In Korea, additional regulatory requirements are increasing due to the full-scale decommissioning of nuclear power plants following the permanent shutdown of Kori Unit 1 and Wolseong Unit 1. Accordingly, it is necessary to preemptively expand the scope of physical protection regulations from design, construction, and operation stage to back-end nuclear fuel cycle such as cessation of operation and decommissioning. According to Article 2, Paragraph 24 of the Nuclear Safety Act, the decommissioning of nuclear facilities is defined as all activities to exclude them from the application of the Nuclear Safety Act by permanently suspending the operation of nuclear facilities, demolishing the facilities and sites, or removing radioactive contamination. In other words, it refers to a series of technologies or activities to safely and efficiently dismantle nuclear power plant and remove radioactive contamination and restore them to their original state after permanently shut down of nuclear power plant. Security changes during decommissioning and decontamination since removing fuel from the reactor alters the plant’s safety status, some of the systems or components considered as vital equipment during plant operation will no longer be needed. The vital areas may be reduced as fewer buildings, equipment and systems need to be protected, which means access controls, surveillance and so on can be reduced. And also, decommissioning will probably require more workers than operation would, although this might not be the case at all times. From a security point of view, this might require more personnel or additional access points. Changing operating require changed security measures, to ensure that the required security level will be maintained while at the same time work proceeds efficiently. Once all of the fuel is removed from the plant, radiological release risk is much lower. The lower risk requires a lower level of security measures. Even during the removal of nuclear material and contaminated equipment from nuclear facilities, lower level of security measures should meet regulatory requirements based on a graded approach. Therefore, this study intends to examine the responsibilities and obligations of regulatory authorities, regulator, and nuclear operators in terms of protection after permanent shutdown and decommissioning.

Under the Foreign Trade Act, an export license from the Nuclear Safety Commission is required to export items specified in Part 10 of Schedule 2 of the Public Notice of Exportation and Importation of Strategic Items (Trigger List Items). In the case of nuclear materials, deuterium, and heavy water, its cumulative amount determines whether it is trigger list item. An export license is required only if the cumulative amount exported to a single end-user country from January 1st to December 31st exceeds the regulation criteria. The reason for this cumulative control is to exclude small amounts of materials from the scope of control as they are considered less important in view of nuclear proliferation, but to prevent the possibility of acquiring large quantities of materials by importing small amounts several times. As a result, export control of nuclear material, deuterium, and heavy water requires different considerations than other Trigger List Items. First, materials exported by different companies must be consolidated to manage the cumulative amount. Second, it is necessary to continuously follow up the actual export status. If the material is not exported after it was classified as ‘non-Trigger List Items’, it should not be included in the cumulative amount. Third, there may be a difference between the accumulated quantities aggregated at the time of the classification and the time of the actual export. The classification should be changed if an export of the classified material is postponed or another export of same materials occurs before the export of the classified material. Fourth, the classification result of these materials should not be reused. Generally, the classification result could be reused within the expiration date (2 years) but in the case of substances. However, the reuse of classification result for materials should be limited as the classification results could be change depending on the cumulative amount. In addition, the sharing of classification results between different entities should also be restricted. The government approval procedures are required even for export of small amounts of nuclear materials which are less than the regulation criteria. The cumulative quantities of nuclear materials are systematically managed in the Nuclear Export & imPort control System (NEPS) through these procedures. NEPS is also linked to the custom clearance system of Korea Customs Service, which enables to track actual exports and the time of exports. However, cumulative quantities for the heavy water and deuterium are managed individually by classification reviewers. The annual export plans are received in advance from major entities which deal with the materials for nuclear uses, and the cumulative quantities for each application are managed manually. The systematic management has not been required as there were a few cases of exporting small quantities. However, systematic management may be required in the future as overseas expansion attempts from various companies in the nuclear field has been increasing. In addition, further study is needed on the criteria and system for calculating the cumulative amount. The time of aggregate the cumulative amount should be clarified by considering the difference between the time of classification and actual export. It is required to devise an efficient way to follow up the actual export.

A bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) should define what is subject to the agreement and when. Nuclear Materials (NM) are the subject of NCA with almost all countries, and the definition used in these agreements is borrowed from Article 20 of the IAEA Charter. The IAEA’s definition of NM as consisting of special fissionable material and source material and describes the types of material each contains. In order to control the export of NM under national laws and implement NCA, not only the types of NM but also quantitative criteria are required. This is because controlling small quantities of NM is impossible, unnecessary, and would create excessive administrative burdens. For this reason, the NSG guidelines establish a quantitative threshold of NM requiring control. Nevertheless, no quantitative thresholds have been agreed upon for NM subject to a NCA. Whether NM transferred is subject to the NCA is primarily a matter for the supplier states to determine. The supplier states make the decision based on quantitative criteria defined in their own export control laws. ROK identifies NM that require export licenses by reflecting the same criteria as the NSG guidelines in Foreign Trade Laws and its Notifications. Less than 500 kg of Natural Uranium, 1,000 kg of Depleted Uranium, 1,000 kg of Thorium, and 50 effective grams of special fissionable materials do not require an export license and is therefore not subject to NCA. In the US, the quantitative threshold for requiring an export license is different from that of ROK. For example, special fissionable materials that are not Pu are required if the individual shipment exceed 1 effective gram or 100 effective grams per year. The difference in the quantitative thresholds for NM between the two countries mean that the same item may be subject to NCA under US standards, but not under ROK’s. For example, the export of 8 grams of highly enriched uranium (93%) contained in a neutron detector would not be subject to the NCA in ROK, but would be considered NM subject to a NCA and required a special license in the US. Of course, in order to ensure the application of safeguards and physical protection to all NM transferred between the two countries, the agreement may not include a quantitative threshold for NM. However, the absence of such a threshold can lead to different conclusions by the two countries on the same item and make it challenging to control retransfers. The definition of quantitative standards will be necessary in the supplementary administrative arrangement for the practical control and management of NM subject to the NCA.

In the late 80s, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological, became an internationally important issue, and in order to keep pace with the international situation, Korea amended the Foreign Trade Act in 1992 to legislate the export control of strategic goods. In addition, Korea joined the NSG, one of the international export control regimes, in 1995, and nuclear power operators are required to obtain export licenses in accordance with the NSG export control guidelines. In the nuclear export business, technical documents, equipment, materials, SW, etc. are exported to the importer, and the export items may include strategic items designated by the NSG, so operators must check whether they are strategic items and, if so, obtain an export license in accordance with foreign trade laws that reflect the NSG export control guidelines. In the case of processing and exporting goods or materials imported from another country, exporters must fulfill complex nuclear export control procedures, including obtaining the original supplier’s consent for re-transfer. In recent years, the international situation on export control has been more sensitive than ever, including the Russo-Ukrainian war, the U.S.-China semiconductor supremacy dispute, and U.S. lawsuits against domestic companies related to original technologies. In the worst-case scenario, a company may not be able to fulfill a contract due to export control issues. In order to facilitate the smooth export business of operators when exporting nuclear energy, ‘Nuclear Export Control Pre-Consulting’ is proposed to check compliance with export control requirements in advance and provide operators with customized export control implementation plans reflecting business characteristics. Through the pre-consultation, issues, requirements, and preparatory documents related to nuclear export control can be checked before the export business starts in earnest, i.e., when the decision to participate in the business is made, and the business can be supported to export smoothly by complying with the export control system. The most important aspect of pre-consultation is that domestic nuclear exporters need to know and apply for the program. To this end, the program will be actively promoted online and offline, and support will be provided for easy application through NEPS. In addition, procedures and outcomes will be continuously refined to ensure that the program is a means of ensuring full compliance with international nuclear non-proliferation norms for nuclear exports.

This study examined the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s illegal trade in UNsanctioned items as revealed in the UN panel of experts report in order to estimate the types of illegal trade in nuclear items, one of the UN-sanctioned prohibited items, and to find efficient ways to block it. Also, The research revealed that DPRK secretly imports UN-sanctioned prohibited items without going through customs through maritime transshipment, conceals or disguises them through identity laundering by falsifying documents at customs clearance, and makes various attempts to escape the international community’s surveillance, such as using a combination of methods such as Re-Flagged and Double-Flagged for identity laundering, and concealing them without operating the Automatic Identification System (AIS) at sea. The DPRK’s Illicit trade cases have been divided into two types of transactions: those that violate customs clearance procedures by providing false information to customs through disguise or concealment, and those that do not go through normal customs procedures, such as smuggling. To block customs violations, technical measures such as increasing the number of inspections of container ships or improving the accuracy of inspections are required, while to block smuggling, since it does not go through physical inspections, there are ways to monitor it through satellite images or strengthen border enforcement such as airport bays and land routes. As a result, DPRK’s nuclear items are designated as sanctioned items under UN resolutions, and it is assumed that DPRK and its networks will attempt to trade illegally through a combination of customs clearance violations and non-customs clearance violations, depending on the circumstances. Furthermore, since DPRK is subject to extensive sanctions from the international community, including the UN, in connection with its nuclear weapons program, illegal trade continues, and efforts should be made to block illegal trade through physical inspection at customs clearance.

