The objective of this study is to investigate the safety awareness and effectiveness of the education and training for employees engaged in radiological emergency organization of the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI). In 2022, the questionnaire for the education satisfaction survey was revised to regulary evaluate the effect of edcation on perceptions of importance on emergency preparedness for nuclear research facilities. In line with, a standard questionnaire was created which covers 3 factors and 9 attributes, and the evaluation indicatior is based on a 5-point Likert scale. In 2023, the education on radiological emergency preparedness was conducted for 235 emergency staff. From May 24 to July 13, 2023, data was collected from a total of 235 emergency response personnels, including 28 new staffs and 207 maintenance staffs. Aa a result of response analysis, it was identified that education for radiological emergency response had a significant correlation with the promoting safety culture. It was found that senior emergency personnel with more years of experience are highly interested in radioactive disaster prevention and actively participate in and training. On the other hand, it was presented that new and less experienced groups tend to have a relatively high scored of the risk perception of nuclear research facilitites. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the practical curriculum in order to increase the participation of junior disaster prevention personnel in education and training, ensuring that they correctly recognize the risk of research facilities. This results are expected to be used to improve the quality of education and drills for radiological emergency response at KAERI.

One of the important components of a nuclear fuel cycle facility is a hot cell. Hot cells are engineered robust structures and barriers, which are used to handle radioactive materials and to keep workers, public, and the environment safe from radioactive materials. To provide a confinement function for these hot cells, it is necessary to maintain the soundness of the physical structure, but also to maintain the negative pressure inside the hot cell using the operation of the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems. The negative pressure inside the hot cells allows air to enter from outside hot cells and limits the leakage of any contaminant or radioactive material within the hot cell to the outside. Thus, the HVAC system is one of the major components for maintaining this negative pressure in the hot cell. However, as the facility ages, all the components of the hot cell HVAC system are also subject to age-related deterioration, which can cause an unexpected failure of some parts. The abnormal operating condition from the failure results in the increase of facility downtime and the decrease in operating efficiency. Although some major parts are considered and constructed in redundancy and diversity aspects, an unexpected failure and abnormal operating condition could result in reduction of public acceptance and reliability to the facility. With the advent of the 4th Industrial Revolution, prognostics and health management (PHM) technology is advancing at a rapid pace. Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power, Siemens, and other companies have already developed technologies to constantly monitor the integrity of power plants and are applying the technology in the form of digital twins for efficiency and safety of their facility operation. The main point of PHM, based on this study, is to monitor changes and variations of soundness and safety of the operation and equipment to analyze current conditions and to ultimately predict the precursors of unexpected failures in advance. Through PHM, it would be possible to establish a maintenance plan before the failure occurs and to perform predictive maintenance rather than corrective maintenance after failures of any component. Therefore, it is of importance to select appropriate diagnostic techniques to monitor and to diagnose the condition of major components using the constant examination and investigation of the PHM technology. In this study, diagnostic techniques are investigated for monitoring of HVAC and discussed for application of PHM into nuclear fuel cycle facilities with hot cells.

Currently, Korea is planning to use various equipments and technologies for cutting, decontamination, compression, solidification, and packaging at decommissioning site of Kori unit 1 and Wolsung unit 1. In particular, Korea is considering to apply new technologies like inorganic acid decontamination, spent resion treatment technology not only to localize various decommissioning technology, but to meet the limit of 14,500 drums of the decommissioning waste per unit. However, before the techniques applied to decommissioning, it is necessary to demonstrate the effectiveness and the safety of the techniques. Because unlike the industrial fields, the failure of the decommissioning technique in nuclear power plants can cause the spread or leakage of radioactive materials. In the「Regulation on Technical Standards for Nuclear Reactor Facilities, Etc.」is stated that the licensee shall apply proven technology to decommissioning and if the licensee apply new technology, he must provide resonable evidence and prove its safety. In accordance with this approach, Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) Notice No. 2021-24 can be applied to the decommissioning technology as one of a technical standard related with the demonstration of it. And it states 9 kinds of elements related to the radioactive waste management facilites and components like the management of radioactive effluents, prevention of contamination and overflow by radioactive materials, etc. But, they are mixed with the radioactive material considerations and industrial considerations, and these considerations are usually for the facilities, not equipments or techniques. On the other hand, in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. WS-G-2.1 Section 6.15 to 6.20, it recommended to evaluate 12 considerations for the decontamination technique and 7 considerations for the dismantling techniques. The Decommissioning Guide in Germany recommends to consider 3 conditions for radiation protection of decontamination techniques and 4 conditions for dismantling techniques. Therefore, it is necessary to compare the safety requirements or recommendations related to the demonstration of decommissioning technology with the other countries to check there is something to learn from it.

