PURPOSES : The objective of this study was to review roadway management strategies that can be utilized in the event of a radiological emergency, select feasible alternatives, and simulate a portion of the West Coast network to analyze the effectiveness of these strategies. METHODS : The methodology of the study involved reviewing the relevant literature, extracting the implications, establishing an analysis procedure, and selecting an effectiveness evaluation scale. Using a national transportation database, a network was constructed using Toba, a macroscopic model. RESULTS : A reverse-flow lane system was applied to the West Coast Expressway Glory IC–Hampyeong IC (total 25 km), and a plan to increase the number of lanes was applied to the Seokgyo Street–Shinpyeong Intersection on National Route 23 (total extension 28 km). Consequently, both road management strategies were found to be effective. CONCLUSIONS : This study examined roadway management strategies that can be utilized in the event of a radiological emergency, selected feasible alternatives, and simulated a portion of the West Coast network to verify the effectiveness of these strategies. In the case of reverse flow lanes, it is most effective when applied to expressways that can restrict the entrance and exit of vehicles. In the case of increasing the number of lanes, it is most effective when applied to general roads, and institutional arrangements should be made to enable two-way traffic to use the reserved shoulder lanes.

This study aims to evaluate the level of reproducibility of the marketing field. The research is motivated because many significant published research findings in various scientific areas, including marketing, have been found to be false or only partially replicable, a phenomenon labelled Reproducibility Crisis. This crisis is partly due to the strong overreliance on frequentist statistics and the misuse and misinterpretation of p-values in the Null Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST) framework. This study offers two main contributions: first, it develops a methodological, quantitative evaluation of the most-cited published papers in marketing history in its four top journals, creating an overall index of marketing science reproducibility. Second, it analyzes how misuse and misinterpretation of p-values and frequentist statistics have undermined marketing science's reproducibility and discusses possible solutions for these problems. We selected a representative sample of the marketing literature, screening the papers using hierarchical classification criteria and the Web of Science (WoS) database to select the most-cited papers.

For licensees who face the decommissioning project for the first time, even if they can utilize their experience in operation, they should be well prepared and assessed for the risks of dismantling activities reflecting the characteristics of decommissioning. This can be included in the risk management of the decommissioning project, but what we want to discuss in this study is the evaluation of the industrial risk of the actual work before the dismantling work is carried out. We would like to focus more on the review of dismantling activities subject to industrial risk assessment and a series of processes for risk assessment. The dismantling work plan will need to obtain approval from the supervisory department before work on the Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCs) can be carried out. At this time, risk assessment may be included among many safety-related required documents, which are divided into radiological and non-radiological risks. The target activities at Level 1 level can include preparation for dismantling and maintenance of facilities, dismantling big components, removing the contamination of concrete structures, managing radioactive waste, etc. In addition, it can be composed of preparation work, removal of connections, lifting/installation, cutting, radiation/radioactivity measurement, and withdrawal as detailed work stages of each item’s activities. For domestic nuclear decommissioning projects, two major performance organizations, licensees and contractors, must be considered. Regarding risk assessment, the licensee will have a supervisory department controlling decommissioning activities and an HSE department at the site, and a process will need to be established in consideration of the contractor’s work organization. Therefore, activities in the risk assessment process may be established. In this study, risk assessment was reviewed as safety-related matters to be considered when carrying out the dismantling work. Safety-related risk assessment is a necessary procedure for performing practical dismantling activities, and this should be considered well in advance. Therefore, work activities and criteria were established for risk assessment, and the performance process was assumed to apply them. In terms of the performance organization and the responsibilities and roles of the processes to be performed by each organization were constructed, and this can be referred to in the process of preparing for the decommissioning project.

As a result of various generation, transmutation, and decay schemes, a wide variety of radionuclides exist in the reactor prior to accident occurrence. Considering all of the radionuclides as the accident source term in an offsite consequence analysis will inevitably take up excessive computer resources and time. Calculation time can be reduced with minimal impact on the accuracy of the results by considering only the nuclides that have a significant effect on the calculation among the potential radioactive sources that may be released into the environment. In earlier studies related to offsite consequence analysis, it is shown that the principal criteria for the radionuclide screening applied are as follows; radionuclide inventory in the reactor, radioactive half-life, radionuclide release fraction to the environment, relative dose contribution of nuclides within a specific group, and radiobiological importance. As a result, it is confirmed that 54, 60, and 69 nuclides are applied to the risk assessment performed in WASH-1400, NUREG-1150, and SOARCA (State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses) project in the United States, respectively. In addition, in this study, the technical consultations with domestic and foreign experts were carried out to confirm details on criteria and process for screening out radionuclides in offsite consequence analysis. In this paper, based on the literature survey and technical consulting, we derived the screening process of selecting a list of radionuclides to be considered in the offsite consequence analysis. The first step is to eliminate radionuclides with little core inventory (less than specific threshold) or very short half-lives. However, important decay products of radionuclides that have short half-lives should not be excluded by this process. The next step is to further eliminate radionuclides by considering contribution to offsite impact, which is defined as a product of radioactivity released to the environment (i.e. ‘inventory in the reactor’ times ‘release fraction to offsite’) and comprehensive dose (or risk) coefficient taking into account all exposure pathways to be included. The final step is to delete isotopes that contribute less than certain threshold to any important dose metric through additional computer runs for each important source term. Even though it is presumed that this process is applicable to existing light water reactors and the set of accidents that would be considered in PSA, some of the assumptions or specific recommendations may need to be reconsidered for other reactor types or set of accident categories.