The Internal Compliance Program (ICP) is a framework for promoting compliance with laws and regulations and minimizing violations. It aims to prevent law breaches, by raising awareness of the compliance within the organization, which leads to enhance the credibility of the organization, and to prepare for audits. From the perspective of nuclear export control, ICP can be used to verify the company’s credibility by following NSG Guidelines and is expected to contribute to preventing the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons in the international community. However, ICP system is not globally established, and the NSG does not provide official guidelines for ICP. Therefore, this study aims to analyze the “Good Practices for Internal Compliance Programs for Nuclear and Nuclear-Related Exports” provided by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to find ways to apply and activate ICPs for domestic exporters. The form of ICP could vary depending on company’s size and internal environments, but it should be organized as follows. First, an internal department should be established so as to implement the ICP, and an executive who has export control knowledge should be assigned as the Chief Export Control Officer (CECO). The CECO, establish and revise ICP operating procedures and manual, organize contact point to communicate internally and externally. Second, measures should be established minimize risks in the export process, including business development transaction screening, supply chain, research and development, human resource, and intangible technology transfer risks. Third, internal control system should be established for export control compliance. The CECO should conduct regular assessments to ensure compliance and strengthen the organization’s internal export compliance processes. Fourth, an export-related training program should be periodically conducted for employees. In addition, as soon as the CECO becomes aware of, CECO should review the matter, take corrective action, and report to the relevant national authorities, when a violation of domestic export control laws or suspicious circumstances are captured. Nuclear export control plays an important role in ensuring nuclear nonproliferation. Republic of Korea has been implementing the ICP system for Dual-Use Items under the Foreign Trade Act, but not for Trigger List Items. Therefore, introduction of ICP for Trigger List Items is expected significantly contribute to nuclear nonproliferation. The subjects of ICP will be initially targeted to major nuclear enterprises, then gradually expanded to all nuclear enterprises. Further researches are needed to introduce on ICP for Trigger List Items.

For the export of nuclear materials (NM), the NSG guidelines require governmental assurance from the importing State that the NM will be used for peaceful purposes, safeguards and physical protection will be applied, and prior consent will be obtained for retransfer. By providing this assurance, the importing State (recipient) is responsible for fulfilling the obligations required by the exporting States (supplier). If the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) has been concluded between the supplier and recipient, it may be replaced by implementing the procedures under the NCA. In the case of NM subject to this obligation, continuous management at the national level is required because prior consent from the supplier may be required for retransfer to a third party under the assurance or may be subject to annual reporting. The obligation swaps are the exchange of obligations of NM without the physical movement of it. Since the physical movement of NM is costly and risky, its obligations are often exchanged for commercial reasons. The basis for obligation swaps is the fungibility and equivalence of NM. The fungibility allows that the inventories of NM need not physically identify the particular NM originally obligated but identify an equivalent quantity of the same isotopic composition. In addition, under the principle of equivalence, even if NM loses its unique physical properties, it can be exchanged by another obligated or nonobligated NM. That is, the principles of equivalence and proportionality allow the comparison of quantities of uranium in different forms. Therefore, it is theoretically possible not only to exchange obligations between NM in same physical form, but also different physical forms of same composition (with the same enrichment), e.g., UO2 powder and its pellets. In U.S., it appears that there are obligation swaps of NM between different enrichment levels, but according to the NCA and its Administrative Arrangement between ROK and U.S., Canada and Australia, the principle of fungibility and equivalence shall not be used to reduce the quality of a quantity of NM. In other words, swaps between NM of different enrichment levels are not allowed under the NCA and AA. However, according to the Supplementary Arrangement between ROK and Canada, the replacement of NM by lower quality NM may only occur where the two States so decide following consultation. The U.S., Canada, and Australia, which are major suppliers of NMs, allow internal obligation swaps within the U.S. and the EU through NCA. The NCA between ROK and these countries does not address whether internal swaps are possible. Since governmental assurance does not impose restrictions on swaps, it can be considered if necessary. Although there is no actual practice of obligation swaps in ROK, research will be necessary regarding the extent to which swaps in ROK should be allowed and the need for government approval or permission.

