In the 3rd revision of NUREG-0800, which was revised in 2007, the calculation method for decay heat in the design of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) for a pressurized water reactor is recommended to be based on the ANSI/ANS-5.1 method. This method employs a more complex decay heat calculation formula compared to the one introduced in Branch Technical Position ASB 9-2, which was presented in the 2nd revision. While most of the variables for decay heat calculation in ANSI/ANS-5.1 can be inferred from the methods outlined in the appendices, determining the fractions of fission products is not straightforward despite their significant impact on the results. When reviewing documents that evaluate decay heat using the ANSI/ANS-5.1 method, it is observed that they often adopt a conservative approach by assuming that the fraction of the most influential fission product is 100%. In this study, the fractions of each fission product presented in LLNL’s 2016 report were used to calculate decay heat, and the results were compared with the ASB 9-2 method and ORIGEN code results. The comparison showed that ANS 5.1 tends to yield higher decay heat values than ANS 9-2, particularly at the reference time of 1M seconds, while ORIGEN-ARP generally produced lower values. Therefore, it is concluded that even when using the ANSI/ANS-5.1 method with the fractions of each fission product for decay heat calculations in spent nuclear fuel wet or dry storage facility assessments, it provides a sufficiently conservative thermal evaluation.

The solid-state chemistry of uranium is essential to the nuclear fuel cycle. Uranyl nitrate is a key compound that is produced at various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, both in front-end and backend cycles. It is typically formed by dissolving spent nuclear fuel in nitric acid or through a wet conversion process for the preparation of UF6. Additionally, uranium oxides are a primary consideration in the nuclear fuel cycle because they are the most commonly used nuclear fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the oxidation and thermal behavior of uranium oxides and uranyl nitrates. Under the ‘2023 Nuclear Global Researcher Training Program for the Back-end Nuclear Fuel Cycle,’ supported by KONICOF, several experiments were conducted at IMRAM (Institute of Multidisciplinary Research for Advanced Materials) at Tohoku University. First, the recovery ratio of uranium was analyzed during the synthesis of uranyl nitrate by dissolving the actual radioisotope, U3O8, in a nitric acid solution. Second, thermogravimetric-differential thermal analysis (TG-DTA) of uranyl nitrate (UO2(NO3)2) and hyper-stoichiometric uranium dioxide (UO2+X) was performed. The enthalpy change was discussed to confirm the mechanism of thermal decomposition of uranyl nitrate under heating conditions and to determine the chemical hydrate form of uranyl nitrate. In the case of UO2+X, the value of ‘x’ was determined through the calculation of weight change data, and the initial form was verified using the phase diagram for the U-O system. Finally, the formation of a few UO2+X compounds was observed with heat treatment of uranyl nitrate and uranium dioxide at different temperature intervals (450°C-600°C). As a result of these studies, a deeper understanding of the thermal and chemical behavior of uranium compounds was achieved. This knowledge is vital for improving the efficiency and safety of nuclear fuel cycle processes and contributes to advancements in nuclear science and technology.

