After the permanent shut down of Kori Unit 1, various decommissioning activities will be implemented, including decontamination, segmentation, waste management, and site restoration. During the decommissioning period, waste management is among the most important activities to ensure that the process proceeds smoothly and within the expected timeframe. Furthermore, the radioactive waste generated during the operation should be sent to a disposal facility to complete the decommissioning project. Square and cylindrical concrete re-package drums were generated during the 1980s and 1990s. The square, containing boron concentrates, and cylindrical, containing spent resin, concrete re-package drums have been stored in a radioactive waste storage building. Homogeneous radioactive waste, including boron concentrates, spent resin, and sludge, should be solidified or packaged in high-integrity containers (HICs). This study investigates the sequential segmentation process for the separation of contaminated and non-contaminated regions, the re-packaging process of segmented or crushed cement-solidified boron concentrate, and re-packaging in HICs. The conceptual design evaluates the re-packaging plan for the segmented and crushed cement-solidified waste using HICs, which is acceptable in a disposal facility, and the quantity of generated HICs from the treatment process.

Radioactive waste (hereinafter referred to as mixed waste) containing hazardous substances (heavy metals, organic and inorganic waste liquids, asbestos, etc.) has been continuously generated from domestic nuclear power plants, nuclear facilities, and other industrial facilities, and heavy metals were released during the dismantlement of Kori Unit 1 and Wolseong Unit 1. Lead, cadmium, mercury, arsenic), asbestos, decontamination waste liquid (organic/inorganic waste liquid), etc. may be generated. Although hazardous waste related to the nuclear industry continues to be generated, only the regulation direction for hazardous substances is presented in the provisions related to hazardous substances in the delivery regulations for low and intermediate-level radioactive waste and the acceptance criteria for low and intermediate-level radioactive waste disposal facilities. In particular, because there is no clear definition of “hazardousness” and specific standards such as concentration and characteristics for classification of hazardous substances, as well as hazard removal procedures when the hazardousness of radioactive waste is confirmed, no hazardous substances have been delivered in Korea to date and many mixed wastes are stored at each generation facility or at the NPP. As a plan to improve delivery standards related to mixed waste is being prepared recently, it is believed that if the acceptance standards are revised accordingly, it will be possible to confirm the suitability for disposal of drums produced after the establishment of the acceptance standards in 2015. However, it is believed that securing disposal suitability for waste that was packed in 200L drums and compressed under super high pressure in the absence of specific technical standards and regulatory guidelines for the disposal of radioactive waste containing hazardous substances would still remain a difficult problem. In this report overseas acceptance standards related to hazardous waste were reviewed and a plan to secure the disposal suitability of 200 L drums compressed with of super high pressure was proposed.

Most of the radioactive wastes generated during the nuclear fuel processing activities conducted by KEPCO Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd. are classified as the categories of intermediate and low-level radioactive waste. These radioactive waste materials are intended for permanent disposal at a designated disposal site, adhering strictly to the waste acceptance criteria. To facilitate the safe transportation of radioactive waste to the disposal site, it is necessary to ensure that the waste drums maintain a level of criticality that complies with the waste acceptance criteria. This necessitates the maintenance of subcritical conditions, under immersion or optimal neutron moderation conditions. This paper presents a criticality safety assessment of concrete radioactive waste under the most conservative conditions of immersion and moderation conditions for waste drums. Specifically, In order to send radioactive waste, which is the subject of criticality analysis, to a disposal facility, pre-processing operations must be performed to ensure compliance with waste accepatance criteria. To meet the physical characteristics required by the accepance criteria, particles below 0.2 mm should not be included. Thus, a 0.3 mm sieve is used to separate particles lager than 0.3 mm, and only those particles are placed in drums. The drums should be filled to achieve a filling ratio of at least 85%. A criticality analysis was conducted using the KENO-VI of SCALE. The Criticality Safety Analysis Results of varying the filling ratio of concrete drums from 85% to 100% presented in an effective multiplication factor of 0.22484. Additionally, the effective multiplication factor presented to be 0.25384 under the optimal moderation conditions. This demonstrates full compliance with the USL and criticality technology standards set as 0.95.

Spent filters contained in drums of radioactive waste generated from nuclear power plants are contaminated with various radioactive isotopes due to their use in various water purification processes in the system. Radiation doses from the spent filters can vary from low to high levels. To dispose of drums containing spent filters as radioactive waste, the inventory of radioactive isotopes in the filters must be determined. Two methods for determining the inventory are indirect measurement using scaling factors and direct analysis of filter samples. This study suggests a method to determine the appropriate sample size for each drum based on the number of filters stored in the drum, when direct analysis is used to determine the inventory of radioactive isotopes. In particular, Visual Sample Plan (PNNL) software’s Item Sampling function was used to calculate the sample size, considering the confidence level and minimum acceptable coverage rate. As a result, assuming that the number of filters packed per drum ranges from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 30, the study suggests that a full inspection is required for drums containing 9 or fewer filters, while drums containing 10 filters should be sampled with 9 samples, 11 filters with 10 samples, 12-13 filters with 11 samples, 14-16 filters with 12 samples, 19-22 filters with 14 samples, 23-26 filters with 15 samples, and 27-30 filters with 16 samples.