Working with molten metal has always been and will always be a dangerous workplace. No matter how carefully equipment is designed, workers are trained and procedures are followed, the possibility of an accident can occur in melting workplace. Some primary causes of melt splash and furnace eruptions include wet or damp charge material, dropping heavy charge into a molten bath, wet or damp tools or additives and sealed scrap or centrifugally cast scrap rolls. Induction melting brings together three things (water, molted metal and electricity) that have the potential for concern if the furnace is not properly working. Induction furnace must have a water cooling system built into the coil itself. Water picks up the heat caused by the current as well as heat conducted from the metal through the refractory. The water carries the heat to a heat exchange for removal. Spill pits serve to contain any molten metal spilled as a result of accident, run out or dumping of the furnace in an emergency. If a leak is suspected at any time, cease operation and clear the melt deck area of all personnel and empty the furnace. Molten metal fins can penetrate worn or damaged refractory and come into contact with the coil. A furnace or a close capture hood which suddenly swings down from a tilted position will cause injury or death. Whenever workers are working on a furnace or close capture hood when it is in the tilted position, be sure that it is supported with a structural brace that is strong enough to keep it from dropping if hydraulic pressure is lost. In theory refractory wear should be uniform, however, in practice this never occurs. The most causes of lining failure are improper installation of refractory material, inadequate sintering of refractory material, failure to monitor and record normal lining wear, allowing the lining to become too thin, installation of the wrong refractory, improper preheating of a used cold lining, failure to properly maintain the furnace the sudden or cumulative effects of physical shocks or mechanical stress, and excessive slag or dross buildup. Pouring cradles provide bottom support for crucibles. A crack in the crucible occur below the bottom ring support, the bottom of the crucible can drop and molten metal will spill and splash, possibly causing serious injury or death. To reduce this danger, a pouring cradle that provides bottom support for the crucible must be used. Power supply units must have safety locks and interlocks on all doors and access panels. Workers who work with low voltage devices must be made aware of the risk posed by high levels of voltage and current. The most causes of accidents are introduction of wet or damp material, improper attention to charging, failure to stand behind safety lines, coming into contact with electrically charged components and lack of operator skills and training. Only trained and qualified personnel are to have access to high risk areas. Safety lockout systems are another effective measure to prevent electrical shock

The periodic safety review (PSR), for all operating nuclear power plants in Korea, has been conducted in accordance with SSG-25, a guideline suggested by the IAEA, The PSR is performed through the review of the regulatory body after the operator’s self-evaluation. In order to guarantee a high level of safety in consideration of the changed environment, such as operating experience (OE) and technology development, it should be comprehensively and integratedly performed, and it is also carried out every 10 years after the operation permit. However, in case that all or part of the reactor facilities have been permanently shut down, such as Kori Unit 1 and Wolsong Unit 1, Around a half of reactor facilities are not in operation. The periodic safety evaluation may not be conducted for unused parts if there is no safety hazard and if there are some difficulties for applying periodic safety evaluation. In considering that the biggest purpose of PSR safety (by PSR definition of KINS guideline) is to improve and accumulated factors such as aging deterioration, facility change, operation experience, and technological development for operating nuclear power plants. It refers to a comprehensive safety evaluation that is periodically performed during the period of operation of a nuclear power plant. It is necessary to review whether PSR should be performed for a nuclear power plant that is permanently shut down after nuclear power plant operation is terminated. Also, in IAEA SSR 2/2 Rev1, it is defined that PSR is performed during the nuclear power plant operation period. “Requirement 12: Periodic safety review, Systematic safety assessments of the plant, in accordance with the regulatory requirements, shall be performed by the operating organization throughout the plant’s operating lifetime, with due account taken of operating experience and significant new safety related information from all relevant sources”. Recently, Kori Unit 1 and Wolsong Unit 1 were decided to permanently shut down in June 2017 and December 2019, and are currently being prepared for decommissioning. According to the Wolsong decommissioning plan, decontamination and demolition will be completed by 2032. The PSR for permanent shutdown of Kori Unit 1 was submitted to the regulatory body in December 2018 and is under approval review. In the case of the permanent shutdown PSR of Wolsong Unit 1, the project will be launched in May 2023 and the PSR will be submitted to the regulatory body in May 2024. In the case of Wolsong Unit 1, it is necessary to operate the various systems, including the systems related to the spent fuel storage tank, even during the period of permanent shutdown. Such as the heavy water related systems used in common with Wolsong Unit 2, are essential operating systems. Based on Basic Subject Index (BSI), 112 out of 218 systems require operation, indicating that about 50% of systems require operation even after permanent shutdown. Decommissioning of systems and equipment will begin after the transfer to modular air-cooled canister storage (MACSTOR) by the end of 2025, and then in-depth discussions will be needed whether PSR evaluation is meaningful.