To address the pressing societal concern in Korea, characterized by the imminent saturation of spent nuclear fuel storage, this study was undertaken to validate the fundamental reprocessing process capable of substantially mitigating the accumulation of spent nuclear fuel. Reprocessing is divided into dry processing (pyro-processing) and wet reprocessing (PUREX). Within this context, the primary focus of this research is to elucidate the foundational principles of PUREX (Plutonium Uranium Redox Extraction). Specifically, the central objective is to elucidate the interaction between uranium (U) and plutonium (Pu) utilizing an organic phase consisting of tributyl phosphate (TBP) and dodecane. The objective was to comprehensively understand the role of HNO3 in the PUREX (Plutonium Uranium Redox Extraction) process by subjecting organic phases mixed with TBPdodecane to various HNO3 concentrations (0.1 M, 1.0 M, 5.0 M). Subsequently, the introduction of Strontium (Sr-85) and Europium (Eu-152) stock solutions was carried out to simulate the presence of fission products typically contented in the spent nuclear fuel. When the operation proceeds, the complex structure takes the following form. 􀜷􀜱􀬶 􀬶􀬾(􀜽􀝍) + 2􀜰􀜱􀬷 􀬿(􀜽􀝍) + 2􀜶􀜤􀜲(􀝋􀝎􀝃) ↔ 􀜷􀜱􀬶(􀜰􀜱􀬷)􀬶 ∙ 2􀜶􀜤􀜲(􀝋􀝎􀝃) Subsequently, separate samples were gathered from both the organic and aqueous phases for the quantification of gamma-rays and alpha particles. Alpha particle measurements were conducted utilizing the Liquid Scintillation Counter (LSC) system, while gamma-ray measurements were carried out using the High-Purity Germanium Detector (HPGe). The distribution ratio for U, Eu (Eu-152), and Sr (Sr-84) was ascertained by quantifying their activity through LSC and HPGe. Through the experiments conducted within this program, we have gained a comprehensive understanding of the selective solvent extraction of actinides. Specifically, uranium has been effectively separated from the aqueous phase into the organic phase using a combination of tributyl phosphate (TBP) and dodecane. Subsequently, samples containing U(VI), Eu(III), and Sr(II) underwent thorough analysis utilizing LSC and HPGe detectors. Our radiation measurements have firmly established that the concentration of nitric acid enhances the selective separation of uranium within the process.

Notice of the NSSC No.2021-14 defines the term ‘Neutron Absorber’ as a material with a high neutron absorption cross section, which is used to prevent criticality during nuclear fission reactions and includes neutron absorbers as target items for manufacture inspection. U.S.NRC report of the NUREG-2214 states that the subcriticality of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in Dry Storage Systems (DSSs) may be maintained, in part, by the placement of neutron absorbers, or poison plates, around the fuel assemblies. This report mentions the need for Time-Limited Aging Analysis (TLAA) on depletion of Boron (10B) in neutron absorbers for HI-STORM 100 and HISTAR 100. Also, this report mentions that 10B depletion occurs during neutron irradiation of neutron absorbers, but only 0.02% of the available 10B is to be depleted through conservative assumptions regarding the neutron flux or accumulated fluence during irradiation, which supports the continued use of the neutron absorbers in the SNF dry storage cask even after 60 years of evaluated period. There are several types of commercially available neutron absorbers, broadly classified into Boron Carbide Cermets (e.g., Boral®), Metal Matrix Composites (MMC) (e.g., METAMIC), Borated Stainless Steel (BSS), and Borated Al alloy. While irradiation tests for neutron absorbers are primarily conducted during wet storage systems, there are also some prior studies available on irradiation tests for neutron absorbers during dry storage systems. For examples, there is an analysis of previous research on high-temperature irradiation test of metallic materials and identification of limitations in existing methodologies were conducted. Furthermore, an improvement plan for simulating the high-temperature irradiation damage of neutron absorbers was developed. In report published by corrosion society summarizes the evaluation results of the degradation mechanisms for Stainless Steel- and Al-based neutron absorbers used in SNF dry storage systems.

When storing spent fuel in a dry condition, it becomes essential to ensure that any remaining moisture bound to the canister and spent fuel is effectively removed and stored within an inert gas environment. This is crucial for preserving the integrity of the spent fuel. According to the NRC- 02-07-C-006 report, it is advised to reduce pressure gradually or in incremental stages to prevent the formation of ice. In the context of vacuum drying, it is desirable to perform testing using a prototype model; however, utilizing a prototype model can be difficult due to budget constraints. To address this limitation, we designed and constructed a laboratory-scale vacuum drying apparatus. Our aim was to assess the impact of vacuum pump capacity on the drying process, as well as to evaluate the influence of canister volume on drying efficiency. The vacuum drying tests were carried out until the surface temperature of the water inside reached 0.1°C. In the tests focusing on vacuum pump capacity, vacuum pumps with capacities of 100, 200, 400, and 600 liters were employed. The outcomes of these tests indicated that smaller vacuum pump capacities resulted in increased evaporation rates but also prolonged drying times. In the case of drying tests based on canister volume, canisters with volumes of approximately 100 and 200 liters were utilized. The results revealed that larger canister volumes led to longer drying times and lower rates of evaporation. Consequently, if we were to employ an actual dry storage cask for vacuum drying the interior of the canister, it is anticipated that the process would require a substantial amount of time due to the considerably larger volume involved.

