Regulatory agencies require burn-up verification to ensure that dry storage casks using burn-up credit are not loaded with fuel with a reactivity greater than the allowable standard. Accordingly, in preparation for dry storage of SF, the reliability of the burnup was verified and action plans for fuel with confirmed errors were reviewed. Reliability verification was performed by comparing the actual burnup calculated with combustion calculation code (TOTE, ISOTIN) used in NPP and the design burnup calculated with the nuclear design code (ANC). As a result of comparing the differences between actual burnup and design burnup for 7,414 assemblies of SF generated from CE-type NPPs, the average deviation was confirmed to be 0.79% and 220 MWD/MTU. In the CE-type NPPs, no fuel showing large deviations was identified, and it was confirmed that reliability was secured. As a result of comparing the differences in 11,082 assemblies of SF generated from WH-type NPPs, the differences were not large, averaging 1.16% or 422 MWD/MTU. However, fuels showing significant differences were identified, and cause analysis was performed for those fuels. The cause analysis used a method of comparing the burnup of symmetrically loaded fuels in the reactor. For fuels that were not symmetrically loaded, a method was used to compare them with fuels with similar combustion histories. As a result of the review, it was confirmed that the fuel was under- or over-burned compared to symmetrically loaded fuel. For fuels for which clear errors have been identified, we are considering replacing them with the design burnup, and for fuels whose causes cannot be confirmed, we are considering ways to maintain the actual burnup.

Once discharged, spent nuclear fuel undergoes an initial cooling process within deactivation pools situated at the reactor site. This cooling step is crucial for reducing the fuel’s temperature. Once the heat has sufficiently diminished, two viable options emerge: reprocessing or interim storage. A method known as PUREX, for aqueous nuclear reprocessing, involves a chemical procedure aimed at separating uranium and plutonium from the spent nuclear fuel. This separation not only minimizes waste volume but also facilitates the reuse of the extracted materials as fuel for nuclear reactors. The transformation of uranium oxides through dissolution in nitric acid followed by drying results in uranium taking the form of UO2(NO3)2 + 6H2O, which can then be converted into various solid-state configurations through different heat treatments. This study specifically focuses on investigating the phase transitions of artificially synthesized UO2(NO3)2 + 6H2O subjected to heat treatment at various temperatures (450, 500, 550, 600°C) using X-ray Diffraction (XRD) analysis. Heat treatments were also conducted on UO2 to analyze its phase transformations. Additionally, the study utilized XRD analysis on an unidentified oxidized uranium oxide, UO2+X, and employed lattice parameters and Bragg’s law to ascertain the oxidation state of the unknown sample. To synthesize UO2(NO3)2 + 6H2O, U3O8 powder is first dissolved in a 20% HNO3 solution. The solid UO2(NO3)2 + 6H2O is obtained after drying on a hotplate and is subsequently subjected to heat treatment at temperatures of 450, 500, 550, and 600°C. As the heat treatment temperature increases, the color of the samples transitions from orange to dark green, indicating the formation of different phases at different temperatures. XRD analysis confirms that uranyl nitrate, when heattreated at 500 and 550°C, oxidizes to UO3, while the sample subjected to 600°C heat treatment transforms into U3O8 due to the higher temperature. All samples exhibit sharp crystal peaks in their XRD spectra, except for the one heat-treated at 450°C. In the second experiment, the XRD spectra of the heat-treated UO2 consistently indicate the presence of U3O8 rather than UO3, regardless of the temperature. Under an oxidizing atmosphere within a temperature range of 300 to 700°C, UO2 can be oxidized to form U3O8. In the final experiment, the oxidation state of the unknown UO2+X was determined using Bragg’s law and lattice parameters, revealing that it was a material in which UO2 had been oxidized, resulting in an oxidation state of UO2.24.