About 83% of the information systems of administrative and public agencies are operated by agencies, and most of them are vulnerable to security due to the small scale of operation, insufficient facilities, and lack of dedicated personnel. To address these issues, the Ministry of the Interior and Safety announced in June 2021 that, as part of the “Second Basic Plan for E-Government,” all information systems of administrative and public agencies will be converted to a cloud-based integrated management operating environment by 2025 to provide stable public services. Accordingly, relevant laws and guidelines should be researched and analyzed to prepare for the cloud conversion of the Nuclear Export and Import Control System (NEPS) operated by the Export and Import Control Office of the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC). The Cloud Computing Act defines cloud computing, establishes a basic plan and implementation plan, provides support for promoting the adoption of cloud computing by state institutions, supports the construction of integrated information and communication facilities based on cloud computing technology, provides cost and technical support, and regulates cloud security certification, and applies the Personal Information Protection Act and the Act on Promotion of Information and Communication Network Utilization and Information Protection to protect personal information. The E-Government Act defines integrated standards and principles for information resources, support for the use of cloud computing services, classification standards for information resources, and integrated standards for calculating the size and capacity of information systems. The Notice on Standards for Using Cloud Computing Services and Securing Safety for Administrative Agencies and Public Institutions specifies the standards for using cloud computing services and measures to secure stability for administrative agencies, contracts for using cloud computing services, and ensuring continuity of cloud computing services. The Basic Guidelines on National Information Security stipulate the establishment and implementation of security measures, system security, user security, security management, information and communication network security separating internal network and internet network, and cloud computing security measures, and stipulate the NIS security review when introducing private cloud services. In order to convert NEPS to the cloud computing services, network, and software design plans, transfer plans, and cloud operation plans will be established in compliance with the relevant laws and guidelines. And future research will include researching the system status of major public and private cloud service providers and analyzing their advantages and disadvantages.

Surveillance plays a crucial role in safeguards. Reviewing surveillance data requires a significant number of inspection manpower. As the number of surveillance cameras increases, the demand for such manpower is expected to grow even more. Recently, in the field of security, there has been a development of deep learning models that automatically detect abnormal events from video images, and their usage is expanding. In this study, we used an AutoEncoder-based semi-supervised learning model, which can detect unexpected abnormal events, to detect anomalies in the UCSDped2 dataset and in simulating safeguards-related event videos taken at Dry Mockup facility of KAERI. To improve the model performance, we transformed the video images into two parts: the appearance part, which are sequences of video image frames, and the motion part, which are the pixel value differences of consecutive video frames. In addition, we added memory module to the bottle neck of the AutoEncoder model, and skip connection to enhance the model performance. To evaluate the model performance, we proposed a new evaluation index, which is adequate to the video images of safeguards surveillance in addition to the widely used AUC (Area Under the ROC Curve).

When proliferation activity occurs, states and non-state actors combine various sources of information to gain a better understanding of the situation. The quality of information source, content, and presentation can significantly influence the perception of decision-makers and end users. However, a state’s nuclear or missile activities are almost always classified. Also, states might intentionally reveal information to deter their adversary, threaten their adversary, bolster their prestige in the international community, or a combination of all three. Hence, any revealed information inherently contains some degree of uncertainty regarding its credibility. Lack of credibility makes it difficult for other states or non-state actors to determine how much of the information is accurate and how much is deception. The increase of publicly available information (open-source information) and the development of tools to collect, process, and analyze this information increased the possibilities of using open-source information to cross-check the proliferation claims of states. North Korea is a hermit state that has very little outside interaction. It also has continued to develop and refine its nuclear program. How credible is information released by North Korea? How can scholars/experts compensate for this lack of credibility in information on North Korea’s nuclear activity? This paper seeks to apply a framework on information quality to answer these questions. First, it will briefly explain the factors comprising information quality (sources, content, and presentation). Then, it will apply the information quality framework to North Korean activity analysis. It will conclude with implications of using the information quality framework to analyze a state that is low in accessibility and high uncertainty.