The saturation of wet storage facilities constructed and operated within nuclear power plant sites has magnified the significance of research concerning the dry storage of spent nuclear fuel. Not only do wet storage facilities incur higher operational and maintenance costs compared to dry storage facilities, but long-term storage of metal-clad fuel assemblies submerged in aqueous tanks is deemed unsuitable. Consequently, dry storage is anticipated to gain prominence in the future. Nevertheless, it is widely acknowledged that quantitatively assessing the residual water content remains elusive even when employing the apparatus and procedures utilized in the existing dry storage processes. The presence of residual water can only be inferred from damage or structural alterations to the spent nuclear fuel during its dry storage, making precise prediction of this element crucial, as it can be a significant contributor to potential deformations and deterioration. The aforementioned challenges compound the issue of retrievability, as substantial complexities emerge when attempting to retrieve spent nuclear fuel for permanent disposal in the future. Consequently, our research team has established a laboratory-scale vacuum drying facility to investigate the sensitivity of various parameters, including canister volume, pump capacity, water surface area, and water temperature, which can exert thermohydraulic influences on residual water content. Moreover, we have conducted dimensional analysis to quantify the thermohydraulic effects of these parameters and express them as dimensionless numbers. These analytical approaches will subsequently be integrated into predictive models for residual water content, which will be further developed and validated at pilot or full-scale levels. Furthermore, our research team is actively engaged in experimental investigations aimed at fine-tuning the duration of the pressure-holding phase while optimizing the evaporation process under conditions designed to avert the formation of ice caused by abrupt temperature fluctuations. Given that the canister is constructed from acrylic material, we are able to identify, from a phenomenological perspective, the specific juncture at which the boiling phenomenon becomes manifest during the vacuum drying process.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Fundamentals No. SF-1 Safety Principle 7 states that people and the environment, present and future, must be protected against radiation risk. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the safety of radioactive waste repositories on a longterm time scale to ensure future safety. However, IAEA-TECDOC-767 states that the long-term time scale of interest means that the risk or dose to future individuals cannot be reliably predicted because it relies on assumptions. Therefore, evaluating the safety of long-term time scales should use safety indicators that are less dependent on assumptions. Radiotoxicity is one of the safety indicators that represent an inherent risk from radioactive waste. It has been mainly used to show the time required until the hazard presented by waste decreases to that of natural uranium ore and is easy to use in communication with the public. There are several methods for calculating Radiotoxicity. Radioactivity is multiplied by a Dose Conversion Factor (DCF) to be expressed in Sv units, or radioactivity be divided into Maximum Permissible Concentration (MPC) to be expressed in m3 units as the amount of water needed to dilute the radionuclide to the permitted level. It is also often made dimensionless through comparison with reference materials like uranium ore. Radiotoxicity varies in size several times, even if it is a waste of similar origins and components, depending on the Radiological variable (e.g., Annual Limitation Intake (ALI), Dose Conversion Factor (DCF), Maximum Permissible Concentration (MPC), Activity). Therefore, this study was conducted to determine whether there was a significant difference when different radiological variables were substituted. This study compares and analyzes their differences using various MPCs or DCFs used in each country. In addition, this study analyzes radionuclides that influence radiotoxicity with several radiological variables. This study introduces the effects of substituting different radiological variables.