When aluminum is in an alkaline state, the aluminum oxide film surrounding aluminum is dissolved and moisture penetrates the exposed aluminum surface, causing corrosion of aluminum. At this time, hydrogen gas is generated and there is a risk of explosion due to the generated hydrogen gas. Aluminum radioactive waste is difficult to permanently dispose of because it does not meet the standards for the acquisition of low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste cave disposal facilities currently managed and operated by the Korea Nuclear Environment Corporation. However, because of this risk, it is necessary to study how to safely treat and dispose aluminum waste. In this study, overseas cases were investigated and analyzed to ensure the safety of aluminum waste disposal, and the current status of aluminum radioactive waste generated during decommissioning of the Korea Research Reactor 1&2 and a treatment plan to secure disposal suitability were presented. The process of removing a little remaining oxygen in molten steel during the reduction of iron oxide in the iron refining process is called deoxidation, and a representative material used for deoxidation is aluminum. In the case of metal melting decontamination, which is one of the decontamination processes of radioactive metal waste, a method of treating aluminum waste by using aluminum as a deoxidizer is proposed.

In light of recent significant seismic events in Korea and worldwide, there is an urgent need to reevaluate the adequacy of seismic assessments conducted during facility construction. This study reexamines the ongoing viability of the Safety Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) criteria assessment for the Combustible Radioactive Waste Treatment Facility (CRWTF) site at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), originally established in 1994. To validate the SSE assessment, we delineated 13 seismic structure zones within the Korean Peninsula and employed two distinct methodologies. Initially, we updated earthquake occurrence data from 1994 to the present year (2023) to assess changes in the site’s horizontal maximum earthquake acceleration (g). Subsequently, we conducted a comparative analysis using the same dataset, contrasting the outcomes derived from the existing distance attenuation equation with those from the most recent attenuation equations to evaluate the reliability of the applied attenuation model. The Safety Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) criterion of 0.2 g remains unexceeded, even when considering recent earthquake events since the original evaluation in 1994. Furthermore, when applying various assessment equations developed subsequently, the maximum value obtained from the previously utilized ‘Donvan and Bornstein’ attenuation equation is 0.1496 g, closely resembling the outcome derived from the recently employed ‘Lee’ reduction equation of 0.1451 g. The SSE criteria for CRWTF remain valid in the current context, even in light of recent seismic occurrences such as the 2016 Gyeongju earthquake. Additionally, the attenuation equation employed in the evaluation consistently yields conservative results when compared to methodologies used in recent assessments. Consequently, the existing SSE criteria remain valid at present. This study is expected to serve as a valuable reference for confirming the SSE criterion assessment of similarly constructed facilities within KAERI.

