As existing nuclear power plants reach the end of their lifespan, 22 nuclear power plants in korea are scheduled to be permanently shut down and decommissioned by 2050. Chelates are used as decontamination agents during nuclear power plant operation and decommissioning, and as a result, decommissioning waste contains chelates. Chelates contained in radioactive waste are complexed with radionuclides and increases their mobility. So, qualitative and quantitative analysis of chelates contained in radioactive waste is necessary. However, the spectroscopic method (UVVis), previously used for chelate analysis in Korea takes too much time for analysis and cannot analyze two or more chemically similar chelates at the same time. Due to these problems, new methods for analyzing chelate must be developed. Overseas, many cases of chelate analysis using advanced analysis equipment have been reported. CEA in France has developed a chelate analysis method for application to radioactive waste using HPLC-MS (J. Chromatogram. A, 1276, 20-25, 2013). In this method, the existing method of measuring EDTA using a complex of Fe and EDTA was improved to measuring a complex of Ni and EDTA. Based on such overseas cases, we would like to develop an analysis method for chelates in radioactive waste. For this purpose, we will verify similar overseas papers and develop pretreatment methods for mixtures of chelates (EDTA, DTPA, NTA) and metals (Fe, Ni, Cu, etc.) in various media. Finally, we will develop a separation analysis technology for multi-component chelates in nuclear decommissioning waste based on LCMS.

Kori Unit 1 nuclear power plant is a pressurized water reactor type with an output of 587 Mwe, which was permanently shut down on June 18, 2017. Currently, the final decommissioning plan (FDP) has been submitted and review is in progress. Once the FDP is approved, it is expected that dismantling will begin with the secondary system, and dismantling work on the primary system of Kori Unit 1 will begin after the spent nuclear fuel is taken out. It is expected that the space where the secondary system has been dismantled can be used as a temporary storage place, and the entire dismantling schedule is expected to proceed without delay. The main equipment of the secondary system is large and heavy. The rotating parts is connected to a single axis with a length of about 40 meters, and is complexly installed over three floors, making accessibility very difficult. A large pipe several kilometers long that supplies various fluids to the secondary system is installed hanging from the ceiling using a hanger between the main devices, and the outer diameter of the pipe is wrapped with insulation material to keep warm. In nuclear secondary system decommissioning, it is very important to check for radiation contamination, establish and implement countermeasures, and predict and manage safety and environmental risks that may occur when cutting and dismantling large heavy objects. So we plan to evaluate the radiation contamination characteristics of the secondary system using ISOCS (In- Situ Object Counting System) to check for possible radioactive contamination. According to the characteristics results, decommissioning plans and methods for safe dismantling by workers were studied. In addition, we conducted research on how to safely dismantle the secondary system in terms of industrial safety, such as asbestos, cutting and handling of heavy materials and so on. This study proposes a safe decommissioning method for various risks that may occur when dismantling the secondary system of Kori Unit 1 nuclear power plant.

A person who performs or plans to conduct a physical protection inspection as stipulated by the law, the act on physical protection and radiological emergency, should obtain an inspector’s ID card certified and authorized by Nuclear Safety and Security Commission Order No.137 (referred to as Order 137). In addition, according to Order 137, KINAC has been operating some training courses for those with the inspector’s ID card or intending to acquire it. Also, strenuous efforts have been put to incrementally elevate their inspection related expertise. Since Republic of Korea has to import uranium enriched less than 20% in order to manufacture fuels of nuclear reactors in domestic and abroad, the physical protection for categorization III nuclear material in transit is significantly important along with an increase in transport. The expertise of inspectors should be constantly needed to strengthen as the increase in transport leads to an increase in inspection of nuclear material in transit. We have suggested a special way to improve the inspector’s capacities through Virtual Reality technology (VR). A 3-Dimensional virtual space was designed and developed using a 3-axis simulator and VR equipment for practical training. HP’s Reverb G2 product, which was developed in collaboration with VALVE Corporation and MicroSoft, was used as VR equipment, and the 3-axis motion simulator was developed by M-line STUDIO corp. in Korea for the purpose of realizing virtual reality. The training scenarios of transport inspection consist of three parts: preparation at the shipping point, transport in route including stops and handover at the receiving point. At the departure point, scenario of the transport preparation is composed with the contents of checking the transport-related documents which should be carried by shipper and/or carrier during transport and confirming who the shipper and/or carrier is. Second, scenario is designed for inspector to experience how carrier and/or shipper protect the nuclear material during transport or stops for rests or contingency and how they communicate with each other during transport. Lastly, scenario is developed focusing on key check items during handover of responsibilities to the facility operator at the destination. Those training scenarios can be adopted to strengthen the capabilities of those with inspector’s ID card of physical protection in accordance with Order 137 and to help new inspectors acquire inspectionrelated expertise. In addition, they can be used for domestic education to promote understanding of nuclear security, or may be used for education for people overseas for the purpose of export of nuclear facilities.