International Atomic Energy Agency defines the term “Poison” as a substance used to reduce reactivity, by virtue of its high neutron absorption cross-section, in IAEA glossary. Poison material is generally used in the reactor core, but it is also used in dry storage systems to maintain the subcriticality of spent fuel. Most neutron poison materials for dry storage systems are boron-based materials such as Al-B Carbide Cermet (e.g., Boral®), Al-B Carbide MMC (e.g., METAMIC), Borated Stainless Steel, Borated Al alloy. These materials help maintain subcriticality as a part of the basket. U.S.NRC report NUREG-2214 provides a general assessment of aging mechanisms that may impair the ability of SSCs of dry storage systems to perform their safety functions during longterm storage periods. Boron depletion is an aging mechanism of neutron poison evaluated in that report. Although that report concludes that boron depletion is not considered to be a credible aging mechanism, the report says analysis of boron depletion is needed in original design bases for providing long-term safety of DSS. Therefore, this study aimed to simulate the composition change of neutron poison material in the KORAD-21 system during cooling time considering spent fuel that can be stored. The neutron source term of spent fuel was calculated by ORIGEN-ARP. Using that source term, neutron transport calculation for counting neutrons that reach neutron poison material was carried out by MCNP®-6.2. Then, the composition change of neutron poison material by neutron-induced reaction was simulated by FISPACT-II. The boron-10 concentration change of neutron poison material was analyzed at the end. This study is expected to be the preliminary study for the aging analysis of neutron poison material about boron depletion.

After the Fukushima disaster, overseas nuclear power plants have established conditions for issuing a red alert in the event of fuel damage within the spent fuel pool and they have already implemented conditions for issuing a blue alert when fuel is exposed above the water surface. In South Korean nuclear power plants, a real-time monitoring system is in place to oversee the exposure of spent fuel to the surface within the spent fuel pool. To achieve this, a water level indicator gauge is installed within the spent fuel pool, allowing for continuous real-time monitoring. This paper conducted a comparative assessment of radiation levels from water level monitoring system in two units’ spent fuel pools based on the low water levels (1 feet from the storage rack), utilizing the radiation analysis code (MCNP).

After the decision of the Wolsong unit 1 permanent shutdown (2019), spent fuel stored in the spent fuel bay (hereafter, SFB) should be transported to a dry storage facility (MACSTOR or Canister) in order to decommission Wolsong unit 1. Accordingly, KHNP has established a shipment schedule for damaged fuel of Wolsong Unit 1 and is trying to complete the shipment according to the schedule. Wolsong is equipped with transportation casks and dry storage facilities, but baskets need to be manufactured separately. In addition, license approval is required for baskets, transport cask, and dry storage facilities for legal grounds to contain, transport, and store damaged fuels. In this paper, the initial model, upgrade model, and automation model of encapsulation equipment planned to be introduced in Canada to handle PHWR’s damaged fuel were compared, and the optimal model was selected in consideration of KHNP’s planned spent fuel shipment schedule. The PHWR’s damaged fuel encapsulation system is a system developed the PHWR’s damaged spent fuel to be handled in the same way as the existing PHWR when storing it in the dry storage facility and loading a basket for capsulation into transport cask. At the Gentilly-2 nuclear power plant in Canada, a manually operated encapsulation system was used due to the low quantity of damaged fuel, which can be encapsulated two bundles a day, and this model is an initial model. In the case of Wolsong Unit 1, it has about 300 damaged fuels, so it takes about nine months to work when using the initial model. The upgrade model developed to improve work efficiency and reliability has increased work efficiency through some automation, but it would take about eight months to process the damaged spent fuels of Wolsong Unit 1, and this model has not yet been manufactured and applied. Lastly, the automation model changed the work location outside the SFB and automated drainage/drying operations. It is easy to maintain and replace consumables because the work is carried out by lifting the damaged fuel to a shuttle outside the SFB surrounded by a shielding chimney. Considering the reduction of drainage/drying time, it is possible to save about four times as much time as the initial model. That is, if the automation model is used, it is judged that the supply of Wolsong Unit 1 can be processed in about two months. However, in terms of license, initial model and upgrade model are expected to be easier and the period is expected to be shortened. However, if licensing is carried out as soon as equipment design is completed, it is believed that the period can be shortened by parallel equipment manufacturing and licensing. It is judged that the best way to comply with the target schedule is to select an automation model with excellent work performance, develop equipment, and proceed with licensing at the same time. Accordingly, KHNP is in the process of designing equipment with the aim of using the automation model to take out damaged fuel for Wolsong Unit 1.