Most of the radioactive wastes generated during the nuclear fuel processing activities conducted by KEPCO Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd. are classified as the categories of intermediate and low-level radioactive waste. These radioactive waste materials are intended for permanent disposal at a designated disposal site, adhering strictly to the waste acceptance criteria. To facilitate the safe transportation of radioactive waste to the disposal site, it is necessary to ensure that the waste drums maintain a level of criticality that complies with the waste acceptance criteria. This necessitates the maintenance of subcritical conditions, under immersion or optimal neutron moderation conditions. This paper presents a criticality safety assessment of concrete radioactive waste under the most conservative conditions of immersion and moderation conditions for waste drums. Specifically, In order to send radioactive waste, which is the subject of criticality analysis, to a disposal facility, pre-processing operations must be performed to ensure compliance with waste accepatance criteria. To meet the physical characteristics required by the accepance criteria, particles below 0.2 mm should not be included. Thus, a 0.3 mm sieve is used to separate particles lager than 0.3 mm, and only those particles are placed in drums. The drums should be filled to achieve a filling ratio of at least 85%. A criticality analysis was conducted using the KENO-VI of SCALE. The Criticality Safety Analysis Results of varying the filling ratio of concrete drums from 85% to 100% presented in an effective multiplication factor of 0.22484. Additionally, the effective multiplication factor presented to be 0.25384 under the optimal moderation conditions. This demonstrates full compliance with the USL and criticality technology standards set as 0.95.

Activated carbon (AC) is used for filtering organic and radioactive particles, in liquid and ventilation systems, respectively. Spent ACs (SACs) are stored till decaying to clearance level before disposal, but some SACs are found to contain C-14, a radioactive isotopes 5,730 years halflife, at a concentration greater than clearance level concentration, 1 Bq/g. However, without waste acceptance criteria (WAC) regarding SACs, SACs are not delivered for disposal at current situation. Therefore, this paper aims to perform a preliminary disposal safety examination to provide fundamental data to establish WAC regarding SACs SACs are inorganic ash composed mostly of carbon (~88%) with few other elements (S, H, O, etc.). Some of these SACs produced from NPPs are found to contain C-14 at concentration up to very-low level waste (VLLW) criteria, and few up to low-level waste (LLW) criteria. As SACs are in form of bead or pellets, dispersion may become a concern, thus requiring conditioning to be indispersible, and considering VLL soils can be disposed by packaging into soft-bags, VLL SACs can also be disposed in the same way, provided SACs are dried to meet free water requirement. But, further analysis is required to evaluate radioactive inventory before disposal. Disposability of SACs is examined based on domestic WAC’s requirement on physical and chemical characteristics. Firstly, particulate regulation would be satisfied, as commonly used ACs in filters are in size greater than 0.3 mm, which is greater than regulated particle size of 0.2 mm and below. Secondly, chelating content regulation would be satisfied, as SACs do not contain chelating chemicals. Also, cellulose, which is known to produce chelating agent (ISA), would be degraded and removed as ACs are produced by pyrolysis at 1,000°C, while thermal degradation of cellulose occurs around 350~600°C. Thirdly, ignitability regulation would be satisfied because as per 40 CFR 261.21, ignitable material is defined with ignition point below 60°C, but SACs has ignition point above 350°C. Lastly, gas generation regulation would be satisfied, as SACs being inorganic, they would be targeted for biological degradation, which is one of the main mechanism of gas generation. Therefore, SACs would be suitable to be disposed at domestic repositories, provided they are securely packaged. Further analysis would be required before disposal to determine detailed radioactive inventories and chemical contents, which also would be used to produce fundamental data to establish WAC.