The nuclear power plant decommissioning project inevitably considers time, cost, safety, document, etc. as major management areas according to the PMBOK technique. Among them, document management, like all projects, will be an area that must be systematically managed for the purpose of information delivery and record maintenance. In Korea, where there is no experience in the decommissioning project yet, data management is systematically managed and maintained during construction and operation. However, if the decommissioning project is to be launched soon, it is necessary to prepare in consideration of the system in operation, what difference will occur from it in terms of data management, and how it should be managed. As a document that can occur in the decommissioning project, this study was considered from the perspective of the licensee. Therefore, the types of documents that can be considered at Level 1 can be divided into (1) corresponding documents, (2) project documents, (3) internal documents, and (4) reference materials. Four document types are recommended based on Level 1 for the classification of documents to be managed in the decommissioning of nuclear facilities. In this study, documents to be managed in the decommissioning project of nuclear facilities were reviewed and the type was to be derived. Although it was preliminary, it was largely classified into major categories 1, middle categories 2, and 3 levels, and documents that could occur in each field were proposed. As a result, it could be largely classified into corresponding documents, project documents, internal documents, and reference materials, and subsequent classifications could be derived. Documents that may occur in the decommissioning project must be managed by distinguishing between types to reduce the time for duplication or search, and the capacity of the storage can be efficiently managed. Therefore, it is hoped that the document types considered in this study will be used as reference materials for the decommissioning project and develop into a more systematic structure.

The domestic Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) decommissioning project is expected to be carried out sequentially, starting with Kori Unit 1. As a license holder, in order to smoothly operate a new decommissioning project, a process in terms of project management must be well established. Therefore, this study will discuss what factors should be considered in establishing the process of decommissioning NPPs. Various standards have been proposed as project management tools on how to express the business process in writing and in what aspects to describe it. Representatively, PMBOK, ISO 21500, and PRICE 2 may be considered. It will be necessary to consider IAEA safety standards in the nuclear decommissioning project. GSR part 6 and part 2 can be considered as two major requirements. GSR part 6 presents a total of 15 requirements, including decommissioning plans, general safety requirements until execution and termination. GSR part 2 presents basic principles for securing the safety of nuclear facilities, and there are a total of 14 requirements. Domestic regulatory guidelines should be considered, and there will be largely laws and regulations related to the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, guidelines for regulatory agencies, and guidelines and regulations related to HSE. The Nuclear Safety Act, Enforcement Decree, Enforcement Rules, and NSSC should be considered in the applicable law for nuclear facilities. Since the construction and operation process has been established for domestic decommissioning project, there will be parts where existing procedures must be applied in terms of life cycle management of facilities and the same performance entity. As a management areas classification in the construction and operation stage, it seems that a classification similar to Level 1 and Level 2 should be applied to the decommissioning project. This study analyzed the factors to be considered in the management system in preparing for the first decommissioning project in Korea. Since it is project management, it is necessary to establish a system by referring to international standards, and it is suggested that domestic regulatory reflection, existing business procedures, and domestic business conditions should be considered.