Since the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, concerns about intentional aircraft crashes into nationally critical facilities have soared in countries around the world. The United States government advised nuclear utilities to strengthen the security of nuclear power plants against aircraft crashes and stipulated aircraft crash assessment for new nuclear facilities. Interest in military missile attacks on nuclear facilities has grown after Russia attacked Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, where spent nuclear power dry storage facility is operated. Spent nuclear fuel dry storage facilities in nuclear power plant sites should also strengthen security in preparation for such aircraft crashes. Most, but not all, spent nuclear fuel dry storage facilities in Europe, Japan and Canada are operated within buildings, while the United States and Korea operate dry storage facilities outdoors. Since all of Korea’s dry storage systems are concrete structures vulnerable to crash loads and are exposed to the outside, it is more necessary to prepare for aircraft crash terrorist attacks due to the Korea’s military situation. Residents near nuclear power plants are also demanding assessment and protective measures against such aircraft crashes. However, nuclear power plants, including spent nuclear fuel dry storage facilities, are strong structures and have very high security, so they are unlikely to be selected as targets of terrorism, and spent nuclear fuel dry storage systems are so small that aircraft cannot hit them accurately. Collected opinions on the assessment of aircraft crash accidents at spent nuclear fuel dry storage facilities in nuclear power plant sites were reviewed. In addition, the current laws and regulatory requirements related to strengthening the security of new and existing nuclear power plants against intentional aircraft crashes are summarized. Such strengthening of security can not only ensure the safety of on-site spent nuclear fuel dry storage facilities, but also contribute to the continuous operation of nuclear power plants by increasing resident acceptance.

Once discharged, spent nuclear fuel undergoes an initial cooling process within deactivation pools situated at the reactor site. This cooling step is crucial for reducing the fuel’s temperature. Once the heat has sufficiently diminished, two viable options emerge: reprocessing or interim storage. A method known as PUREX, for aqueous nuclear reprocessing, involves a chemical procedure aimed at separating uranium and plutonium from the spent nuclear fuel. This separation not only minimizes waste volume but also facilitates the reuse of the extracted materials as fuel for nuclear reactors. The transformation of uranium oxides through dissolution in nitric acid followed by drying results in uranium taking the form of UO2(NO3)2 + 6H2O, which can then be converted into various solid-state configurations through different heat treatments. This study specifically focuses on investigating the phase transitions of artificially synthesized UO2(NO3)2 + 6H2O subjected to heat treatment at various temperatures (450, 500, 550, 600°C) using X-ray Diffraction (XRD) analysis. Heat treatments were also conducted on UO2 to analyze its phase transformations. Additionally, the study utilized XRD analysis on an unidentified oxidized uranium oxide, UO2+X, and employed lattice parameters and Bragg’s law to ascertain the oxidation state of the unknown sample. To synthesize UO2(NO3)2 + 6H2O, U3O8 powder is first dissolved in a 20% HNO3 solution. The solid UO2(NO3)2 + 6H2O is obtained after drying on a hotplate and is subsequently subjected to heat treatment at temperatures of 450, 500, 550, and 600°C. As the heat treatment temperature increases, the color of the samples transitions from orange to dark green, indicating the formation of different phases at different temperatures. XRD analysis confirms that uranyl nitrate, when heattreated at 500 and 550°C, oxidizes to UO3, while the sample subjected to 600°C heat treatment transforms into U3O8 due to the higher temperature. All samples exhibit sharp crystal peaks in their XRD spectra, except for the one heat-treated at 450°C. In the second experiment, the XRD spectra of the heat-treated UO2 consistently indicate the presence of U3O8 rather than UO3, regardless of the temperature. Under an oxidizing atmosphere within a temperature range of 300 to 700°C, UO2 can be oxidized to form U3O8. In the final experiment, the oxidation state of the unknown UO2+X was determined using Bragg’s law and lattice parameters, revealing that it was a material in which UO2 had been oxidized, resulting in an oxidation state of UO2.24.