Measuring the amount of water remaining in the canister after drying is critical to ensuring the integrity of Dry Storage. There are many ways to measure residual moisture, but dew point sensors are typically used to measure residual moisture after drying the canister. Because the dew point temperature inside the canister depends on the water vapor partial pressure, the water vapor partial pressure present in the canister can be determined using the dew point temperature. The British Standard (BS1336) proposes a formula for converting dew point temperature into vapor partial pressure. It is possible to validate changes in residual water concentration throughout drying and at the end of drying. It has around 500 ppmv when the dew point temperature hits -73°C at 3 torr. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC) presented at 3 torr for 30 minutes as a criterion for the suitability of spent nuclear fuel drying. When the canister’s internal pressure is around 1,000 torr and the dryness criteria are met, the moisture concentration for this value is around 3,000 ppmv. We conducted a vacuum drying test of a 57 liter test vessel. It is filled with helium after vacuum drying was completed, and the concentration of residual water is measured by AquaVolt Moisture Analyzer (AMA) connected by a sample flow line. After the vacuum pressure of 1.5 torr was reached, the test vessel was filled to a pressure of 1,140 torr of helium after 30 minutes. The average temperature inside the basket inside the test vessel is 50°C, the dew point temperature is below -70°C, the pressure of test vessel is around 1,000 torr, and the measurement results of the AMA connected to the sample line showed less than 200 ppmv. From these results, we can evaluate that the residual moisture in the test vessel is about 0.01 gram.

It is known that ZrCl4 can be used in the chlorination process of spent nuclear fuel. However, its solubility in high temperature molten salt is very small, making it difficult to dissolve a large amount of ZrCl4. Therefore, in this study, a flange-type sealed reactor was manufactured to observe the reaction characteristics of LiCl-KCl salt and ZrCl4. LiCl-KCl salt and ZrCl4 were placed in each alumina crucible, the reactor was sealed, and heated. The temperature at the reactor surface was above 500°C and maintained at that temperature for 48 hours. After completion of the reaction, the reactor was opened and the reaction products were recovered from each alumina crucible. The crystal structure of the reaction product was identified through XRD analysis, and the concentration of Zr was analyzed using ICP. Reaction characteristics were observed according to the molar ratio of ZrCl4 added to the number of moles of KCl in LiCl-KCl salt. The molar ratios of ZrCl4 to KCl were 0.5, 1, 2, and 3, respectively. As a result of each experiment, more than 95% of the injected ZrCl4 was vaporized and there was almost no residue in the ZrCl4 crucible. In the LiCl- KCl crucible, the weight increased in proportion to the amount of ZrCl4 added. As a result of XRD analysis, K2ZrCl6 was confirmed in all LiCl-KCl salt product. When the ZrCl4/KCl molar ratio was 2 and 3, LiCl-KCl could not be confirmed. Additionally, when the ZrCl4/KCl molar ratio was 1, LiCl was identified, but KCl was not found. Almost all of the KCl appears to have reacted with ZrCl4. ICP analysis results showed that the Zr concentration was proportional to the amount of ZrCl4 added in each LiCl-KCl salt, and exceeding the number of moles of reaction with KCl in the LiCl-KCl salt was observed. Therefore, these experimental results showed that ZrCl4 can be dissolved in LiCl-KCl salt at a maximum concentration higher than its solubility.

Since the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, concerns about intentional aircraft crashes into nationally critical facilities have soared in countries around the world. The United States government advised nuclear utilities to strengthen the security of nuclear power plants against aircraft crashes and stipulated aircraft crash assessment for new nuclear facilities. Interest in military missile attacks on nuclear facilities has grown after Russia attacked Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, where spent nuclear power dry storage facility is operated. Spent nuclear fuel dry storage facilities in nuclear power plant sites should also strengthen security in preparation for such aircraft crashes. Most, but not all, spent nuclear fuel dry storage facilities in Europe, Japan and Canada are operated within buildings, while the United States and Korea operate dry storage facilities outdoors. Since all of Korea’s dry storage systems are concrete structures vulnerable to crash loads and are exposed to the outside, it is more necessary to prepare for aircraft crash terrorist attacks due to the Korea’s military situation. Residents near nuclear power plants are also demanding assessment and protective measures against such aircraft crashes. However, nuclear power plants, including spent nuclear fuel dry storage facilities, are strong structures and have very high security, so they are unlikely to be selected as targets of terrorism, and spent nuclear fuel dry storage systems are so small that aircraft cannot hit them accurately. Collected opinions on the assessment of aircraft crash accidents at spent nuclear fuel dry storage facilities in nuclear power plant sites were reviewed. In addition, the current laws and regulatory requirements related to strengthening the security of new and existing nuclear power plants against intentional aircraft crashes are summarized. Such strengthening of security can not only ensure the safety of on-site spent nuclear fuel dry storage facilities, but also contribute to the continuous operation of nuclear power plants by increasing resident acceptance.