Among nuclear power plants in the Republic of Korea, Kori Unit 1 and Wolsong Unit 1 have been permanently shut down, and Kori Unit 1 is preparing to be decommissioned. According to the decommissioning plan (DP) of Kori Unit 1, a radioactive waste processing complex will be built on the Kori site to reduce radioactive waste generated during decommissioning actively, and various types of decommissioning waste are expected to be treated in the complex. It is judged that matters related to the safety assessment of the complex are not included in the DP since the equipment and treatment processes have not been determined. IAEA GSR Part 5 states that radioactive waste processing complex shall be operated according to national regulations and the conditions imposed by the regulatory body. However, it has been confirmed that separate regulatory requirements for the complex have not yet been established in Korea. It is expected that the Regulation on Technical Standards for Nuclear Facilities, etc. will be applied mutatis mutandis. Liquid and gaseous radioactive materials can be expected to be released into the sea or atmosphere during the operation of the complex. Accordingly, it should be proved that standards such as discharge limits of radioactive effluents are met. Although the assessment of radioactive effluent discharged from nuclear power plants to the environment is systematically conducted, it has been confirmed that the safety assessment framework for radioactive effluents discharged from the complex has not yet been established. Currently, the SAFRAN Tool is based on SADRWMS (Safety Assessment Driving Radioactive Waste Management Solutions), an IAEA safety assessment methodology for pre-disposal management, which uses Pathway Dose Factors (PDFs) derived from generic environmental models. Therefore, in order to conduct a more detailed safety assessment of the complex on a specific site, site characteristic data should be reflected. Although safety assessment using the SAFRAN Tool was conducted at the Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology (TINT) facility, detailed data were not provided, and PDFs reflecting site characteristic data were not applied. Also, no other studies that considered many types of waste and provided detailed data on the safety assessment were not confirmed. Therefore, this study developed K-CRAFT (Kyung Hee – Comprehensive RAdioactive waste treatment Facility safety assessment Tool), this tool that can derive PDFs by reflecting site characteristic data based on the SADRWMS methodology and conducted preliminary safety assessment for the complex which will be built in Kori site by this tool.

Over the years, in the field of safety assessment of geological disposal system, system-level models have been widely employed, primarily due to considerations of computational efficiency and convenience. However, system-level models have their limitations when it comes to phenomenologically simulating the complex processes occurring within disposal systems, particularly when attempting to account for the coupled processes in the near-field. Therefore, this study investigates a machine learning-based methodology for incorporating phenomenological insights into system-level safety assessment models without compromising computational efficiency. The machine learning application targeted the calculation of waste degradation rates and the estimation of radionuclide flux around the deposition holes. To develop machine learning models for both degradation rates and radionuclide flux, key influencing factors or input parameters need to be identified. Subsequently, process models capable of computing degradation rates and radionuclide flux will be established. To facilitate the generation of machine learning data encompassing a wide range of input parameter combinations, Latin-hypercube sampling will be applied. Based on the predefined scenarios and input parameters, the machine learning models will generate time-series data for the degradation rates and radionuclide flux. The time-series data can subsequently be applied to the system-level safety assessment model as a time table format. The methodology presented in this study is expected to contribute to the enhancement of system-level safety assessment models when applied.

The effect of various physicochemical processes, such as seawater intrusion, on the performance of the engineered barrier should be closely analyzed to precisely assess the safety of high-level radioactive waste repository. In order to evaluate the impact of such processes on the performance of the engineered barrier, a thermal-hydrological-chemical model was developed by using COMSOL Multiphysics and PHREEQC. The coupling of two software was achieved through the application of a sequential non-iterative approach. Model verification was executed through a comparative analysis between the outcomes derived from the developed model and those obtained in prior investigations. Two data were in a good agreement, demonstrating the model is capable of simulating aqueous speciation, adsorption, precipitation, and dissolution. Using the developed model, the geochemical evolution of bentonite buffer under a general condition was simulated as a base case. The model domain consists of 0.5 m of bentonite and 49.5 m of granite. The uraninite (UO2) was assigned at the canister-bentonite interface as the potential source of uranium. Assuming the lifetime of canister as 1,000 years, the porewater mixing without uranium leakage was simulated for 1,000 years. After then, the uranium leakage through the dissolution of uraninite was initiated and simulated for additional 1,000 years. In the base case model, where the porewater mixing between the bentonite and granite was the only considered process, the gypsum tended to dissolve throughout the bentonite, while it precipitated in the vicinity of bentonite-granite boundary. However, the precipitation and dissolution of gypsum only showed a limited effect on the performance of the bentonite. Due to the low solubility of uraninite in the reduced environment, only infinitesimal amounts of uranium dissolved and transported through the bentonite. Additional cases considering various environmental processes, such as seawater or cement porewater intrusion, will be further investigated.