More than 20,000 bundles of spent nuclear fuel are stored in the spent nuclear fuel storage pool of domestic nuclear power plants, and the dry storage facility project in the nuclear power plant site is being promoted as the saturation of the wet storage pool is imminent. Since bending or twisting of spent nuclear fuel is an important item in order to load spent nuclear fuel into a dry storage cask, PSE (Pool Side Examination) was performed to verify this. This paper describes whether it can be safely loaded into a dry storage cask based on the measurement results of bending or twisting of spent nuclear fuel. The nuclear fuel assembly is designed to prevent excessive assembly bending and twisting because it can cause interference during dry storage and handling due to factors such as differences in depletion of nuclear fuel rods, irradiation growth, and coolant flow during reactor operation. The bending of the nuclear fuel assembly is measured by establishing a Plumb Line to photograph the nuclear fuel assembly based on it, and calculating a pixel that images the distance between the support grid and the Plumb Line. The twisting of the nuclear fuel assembly is measured by forming a virtual vertical plane with two Plumb Lines, and based on this, the twisting angle of the lower fixed compared to the upper fixed. As a result of the measurement, the bending of spent nuclear fuel was about 0.0-10.2 mm, much lower than the reactor loading criteria of 15.0 mm, and in the case of twisting, about 0.0~2.2° much lower than the reactor loading criteria of 5.0°. Therefore, it was confirmed that spent nuclear fuel at domestic nuclear power plants was not affected by bending and twisting when loading into dry storage cask.

Pyroprocessing is a crucial method for recovering nuclear fuel materials, particularly uranium and transuranic elements (TRU), through electrochemical reactions in a LiCl or LiCl-KCl molten salt system, which is highly stable medium at elevated temperatures. In the electrochemical reduction stage, actinide metal oxides are effectively transformed into their metallic forms and retained at the cathode within a molten LiCl-Li2O environment at 650°C. Simultaneously, oxygen ions (O2-) are generated at the cathode and then transported through the molten salt to be discharged at the anode, where they combine to form oxygen gas (O2) on the anode’s surface. One notable challenge in this electrochemical process is the generation of various byproducts during the anode oxide reduction step, including oxygen, chlorine, carbon dioxide, and carbon monoxide. Consequently, significant amounts of corrosion products tend to accumulate on the upper region of the anode’s immersion area over time. This report introduces a novel solution to mitigate corrosion-related challenges within the specified temperature range. We propose a selective oxidation treatment for the NiCrAl-based 214 Haynes alloy, involving exposure to 1,100°C in a reducing atmosphere. The objective is to stimulate the growth of protective α-Al2O3 scales on the alloy’s surface. The resulting oxide scales have undergone thorough characterization using SEM, EDS, and XRD techniques. The pre-grown alumina scale has demonstrated commendable adherence and thermal stability, even when subjected to a chlorine-oxygen mixed atmosphere at the specified temperature.