On a global scale, the storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) within nuclear power plants (NPP) has become an important research topic due to limited space caused by approaching capacity saturation. SNF have e been collected over decades of NPP operation, coming up to capacity limitation. In case of Korea, every reactor except Saeul 1 and 2 has reached a SNF storage saturation rate of over 75%. One of the most studied methods for enhancing storage capacity efficiency involves increasing storage density using racks with neutron absorbers. Neutron absorbers like borated stainless steel (BSS) are utilized to manage the reactivity of densely stored SNF. However, major challenges of applying BSS are manufacturing hardness from heterogenous microstructure and mechanical property degradation from helium bubble formation. This study suggests that innovative fabrication methods of 3D printing can be good candidate for easier fabrication and better structural integrity of BSS. Directed energy deposition (DED), one of the 3D printing methods have become major candidate method for various alloys. It deposits alloy powder on base melt surface by high intensity laser, similar with welding process. Powder manufacturing is already demonstrated superior performance compared to casting in ASTM-A887, such as increased mechanical properties, owing to its well distributed chemistry of alloy. Moreover, as its original microstructural property, the formation of micro-pores through DED could lead to long-term performance improvements by capturing helium generated from the neutron absorption of boron. The potential for fabricating complex structure is also among the advantages of DED-produced neutron absorbers. Expected challenge on DED application on BSS is lack of printing condition data, because the 3D printing process have to be kept very careful variables of thermal intensity, powder flux and etc. These processes may get through much of trial & error for initial condition approaching. Nonetheless, as a recommendation of improved neutron absorber for efficient SNF pool storage, the concept of 3D printed BSS stands out as an intriguing avenue for research.

After the decision of the Wolsong unit 1 permanent shutdown (2019), spent fuel stored in the spent fuel bay (hereafter, SFB) should be transported to a dry storage facility (MACSTOR or Canister) in order to decommission Wolsong unit 1. Accordingly, KHNP has established a shipment schedule for damaged fuel of Wolsong Unit 1 and is trying to complete the shipment according to the schedule. Wolsong is equipped with transportation casks and dry storage facilities, but baskets need to be manufactured separately. In addition, license approval is required for baskets, transport cask, and dry storage facilities for legal grounds to contain, transport, and store damaged fuels. In this paper, the initial model, upgrade model, and automation model of encapsulation equipment planned to be introduced in Canada to handle PHWR’s damaged fuel were compared, and the optimal model was selected in consideration of KHNP’s planned spent fuel shipment schedule. The PHWR’s damaged fuel encapsulation system is a system developed the PHWR’s damaged spent fuel to be handled in the same way as the existing PHWR when storing it in the dry storage facility and loading a basket for capsulation into transport cask. At the Gentilly-2 nuclear power plant in Canada, a manually operated encapsulation system was used due to the low quantity of damaged fuel, which can be encapsulated two bundles a day, and this model is an initial model. In the case of Wolsong Unit 1, it has about 300 damaged fuels, so it takes about nine months to work when using the initial model. The upgrade model developed to improve work efficiency and reliability has increased work efficiency through some automation, but it would take about eight months to process the damaged spent fuels of Wolsong Unit 1, and this model has not yet been manufactured and applied. Lastly, the automation model changed the work location outside the SFB and automated drainage/drying operations. It is easy to maintain and replace consumables because the work is carried out by lifting the damaged fuel to a shuttle outside the SFB surrounded by a shielding chimney. Considering the reduction of drainage/drying time, it is possible to save about four times as much time as the initial model. That is, if the automation model is used, it is judged that the supply of Wolsong Unit 1 can be processed in about two months. However, in terms of license, initial model and upgrade model are expected to be easier and the period is expected to be shortened. However, if licensing is carried out as soon as equipment design is completed, it is believed that the period can be shortened by parallel equipment manufacturing and licensing. It is judged that the best way to comply with the target schedule is to select an automation model with excellent work performance, develop equipment, and proceed with licensing at the same time. Accordingly, KHNP is in the process of designing equipment with the aim of using the automation model to take out damaged fuel for Wolsong Unit 1.