The nuclide management technology for separating high-heat generating/high-mobility/long-lived nuclides from high-level wastes based on the chemical reactions is under development. In order to secure the reliability of nuclear non-proliferation and to implement the effective safeguards, it is necessary to consider the safeguards from the conceptual design phase of the novel technologies. However, there was no experience and research on safeguards for the chemical reaction based nuclide management technology. In order to development the available monitoring techniques for the safeguards of nuclide management technology, the possible diversion scenarios were developed and the material flows of major nuclear materials were analyzed according to the various diversion strategies for each unit process in this study. The diversion strategies in this study is limited to the diversion of nuclear materials according to the change of operational parameters (temperature, chemical reagents, pressures, etc). The nuclear material distribution behaviors under the abnormal conditions were analyzed and compared with normal conditions using the HSC Chemistry. The results will be used to determine the proper signals and feasible techniques to monitor the abnormal operations.

In order to enter a nuclear power plant, access approval is required in advance, and biometric information such as fingerprints of visitors must be registered when issuing a key card, and only those certified through biometric equipment can enter the nuclear facilities (Protected area II). Fingerprint recognizers and facial recognizers are installed and operated in domestic nuclear facilities for access control. Domestic nuclear facilities establish and implement a protection system in accordance with physical protection requirements under the “Act on Physical Protection and Radiological Emergency” and “Physical Protection Regulations” of each nuclear facility. Detailed implementation standards are specified in Regulation Standard (RS) documents established and distributed by KINAC. Biometrics are mentioned in a KINAC RS-104 (Access Control) document. In this study, it was analyzed what points should be considered in order to prepare for performance tests and establish plans for biometric devices. In order for the results of performance evaluation of biometric devices to obtain high reliability and to be applied to nuclear facilities in the future, standardized performance evaluation targets, procedures, standards, and environments must be created. In order to collect samples such as fingerprints for performance evaluation, the size roll of the sample shall be determined, and the appropriateness of the sample size shall be evaluated in consideration of reliability and error range. In addition, the analysis results for the characteristics (gender, age, etc.) of the sample should be presented. When collecting samples, conflicts with other laws such as personal information protection should be considered, and the reliability of the performance test result data should be analyzed and presented. Quality evaluation should also be performed on forged biometric information data such as silicon fingerprints. In addition, when establishing a performance evaluation plan, a systematic evaluation procedure should be established by referring to domestic and foreign certification and evaluation systems such as the Korea Internet & security Agency (KISA). In order to improve the completeness of the access control system using the biometrics of nuclear facilities, it is necessary to test the performance of biometric devices and to install and operate only devices that have the ability to defend against counterfeit technology. In this study, it was analyzed what points should be considered in order to prepare for performance tests and establish plans for biometric devices.

By Foreign Trade Act and the relevant laws, any organization which intends to export strategic items shall be classified whether the products, S/W, or technology are strategic items and obtain an export license from the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) in case those are nuclearrelated strategic items. The NSSC and KINAC conduct outreach activities to enhance the recognition and implementation of nuclear export and import control. However, ensuring that all target organizations identify and comply with relevant legislation and laws is difficult. Therefore, the government and regulators should continuously make efforts to reduce blind spots for nuclear export and import control. KINAC established the National Nuclear Technology Information Collection and Analysis System (NNTICAS) to find nuclear-related companies through online website information of various companies and to list organizations that handle nuclear-related strategic items. Based on the NICE corporate information website, NNTICAS finds related companies using dynamic collection methods through interactions such as search word input, search button input, check box click, and collected text from each company website using static collection methods through URL address access and HTML source code extraction. After that, the text contained on the company website is analyzed to check whether the predefined normalized word is included, and if the normalized word appears at a certain number or higher, it is judged as a potential target company dealing with nuclearrelated strategic items. Information on the potential target company is compared with the export controlled item list and finally classified as a target company dealing with nuclear-related strategic items. According to the comparison a manually analyzed result of potential target companies and finally selected target companies NNTICAS, it is confirmed that predefined normalized words need to be more detailed, and a controlled item list such as axes (0B001.b.2) needs to be additionally processed. In addition, if the collection is repeated without completing the previous classification of the collected corporate information, it is also possible to collect companies in cosmetics, semiconductors, and displays. Although it was confirmed that some supplementation is needed to use this system to select target companies for the outreach activity, it is also confirmed that target companies for outreach activity can be expanded through this system and is expected to increase the implementation rate and reduce the blind spot for nuclear export and import control.