Globally, the operation of nuclear power plants results in the production of a tremendous quantity of spent nuclear fuel. The methods for handling spent nuclear fuel can be categorized into three: storage, direct disposal and recycling. A technology designed to recycle accumulated spent nuclear fuel is pyropocessing. In pyroprocessing, various fission products (FPs) such as C-14, H-3, I-129 and Cs-137 are generated. Among these FPs, technetium (Tc-99) is a gaseous nuclear isotope with a long half-life and high mobility in the form of TcO4 - in aqueous solutions, making it essential to capture strictly in order to prevent radioactive contamination of the environment. In previous studies, ion-exchange or adsorption using MOFs (Metal Organic Frameworks) have been used to remove Tc-99. These methods, however, involve separation in aqueous solutions, not in the gaseous state. In this study, we developed a CaO-based adsorbent for capturing Re as a surrogate for radioactive Tc-99. Isopropyl alcohol (IPA) was employed as a pore-forming agent during the preparation of the adsorbents, and its effects on characteristics and adsorption performance were investigated. The size of the pores were analyzed from nitrogen (N2) adsorption isotherm analysis and mercury (Hg) intrusion curves. As a result, it was confirmed that the addition of IPA had a significant impact on the formation of macro-pores. Furthermore, this macroporous structure was found to enhance the adsorption performance of Re.

Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) is currently developing a vertical concrete dry storage module for the dry storage of used nuclear fuel within nuclear power plants. This module is designed with a structure consisting of cylinders, which can block the ingress of external air, thereby preventing Chloride-Induced Stress Corrosion Cracking (CISCC). However, due to the presence of these cylinder structures, unlike conventional dry storage systems, it cannot directly dissipate heat to the external atmosphere, making thermal evaluation an important issue. The SF dry storage module being developed by KHNP is a massive concrete structure of approximately 20 m × 10 m × 7 m in size, employing a vertical storage system. To demonstrate the safety of such a large structure, there is no alternative to conducting experiments with scaled-down models. Furthermore, according to NUREG-2215 Section 5.5.4, it is explicitly mentioned that design-verification testing can be performed using scaled-down models. In this paper, a 1/4 scaled-down model was constructed to perform thermal performance verification experiments, and the effectiveness of this model was analyzed using Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) methods. The analysis results indicated that there was not a significant difference in terms of maximum concrete temperature and air outlet temperature. However, a considerable difference was observed in the canister surface temperature. Therefore, it is concluded that careful consideration of natural convection heat transfer is necessary for the full application of the scaled-down model.

Hydride reorientation is widely known as one of the major degradation mechanisms in Zirconium cladding during dry storage. Some previous theoretical models for hydride reorientation used assumption of an ideal radial basal pole orientation for HCP structure of Zirconium cladding. Under this assumption, circumferential hydride was considered to precipitate in the basal plane while radial hydride was considered to precipitate in the prismatic plane, thereby giving energetical penalty on thermodynamical precipitation of radial hydrides. However, in reality, reactor-grade Zirconium cladding exhibits average 30° tilted texture, adding complexity to the hydride precipitation mechanism. In this study, reactor-grade Zirconium cladding was charged with hydrogen and hydride reorientation -treated specimens were fabricated. Microstructural characterization of hydrides was conducted via following three methods in terms of interface and stored energy. And this study aimed to compare these characteristics between circumferential and radial hydrides. Using Electron Back Scattered Diffraction (EBSD), the interface was investigated assuming that interface lies parallel to the axial axis of the tube. These were further validated with Transmission Electron Microscope (TEM). In addition, Differential Scanning Calorimetry (DSC) analysis was conducted to calculate the stored energy. This investigation is expected to establish fundamental understanding of how hydrides precipitate in Zirconium cladding with different orientations. And it will also increase the predictability of radial hydride formation and help understanding the mechanical behavior of Zirconium cladding with radial hydrides.