Due to the saturation of spent fuel pool of nuclear power plant in Korea, temporary storage for spent fuel will be installed, and spent fuel will be stored and managed in dry cask for a considerable period of time. Since spent nuclear fuel must withstand continuous decay heat, radiation and high internal pressure of the fuel rod in the cask, behavior of spent nuclear fuel is needed to be reviewed. Spent nuclear fuel used in Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) in Korea is stored in a wet storage currently, but it is going to store a temporary dry-storage facility on Kori site. Therefore, it is very important and meaningful to evaluate the behavior of nuclear fuel with realistic modeling. Also, domestic PWR nuclear fuel has various burn-up. In the past, the burn-up of nuclear fuel in light water reactors was low, but in order to increase power generation efficiency, the concentration of uranium was increased and the number of new fuel was increased. Therefore, a large amount of nuclear fuel with burn-up of 45,000 MWD/MTU or higher, generally called high burn-up, is also stored in the spent fuel pool (SFP). Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate by dividing three different burn-up such as, low, medium, and high burn-up. Thus, this study will review the behavior of nuclear fuel at different burn-up during the temporary storage period with FALCON (EPRI), computational code and analyze the factors affecting the integrity of nuclear fuel, including when the temporary storage is extended its additional lifetime. And this evaluation will contribute developing the spent fuel management plan in Korea.

The radionuclide management process is a conditioning technology to reduce the burden of spent fuel management, and refers to a process that can separate and recover radionuclides having similar properties from spent fuels. In particular, through the radionuclide management process, high heat- emitting, high mobility, and high toxicity radionuclides, which have a significant impact on the performance of disposal system, are separated and managed. The performance of disposal system is closely related to properties (decay heat and radioactivity) of radioactive wastes from the radionuclide management process, and the properties are directly linked to the radionuclide separation ratio that determines the composition of radionuclides in waste flow. The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute have derived process flow diagrams for six candidates for the radionuclide management process, weighing on feasibility among various process options that can be considered. In addition, the GoldSim model has been established to calculate the mass and properties of waste from each unit process of the radionuclides management process and to observe their time variations. In this study, the candidates for the radionuclide management process are evaluated based on the waste mass and properties by using the GoldSim model, and sensitivity analysis changing the separation ratio are performed. And the effect of changes in the separation ratio for highly sensitive radionuclides on waste management strategy is analyzed. In particular, the separation ratio for high heat-emitting radionuclides determines the period of long-term decay storage.

EU taxonomy requires to solve problems for safe management of radioactive waste and disposal of spent fuel, which is a precondition for growing demand for nuclear power plant. Currently, Korea manages about 18,000 tons of high-level radioactive waste at temporary storage facilities in nuclear power plant sites, but such temporary storage facilities are expected to become saturated sequentially from 2031. Therefore, it is necessary to secure a permanent disposal facility to safely treat high-level radioactive waste. In accordance with the second basic plan for high-level radioactive waste management in 2021, it is necessary to establish requirements for regulatory compliance for the site selection and site acquisition, investigation and evaluation, and construction for the establishment of a deep geological disposal facility. In this study, we analyzed the regulatory policies and cases of leading foreign countries related to deep geological disposal facilities for high-level radioactive waste disposal waste such as IAEA, USA, Sweden, and Finland using data analysis methodology. To analyze a large amount of textbased document data, text mining is applied as a major technology and a verification standard that secures validity and safety based on the regulatory laws described so far is developed to establish a regulatory base suitable for domestic deep geological disposal status. Based on the collected data, preprocessing and analysis with Python were performed. Keywords and their frequency were extracted from the data through keyword analysis. Through the measured frequency values, the contents of the objects and elements to be regulated in the statutory items were grasped. And through the frequency values of words co-occurring among different sections through the analysis of related words, the association was obtained, and the overall interpretation of the data was performed. The results of analyzing regulations of major foreign countries using text mining are visualized in charts and graphs. Word cloud can intuitively grasp the contents by extracting the main keywords of the contents of the regulations. Through the network connection graph, the relationship between related words can be visually structured to interpret data and identify the causal relationship between words. Based on the result data, it is possible to compare and analyze the factors to be supplemented by analyzing domestic nuclear safety case and regulations.