The operation time of a disposal repository is generally more than one hundred years except for the institutional control phase. The structural integrity of a repository can be regarded as one of the most important research issues from the perspective of a long-term performance assessment, which is closely related to the public acceptance with regard to the nuclear safety. The objective of this study is to suggest the methodology for quantitative evaluation of structural integrity in a nuclear waste repository based on the adaptive artificial intelligence (AI), fractal theory, and acoustic emission (AE) monitoring. Here, adaptive AI means that the advanced AI model trained additionally based on the expert’s decision, engineering & field scale tests, numerical studies etc. in addition to the lab. test. In the process of a methodology development, AE source location, wave attenuation, the maximum AE energy and crack type classification were subsequently studied from the various lab. tests and Mazars damage model. The developed methodology for structural integrity was also applied to engineering scale concrete block (1.3 m × 1.3 m × 1.3 m) by artificial crack generation using a plate jacking method (up to 30 MPa) in KURT (KAERI Underground Research Tunnel). The concrete recipe used in engineering scale test was same as that of Gyeongju low & intermediate level waste repository. From this study, the reliability for AE crack source location, crack type classification, and damage assessment increased and all the processes for the technology development were verified from the Korea Testing Laboratory (KTL) in 2022.

In order to ensure the long-term safety of a deep geological repository, the performance assessment of the Engineered Barrier System (EBS) considering a thermal process should be performed. The maximum temperature at the side wall of a disposal canister for the technical design requirement should not exceed 100°C. In this study, the thermal modelling was conducted to analyze the effects of the thermal process from a disposal canister to the surrounding near-field host rock using the PFLOTRAN code. The mesh was generated using the LaGriT code and the material properties were assigned by applying the FracMan code. Initial conditions were set as the average geothermal gradient (25.7°C/km) and an average surface temperature (14.7°C) in Korea. The highest temperature was observed at the middle of the canister side wall. The temperature of the buffer was lower than that of the canister, and the temperature increase of the deposition tunnel and the host rock was insignificant due to the lower effect of the heat source. The result of the thermal evolution of the EBS represented the highest thermal effects in the vicinity of the canister. In addition, the thermal effects were largely decreased after 10 years of the entire simulation period. It demonstrated that the model took 3 years to heat up the buffer around the canister. The temperature at the canister side wall increased until 3 years and then decreased after that time. This is because that the radioactive decay heat from the heat source was emitted enough to raise the overall temperature of the EBS by 3 years. However, the decay heat rate of the canister decreased exponentially with the disposal time and then its decay heat was not emitted enough after 3 years. In conclusion, the peak temperature results of the EBS were lower than 70°C to meet the technical design requirement.

According to the second high-level radioactive waste management national basic plan announced in December 2021, the reference geological disposal concept for spent nuclear fuels (SNF) in Korea followed the Finnish concept based on KBS-3 type. Also, the basic plan required consideration of the development of the technical alternatives. Accordingly, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute is conducting analyses of various alternative disposal concepts for spent nuclear fuels and is in the final selection stage of an alternative disposal concept. 10 disposal concepts including reference concept were considered for analysis in terms of disposal efficiency and safety. They were reference concept, mined deep borehole matrix, sub-seabed disposal, deep borehole disposal, multi-level disposal, space disposal, sub-sea bed disposal, long-term storage, deep horizontal borehole disposal, and ice-sheet disposal. Among them, first 4 concepts, mined deep borehole matrix, sub-seabed disposal, deep borehole disposal, multi-level disposal, were selected as candidate alternative disposal concepts by the evaluation of qualitative items. And then, by the evaluation of quantitative and qualitative items with specialists, multi-level disposal concept was being selected as a final alternative disposal concept. Design basis and performance requirements for designing alternative disposal systems were laid in the previous stage. Based on this, the design strategy and main design requirements were derived, and the engineered barrier system of a high-efficiency disposal concept was preliminary designed accordingly. In addition, as an alternative disposal concept, performance targets and related requirements were established to ensure that the high-efficiency repository system and its engineered barrier system components, such as disposal containers, buffer bentonites, and backfill perform the safety functions. Items that qualitatively describe safety functions, performance goals, and related requirements at this stage and items whose quantitative values are changed according to future test results will be determined and updated in the process of finalizing and specifically designing an alternative highefficiency disposal system.