Concerns with colloids, dispersed 1~1,000 nm particles, in the LILW repository are being raised due to their potential to enhance radionuclide release. Due to their large surface areas, radionuclides may sorb onto mobile colloids, and drift along with the colloidal transport, instead of being sorbed onto immobile surfaces. To prevent adverse implications on the safety of the repository, the colloidal impact must be evaluated. In this paper, colloid analysis done by SKB is studied, and factors to be considered for the safety assessment of colloids are analyzed. First, the colloid generation mechanism should be analyzed. In a cementitious repository, due to a highly alkaline environment, colloid formation from wastes may be promoted by the decomposition of organic materials, dissolution of inorganic materials, and corrosion of metals. Radiolysis is excluded when radionuclide inventory is moderate, as in the case of SKB. Second, colloid stability should be evaluated to determine whether colloids remain in dispersion. Stable colloids acquire electric charges, allowing particles to continuously repel one another to prevent coagulation. Thus, stability depends on the pH and ionic condition of the surroundings, and colloid composition. For instance, under a highly alkaline cementitious environment, colloids tend to be negatively charged, repelling each other, but Ca2+ ion from cement, acting as a coagulant, makes colloid unstable, promoting sedimentation. As in the case of SKB, the colloidal impact is assumed negligible in the silo, BMA, and BTF due to their extensive cement contents, but for BLA, with relatively less cement source, the colloidal impact is a potential concern. Third, colloid mobility should be assessed to appraise radionuclide release via colloid transport. The mobility depends on the density and size of colloids, and flow velocity to commence motion. As a part of the assessment, the filtration effect should also be included, which depends on pore size and structure. As in the case of SKB, due to static hydraulic conditions and engineering barriers, acting as efficient filters, colloidal transport is expected to be unlikely. In the domestic underground repository, the highly alkaline environment would lead to colloid formation, but due to high Ca2+ concentration and low flow velocity, colloids would achieve low stability and mobility, thus colloidal impact would be a minor concern. In the future, with further detailed analysis of each factor, waste composition, and disposal condition, reliable data for safety evaluation could be generated to be used as fundamental data for planning waste acceptance criteria.

Global concerns have grown regarding emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) caused by previously unknown pathogens. Considering that strengthening surveillance capacity for unknown diseases is one of the core capacities for preparedness and early response to EIDs, identifying areas with poor capacity could be beneficial to prioritize regions for the improvement of surveillance. In this regard, we aimed to develop prediction models to identify high risk areas for low surveillance capacity for unknown diseases in a global scale. Unexplained death events reported between 2015 and 2019 were collected from two internet-based surveillance systems, ProMED-mail and Global Public Health Intelligence Network. From the reports, the number of reported unexplained deaths at the first report and the time gap between death and report were extracted as measures for sensitivity and timeliness of surveillance capacity, respectively. Using geographical locations of the reports and published global scale spatial data, including demographic, socioeconomic, public health and geographical variables, we fitted two boosted regression tree models to predict regions with the low sensitivity and timeliness. The performance of prediction model for the low sensitivity showed moderate validity, but in terms of the model for timeliness, the performance was unreliable. Therefore, we provided predicted risk only for low sensitivity. The mean predicted risks of low sensitivity were, respectively, 45.2%, 37.4%, 12.5%, and 3.0% in low-income, lower middle-income, upper middle-income, and high-income countries. Enhancing surveillance capacity in low-income countries is highly required, given the predicted low level of sensitivity despite the importance of early response.

The goal of the decommissioning of nuclear facilities is to remove the regulations from the Nuclear Safety Act. The media that can be considered at the time of remediation stage may usually include soils, buildings, and underground materials. In addition, underground materials may largely be the groundwater, buried pipes, and concrete structures. In fact, it can be seen that calculations of the Derived Concentration Guideline Level (DCGL) and ALARA action levels was conducted in the case of overseas decommissioning experiences of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). Therefore, the aim of this study is to review the remediation activities and scenarios applied for the calculation of ALARA action level from the overseas decommissioned nuclear power plants. Media that can be considered for DCGL calculation at the time of license termination may differ from site to site. If the DCGL for the target media was derived, whether additional remediation actions are required under the DCGL value from the ALARA perspective was identified by calculating the ALARA action levels in the case of the U.S. The activities to determine whether additional clean-up is justified under the regulatory criteria are remediation actions which is dependent on the material contaminated. Therefore, the typical materials that can be subjected to remediation are soils and structure basements in the overseas cases. Remediation actions involved in the decommissioning process on the structure surfaces can be typically considered to be scabbling, shaving, needle guns, chipping, sponge and abrasive blasting, pressure washing, washing and wiping, grit blasting, and removal of contaminated concrete. For the cost-benefit analysis of the media subject to DCGL calculation, it is necessary to assume a scenario for the remediation actions of the target media. The scenarios can be largely divided into two types. Those are basement fill and building occupancy scenario. In basement fill mode, buildings and structures on the site are removed, and the effect of receptors from the contamination of the remaining structures is considered. In the building occupancy mode, it is assumed that the standing building remains on the site after the remediation stage. It is a situation to evaluate how the effect of additional remediation actions changes as the receptors occupy inside of the contaminated building. Therefore, parameters such as population density, area being evaluated, monetary discount rate, numbers of years, etc. can be set and assessed according to the scenarios.