Pyroprocessing technology has emerged as a viable alternative for the treatment of metal/oxide used fuel within the nuclear fuel cycle. This innovative approach involves an oxide reduction process wherein spent fuel in oxide form is placed within a cathode basket immersed in a molten LiCl-Li2O salt operating at 923 K. The chemical reduction of these oxide materials into their metallic counterparts occurs through a reaction with Li metal, which is electrochemically deposited onto the cathode. However, during process, the generation of Li2O within the fuel basket is inevitable, and due to the limited reduction efficiency, a significant portion of rare earth oxides (REOx) remains in their oxide state. The presence of these impurities, specifically Li2O and REOx, necessitates their transfer into the electrorefining system, leading to several challenges. Both Li2O and REOx exhibit reactivity with UCl3, the primary electrolyte within the electrorefining system, causing a continuous reduction in UCl3 concentration throughout the process. Furthermore, the formation of fine UO2 powder within the salt system, resulting from chemical reactions, poses a potential long-term operational and safety concern within the electrorefining process.Various techniques have been developed to address the issue of UO2 fine particle removal from the salt, utilizing both chemical and mechanical methods. However, it is crucial that these methods do not interfere with the core pyroprocessing procedure. This study aims to investigate the impact of Li2O and REOx introduced from the electrolytic reduction process on the electrorefining system. Additionally, we propose a method to effectively eliminate the generated UO2 fine powder, thereby enhancing the long-term operational stability of the electrorefining process. The efficiency of this proposed solution in removing oxidized powder has been confirmed through laboratory-scale testing, and we will provide a comprehensive discussion of the detailed results.

After the Fukushima disaster, overseas nuclear power plants have established conditions for issuing a red alert in the event of fuel damage within the spent fuel pool and they have already implemented conditions for issuing a blue alert when fuel is exposed above the water surface. In South Korean nuclear power plants, a real-time monitoring system is in place to oversee the exposure of spent fuel to the surface within the spent fuel pool. To achieve this, a water level indicator gauge is installed within the spent fuel pool, allowing for continuous real-time monitoring. This paper conducted a comparative assessment of radiation levels from water level monitoring system in two units’ spent fuel pools based on the low water levels (1 feet from the storage rack), utilizing the radiation analysis code (MCNP).

The process basket assembly is an important module in pyroprocess, because pyroprocess is a batch process, so process materials are contained in a basket assembly and transferred with the basket. The basket assembly is composed of upper and lower assembly. The lower assembly is a basket or crucible which contains process materials, and it can have electrodes. The upper assembly mainly consists of heat shields, a flange, and connectors for supplying currents to electrodes of the lower assembly. During the electrolytic recovery process, the lower part is submerged into molten salt, whose temperature is about 500°C at least and the heat from salt is transferred to the upper assembly. And the heat affects the performance or durability of parts on the top of equipment and can raise cell temperature, which is an undesired situation. In addition, the handling equipment can pick the assembly when it is hottest, and during the transfer, the gripped part is under thermal and mechanical stresses. Because of this, the thermal effects from the heat should be required during equipment design stage. In this study, the thermal analyses of process basket assembly were conducted for 3 cases: the steady state of the basket assembly when it submerged in molten salt, the thermal and mechanical stresses when gripped by remote handling device, and the temperature changes under natural convection. These analyses were performed using Solidworks with flow simulation package, and the results will apply to improve the thermal resistant performance of the basket assembly.

In nuclear fuel development research, consideration of the back-end cycle is essential. In particular, a review of an in-reactor performance of nuclear fuel related to the various degradation phenomena that can occur during spent fuel dry storage is an important area. The important factors affecting the degradation of zirconium-based cladding during dry storage are the cladding’s hydrogen concentration and rod internal pressure after irradiation. In this study, a preliminary analysis of the in-reactor behavior of the HANA cladding, which has been developed and is currently undergoing licensing review, was performed, and based on this result, a comparative analysis between nuclear fuel with HANA cladding and current commercial fuel under storage conditions was performed. The results show that the rod internal pressure of nuclear fuel with HANA cladding is not significantly different from that of commercial cladding, and the hydrogen concentration in the cladding tends to reduce due to the increased corrosion resistance, so fuel integrity in a dry storage conditions is not expected to be a major problem. Although the lack of cladding creep data under dry storage conditions, the results from the Halden research reactor test comparing in-reactor creep behavior with Zircaloy-4 showed that there is sufficient margin for degradation due to creep during storage.