In nuclear facilities, a graded approach is applied to achieve safety effectively and efficiently. It means that the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that are important to safety should be assured to be high quality. Accordingly, SSCs that consist of nuclear facilities should be classified with respect to their safety importance as several classes, so that the requirements of quality assurance relevant to the designing, manufacturing, testing, maintenance, etc. can be applied. Guidance for the safety classification of SSCs consisting of nuclear power plants and radioactive waste management facilities was developed by U.S.NRC and IAEA. Especially, in guidance for nuclear power plants, safety significance can be evaluated as following details. The single SSC that mitigates or/and prevents the radiological consequence or hazard was assumed to be failure or malfunction as the initiating event/accident occurred and the following radiological consequence was evaluated. Considering both the consequence and frequency of the occurrence of the initiating event/accident, the safety significance of each SSC can be evaluated. Based on the evaluated safety significance, a safety class can be assigned. The guidance for the safety classification of the spent nuclear fuel dry storage systems (DSS) was also developed in the United States (NUREG/CR-6407) and the U.S.NRC acknowledges the application of it to the safety classification of DSS in the United States. Also, worldwide including the KOREA, that guidance has been applied to several DSSs. However, the guidance does not include the methodology for classifying the safety or the evaluated safety significance of each SSC, and the classification criteria are not based on quantitative safety significance but are expressed somewhat qualitatively. Vendors of DSS may have difficulties to apply this guidance appropriately due to the different design characteristics of DSSs. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to evaluate the safety significance of representative SSCs in DSS. A framework was established to evaluate the safety significance of SSCs performing safety functions related to radiation shielding and confinement of radioactive materials. Furthermore, the framework was applied to the test case.

In Korea, Kori Unit 1 and Wolsong Unit 1, have been permanently shut down in 2017 and 2019, and more nuclear power plants are expected to be permanently shut down after continued operation successively. Spent fuel has been generated during operation and stored in spent fuel pools. Due to the expected saturation of spent fuel pools within the next several decades, transportation of a huge amount of spent fuel is anticipated to interim storage facilities or final disposal facilities, even though the specific location is not decided. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) states that every environmental report prepared for the licensing stage of a Pressurized Water Reactor shall contain a statement concerning risk during the transportation of fuel and radioactive wastes to and from the reactor. Thus, the licensee should ensure that the radiological effects in accidents, as well as normal conditions in transport, do not exceed certain criteria or be small if cannot be numerically quantified. Specific conditions that a full description and detailed analysis of the environmental effects of transportation of fuel and wastes to and from the reactor are exempted are specified in 10 CFR Part 51. Since there are no official requirements for radiological dose assessment for workers and public during the transportation of spent fuel in Korea, the margin when applying the U.S. regulatory criteria to the environmental impact assessment during the transport of spent fuel generated from domestic nuclear power plants is evaluated. A different approach would be needed due to the difference in the characteristics of spent fuel and geographical features.

The use of nuclear materials for nuclear power generation is increasing worldwide, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has signed an agreement with countries using nuclear materials to prevent using military purpose through the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for the management of nuclear materials. Accordingly, all member countries manage nuclear material and equipment facilities under the treaty and are obligated to conduct safety measures such as inspection, containment, and surveillance in accordance with safety standards. The equipment used in the inspection basically consists of a Scintillator type and a semiconductor detector type, and is mainly used for portable equipment to ensure the integrity of the equipment. In general, the operating environment of the detector guaranteed by the manufacturer is -10 degrees to 40 degrees due to poor resolution and electrical problems. However, in the case of an outdoor environment other than a laboratory environment, it is difficult to maintain the above temperature conditions. In particular, the internal temperature of the vehicle used for transport rises to more than 50 degrees in Korea, making the detector stored therein vulnerable. In this study, a storage chamber for extreme environments was developed. The developed chamber compared the internal temperature by heating the external temperature. In addition, the performance before and after heating was compared by heating the radiation detectors HPGe, CZT, and NaI from -20 to 70 degrees Celsius while using the storage chamber. Our proposed chamber can play a key role in applications with good performance in complex environmental adaptability in their design.