Since the first operation of the Gori No. 1 nuclear power plant in Korea was started to operate in 1978, currently 24 nuclear power plants have been being operated, out of which 21 plants are PWR types and the rest are CANDU types. About 30% of total electricity consumed in Korea is from all these nuclear power plants. The accumulated spent nuclear fuels (SFs) generated from each site are temporarily being stored as wet or dry storage type at each plant site. These SFs with their high radiotoxicity, heat generating, and long-lived radioactivity are actually the only type of high-level radioactive waste (HLW) in Korea, which urgently requires to be disposed of in deep geological repository. Studies on disposal of HLW in various kind of geological repositories have been carried out in such countries as Sweden, Finland, United States, and etc. with their own methodologies and management policies in consideration of their situations. In Korea long-term R&D research program for safe management of SF has also been conducted during last couple of decades since around 1997, during which several various alternative type of disposal concepts for disposal of SNFs in deep geological formations have been investigated and developed. The first concept developed was KAERI Reference Disposal System (KRS) which is actually very much similar to Swedish KBS-3, a famous concept of direct disposal of SF in stable crystalline rock at a depth of around 500 m which has been regarded as one of the most plausible method worldwide. The world first Finnish repository which is expected to begin to operate sooner or later will be also this type. Since the characteristics of SF discharged from domestic nuclear reactors have been changed and improved, and burnup has sometimes increased, a more advanced deep geological repository system has been needed, KRS-HB (KRS with High Burnup SF) has been developed and in consideration of the dimensions of SNFs and the cooling period at the time point of the disposal time, KRS+, a rather improved disposal concept has also been subsequently developed which is especially focused on the efficient disposal area. Recently research has concentrated on rather advanced disposal technology focused on a safer and more economical repository system in recent view of the rapidly growing amount of accumulated SF. Especially in Korea the rock mass and the footprint area for the repository extremely limited for disposal site. Some preliminary studies to achieve rather higher efficiency repository concept for disposal of SF recently have already been emphasized. Among many possible ones for consideration of design for high-efficiency repository system, a double-layered system has been focused which is expected to maximize disposal capacity within the minimum footprint disposal area. Based on such disposal strategy a rather newly designed performance assessment methodology might be required to show long-term safety of the repository. Through the study some prerequisites for such methodological development has been being roughly checked and investigated, which covers FEP identification and pathway and scenario analyses as well as preliminary conceptual modeling for the nuclide release and transport in nearfield, far-field, and even biosphere in and around the conceptual repository system. Through the study such scenarios and models has been implemented to development of a safety assessment by utilizing GoldSim development tool for a rough quantitative comparison with existing disposal options and simple illustration purpose as well as for showing how to develop and implementation of the model to GoldSim templet.

Spent nuclear fuel management is a high-priority issue in South Korea, and addressing it is crucial for the country’s long-term energy sustainability. The KORAD (Korea Radioactive Waste Agency) is leading a comprehensive, long-term project to develop a safe and effective deep geological repository for spent nuclear fuel disposal. Within this framework, we have three primary objectives in this work. First, we conducted statistical analysis to assess the inventory of spent nuclear fuel in South Korea as of 2021. We also projected future generation rates of spent nuclear fuels to identify what we refer to as reference spent nuclear fuels. These reference spent nuclear fuels will be used as the design basis spent fuels for evaluating the safety of the repository. Specifically, we identified four types of design basis reference spent nuclear fuels: high and low burnup from PLUS7 (with a 16×16 array) and ACE7 (with a 17×17 array) assemblies. Second, we analyzed radioactive nuclides’ inventory, activities, and decay heats, extending up to a million years after reactor discharge for these reference spent nuclear fuels. This analysis was performed using SCALE/TRITON to generate the burnup libraries and SCALE/ORIGEN for source term evaluation. Third, to assess the safety resulted from potential radioactive nuclides’ release from the disposal canister in future work, we selected safety-related radionuclides based on the ALI (Annual Limit of Intake) specified in Annex 3 of the 2019-10 notification by the NSSC (Nuclear Safety and Security Commission). Conservative assumptions were made regarding annual water intake by humans, canister design lifetime, and aquifer flow rates. A safety margin of 10-3 of the ALI was applied. We selected 56 radionuclides that exceed the intake limits and have half-lives longer than one year as the safety-related radionuclides. However, it is crucial to note that our selection criteria focused on ALI and half-lives. It did not include other essential factors such as solubility limits, distribution coefficients, and leakage processes. So, some of these nuclides can be removed in a specific analysis area depending on their properties.