In the wake of the Fukushima NPP accident, research on the safety evaluation of spent fuel storage facilities for natural disasters such as earthquakes and tsunamis has been continuously conducted, but research on the protection integrity of spent fuel storage facilities is insufficient in terms of physical protection. In this study, accident scenarios that may occur structurally and thermally for spent fuel storage facilities were investigated and safety assessment cases for such scenarios were analyzed. Major domestic and international institutions and research institutes such as IAEA, NEA, and NRC provide 13 accident scenario types for Spent Fuel Pool, including loss-of-coolant accidents, aircraft collisions, fires, earthquakes. And 10 accident scenario types for Dry Storage Cask System, including transportation cask drop accidents, aircraft collisions, earthquakes. In the case of Spent Fuel Pool, the impact of the cooling function loss accident scenario was mainly evaluated through empirical experiments, and simulations were performed on the dropping of spent nuclear fuel assembly using simulation codes such as ABAQUS. For Dry Storage Cask System, accident scenarios involving structural behavior, such as degradation and fracture, and experimental and structural accident analyses were performed for storage cask drop and aircraft collision accidents. To evaluate the safety of storage container drop accidents, an empirical test on the container was conducted and the simulation was conducted using the limited element analysis software. Among the accident scenarios for spent fuel storage facilities, aircraft and missile collisions, fires, and explosions are representative accidents that can be caused by malicious external threats. In terms of physical protection, it is necessary to analyze various accident scenarios that may occur due to malicious external threats. Additionally, through the analysis of design basis threats and the protection level of nuclear facilities, it is necessary to derive the probability of aircraft and missile collision and the threat success probability of fire and explosion, and to perform protection integrity evaluation studies, such as for the walls and structures, for spent fuel storage facilities considering safety evaluation methods when a terrorist attack occurs with the derived probability.

The Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) and the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) operate the Nuclear Export and Import Control System (NEPS), an online comprehensive export and import control management system to guide the domestic nuclear export and import control regime and efficiently process the application, processing, and issuance of various civil complaints required for compliance. This paper analyzes the results of NEPS functional improvements made in 2022. First, NSSC and KINAC launched a nuclear plant technology follow-up system. Since establishing the Nuclear Plant Technology Export License (Plant License) system in 2015, large-scale nuclear power plant projects with a large amount of technology transfer have been issued a Plant License, allowing them to transfer technology without a separate individual export license. The recipient of a Plant License is not required to obtain an additional export license but to follow up on the transferred technology, such as checking whether it is a strategic technology and reporting quarterly transfer details. A dedicated system has been established to facilitate the follow-up of plant license projects. That has improved work efficiency for both the regulated and the regulator. Second, we have improved the procedures for retrieving and supplementing civil petitions. We added a function allowing civil petitioners to directly retrieve a civil petition to cancel a previously filed civil petition or to revise it themselves. In addition, we improved the procedure for supplementing a civil petition by setting a supplementation deadline for a reviewer’s request to modify a civil petition and sending a reminder before the expiration of the supplementation deadline. That enhances the convenience of the complainant and the examiner. Finally, we have changed the numbering system for export and import control reviews. Previously, the application number was a 15-digit system with an 8-digit date and 7-digit serial number. We have simplified the number by changing the three unused digits in the serial number to a single symbol that separates the type of application. That made it possible to utilize the number for relevant searches in the future. Also, simplifying the number has improved the efficiency of applying, processing, and consulting for civil affairs. In the future, NSSC and KINAC will continue to upgrade NEPS and make various functional improvements, and there will be many changes in system operation through cloud transfer in a few years.

With the introduction and implementation of the National Research and Development Innovation Act in 2021, researchers are required to have a greater understanding of research ethics and to comply more strictly. The range of misconduct in research and the standards for sanctions have been expanded with the introduction of the National Research and Development Innovation Act. In addition, researchperforming institutions and specialized agencies have been obligated to establish their own research management systems and standards according to the changed criteria. The Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC), a nuclear regulatory authority that is conducting national R&D in related fields, has sought to strengthen research ethics by revising related regulations, introducing a plagiarism detection system, and expanding related education in accordance with these policies. In this study, we analyzed the effectiveness of the plagiarism detection system as a basic quality control measure for research results and a tool for enhancing research ethics, which was introduced. KINAC did not simply introduce a plagiarism detection program but established institutional improvements and other regulatory measures to support it, with the aim of more effectively managing research results. To analyze the effectiveness of this system, we calculated the plagiarism rate by sampling 30 papers each year for the three years before the introduction of the plagiarism detection system. When comparing the plagiarism rates before and after the introduction of the plagiarism detection system, no exceptional cases of high plagiarism rates were found in papers published after the introduction of the system. Although most of the papers before the introduction of the system showed a satisfactory plagiarism rate, some cases showed high plagiarism rates. We analyzed the cause of such cases in detail. Some exceptional cases were also found to be included in the range of misconduct regulated by the National Research and Development Innovation Act. As no such cases were found after the introduction of the system, we could infer that the system is effectively functioning as a tool for basic quality control and enhancing research ethics. In the future, we plan to expand the sample qualitatively and quantitatively by including other forms of outcomes published by the institution, not just papers, and conduct a more detailed analysis. Based on the results, we will develop various improvement plans for enhancing the quality and research ethics of the institution’s research results.