International Atomic Energy Agency defines the term “Poison” as a substance used to reduce reactivity, by virtue of its high neutron absorption cross-section, in IAEA glossary. Poison material is generally used in the reactor core, but it is also used in dry storage systems to maintain the subcriticality of spent fuel. Most neutron poison materials for dry storage systems are boron-based materials such as Al-B Carbide Cermet (e.g., Boral®), Al-B Carbide MMC (e.g., METAMIC), Borated Stainless Steel, Borated Al alloy. These materials help maintain subcriticality as a part of the basket. U.S.NRC report NUREG-2214 provides a general assessment of aging mechanisms that may impair the ability of SSCs of dry storage systems to perform their safety functions during longterm storage periods. Boron depletion is an aging mechanism of neutron poison evaluated in that report. Although that report concludes that boron depletion is not considered to be a credible aging mechanism, the report says analysis of boron depletion is needed in original design bases for providing long-term safety of DSS. Therefore, this study aimed to simulate the composition change of neutron poison material in the KORAD-21 system during cooling time considering spent fuel that can be stored. The neutron source term of spent fuel was calculated by ORIGEN-ARP. Using that source term, neutron transport calculation for counting neutrons that reach neutron poison material was carried out by MCNP®-6.2. Then, the composition change of neutron poison material by neutron-induced reaction was simulated by FISPACT-II. The boron-10 concentration change of neutron poison material was analyzed at the end. This study is expected to be the preliminary study for the aging analysis of neutron poison material about boron depletion.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Fundamentals No. SF-1 Safety Principle 7 states that people and the environment, present and future, must be protected against radiation risk. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the safety of radioactive waste repositories on a longterm time scale to ensure future safety. However, IAEA-TECDOC-767 states that the long-term time scale of interest means that the risk or dose to future individuals cannot be reliably predicted because it relies on assumptions. Therefore, evaluating the safety of long-term time scales should use safety indicators that are less dependent on assumptions. Radiotoxicity is one of the safety indicators that represent an inherent risk from radioactive waste. It has been mainly used to show the time required until the hazard presented by waste decreases to that of natural uranium ore and is easy to use in communication with the public. There are several methods for calculating Radiotoxicity. Radioactivity is multiplied by a Dose Conversion Factor (DCF) to be expressed in Sv units, or radioactivity be divided into Maximum Permissible Concentration (MPC) to be expressed in m3 units as the amount of water needed to dilute the radionuclide to the permitted level. It is also often made dimensionless through comparison with reference materials like uranium ore. Radiotoxicity varies in size several times, even if it is a waste of similar origins and components, depending on the Radiological variable (e.g., Annual Limitation Intake (ALI), Dose Conversion Factor (DCF), Maximum Permissible Concentration (MPC), Activity). Therefore, this study was conducted to determine whether there was a significant difference when different radiological variables were substituted. This study compares and analyzes their differences using various MPCs or DCFs used in each country. In addition, this study analyzes radionuclides that influence radiotoxicity with several radiological variables. This study introduces the effects of substituting different radiological variables.

The saturation of wet storage facilities constructed and operated within nuclear power plant sites has magnified the significance of research concerning the dry storage of spent nuclear fuel. Not only do wet storage facilities incur higher operational and maintenance costs compared to dry storage facilities, but long-term storage of metal-clad fuel assemblies submerged in aqueous tanks is deemed unsuitable. Consequently, dry storage is anticipated to gain prominence in the future. Nevertheless, it is widely acknowledged that quantitatively assessing the residual water content remains elusive even when employing the apparatus and procedures utilized in the existing dry storage processes. The presence of residual water can only be inferred from damage or structural alterations to the spent nuclear fuel during its dry storage, making precise prediction of this element crucial, as it can be a significant contributor to potential deformations and deterioration. The aforementioned challenges compound the issue of retrievability, as substantial complexities emerge when attempting to retrieve spent nuclear fuel for permanent disposal in the future. Consequently, our research team has established a laboratory-scale vacuum drying facility to investigate the sensitivity of various parameters, including canister volume, pump capacity, water surface area, and water temperature, which can exert thermohydraulic influences on residual water content. Moreover, we have conducted dimensional analysis to quantify the thermohydraulic effects of these parameters and express them as dimensionless numbers. These analytical approaches will subsequently be integrated into predictive models for residual water content, which will be further developed and validated at pilot or full-scale levels. Furthermore, our research team is actively engaged in experimental investigations aimed at fine-tuning the duration of the pressure-holding phase while optimizing the evaporation process under conditions designed to avert the formation of ice caused by abrupt temperature fluctuations. Given that the canister is constructed from acrylic material, we are able to identify, from a phenomenological perspective, the specific juncture at which the boiling phenomenon becomes manifest during the vacuum drying process.