Dry storage of nuclear fuel is compromised by threats to the cladding integrity, such as creep and hydride reorientation. To predict these phenomena, spent fuel simulation codes have been developed. In spent fuel simulation, temperature information is the most influential factor for creep and hydride formation. Traditional fuel simulation codes required a user-defined temperature history input which is given by separate thermal analysis. Moreover, geometric changes in nuclear fuel, such as creep, can alter the cask’s internal subchannels, thereby changing the thermal analysis. This necessitates the development of a coupled thermal and nuclear fuel analysis code. In this study, we integrated the 2D FDM nuclear fuel code GIFT developed at SNU with COBRA -SFS. Using this, we analyzed spent nuclear stored in TN-24P dry storage cask over several decades and identified conditions posing threats due to phenomena like creep and hydrogen reorientation, represented by the burnup and peak cladding temperature at the start of dry storage. We also investigated the safety zone of spent nuclear fuel based on burnup and wet storage duration using decay heat.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Fundamentals No. SF-1 Safety Principle 7 states that people and the environment, present and future, must be protected against radiation risk. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the safety of radioactive waste repositories on a longterm time scale to ensure future safety. However, IAEA-TECDOC-767 states that the long-term time scale of interest means that the risk or dose to future individuals cannot be reliably predicted because it relies on assumptions. Therefore, evaluating the safety of long-term time scales should use safety indicators that are less dependent on assumptions. Radiotoxicity is one of the safety indicators that represent an inherent risk from radioactive waste. It has been mainly used to show the time required until the hazard presented by waste decreases to that of natural uranium ore and is easy to use in communication with the public. There are several methods for calculating Radiotoxicity. Radioactivity is multiplied by a Dose Conversion Factor (DCF) to be expressed in Sv units, or radioactivity be divided into Maximum Permissible Concentration (MPC) to be expressed in m3 units as the amount of water needed to dilute the radionuclide to the permitted level. It is also often made dimensionless through comparison with reference materials like uranium ore. Radiotoxicity varies in size several times, even if it is a waste of similar origins and components, depending on the Radiological variable (e.g., Annual Limitation Intake (ALI), Dose Conversion Factor (DCF), Maximum Permissible Concentration (MPC), Activity). Therefore, this study was conducted to determine whether there was a significant difference when different radiological variables were substituted. This study compares and analyzes their differences using various MPCs or DCFs used in each country. In addition, this study analyzes radionuclides that influence radiotoxicity with several radiological variables. This study introduces the effects of substituting different radiological variables.

In nuclear facilities, a graded approach is applied to achieve safety effectively and efficiently. It means that the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that are important to safety should be assured to be high quality. Accordingly, SSCs that consist of nuclear facilities should be classified with respect to their safety importance as several classes, so that the requirements of quality assurance relevant to the designing, manufacturing, testing, maintenance, etc. can be applied. Guidance for the safety classification of SSCs consisting of nuclear power plants and radioactive waste management facilities was developed by U.S.NRC and IAEA. Especially, in guidance for nuclear power plants, safety significance can be evaluated as following details. The single SSC that mitigates or/and prevents the radiological consequence or hazard was assumed to be failure or malfunction as the initiating event/accident occurred and the following radiological consequence was evaluated. Considering both the consequence and frequency of the occurrence of the initiating event/accident, the safety significance of each SSC can be evaluated. Based on the evaluated safety significance, a safety class can be assigned. The guidance for the safety classification of the spent nuclear fuel dry storage systems (DSS) was also developed in the United States (NUREG/CR-6407) and the U.S.NRC acknowledges the application of it to the safety classification of DSS in the United States. Also, worldwide including the KOREA, that guidance has been applied to several DSSs. However, the guidance does not include the methodology for classifying the safety or the evaluated safety significance of each SSC, and the classification criteria are not based on quantitative safety significance but are expressed somewhat qualitatively. Vendors of DSS may have difficulties to apply this guidance appropriately due to the different design characteristics of DSSs. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to evaluate the safety significance of representative SSCs in DSS. A framework was established to evaluate the safety significance of SSCs performing safety functions related to radiation shielding and confinement of radioactive materials. Furthermore, the framework was applied to the test case.