Since the National R&D Innovation Act was enacted in 2022, it became a crucial issue how to qualify or improve R&D activities and disseminate their outcomes. Many organizations have referred to various quality management standards such as the American National Standards Institute/American Society for Quality (ANSI/ASQ) Z1.13, International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 9001, and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Nuclear Quality Assurance-1 (ASME NQA-1), as a means to set up their own quality system. ISO is the international standard for implementing a quality management system (QMS), which provides a framework and principles for managing an organization’s QMS, with the aim of ensuring that the organization consistently provide products or services that meet regulatory requirements. ISO 9001 can cover all aspects of an organization’s operations, and it can also be expanded to include R&D areas. The introduction of ISO 9001 to R&D aims to improve R&D practices and establish a standardized process framework for conducting R&D. ANSI/ASQ Z1.13 provides quality guidelines for research and consists of 10 sections covering various aspects of research quality, emphasizing ethical conduct, clear objectives, reliable data collection, and analysis. ASME NQA-1 is one of quality assurance standards for nuclear facility applications, but it has been extended and applied to R&D activities in the nuclear fields. It just focuses on planning, procedures, documentation, competence, equipment, and material control. KINAC has conducted extensive research on verifying and regulating nuclear activities while providing support for national nonproliferation technologies and policies. In addition to the quantitative growth achieved so far, efforts are being made to establish a qualitative and integrated management system. As a first step to achieve this goal, this study reviewed international standards and methodologies for research quality and derived the key components for R&D quality management. Moreover, the appropriate outline of quality management system framework was proposed for R&D as a regulatory support process, based on the ISO 9001. The implementation of quality management standards and procedures for R&D in KINAC, which could lead to improved research practices, more reliable data collection and analysis and increased efficiency in conducting R&D activities.

The Korea Laboratory Accreditation Scheme (KOLAS) is the national accreditation body responsible for providing accreditation services to testing and calibration laboratories. The primary objective of KOLAS is to promote the quality and reliability of laboratory testing by providing nationally and internationally recognized accreditation services. Laboratories accredited by KOLAS are required to meet rigorous international standards set by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and are subject to regular assessments to ensure ongoing compliance with the standards. KOLAS accreditation is highly regarded both domestically and internationally, and is recognized for providing high-quality and reliable testing services. The nuclear analysis laboratory at KINAC has been working to establish a quality management system to ensure the external reliability of analytical results and to secure its position as an authorized testing agency. To achieve this, a detailed manual and procedure for nuclear material analysis were developed to conform to the international standards of ISO/IEC 17025. This study presents the preparation process for establishing the management system, focusing on meeting technical and quality requirements for the implementation of the ISO/IEC 17025 standard in the KINAC nuclear analysis laboratory, specifically in the field of chemical testing (dosimetry, radioactive, and neutron measurement subcategories). The preparation process involved two tracks. The first track focused on satisfying technical requirements, with Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometer (TIMS) and Inductively Coupled Plasma-Mass Spectrometer (ICP-MS) selected as the major equipment for analysis. Analytical methods for determining isotope ratios and concentrations of nuclear materials were determined, and technical qualification was ensured through participation in proficiency test programs, inter-experimenter comparison tests, and uncertainty reports. The second track focused on developing the quality system, including quality manuals, procedures, and guidelines based on the requirements of the ISO/IEC 17025 standard. Various implementation documents were produced during the six-month pilot period, in accordance with the three levels of documents required by the standard. Implementation of ISO/IEC 17025 is expected to have a systematic quality management process for the analysis lab’s operations and to increase confidence in KINAC’s nuclear analysis.

Timely detection of nuclear activity is important for the management and supervision of nuclear materials, and inspections on North Korea as a method of safety measures for this monitoring system seem to be a not far future in the rapidly changing North Korea relationship. However, a simpler and more reliable monitoring device is required since the inspection period is limited and the possibility of revisiting is unclear. The seal is a simple but easily used security device for monitoring forgery and falsification in the IAEA. IAEA presents matters related to 1) project engineering, 2) remote monitoring, and 3) seal development as the three major tasks of the Department of safeguards and Division of Technical Support. The importance of development, modernization, and application of new seal devices is emphasized, and advanced sealing and identification system development is in progress at many research institutes such as JRC, ISCN, and JAEA. Since the existing seal devices used by IAEA and KINAC can only be confirmed through on-site inspections for damage, it is difficult to respond immediately in the event of similar situations such as theft of nuclear materials and loss of continuity of knowledge. Unlike facilities that comply with the requirements for safety measures, such as domestic nuclear facilities, in the case of facilities subject to denuclearization, it is very likely that various hazardous environments will exist that make it difficult to apply safety measures. Hence, a real-time seal device has developed through prior research due to the high possibility of situations in which Continuity of Knowledge (COK) is not maintained, such as damage, malfunction, and power loss of sealing and monitoring equipment. Through previous studies, the real-time seal device was loaded with server-based operating software and improved its performance by utilizing feedback from real users (KINAC) after use. In this study, the effectiveness of the previously developed sealing system was verified through performance evaluation, and the authentication of the equipment was secured through environmental tests.