When storing spent fuel in a dry condition, it becomes essential to ensure that any remaining moisture bound to the canister and spent fuel is effectively removed and stored within an inert gas environment. This is crucial for preserving the integrity of the spent fuel. According to the NRC- 02-07-C-006 report, it is advised to reduce pressure gradually or in incremental stages to prevent the formation of ice. In the context of vacuum drying, it is desirable to perform testing using a prototype model; however, utilizing a prototype model can be difficult due to budget constraints. To address this limitation, we designed and constructed a laboratory-scale vacuum drying apparatus. Our aim was to assess the impact of vacuum pump capacity on the drying process, as well as to evaluate the influence of canister volume on drying efficiency. The vacuum drying tests were carried out until the surface temperature of the water inside reached 0.1°C. In the tests focusing on vacuum pump capacity, vacuum pumps with capacities of 100, 200, 400, and 600 liters were employed. The outcomes of these tests indicated that smaller vacuum pump capacities resulted in increased evaporation rates but also prolonged drying times. In the case of drying tests based on canister volume, canisters with volumes of approximately 100 and 200 liters were utilized. The results revealed that larger canister volumes led to longer drying times and lower rates of evaporation. Consequently, if we were to employ an actual dry storage cask for vacuum drying the interior of the canister, it is anticipated that the process would require a substantial amount of time due to the considerably larger volume involved.

Currently, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute is conducting research on the development of technology to reduce the disposal area for SF (Spent nuclear Fuel). If the main radionuclides contained in SF can be separated and recovered according to their characteristics (long half-life, high mobility and high heat load) and uranium oxide which is expected to be the final residue, can be made into solids, the burden of the permanent disposal area of the SF will be greatly reduced. The waste form that end up in the repository must be verified for ease of manufacture and stability of the block. And, in order to increase the loading efficiency, a large block manufacturing technology is needed. This study describes the background of introducing PSA (Particle Size Analyzer) which is one of the necessary equipment for manufacturing UO2 blocks using slip casting, the method of using the equipment and performance verification of the equipment using standard samples. The particle size affects the sintering quality by the way the particles rearrange themselves during sintering. Powders of small particles are generally less free flowing and more difficult to compress, they form thin pores between the particles and sinter to higher density. In contrast, larger particle has a lower sintered density. Therefore, accurate particle size measurement and the selection of a suitable particle size are important. For this purpose, a PSA was installed in nuclear cycle experiment research center. To verify the performance of the equipment, a standard sample of 1.025 μm was analyzed. We got an average particle size of 1.0293 μm and standard deviation of 0.0668 μm. This value was within the uncertainty(±0.018 μm) of the sample’s certificate. In the future, this equipment will measure the size of UO2 (depleted uranium) powder and to produce large scale uranium oxide blocks.

Notice of the NSSC No.2021-14 defines the term ‘Neutron Absorber’ as a material with a high neutron absorption cross section, which is used to prevent criticality during nuclear fission reactions and includes neutron absorbers as target items for manufacture inspection. U.S.NRC report of the NUREG-2214 states that the subcriticality of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in Dry Storage Systems (DSSs) may be maintained, in part, by the placement of neutron absorbers, or poison plates, around the fuel assemblies. This report mentions the need for Time-Limited Aging Analysis (TLAA) on depletion of Boron (10B) in neutron absorbers for HI-STORM 100 and HISTAR 100. Also, this report mentions that 10B depletion occurs during neutron irradiation of neutron absorbers, but only 0.02% of the available 10B is to be depleted through conservative assumptions regarding the neutron flux or accumulated fluence during irradiation, which supports the continued use of the neutron absorbers in the SNF dry storage cask even after 60 years of evaluated period. There are several types of commercially available neutron absorbers, broadly classified into Boron Carbide Cermets (e.g., Boral®), Metal Matrix Composites (MMC) (e.g., METAMIC), Borated Stainless Steel (BSS), and Borated Al alloy. While irradiation tests for neutron absorbers are primarily conducted during wet storage systems, there are also some prior studies available on irradiation tests for neutron absorbers during dry storage systems. For examples, there is an analysis of previous research on high-temperature irradiation test of metallic materials and identification of limitations in existing methodologies were conducted. Furthermore, an improvement plan for simulating the high-temperature irradiation damage of neutron absorbers was developed. In report published by corrosion society summarizes the evaluation results of the degradation mechanisms for Stainless Steel- and Al-based neutron absorbers used in SNF dry storage systems.