the numerical models used for safety evaluation need to be comprehensive, robust, and efficient. This study describes the development of an accessible, transparent, and extensible integrated hydrologic models (IHM) which can be approved with confidence by the regulators as well as scientific community and thus suitable for current and future safety assessment of the DGR systems. The IHM under development can currently simulate overland flow, groundwater flow, near surface evapotranspiration in a modular manner. The IHM can also be considered as a framework as it can easily accommodate additional processes and requirements for the future as it is necessary. The IHM is capable of handling the atmospheric, land surface, and subsurface processes for simultaneously analyzing the regional groundwater driving force and deep subsurface flow, and repository scale safety features, providing an ultimate basis for seamless safety assessment in the DGR program. The applicability of the IHM to the DGR safety assessment is demonstrated using illustrative examples.

Once systems, structures and components (SSCs) of dry storage systems are classified with respect to safety function or safety significance (i.e., safety classification), appropriate engineering rules can be applied to ensure that they are designed, manufactured, maintained, managed (e.g. aging management) etc. In Unites States, the systems, structures and components (SSCs) consisting DSSs are classified into two or several grades (i.e., class A, B and C or not important to safety, and important to safety (ITS) or not important to safety (NITS)) with respect to intended safety function and safety significance. This classification methods were based on Regulatory Guide 7.10 (i.e., guidance for use in developing quality assurance programs for packaging). Also, in Korea, SSCs of DSSs should be classified into ITS and NITS in much the same as method based on Regulatory Guide 7.10. In that guidance, for providing graded approach to manage the SSCs of packaging, they were trying to classifying SSCs in accordance with radiological consequences. But there was limitations that the provided classification criteria was still qualitative, so that it was not enough for managing the SSCs according to graded approach. On the other hand, in some other nuclear facilities (i.e., nuclear power plant, radioactive waste management facility and disposal facility etc.), quantitative criteria relevant to radiological consequence (i.e., radiation doses to workers or to the public) or inventory of radioactivity are existed so that it can be applied for classifying safety classes. In summary, the study on the application safety classification that applied quantitative criteria to perform safety classification of SSCs in DSS is inadequate or insufficient. The purpose of this study is proposing the preliminary framework for estimating safety significance of SSCs in DSS which can be utilized in our further advanced studies. In this study, a framework was established to estimate the safety significance of SSCs related to radiation shielding and confinement using MCNP® 6.2 and Microsoft Excel. Referring to the methodology of IAEA Specific Safety Guide 30, we assumed severity for failures of components that could lead to degradation of the SSC’s performance. The safety class of SSC was decided based on the impact of SSC’s failure on consequences.

Uranium inventory in Boeun aquifer is facing the artificial reservoir that intended for supplying water to nearby cities (40-70 m apart) where, toxic radionuclides might mobile and enter the reservoir. In order to understand U mobility in the system, groundwater and fracture filling materials (FFMs) were analyzed for microbial signatures, C, O, Fe, S and U-series isotopes. The δ18O-H2O and 14C signatures suggested groundwater was originated from upland recharges dominantly and not affected by mixing with the surface water. However, the 234U/238U activity ratios (ARs) and 230Th/234U ARs in FFMs ranged from 0.93 to 1.67 and from 0.22 to 1.97, respectively, indicating that U was mobile along the fractures. In shallow FFMs, the U accumulations (~157 mg/kg) were found with Fe enrichments (~226798 mg/kg) and anomalies of δ56Fe and δ57Fe, implied U mobility in shallow depths was associated with Fe-rich environment. Also, in the shallow depths, Fe-oxidizers, Gallionella was prevailing in groundwater while Acidovorax was abundant near U ore depth. The Fe-rich environment in shallow depths was formed by pyrite dissolution, demonstrated using δ34S-SO4 and δ18O-SO4 distribution. Conclusively, the Fe-rich aquifer was capable of immobilizing the dissolved U through biotic and abiotic processes, without significant discharge into the nearby reservoir.

Domestic nuclear power plants have developed radiological emergency plans based on the USNRC’s NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-Rev.1 report and the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety’s (KINS) research report on radiation emergency criteria for power reactors (KINS/RR-12). NUREG-0654 is a US emergency planning guide for nuclear power plants and provides detailed technical requirements for the content of radiological emergency plans. The document classifies radiological emergencies into three levels: Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency, which correspond to the white, blue, and red emergency levels used in domestic nuclear power plants. KINS/RR-12 is a technical guidance document published by the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety in 2012, which divides radiological emergency criteria into criteria for pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and criteria for boiling water reactors (BWRs), and describes in detail the regulatory position and implementation of radiological emergency criteria for domestic PWRs and BWRs. The physical protection-related radiation emergency criteria included in the radiological emergency plan are specified in the radiological emergency criteria guidelines. There are two items each related to white and blue emergencies and one item related to red emergencies. Standard order of emergency plan lists the physical protection-related radiological emergency criteria for domestic PWRs and BWRs, which are identical according to the radiological emergency criteria guidelines. To enhance the physical protection regulation, the legal and regulatory basis for target set identification and vital area identification need to be established by considering radiological and physical protection emergency plan.

Long-term evolution of the surface environments can affect the safety of deep geological disposal. Therefore, it is important to understand the water balance components constituting the water cycle among atmosphere, surface, and subsurface. In Finand, the surface and near-surface hydrological model (SHYD) was developed to calculate the water balance of Olkiluoto Island. Through the intensive site investigations, the data sets as input for the site scale model in present-day conditions have been collected such as transpiration and meteorological data. In this study, weighing lysimeter method was selected to quantify small-scale soil water balance of the vadose zone in the UNsaturated zone In-situ Test facility (UNIT) around KAERI Underground Research Tunnel. Hydrological components such as precipitation, evapotranspiration (ET) and leachate were derived from water balance analysis on the lysimeter measurements in UNIT. Among the hydrological components, actual ET accounts for more than 50% of the annual precipitaion, and thus plays an important role on predicting the hydrological evolution in the future. In this context, actual ET measured from the weighing lysimeter was compared with potential ET estimated from meteorological data using FAO-56 Penman-Monteith method.

Although it is highly dependent on the production of coastal and offshore fishing, the Fishing Vessels Safety Fisheries Act was enacted in 2019 due to the continuous increase in marine accidents of coastal and offshore fishing vessels. However, the law is too focused on fishing and navigation in certain waters and does not contain accident-preventive content. Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries proposes a plan to revise the Fishing Boat Safety Fishing Act through legal comparison with Japan's Seafarers' Labor Sanitation Rules. It also proposes an amendment that includes the content of the Seafarers Act on post-accident action obligations. Under the Fishing Vessels Safety Fishing Act, the safety fishing education is implemented for specific people and adopts a method of delivery education after completing the education. The reason for this is that the educational requirements are not sufficient compared to the number of education personnel. Moreover, four hours of education are conducted once a year, which is not suitable for insufficient educational conditions. For efficient safety fishing education, improvement measures are proposed compared to education in the United States and the United Kingdom.