As existing nuclear power plants reach the end of their lifespan, 22 nuclear power plants in korea are scheduled to be permanently shut down and decommissioned by 2050. Chelates are used as decontamination agents during nuclear power plant operation and decommissioning, and as a result, decommissioning waste contains chelates. Chelates contained in radioactive waste are complexed with radionuclides and increases their mobility. So, qualitative and quantitative analysis of chelates contained in radioactive waste is necessary. However, the spectroscopic method (UVVis), previously used for chelate analysis in Korea takes too much time for analysis and cannot analyze two or more chemically similar chelates at the same time. Due to these problems, new methods for analyzing chelate must be developed. Overseas, many cases of chelate analysis using advanced analysis equipment have been reported. CEA in France has developed a chelate analysis method for application to radioactive waste using HPLC-MS (J. Chromatogram. A, 1276, 20-25, 2013). In this method, the existing method of measuring EDTA using a complex of Fe and EDTA was improved to measuring a complex of Ni and EDTA. Based on such overseas cases, we would like to develop an analysis method for chelates in radioactive waste. For this purpose, we will verify similar overseas papers and develop pretreatment methods for mixtures of chelates (EDTA, DTPA, NTA) and metals (Fe, Ni, Cu, etc.) in various media. Finally, we will develop a separation analysis technology for multi-component chelates in nuclear decommissioning waste based on LCMS.

Plasma melting technology uses electrical arc phenomena such as lightning to create hightemperature sparks of about 1,600 degrees or more to meet waste disposal requirements through treatment and reduction without distinguishing radioactive waste generated during nuclear power plant operation and dismantling according to physical characteristics. Decommissioning radioactive waste scabbed concrete occurs when polishing and cutting the contaminated structure surface to a certain depth. In this study, Scabbed concrete containing paint was confirmed for volume reduction and disposal safety using plasma treatment technology, and it is planned to be verified through continuous empirical tests.

Kori Unit 1 nuclear power plant is a pressurized water reactor type with an output of 587 Mwe, which was permanently shut down on June 18, 2017. Currently, the final decommissioning plan (FDP) has been submitted and review is in progress. Once the FDP is approved, it is expected that dismantling will begin with the secondary system, and dismantling work on the primary system of Kori Unit 1 will begin after the spent nuclear fuel is taken out. It is expected that the space where the secondary system has been dismantled can be used as a temporary storage place, and the entire dismantling schedule is expected to proceed without delay. The main equipment of the secondary system is large and heavy. The rotating parts is connected to a single axis with a length of about 40 meters, and is complexly installed over three floors, making accessibility very difficult. A large pipe several kilometers long that supplies various fluids to the secondary system is installed hanging from the ceiling using a hanger between the main devices, and the outer diameter of the pipe is wrapped with insulation material to keep warm. In nuclear secondary system decommissioning, it is very important to check for radiation contamination, establish and implement countermeasures, and predict and manage safety and environmental risks that may occur when cutting and dismantling large heavy objects. So we plan to evaluate the radiation contamination characteristics of the secondary system using ISOCS (In- Situ Object Counting System) to check for possible radioactive contamination. According to the characteristics results, decommissioning plans and methods for safe dismantling by workers were studied. In addition, we conducted research on how to safely dismantle the secondary system in terms of industrial safety, such as asbestos, cutting and handling of heavy materials and so on. This study proposes a safe decommissioning method for various risks that may occur when dismantling the secondary system of Kori Unit 1 nuclear power plant.

Carbon 14 (14C) is radioactive isotope of carbon which emits beta ray with long half-life (5730±30 years). Since the 14C is significantly hazardous for human being, the appropriate process to treat 14C is necessary. From the nuclear power plant, the ion exchange resin, graphite, and activated carbon are the main source of 14C. During the effort to reduce the volume of those wastes, the 14C is inevitably occurred as carbon dioxide (CO2) form, so called 14CO2. Thus, the development of technology to permanently capture and safely dispose 14CO2 is required. In this presentation, we introduce the decommissioning technology ranging from 14CO2 capture to solidification. First, the new class of glass adsorbent is developed which can irreversibly capture CO2 even under mild conditions. This material promotes the dissolution of alkaline earth ions due to the unstable glass structure. Then, the physical and chemical optimization of glass adsorbent enhances the performance of CO2 capture. Further, room temperature geopolymeric solidification is also performed to safely dispose 14C without any potential release.