In the Kori-1 radioactive waste storage, the concentrated waste and spent resin drums generated in the past are repacked and stored in large concrete drums. In order to dispose of radioactive waste generated before the establishment of the waste acceptance criteria, it is necessary to develop a large concrete drum treatment and waste treatment process to evaluate disposal suitability and secure technology that meets the latest technical standards. In addition, for worker safety and waste reduction, it is important to develop secondary waste treatment technology generated during waste treatment. In this study, the types and characteristics of secondary wastes that can be generated when large concrete drums are decommissioned were investigated. In addition, considering the characteristics of possible secondary wastes, suitable treatment methods and characteristic evaluations were analyzed. We plan to develop an optimal process for secondary waste treatment in consideration of on-site work space, economic feasibility, and safety.

The dose was evaluated for the workers transporting the spent resin drums from a spent resin mixture treatment facility. The treatment technology of spent resin mixture waste based on microwave was developed to compensate for the shortcoming of the existing one. The mechanism of the facility for the treatment is divided into separation, desorption, condensation and adsorption process. The treated spent resin that has passed through the microwave reactor flows into the spent resin storage tank. As the treatment time elapses, if spent resin accumulates in the spent resin storage tank, it is moved to the drum of the volume of 200 L. The drum must be moved by the worker, in which case radiation exposure to the drum transport worker occurs. It requires the dose evaluation for drum transport workers in terms of radiation safety. Dose evaluation was performed in consideration of the change in the composition ratio and weight of the spent resin mixture, where the working time for transportation was considered from 10 to 120 minutes in 10-minute increment. In the case of 100 kg of the spent resin mixture, the dose range was derived as 4.62×10−3 – 5.90×10−2 mSv for the 100 kg of spent resin, 4.72×10−3– 5.58×10−2 mSv for the 80 kg of spent resin and 20 kg of zeolite and activated carbon, and 5.38×10−3 – 6.32×10−2 mSv for the 60 kg of spent resin and 40 kg of zeolite and activated carbon. In the case of 150 kg of the spent resin mixture, the dose range was derived as 6.83×10−3 – 8.20×10−2 mSv for the 150 kg of spent resin, 7.13×10−3 – 8.22×10−2 mSv for the 120 kg of spent resin and 30 kg of zeolite and activated carbon, and 8.28×10−3 – 8.86×10−2 mSv for the 90 kg of spent resin and 60 kg of zeolite and activated carbon. The estimated maximum doses for each weight (100 kg and 150 kg of mixture) were confirmed to be 3.16×10−1% and 4.43×10−1% of the annual average dose limit of 20 mSv for radiation workers.

It is essential to provide a safe working environment for radiation workers. At a research reactor decommissioning site in Seoul (KRR1 & KRR2), radioactive waste drum disposal work is in progress. Before performing radiation work, it is necessary to determine the radioactivity of the waste drum to ensure safety. In this reason, we conducted a study to determine the detection efficiency of waste drums using the EXVol code. Determination of the full energy absorption peak efficiency (detection efficiency) is one of the important processes of the gamma-ray activation analysis. For the large voluminous gamma-ray sources like waste drum, the geometrical and attenuation effect should be considered. EXVol (Efficiency calculator for eXtended Voluminous source) code is a detection efficiency calculation code using the effective solid angle method. EXVol can calculate both coaxial and asymmetric structure. In addition, the introduction of a collimator made it possible to reduce the radiation intensity of a high radiation source. And it is possible to determine the precise detection efficiency according to the energy of a gamma ray at a specific position of the volume source. To verify the performance of the EXVol, a high resolution gamma spectroscopy system was constructed and measurement and analysis were performed. Measurements were performed on coaxial, asymmetric and collimated structures with standard point source, standard 1 L liquid volume source and HPGe detector. The measured results were compared with the calculation results of EXVol. The relative deviation of the measurement and calculation in the coaxial and asymmetric structures was 10%, and that of the collimation structure was 20%. Results can be available in analysis of waste drums’ radioactivity determination at a specific position.