60+ Years of nuclear power generation has led to a significant legacy of radioactively contaminated land at a number of nuclear licenced “mega sites” around the world. The safe management and remediation of these sites is key to ensuring there environmental stewardship in the long term. Bioremediation utilizes a variety of microbially mediated processes such as, enzymatically driven metal reduction or biominerialisation, to sequester radioactive contaminants from the subsurface limiting their migration through the geosphere. Additionally, some of these process can provide environmentally stable sinks for radioactive contaminants, through formation of highly insoluble mineral phases such as calcium phosphates and carbonates, which can incorporate a range of radionuclides into their structure. Bioremediation options have been considered and deployed in preference to conventional remediation techniques at a number of nuclear “mega” sites. Here, we review the applications of bioremediation technologies at three key nuclear licenced sites; Rifle and Hanford, USA and Sellafield, UK, in the remediation of radioactively contaminated land.

Currently, dismantling technology for decommissioning nuclear power plants is being developed around the world. This study describes the cutting technology and one of the technologies being considered for the RV/RVI cutting of Kori Unit 1. The dismantling technology for nuclear power plants include mechanical and thermal methods. Mechanical cutting methods include milling, drill saw, and wire cutting. The advantages of the mechanical method are less generating aerosol and less performance degradation in water. However, the cutting speed is slow and the reaction force is large. Thermal cutting methods use heat sources such as plasma arcs, oxygen, and lasers. The advantages of thermal method are fast cutting speed, low reaction force and thick material cutting. On the other hand, they have problems with fume and melt. Among them, the cutability of the oxygen cutting method is better in carbon steel than in stainless steel. In order to cut the RV/RVI of the Kori Unit 1, the applicability of fine plasma, arc saw, and band/ wheel saw is being reviewed. For RV cutting, the applicability of arc saw and oxy-propane is being considered Because RV is mostly made of carbon steel. However, since the flange is cladded with stainless steel, the use of mechanical methods such as wire saws should be considered. In the case of RVI, since it has a complicated shape and is made of stainless steel, it seems necessary to review various cutting methods. In addition, it will be necessary to minimize radiation exposure of workers by cutting underwater cutting.

The decommissioning of nuclear power plant (NPP) generates large amount of waste. Since the most of the concretes are slightly surface contaminated, the accurate characterization and regionspecific surface decontamination are important for the efficient waste management. After the effective surface decontamination and separation, most of the concrete waste from decommissioning of NPP can be classified as a clearance waste. Various surface characterization and decontamination technologies are suggested. The mechanical technologies are simple and offers direct application. The laser-based technologies offer efficient separation and surface contamination. The high price, however, hesitates the application of the process. The nitro-jet technology, which is based on the evaporation of liquid nitrogen, allows the effective decontamination. However, the high price and uncertainty of large are application hinders the practical application in NPP decommissioning. In this paper, various technologies for characterization, handling, treatment, etc., will be discussed. The advantages and disadvantages of the technologies will be discussed, in terms of practical applications.