Economical radioactive soil treatment technology is essential to safely and efficiently treat of high-concentration radioactive areas and contaminated sites during operation of nuclear power plants at home and abroad. This study is to determine the performance of BERAD (Beautiful Environmental construction’s RAdioactive soil Decontamination system) before applying magnetic nanoparticles and adsorbents developed by the KAERI (Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute) which will be used in the national funded project to a large-capacity radioactive soil decontamination system. BERAD uses Soil Washing Process by US EPA (402-R-007-004 (2007)) and can decontaminate 0.5 tons of radioactive soil per hour through water washing and/or chemical washing with particle size separation. When contaminated soil is input to BERAD, the soil is selected and washed, and after going through a rinse stage and particle size separation stage, it discharges decontaminated soil separated by sludge of less than 0.075 mm. In this experiment, the concentrations of four general isotopes (A, B, C, and D which are important radioisotopes when soil is contaminated by them.) were analyzed by using ICP-MS to compare before and after decontamination by BERAD. Since BERAD is the commercial-scale pilot system that decontaminates relatively large amount of soil, so it is difficult to test using radioactive isotopes. So important general elements such as A, B, C, and D in soil were analyzed. In the study, BERAD decontaminated soil by using water washing. And the particle size of soil was divided into a total of six particle size sections with five sieves: 4 mm, 2 mm, 0.850 mm, 0.212 mm, and 0.075 mm. Concentrations of A, B, C, and D in the soil particles larger than 4 mm are almost the lowest regardless of before and after decontamination by BERAD. For soil particles less than 4 mm, the concentrations of C and D decreased constantly after BERAD decontamination. On the other hand, the decontamination efficiency of A and B decreased as the soil particle became smaller, but the concentrations of A and B increased for the soil particle below 0.075 mm. As a result, decontamination efficiency of one cycle using BERAD for all nuclides in soil particles between 4 mm and 0.075 mm is about 45% to 65 %.

At domestic nuclear power plant, concrete containers are stored to store waste generated before waste acceptance criteria (WAC) was established. Concrete container store concentrated waste liquid and waste resin. In order to disposal radioactive waste to a disposal site, it is necessary to conduct a characteristic evaluation inside the waste to check whether it satisfies the WAC. Two types of concrete containers are stored: round and square. The round type is filled with one 200-liter drum, and the square type is filled with four 200-liter drums. In the case of a round shape, the top lid is fastened with bolts, so it is possible to collect samples after opening the top lid without the need for additional equipment. However, in the case of a square shape, there is no top lid, and concrete is poured to cure the lid, so the separate equipment for characteristic evaluation is required. It is necessary to install a workstation for sample collection on the top of the concrete container, equipment for coring the top of the concrete container, and a device to prevent concrete dust scattering. Currently, the design of equipment for evaluating the characteristics of concrete containers has been completed, and equipment optimization through mock-up test will be performed in the future.

In the establishment of procedures for managing spent fuel, the development of an information system for data management is an indispensable prerequisite. Given the prolonged period of spent nuclear fuel management, marked by numerous personnel changes and the anticipation of vast data retention, addressing this matter appropriately is imperative, particularly in the specialized field of spent nuclear fuel operations. Recognizing the need for a method to mitigate these challenges, we endeavored to apply semantic technology to the information system. To achieve this, we constructed the ontology of spent nuclear fuel and conducted research to transform it into a relational database. As a result, the information system, developed by the application of semantic technology, has attained the capability to comprehend and perceive relationships among information itself. Through this research, the system not only addresses previously identified concerns but also enhances its versatility, enabling it to perform functions previously unattainable within existing information systems.

In the contemporary digital age, the rapid pace of technological advancement has elevated concerns regarding unauthorized technology transfers. These illicit transfers not only pose economic threats but also have the potential to compromise national security, strain international relationships, and impede technological innovation. Recognizing these challenges, the United States, as a technological leader, has implemented stringent laws and regulations to counteract such activities. Unauthorized technology transfer or disclosure is treated seriously within the United States. It can be subject to various laws, including export control regulations, economic sanctions, and Nonproliferation laws. Export control measures such as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), targeting defense items, and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), focused on dual-use items, are enforced. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) regulations oversee U.S. trade sanctions. At the same time, the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Non-proliferation Act (INKSNA) penalizes those aiding proliferation activities in these countries. Such unauthorized transfers could undermine global security by violating international agreements like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States employs a multi-faceted approach to counter these threats, including international partnerships, strengthened export controls, diplomatic efforts, and rigorous enforcement. Beyond the legal aspects, unauthorized technology transfer carries significant economic, national security, and global trade implications. Intellectual property (IP) theft can result in economic losses, national security risks, and strained trade relations. Legal protections against IP theft encompass Patents, Trade Secrets, Copyright, and Trademark Acts. In conclusion, unauthorized technology transfers and IP theft present multi-faceted challenges with far-reaching implications for global security, economic prosperity, and international relations. The comprehensive approach taken by the United States, which combines legal measures, diplomatic engagement, and collaborative efforts, serves as a valuable example that South Korea can learn from and enhance to keep technological advancements and ensure a secure digital future.