Nuclear inspection is necessary to verify nuclear activities. If North Korea takes denuclearization, North Korea’s nuclear materials should be verified through non-destructive testing and destructive testing for nuclear material production. Since destructive testing of all substances is impossible, nondestructive testing is essential. Most non-destructive tests are performed by measuring the energy of gamma rays, but the characteristics of nuclear fuel can be evaluated by measuring neutron sources when enclosed with thick shields and when shielding structures are difficult to remove. Before the neutron source evaluation of MAGNOX used by North Korea, the relative characteristics will be evaluated later by analyzing the burnup, enrichment, and cooling time of the spent nuclear fuels discharged from the domestic nuclear power plant. This study evaluated the source strength and major nuclides according to burnup for the WH17×17 nuclear fuel assembly. The depletion calculation was conducted using SCALE 6.2 ORIGEN, and 3.5wt% enrichment, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 MWd/kg burnup, and five years cooling time, the minimum requirement for transport specified in the notice of the Nuclear Safety Commission, was applied. Although the impact assessment on enrichment should be evaluated with MCNP Tally to consider the fission reaction of the generated neutrons, this study only evaluated the spontaneous fission and (a, n) reactions that occurred first because it only evaluates the burnup impact. As burnup increased, neutron generation increased, and most of the total neutron strength occurred through spontaneous fission from the 10 MWd/kg burnup step. The influence of Pu-240 nuclides was dominant in the 10 MWd/kg burnup step but most neutrons were generated in tiny amounts of Cm- 244 generated from 20 MWd/kg burnup. Since DPRK’s 5 MWe Yongbyon MAGNOX has very low burnup (about 0.7 MWd/kg), the primary neutron sources of 10 MWd/kg, Am-241 and Pu isotopes, especially Pu-240, are expected to be used as indicators for evaluating spent nuclear fuel characteristics. If only specific nuclides are evaluated as major neutron sources at lower burnup than those evaluated in this study, in that case, the accuracy of non-destructive testing can be improved. Additionally, the evaluation according to the enrichment and cooling time should be considered as well.

The DPRK had been upgrading its nuclear weapons capabilities from the past to the sixth nuclear test in 2017, and Kim Jong-un has been in power since the death of Kim Jong-il in 2011, striving to upgrade and diversify four nuclear tests and firing means. In 2022, in particular, DPRK launched more than 40 ballistic and cruise missiles and provoked them in various ways, such as developing solid rocket engines, flying fighter jets, and invading drones. In addition, reprocessing facility activities have been observed again since 2021 at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Complex. Operational activities such as continuous activities of the 5MWe Yongbyon reactor and the additional construction of new buildings are observed. DPRK’s recent activities could result in nuclear weapons in all except conventional weapons provocations. DPRK has researched and developed nuclear weapons since the 1950s. It has been preparing to operate nuclear weapons, operating nuclear power, and modernizing nuclear power simultaneously. Given the number of nuclear weapons using DPRK’s nuclear materials and various means of missiles, an offensive transition is expected to enable restrictive deterrence strategies that can be used first use and on assured retaliation. In addition, based on the nuclear strategy, which is interpreted as Vipin Narang’s nuclear doctrine and nuclear posture, DPRK is also capable of assured retaliation and asymmetric escalation posture. In particular, considering the continuous activities of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Complex, which has recently diversified the investment vehicle, and the delegation of nuclear weapon use, it is expected to move differently from the previous one based on the changed nuclear strategy. However, there are clear limitations to interpreting it as a completely assured retaliation and asymmetric expansion nuclear strategy. First, there is a lack of development of atmospheric reentry vehicles that can avoid ICBM interception for assured retaliation capabilities against the United States. Second, there are limitations in the open capacity of nuclear weapons due to the absence of SSBN capabilities. However, delegation to operations at strategy force suggests the possibility of asymmetric expansion strategies. The previous analysis of DPRK’s nuclear strategy and limitations is valid in that the U.S. nuclear umbrella guarantees the Republic of Korea in a strong alliance between the Republic of Korea and the U.S. If the Republic of Korea lacks a nuclear umbrella due to the weakening of the alliance or limits U.S. intervention by having more than dozens of ICBMs, it is considered that DPRK can use a definite confirmation retaliation and asymmetric escalation nuclear strategy. As a response to this, it is the first way to verify and strengthen the validity of the three-axis system (Kill Chain, KAMD, KMPR), second to strengthen the Korea-U.S. alliance, and finally to appeal to the international community and increase consensus. In particular, it is possible to form a consensus of sanctions and condemnation DPRK by expressing concerns about nuclear dominoes caused by nuclear proliferation and arms competition to the international community.