The spent filters stored in Kori Unit 1 are planned that compressed and disposed for volume reduction. However, shielding reinforcement is required to package high-dose spent filters in a 200 L drum. So, in this study suggests a shielding thickness that can satisfy the surface dose criteria of 10 mSv·h−1 when packaging several compressed spent filters into 200 L drums, and the number of drums required for the compressed spent filter packaging was calculated. In this study, representative gamma-emitting nuclides in spent filter are assumed that Co-60 and Cs-137, and dose reduction due to half-life is not considered, because the date of occurrence and nuclide information of the stored spent filter are not accurate. The shielding material is assumed to be concrete, and the thickness of the shielding is assumed to 18 cm considering the diameter of the spent filter and compression mold. Considering the height of the compressed spent filter and the internal height of the shielding drum, assuming the placement of the compressed spent filter in the drum in the vertical direction only, the maximum number of packaging of the compressed spent filter is 3. When applying a 18 cm thick concrete shield, the maximum dose of the spent filter can packaged in the drum is 125 mSv·h−1, so when packaging 3 spent filters of the same dose, the dose of a spent filter shall not exceed 41 mSv·h−1 and not exceed 62 mSv·h−1when packing 2 spent filters. Therefore, the dose ranges of spent filters that can be packaged in a drum are classified into three groups: 0–41 mSv·h−1, 41–62 mSv·h−1, and 62–125 mSv·h−1based on 41 mSv·h−1, 62 mSv·h−1, and 125 mSv·h−1. When 227 spent filters stored in the filter room are classified according to the above dose group, 207, 3 and 4 spent filters are distributed in each group, and the number of shielding drums required to pack the appropriate number of spent filters in each dose group is 75. Meanwhile, 8 spent filters exceeding 125 mSv·h−1 and 5 spent filters that has without dose information are excluded from compression and packaging until the treatment and disposal method are prepared. In the future, we will segmentation of waste filter dose groups through the consideration of dose reduction and horizontal placement of compressed spent filters, and derive the minimum number of drums required for compressed spent filter packaging.

Currently, in domestic nuclear power plants (NPP), the spent filters (SFs) used for the purpose of reducing and purifying the radiation of the primary cooling water system are temporarily stored in an untreated state. In order to dispose of SFs, radioactive nuclide analysis (RNA) of SFs is required to be conducted. As segmented gamma scanner (SGS) is already being used in Kori NPP, utilizing SGS for RNA of SFs would be practical and economical. In this paper, factors required to be considered to improve accuracy of SGSs for RNA of SFs are studied. The analysis of the nuclide inventory of the packaging drum for radioactive waste should be performed by the indirect drum nuclide analysis method. The material of the SFs is iron (SS304) on the outside, and paper on the inside. In addition, to meet disposal acceptance criteria, radioactive waste drums are packaged in thick grouting or shielding drums. Therefore, it is necessary to derive an appropriate correction method for high inhomogeneity and thick media. Considering these factors, evaluating radionuclides inventory plans to measure gamma rays in SGS mode. Correct the gamma ray measurement by examining the medium attenuation factor and error factors. In this way, the inventory of gamma nuclides is calculated, and the specific radioactivity of beta ray and alpha particle emitting nuclides other than gamma rays is planned to be calculated by applying scaling factors.

For the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the international community has devoted itself to fulfilling its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement with IAEA. In this regard, uranium in a radioactive waste drum should be analyzed and reported in terms of mass and 235U enrichment. In order to characterize radioactive wastes, gamma spectroscopy techniques can be effectively applied. In the case of high-resolution gamma spectroscopy, because an HPGe detector can provide excellent energy resolution, it can be applied to analyze a mixture having a complicated isotopic composition. However, other substances such as wood, concrete, and ash are mixed in radioactive waste with various form factors; hence, the efficiency calibration is difficult. On the other hand, In Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS) has a capability of efficiency calibration without standard materials, making it possible to analyze complex radioactive wastes. In this study, the analysis procedure with the ISOCS was optimized for quantification of radioactive waste. To this end, a standard radioactive waste drum at KEPCO NF and low-level radioactive waste drums at Korea Radioactive Waste Agency (KORAD) were measured. The performance of the ISOCS was then evaluated by Monte Carlo simulations, Multi-Group Analysis for Uranium (MGAU) code, and destructive analysis. As a result, the ISOCS showed good performance in the quantification of uranium for a drum with the homogenized simple geometry and long measurement time. It is confirmed that the ISOCS gamma spectroscopy technique could be used for control and accountancy of nuclear materials contained in a radioactive waste drum.