The License on Technology Export of Nuclear Plant is a system that permits the export of strategic technologies for large-scale NPP projects collectively during the project period. So, an issuance of the export license could be omitted for each transfer of technology, but Post Strategic Items Confirmation must be performed before the transfer as a follow-up obligation. Sometimes, transfers of technology have been urgently required during the project. As Post Strategic Items Confirmation process takes up to 15 working days, it may be difficult to respond to urgent situations timely, which may cause setbacks on the project. Therefore, Urgent Technology Transfer System, which allows to transfer technology without prior Post Strategic Items Confirmation, was established to reduce a burden on licensee and improve the efficiency of regulation. This system applies only to the License on Technology Export of Nuclear Plant. In other words, the technology transferred through Urgent Technology Transfer System (hereinafter referred as Urgent Transfer Technology) does not pose any problem with regard to export control because it is already licensed. In addition, the Urgent Transfer Technology should be considered as a strategic technology until Post Strategic Items Confirmation, which means that the Urgent Transfer Technology is more strictly controlled than the generally transferred technology. Also, the Urgent Technology Transfer System does not apply to intangible technology transfers such as technical support through personnel dispatch. The system could be only used in specific conditions which are stipulated for each licensed project in advance in order to prevent indiscriminate abuse of the system by licensee. Licensees are required to report quarterly the stipulated condition corresponding to each Urgent Technology Transfer case, and it would be checked through post-site inspection whether the actual reason for the transfer meets the consulted condition. Moreover, the deadline of application on Post Strategic Items Confirmation after the Urgent Technology Transfer is stipulated for licensee so as not to omit the classification procedure. This Urgent Technology Transfer System does not apply to dual-use items. If the Urgent Transfer Technology is classified as a non-Trigger List Item through the Post Strategic Items Confirmation, it is outside the scope of the NSSC’s export license. In this case, the technology may be subject to an export license of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE). However, if the technology is classified to be a dual-use item after Urgent Technology Transfer, it may result in unauthorized transfer because it has already been transferred. Licensee must apply to classification of MOTIE before Urgent Technology Transfer if the technology being transferred may be related with Dual-use Items. It is easy for licensee to overlook due to the low awareness about this system. Therefore, outreach activities are necessary to raise licensee’s awareness by explaining the Urgent Technology Transfer System and current issues in detail. Consultation with MOTIE may be needed for the improvement on issues.

This paper presents a strategic adoption model for blockchain technology in nuclear nonproliferation by analysing the implementation of legally binding agreements and leveraging results from governmentleading sectors. Blockchain has been emerging as not only a single promising technology but a foundational one which can be combined with diverse sectors. From the national point of view, it is imperative that the government formulates policy for fostering blockchain-related industries, thereby, gaining a competitive advantage at the national level. Accordingly, the Korean government has established the Blockchain Technology Development and Diffusion Strategies in 2018 and 2020, respectively, to verify the technology by supporting pilot projects for apposite industries, such as customs clearance, transhipment of containers, record-keeping of meat processing, and smart contracts. In addition, the strategies announce to support liaison with regulatory sandbox and cooperation between the projects. Internationally, on the other hand, nuclear nonproliferation imposes the duties of verifying that member states under the NPT and the Safeguards Agreement obey the IAEA mandate, “Atoms for Peace and Development”. Similarly, bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements and administrative arrangements specify reporting obligations for the origin and history records of the Trigger List items. Meanwhile, commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential information of any entities involved have to be securely protected. Provided accompanying activities accomplish the integrity of records and mutual transparency, it brings more credibility, and further, the competitiveness of the state’s nuclear industry. In conclusion, the tasks that the Republic of Korea implements as an exemplary country complying with the nuclear nonproliferation regime have many similarities with the pilot projects that have been or are being carried out under national strategies for fostering blockchain technology elsewhere. This implies that the leveraging of the subsets can derive a new competitive model in blockchain adoption that contributes to the competitiveness of the national nuclear industry due to the advanced nuclear regulations.

In decommissioning a nuclear power plant, numerous concrete structures need to be demolished and decontaminated. Although concrete decontamination technologies have been developed globally, concrete cutting remains problematic due to the secondary waste production and dispersion risk from concrete scabbling. To minimize workers’ radiation exposure and secondary waste in dismantling and decontaminating concrete structures, the following conceptual designs were developed. A micro-blast type scabbling technology using explosive materials and a multi-dimensional contamination measurement and artificial intelligence (AI) mapping technology capable of identifying the contamination status of concrete surfaces. Trials revealed that this technology has several merits, including nuclide identification of more than 5 nuclides, radioactivity measurement capability of 0.1–107 Bq·g−1, 1.5 kg robot weight for easy handling, 10 cm robot self-running capability, 100% detonator performance, decontamination factor (DF) of 100 and 8,000 cm2·hr−1 decontamination speed, better than that of TWI (7,500 cm2·hr−1). Hence, the micro-blast type scabbling technology is a suitable method for concrete decontamination. As the Korean explosives industry is well developed and robot and mapping systems are supported by government research and development, this scabbling technology can efficiently aid the Korean decommissioning industry.