A sample size calculation algorithm was developed in a prototype version to select inspection samples in domestic bulk handling facilities. This algorithm determines sample sizes of three verification methods satisfying target detection probability for defected items corresponding to one significant quantity (8 kg of plutonium, 75 kg of uranium 235). In addition, instead of using the approximation equation-based algorithm presented in IAEA report, the sample size calculation algorithm based on hypergeometric density function capable of calculating an accurate non-detection probability is adopted. The algorithm based the exact equation evaluates non-detection probability more accurately than the existing algorithm based on the approximation equation, but there is a disadvantage that computation time is considerably longer than the existing algorithm due to the large amount of computational process. It is required to determine sample size within a few hours using laptop-level performance because sample size is generally calculated with an inspector’s portable laptop during inspection activity. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the calculation speed of the algorithm based on the exact equation. In this study, algorithm optimization was conducted to improve computation time. In order to determine optimal sample size, the initial sample size is calculated first, and the next step is to perform an iterative process by changing the sample size to find optimal result. Most of the computation time occurs in sample size optimization process performing iterative computation. First, a non-detection probability calculation algorithm according to the sample sizes of three verification methods was improved in the iterative calculation process for optimizing sample size. A computation time for each step within the algorithm was reviewed in detail, and improvement approaches were derived and applied to some areas that have major effects. In addition, the number of iterative process to find the optimal sample size was greatly reduced by applying the algorithm based on the bisection method. This method finds optimal value using a large interval at the beginning step and reduces the interval size whenever the number of repetitions increases, so the number of iterative process is less than the existing algorithm using unit interval size. Finally, the sample sizes were calculated for 219 example cases presented by the IAEA report to compare computation time. The existing algorithm took about 15 hours, but the improved algorithm took only about 41 minutes using high performance workstation (about 22 times faster). It also took 87 minutes for calculating the cases using a regular laptop. The improved algorithm through this study is expected to be able to apply the sample size determination process, which was performed based on the approximate equation due to the complexity and speed issues of the past calculation process, based on the accurate equation.

The licensee of nuclear facilities in the Republic of Korea should ensure the functionality of Critical Digital Assets (CDAs) is maintained and minimize the negative impact of cyber-attacks by establishing a cyber security contingency plan. The contingency plan should include detailed response guidelines for each stage of detection, analysis, isolation, eradication, and recovery and comply with the requirements specified in KINAC’s “Regulatory Standard 015 - Security for Computer and Information System of Nuclear Facilities”. However, since the cyber security contingency plan describes the overall response guidelines for CDA, it may be difficult to respond practically to cyberattacks. This paper suggests a method to address this issue by performing exercises based on the classification of CDA types. CDAs in nuclear facilities can be classified according to their characteristics. The criteria for classifying CDA types include whether the asset is a PC, whether communication ports (RS-232, 422, 485) exist, whether storage devices can be connected through USB/memory card ports and whether internal settings can be changed through HMI devices such as built-in buttons. By classifying CDA types based on the proposed criteria, the attack vectors of CDAs can be defined. By defining the attack vectors, a list of cyber-attacks that CDAs may face can be created, and abnormal symptoms of CDAs resulting from the listed cyber-attacks can be defined. By using the defined abnormal symptoms of CDAs, the response measures of detection, analysis, isolation, eradication, and recovery can be concretized and reflected in the contingency plan. This may enable a more practical emergency response. This paper presents an improvement to the cyber security emergency response plan through the definition of cyber-attacks based on the classification of CDA types. By improving the contingency plan for CDAs as a whole using the proposed method, it is expected that more effective response measures can be taken in the event of a cyber-attack.