원전 부지에 저장중인 방사성폐기물을 처분장에 인도하기 전에 폐기물의 물리·화학적 특성이 인수기준에 적합한지를 검사해야 한다. 검사하는 방법 중 비파괴 검사방법에 대해 조사하였는데, 조사결과 X-ray를 이용한 비파괴 방법을 적용하면 인수검사 항목 중‘드럼내 내용물 검사’,‘ 유리수 및 채움율 정량검사’를 할 수 있는 것으로 나타났다. 본 논문에서는 먼저 X-ray 장비의 원리와 시스템 선정 시 고려해야 할 사항들에 대해 간략하게 살펴 본 후 X-ray 장비를 이용하여 검사해야 할 드럼들의 특성을 분석하였다. 분석한 특성들은 드럼의 종류, 드럼의 규격, 드럼내 내용물의 종류 등이었고 이들 특성자료를 이용하여 검사에 필요한 X-ray 소요에너지를 계산하였다. 계산 결과 드럼 크기가 320 ℓ 이하인 드럼을 검사하기 위한 소요에너지는 3 MeV 이하로 나타났으며 경제성 및 실현가능성 측면에서 450 keV 장비와 3 MeV 장비를 조합하거나 단독으로 사용하는 것이 바람직하고 이 때 450 keV 장비를 이용하여 검사가 가능한 저밀도 드럼수는 2006년 12월 저장기준으로 42,327 드럼, 3 MeV 장비를 이용하여 검사가 가능한 드럼 수는 18,105 드럼으로 나타났다. 검사를 수행하는 주체, 장비 구매 방안 등에 따라 4가지 검사 시나리오를 수립하고 이에 대해 경제성 및 적용 가능성을 분석한 결과 최적의 검사시나리오는 인수기준, 처리 및 처분장 인도에 대한 폐기물 발생자의 정책 등에 영향을 받는 것으로 나타났다. 예를들어,‘ 유리수’,‘ 채움율’에 대한 정량분석과‘내용물 확인’을 모두 해야 할 경우에는 밀도가 상대적으로 낮은 폐기물이 담겨있는‘저밀도 드럼’의 검사를 위해 450 keV 이동형 장비 2대를 구입하여 자체 검사하고‘고밀도 드럼’은 외주로 검사하는 것이 바람직할 수 있다. 반면‘내용물 확인’만을 비파괴 검사항목으로 할 경우에는 450 keV 급 이동형 장비 1대면 연간 13,000 드럼을 검사할 수 있는 것으로 나타났다.

IP-2형 운반용기는 정상운반조건에서의 자유낙하시험 및 적층시험을 수행한 후에 운반내용물의 분산 및 유실이 없어야 하며 외부표면에서의 방사선량률이 20%이상 증가할 수 있는 차폐능력의 상실이 없어야 한다. 본 연구에서는 두꺼운 철판을 구조재로 사용하며 볼트체결방식의 뚜껑을 가진 IP-2형 운반용기에 대한 구조 안전성을 평가하기 위한 해석적인 방안을 제안하였다. 해석적인 방법을 통하여 원자력발전소에서 발생된 방사성폐기물 드럼을 폐기물 처리시설에서 임시저장고까지 운반하기 위한 두 종류의 IP-2형 방사성폐기물 운반용기에 대하여 자유낙하조건에서 운반내용물의 분산 및 유실과 차폐손실이 없음을 확인하였다. 자유낙하조건에서 운반내용물의 분산 및 유실을 평가하기 위하여 최대 볼트단면 평균응력값과 최대 뚜껑열림량을 볼트의 인장강도와 뚜껑부에 존재하는 단차와 비교 평가하였다. 또한 최대 차폐두께 감소량을 이용하여 차폐손실을 평가하였다. 자유낙하조건에 대한 동적충돌해석을 검증하고 구조 안전성을 시험적으로 평가하기 위하여 자유낙하시험을 다양한 방향으로 실시하였다. 자유낙하시험에서는 운반내용물의 분산 및 유실은 볼트체결방식의 뚜껑에서 볼트의 파손 및 플랜지의 변형 등을 검사하여 평가하였으며, 차폐손실은 초음파 두께 측정기를 이용한 차폐두께를 측정하여 평가하였다. 해석에 대한 검증을 위하여 시험에서 취득한 변형률과 가속도를 동일한 위치에서 얻어진 해석결과와 비교하였다. 해석결과는 시험결과에 비하여 보수적인 결과를 보여주므로 해석에서 입증한 IP-2형 방사성폐기물 운반용기의 안전성은 보수적인 결과이다. 마지막으로 유한요소해석을 통하여 적층조건에 대한 IP-2형 방사성폐기물 운반용기는 안전함을 입증하였다. 적층해석에서 차폐체의 응력은 항복응력에 비하여 1/3정도의 작은 값을 보였다. 두 종류의 IP-2형 방사성폐기물 운반용기는 정상운반조건에서의 자유낙하시험 및 적층시험에 대하여 안전함을 입증하였다.